If economists are to participate in the policy process, they must combine analytical skill with an understanding of the political process. Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government is a highly acclaimed new book by Jonathan Rauch that suggests that many interpretations of the political process are flawed. Using concepts borrowed from Mancur Olson (Olson 1965, 1982), Rauch seeks to show that interest groups form and multiply to capture rents from the political process. Interest groups, asserts Rauch, have multiplied in both number and effectiveness to the point that they literally clog the arteries of government. Thus, demosclerosis-defined by Rauch as the progressive loss of government's ability to adapt (p. 123)-is the political equivalent of arteriosclerosis. Both are silent killers. Olson (1982) argued that political stability nurtures the development of special interest groups that eventually reduce the efficiency of the market economy and the rate of economic growth. Rauch uses the same arguments to assert that American government is increasingly immobilized by a hyperpluralism of conflicting demands among the public. In Demosclerosis, Rauch argues that, once established, government programs prove difficult or impossible to terminate: is scarcely an exaggeration to say that, in Washington, every program lasts forever (Rauch, p. 132, italics in original). As a result, flexible government funds are nonexistent, and there are few resources for existing or new programs. Meaningful, fundamental changes of policy are almost impossible. It will come as no surprise to note that Rauch (and Olson) used agricultural policy as a prime example of this thesis. While popular criticisms of the federal political process include the accusation that politicians are unresponsive to their constituents, Rauch argues that the problem is precisely the reverse. Government is too responsive, too democratic. That is, as Congress increasingly engages in constituency politics as opposed to representative politics (Stark), it is inundated with lobbying pressure enhanced by electronic faxes, e-mail messages, published public polls, 800-number phone calls, and call-in shows. Responsiveness to these constituent demands raises the economic return to lobbying and encourages yet more groups with more (and more narrowly defined) demands. As evidence of the validity of his thesis, Rauch notes the phenomenal growth in the interest group industry and the public's demand for the services supplied by interest groups (Rauch, pp. 11, 55-58). Despite the public's protestations that interest groups somehow exist separate from voters, surveys indicate that seven of ten Americans Sandra S. Batie is the Elton R. Smith Professor in food and agricultural policy, and David B. Schweikhardt is associate professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics, both at Michigan State University.