Conscious Recollection Research Articles

Poems of the (un)conscious: a narrative approach to dream analysis

ABSTRACT As a narrative therapist with an interest in psychoanalytic dream analysis, I have troubled myself for quite some time thinking of ways that dream-work can be introduced to my practice through the erudition of the narrative metaphor. However, in implying that the primary constituents of our thoughts and behaviours are not available to our conscious recollection and that they require an ‘expert’ to decipher their meanings, the psychoanalytic metaphor of the ‘unconscious’ and it’s corresponding treatment of the dream poses particular challenges to the de-centered posture of the narrative therapist. In this piece I thereby recruit Derrida’s ideas of the ‘poem’ and his treatment of the ‘unconscious’ to theorize a post-structuralist approach to dream work that can harmonize with the ethics of narrative practice. Becoming of this exploration is a ‘map’ of dream analysis that supports therapists to approach dream life from the position of the bricoleur: a posture that values clients as the author of the dreams possibilities.

Bio-inspired cognitive architecture of episodic memory

Memory and learning are essential functions in human beings as they allow us to acquire and store in the brain representations of thoughts, experiences, and behaviors, which are required for problem-solving in our daily life and mainly for survival. Episodic memory is a type of memory that provides the ability to re-experience events in one’s life, and it is associated with their conscious recollection. Since episodic memory can represent our experiences about the environment, similar to a mental journey, it is desired in systems that attempt to create human-like behavior. Currently, the main problem is that state of the art proposals do not consider neuroscientific evidence like memory dynamics for forgetting or bottom-up inputs, and most of them do not consider episodic memory as a different memory but as part of general declarative memory. We consider these omissions to limit the generation of human-like behavior. In this work, we propose a bio-inspired cognitive architecture of episodic memory. Neuroscientific evidence provides us with the brain structures associated with this type of memory, the connections, and the operations these areas perform. We hypothesize that virtual entities endowed with our episodic memory cognitive architecture will plan and make decisions in a more human-like fashion. To test the capabilities of the proposal, we endowed a virtual creature with a distributed and concurrent implementation of our architecture, and it was given two tasks. The first task validated the functions of the memory independently, and in the second task, the creature used episodic memory to solve a planning problem. From the results of these experiments, we validate our proposal and show that it is possible to create a system that behaves as the human brain does.

Autobiographical memory impairment in chronic schizophrenia: Significance and clinical correlates.

Previous studies of autobiographical memory (AM) in schizophrenia yielded a reduction of specificity, richness of details and conscious recollection, which indicate both, quantitative and qualitative AM changes. However, their associations with psychopathological symptoms and neuropsychological deficits were not resolved. Therefore, we sought to investigate AM with respect to psychopathology and neuropsychology in patients with chronic schizophrenia to rule out the influence of different courses of the disease. AM of four lifetime periods was examined in 75 patients and 50 healthy controls by using a semi-structured interview. The recalled episodes were rated for memory specificity. Subsequently, one single event of each period of life was rated for details and experiential aspects of reliving (originality, vividness/visual imagery, emotional re-experiencing and emotional valence). When contrasted with healthy controls, patients recalled a significantly reduced number of episodes and personal semantic facts; moreover, memory specificity of AM was significantly lower in patients than controls. While the richness of details calculated for single events showed only minor, non-significant group differences, vividness and emotional re-experiencing were significantly less pronounced in the patient group. Along with this, AM performance correlated significantly with negative symptoms including apathy as well as verbal memory and executive functions. Our results underline the significance of overgenerality as a key feature of AM in schizophrenia as well as a dissociation between intact number of details of single events and reduced vividness and emotional re-experiencing. The extent of negative symptoms including apathy and impairments of verbal memory/executive functions may explain AM deficits in chronic schizophrenia.

Remembering objects

Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve ‘episodically’ recalling experienced events in one’s personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being about events in which they featured)? This question has broad implications, not least for understanding the nature and role of imagery in remembering, the requirements of memory-based singular thought about objects, and the sense in which remembering involves ‘mental time travel’ through which one ‘relives’ past events. In this paper, I argue that we sometimes do recall objects from our past without remembering events in which they featured. The positive view of such cases I go on to propose draws on a wide body of empirical work in its support and accommodates a more nuanced picture of the role of imagery in remembering. Succinctly, remembering might essentially involve a kind of ‘re-experiencing’, but it need not involve ‘reliving’.

Episodic-like memory in common bottlenose dolphins

Episodic memory involves the conscious recollection of personally experienced events, which has often been argued to be a uniquely human ability.1-5 However, evidence for conscious episodic recall in humans is centered around language-based reports. With no agreed upon non-linguistic behavioral makers of consciousness,6 episodic-like memory7 therefore represents the behavioral characteristics of human episodic memory, in the absence of evidence for subjective experience during recall. Here, we provide compelling evidence for episodic-like memory in common bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), based on the incidental encoding and unexpected question paradigm.8 This methodology aims to capture the incidental encoding characteristic of human episodic memory, in that when we recall an experience, we remember information that was trivial at the time of encoding, but was encoded automatically.9 We show that dolphins are able to use incidentally encoded spatial ("where") and social ("who") information to solve an unexpected memory task, using only a single test trial per test type, which ensured that the dolphins did not have the opportunity to semantically learn "rules" to pass the test. All participating dolphins made correct choices in both the "where" and "who" tests. These results suggest that dolphins are capable of encoding, recalling, and accessing incidental information within remembered events, which is an ability indicative of episodic memory in humans. We argue that the complex socio-ecological background of dolphins may have selected for the ability to recall both spatial and social information in an episodic-like manner.

Quantifying the roles of conscious and unconscious processing in insight-related memory effectiveness within standard and creative advertising.

To maximize marketing effectiveness, many conscious and unconscious elements are simultaneously employed within campaign advertising. However, little is known about the individual contributions that conscious and unconscious processes make to the cognitive effectiveness of creative advertisements, some of which may also induce insight experiences. To quantify the roles of conscious and unconscious processes in memory effectiveness within commercial advertising, a dual-process, signal-detection technique was adopted to separate the contributions of conscious recollection and unconscious discrimination induced by 80 printed advertisements, among which half were considered standard and the other half creative. A total of 51 participants completed immediate (5min later) and delayed (3days later) memory recognition tests. In contrast to standard advertising, creative advertising was found to enhance recognition and to demonstrate advantages in both conscious and unconscious memory, which decreased across the test-time intervals. Further analyses showed that a moment of insight induced by an advertisement, regardless of whether it is standard or creative, can consolidate unconscious memory, whereas advertisements that do not induce insight improve conscious memory. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Special Attention to the Self: a Mechanistic Model of Patient RB’s Lost Feeling of Ownership

Patient RB has a peculiar memory impairment wherein he experiences his memories in rich contextual detail, but claims to not own them. His memories do not feel as if they happened to him. In this paper, I provide an explanatory model of RB’s phenomenology, the self-attentional model. I draw upon recent work in neuroscience on self-attentional processing and global workspace models of conscious recollection to show that RB has a self-attentional deficit that inhibits self-bias processes in broadcasting the contents of episodic memories to the global workspace. Typically, self-related contents enjoy a higher salience level than other-related contents. Elimination of bias toward self-related contents diminishes the salience of those contents to the level of other-related contents. Because the typical high salience of self-related content is necessary for the feeling of ownership, RB lacks the feeling of ownership. I also discuss potential applications of the self-attentional model to other psychopathological cases.

Hippocampal ripples and their coordinated dialogue with the default mode network during recent and remote recollection

Hippocampal ripples are prominent synchronization events generated by hippocampal neuronal assemblies. To date, ripples have been primarily associated with navigational memory in rodents and short-term episodic recollections in humans. Here, we uncover different profiles of ripple activity in the human hippocampus during the retrieval of recent and remote autobiographical events and semantic facts. We found that the ripple rate increased significantly before reported recall compared to control conditions. Patterns of ripple activity across multiple hippocampal sites demonstrated remarkable specificity for memory type. Intriguingly, these ripple patterns revealed a semantization dimension, in which patterns associated with autobiographical contents become similar to those of semantic memory as a function of memory age. Finally, widely distributed sites across the neocortex exhibited ripple-coupled activations during recollection, with the strongest activation found within the default mode network. Our results thus reveal a key role for hippocampal ripples in orchestrating hippocampal-cortical communication across large-scale networks involved in conscious recollection.

Autobiographical memory in schizophrenia: The role of metacognition

BackgroundAutobiographical memory is an important component of declarative memory, which refers to the ability to recall personal events that happened in the past. This requires that the person senses or experiences himself/herself in the past (i.e., conscious recollection). For people with schizophrenia, conscious recollection can be particularly difficult, resulting in difficulty accessing detailed, specific autobiographical information. Our hypothesis is that the ability to monitor and think about one's cognitive processes (metacognition) is a requisite for conscious recollection, and that it mediates the association between having schizophrenia and recalling fewer specific, personal memories. MethodsParticipants were 30 adults with schizophrenia and 30 matched healthy controls. The main assessment instruments were the Metacognition Assessment Scale-Abbreviated (MAS-A) and the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT). Severity of symptoms was assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) for schizophrenia. Cognitive performance was measured with the Screen for Cognitive Impairment in Psychiatry (SCIP). Mediation analysis was conducted following Baron and Kenny's procedure. ResultsPeople with schizophrenia had more semantic associations and fewer specific memories than controls in the AMT. Metacognition (MAS-A total score) partially mediated the association between having schizophrenia and recalling fewer specific past events, even after controlling for cognitive impairment as a potential confounding source. ConclusionsMetacognitive ability, which can be improved with available programs, intervenes in the process of accessing autobiographical memories in people with schizophrenia. Practical implications of this finding are discussed.

Recognition in Posthypnotic Amnesia, Revisited

ABSTRACT Three experiments studied recognition during posthypnotic amnesia (PHA) employing confidence ratings rather than the traditional yes/no format. As the criterion for recognition was loosened, an increase in hits was accompanied by an increase in false alarms, especially to distractor items that were conceptually related to, or semantically associated with, targets. Nevertheless, hits exceeded false alarms at every level of confidence. In addition, amnesic subjects had difficulty identifying the particular list on which recognized items were presented for study or the correct order in which targets appeared on the study list. Taken together, these findings support the conclusion that successful recognition during PHA is more likely to be mediated by a priming-based feeling familiarity than conscious recollection.

The spatial distribution of attention predicts familiarity strength during encoding and retrieval.

The memories we form are determined by what we attend to, and conversely, what we attend to is influenced by our memory for past experiences. Although we know that shifts of attention via eye movements are related to memory during encoding and retrieval, the role of specific memory processes in this relationship is unclear. There is evidence that attention may be especially important for some forms of memory (i.e., conscious recollection), and less so for others (i.e., familiarity-based recognition and unconscious influences of memory), but results are conflicting with respect to both the memory processes and eye movement patterns involved. To address this, we used a confidence-based method of isolating eye movement indices of spatial attention that are related to different memory processes (i.e., recollection, familiarity strength, and unconscious memory) during encoding and retrieval of real-world scenes. We also developed a new method of measuring the dispersion of eye movements, which proved to be more sensitive to memory processing than previously used measures. Specifically, in 2 studies, we found that familiarity strength-that is, changes in subjective reports of memory confidence-increased with (a) more dispersed patterns of viewing during encoding, (b) less dispersed viewing during retrieval, and (c) greater overlap in regions viewed between encoding and retrieval (i.e., resampling). Recollection was also related to these eye movements in a similar manner, though the associations with recollection were less consistent across experiments. Furthermore, we found no evidence for effects related to unconscious influences of memory. These findings indicate that attentional processes during viewing may not preferentially relate to recollection, and that the spatial distribution of eye movements is directly related to familiarity-based memory during encoding and retrieval. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The influence of alexithymia on memory for emotional faces and realistic social interactions

ABSTRACT High levels of alexithymia are typically associated with impaired memory for emotional, but not neutral words. We conducted two experimental studies to establish if this effect generalises to non-verbal socially relevant stimuli. Thirty-nine female undergraduates (Study 1) viewed faces with different expressions (neutral, angry, happy or sad) and 38 female students (Study 2) viewed videos of realistic social interactions (featuring anger, happiness, sadness or neutral affect). Participants were asked to identify the emotion portrayed and were subsequently given an intentional recognition memory test for the stimuli. They also completed self-report measures of alexithymia and mood (depression & anxiety). In Study 1, memory for emotional (especially angry), but not neutral faces was negatively related to the “difficulty describing feelings” facet of alexithymia. In Study 2, memory for emotional (particularly those featuring anger), but not neutral videos was negatively related to the “difficulty identifying feelings” and “externally oriented thinking” facets of alexithymia. In both studies, these memory deficits were independent of the effects of age and mood. Furthermore, the deficits appear to be most evident in the conscious recollection of the emotional stimuli. Our findings confirm that the memory deficit for emotional words in alexithymia generalises to important non-verbal socially relevant stimuli.

Motivated forgetting increases the recall time of learnt items: Behavioral and event related potential evidence

We investigated modulation of the recall time in a motivated forgetting (MF) paradigm and the neural manifestation of it through event related potential (ERP) analysis. We studied whether compared to failed attempts in suppression, partial success can potentiate control mechanisms and this might manifest, neurally as modulation of ERP components related to conscious recollection, and behaviorally as delayed recall of learnt items. We employed a modified version of the Think\\No-Think paradigm with dominant number of No-Think words (cued to forget). We defined a forgetting index as FI = Final Recall Time-Initial Recall Time. The MF trials were separated into three conditions according to their corresponding FI; Forget, Delayed Recall, and Recall conditions. The findings revealed significant late ERP effects in terms of a late parietal positivity (LPP), modulated by the item condition, that appeared to reflect the consequence of conscious suppression on actual retrieval of stored memory. Over the same topographic location, FI was negatively correlated with the LPP amplitude, demonstrating the consequence of inhibition processing during MF in modulating the recall time. The negative correlation between LPP and FI provides evidence that increased recall time due to MF is also related to reduced activity, probably in the hippocampal-parietal network, corresponding to recollection of suppressed memories.

Varieties of recollective experience

Four variants on Tulving's “Remember/Know” paradigm supported a tripartite classification of recollective experience in recognition memory into Remembering (as in conscious recollection of a past episode), Knowing (similar to retrieval from semantic memory), and Feeling (a priming-based judgment of familiarity). Recognition-by-knowing and recognition-by-feeling are differentiated by level of processing at the time of encoding (Experiments 1–3), shifts in the criterion for item recognition (Experiment 2), response latencies (Experiments 1–3), and changes in the response window (Experiment 3). False recognition is often accompanied by “feeling”, but rarely by “knowing”; d’ is higher for knowing than for feeling (Experiments 1–4). Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional study trials, while recognition-by-feeling falls to zero (Experiment 4). In these ways, recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional Remember/Know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering can be distinguished from recognition-without-remembering. Implications are discussed for dual-process theories of memory, and the search for the neural substrates of memory retrieval.

A Naturalistic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

Following a brief review of current efforts to identify the neuronal correlates of conscious processing (NCCP) an attempt is made to bridge the gap between the material neuronal processes and the immaterial dimensions of subjective experience. It is argued that this “hard problem” of consciousness research cannot be solved by only considering the neuronal underpinnings of cognition. The proposal is that the hard problem can be treated within a naturalistic framework if one considers not only the biological but also the socio-cultural dimensions of evolution. The argument is based on the following premises: perceptions are the result of a constructivist process that depends on priors. This applies both for perceptions of the outer world and the perception of oneself. Social interactions between agents endowed with the cognitive abilities of humans generated immaterial realities, addressed as social or cultural realities. This novel class of realities assumed the role of priors for the perception of oneself and the embedding world. A natural consequence of these extended perceptions is a dualist classification of observables into material and immaterial phenomena nurturing the concept of ontological substance dualism. It is argued that perceptions shaped by socio-cultural priors lead to the construction of a self-model that has both a material and an immaterial dimension. As priors are implicit and not amenable to conscious recollection the perceived immaterial dimension is experienced as veridical and not derivable from material processes—which is the hallmark of the hard problem. These considerations let the hard problem appear as the result of cognitive constructs that are amenable to naturalistic explanations in an evolutionary framework.

Posterior Hippocampal Spindle Ripples Co-occur with Neocortical Theta Bursts and Downstates-Upstates, and Phase-Lock with Parietal Spindles during NREM Sleep in Humans.

Human anterior and posterior hippocampus (aHC, pHC) differ in connectivity and behavioral correlates. Here we report physiological differences in humans of both sexes. During NREM sleep, the human hippocampus generates sharpwave ripples (SWRs) similar to those which in rodents mark memory replay. We show that while pHC generates SWRs, it also generates approximately as many spindle ripples (SSR: ripples phase-locked to local spindles). In contrast, SSRs are rare in aHC. Like SWRs, SSRs often co-occur with neocortical theta bursts (TBs), downstates (DSs), sleep spindles (SSs), and upstates (USs), which coordinate cortico-hippocampal interactions and facilitate consolidation in rodents. SWRs co-occur with these waves in widespread cortical areas, especially frontocentral. These waves typically occur in the sequence TB-DS-SS-US, with SWRs usually occurring before SS-US. In contrast, SSRs occur ∼350 ms later, with a strong preference for co-occurrence with posterior-parietal SSs. pHC-SSs were strongly phase-locked with parietal-SSs, and pHC-SSRs were phase-coupled with pHC-SSs and parietal-SSs. Human SWRs (and associated replay events, if any) are separated by ∼5 s on average, whereas ripples on successive SSR peaks are separated by only ∼80 ms. These distinctive physiological properties of pHC-SSR enable an alternative mechanism for hippocampal engagement with neocortex.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Rodent hippocampal neurons replay waking events during sharpwave ripples (SWRs) in NREM sleep, facilitating memory transfer to a permanent cortical store. We show that human anterior hippocampus also produces SWRs, but spindle ripples predominate in posterior. Whereas SWRs typically occur as cortex emerges from inactivity, spindle ripples typically occur at peak cortical activity. Furthermore, posterior hippocampal spindle ripples are tightly coupled to posterior parietal locations activated by conscious recollection. Finally, multiple spindle ripples can recur within a second, whereas SWRs are separated by ∼5 s. The human posterior hippocampus is considered homologous to rodent dorsal hippocampus, which is thought to be specialized for consolidation of specific memory details. We speculate that these distinct physiological characteristics of posterior hippocampal spindle ripples may support a related function in humans.

Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor Val66Met Polymorphism Is Associated With a Reduced ERP Component Indexing Emotional Recollection.

The Met allele of the brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) Val66Met polymorphism is associated with reduced functioning of the amygdala and hippocampus. It has been linked to major psychiatric conditions, including depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, and is associated with deficits in episodic memory. The precise mechanisms of the BDNF gene’s influence on emotional memory are not well characterized, especially its impact on recognition. Two electrophysiological experiments of emotional memory were run on two independent samples genotyped for BDNF Val66Met. Event-related potentials (ERPs) corresponding to the recognition of negative and neutral words (Experiment 1, N = 37) and negative and positive words (Experiment 2, N = 23) were recorded, and the late parietal component (LPC), typically associated with conscious recollection, was analyzed. In Experiment 1, a reduced LPC was observed in Met carriers (N = 12) compared to Val homozygotes (N = 25) in the negative condition, but the group difference was not present in the neutral condition. In Experiment 2, the reduced LPC was seen in Met carriers (N = 12) compared to Val homozygotes (N = 11) across both conditions. This study provides the first evidence of an association between the BDNF Val66Met genotype and the late parietal electrophysiological component, suggesting that the conscious experience of emotional recollection may differ according to BDNF Val66Met genotype. Further, these results suggest that this effect is likely due to emotional arousal rather than valence polarity. Results were discussed with reference to the possible mechanisms by which emotional recollection deficits may contribute to psychopathology.

Conscious and unconscious memory differentially impact attention: Eye movements, visual search, and recognition processes

A hotly debated question is whether memory influences attention through conscious or unconscious processes. To address this controversy, we measured eye movements while participants searched repeated real-world scenes for embedded targets, and we assessed memory for each scene using confidence-based methods to isolate different states of subjective memory awareness. We found that memory-informed eye movements during visual search were predicted both by conscious recollection, which led to a highly precise first eye movement toward the remembered location, and by unconscious memory, which increased search efficiency by gradually directing the eyes toward the target throughout the search trial. In contrast, these eye movement measures were not influenced by familiarity-based memory (i.e., changes in subjective reports of memory strength). The results indicate that conscious recollection and unconscious memory can each play distinct and complementary roles in guiding attention to facilitate efficient extraction of visual information.

Electroencephalogram Evidence for Memory Suppression: A Systematic Review

Abstract Understanding how people forget is one of the fundamental goals of the science of memory. Recent studies indicate that humans can voluntarily regulate awareness of unwanted memories by stopping the retrieval process that would ordinarily bring past experience into awareness. Event-related potential (ERP) research on memory retrieval reveals that electrophysiological effects with specific timing and scalp topography serve as markers of memory processes. This systematic review examines the literature regarding EEG alterations in memory suppression, highlighting their results on electrophysiological indicators. A systematic review from January 2007 to November 2017 was conducted using PubMed, Embase and ScienceDirect databases. As results, 12 studies were eligible for inclusion. Quantitative EEG can be a objective tool for studying the mechanisms involved in memory suppression. There is evidence that a parietal positivity around 400-800ms after cue presentation is an ERP marker of conscious recollection during memory retrieval and a larger N2 deflection during retrieval suppression predicted greater suppression-induced forgetting.

The Think/No-Think Alcohol Task: A New Paradigm for Assessing Memory Suppression in Alcohol-Related Contexts.

Research with the Think/No-Think (TNT) task has shown that voluntary suppression of an unwanted memory may lead to its later forgetting. To date, however, no study has assessed the memory suppression abilities in alcohol-related contexts despite the potential implications that it might have for alcohol research. With this aim, we developed a new version of the TNT paradigm, the TNT Alcohol (TNTA) task, which consists of 36 neutral pictures paired with 36 alcohol/no-alcohol images that are instructed to be suppressed or recollected. Electroencephalographic activity was recorded from 64 electrodes while 20 young healthy females performed the TNTA task. The event-related potentials (ERPs) typically involved in memory suppression/recollection were analyzed, namely the fronto-central N2, the late parietal positivity (LPP), and the frontal slow wave (FSW). Findings revealed reduced recall for previously learned images that were subsequently instructed to be suppressed (No-Think) relative to those instructed to be retrieved (Think) and those not cued to be suppressed or retrieved (Baseline). This reduction seemed to be more prominent for alcohol-related memories. In addition, ERP analysis showed that compared to attempts of recollection, attempts of memory suppression were associated with attenuated LPP amplitude-more pronounced for alcohol-related memories-(indicating reduced conscious recollection for No-Think images) as well as with increased FSW (suggesting strategic control aiming at decrease accessibility of unwanted memories). These results replicate and extend previously reported behavioral and ERP findings in the TNT paradigm and suggest that the TNTA task may be a useful instrument to measure the ability to suppress alcohol-related memories.