Conscious Reasoning Research Articles

How to make up your mind

AbstractThis paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence. By doing this for different pieces of evidence, you begin to make your up mind, making conscious reasoning, as such, a voluntary activity with an involuntary conclusion. The paper then explains how we use conscious reasoning in reflection not just to form and change committed beliefs, but to become aware of existing ones. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the limitations of conscious reasoning require us to maintain committed beliefs in a system. It is our maintenance of this system that allows us to knit together individual episodes of conscious reasoning into one enduring performance as a committed systematic believer.

Neural perspectives on morality due to beguiling mechanisms.

We consider deception an example of behavior that challenges traditional explanations of moral behavior. Beguiling mechanisms, by which we mean deceptiveness with charming seduction for diversion, subtly influence moral sensitivity and judgment in moral dilemma situations. The duality of beguiling mechanisms is important to grasp, including how they relate to the ambiguity of situations. Further, we view moral behavior as quasi-adaptive, affectively based, and reliant on the processes of social cognition, arising out of a set of domain-general primitive predispositions that aggregate to produce moral "mindsets" and increasingly complex moral actions. Building on recent theoretical developments, contend that morality involves a complex heterarchical-hierarchical neurological architecture, where activity is dynamically and contextually dependent, as well as dependent on evolved brain structures and early life year socialization. We contribute to conceptualizing moral behavior from an integrated modern neural perspective. This provides a balance between moral decisions as situational, emotional, and genetically completed non-conscious processes, and the more traditional view of conscious reasoning. Beguiling mechanisms illustrate an integrative model of morality, consistent with emerging insights from affective and cognitive neuroscience.

Moral conflict in a (post)war story: Narrative as enactment of and reflection on moral injury

AbstractThis article examines the discursive construction of moral conflict in a military veteran's (post)war story. By closely examining the linguistic details of a single veteran's narrative of war, this article addresses how moral conflict is revealed in shifts among varying modes of morality: from the conventional moral dispositions of the military, in which soldiers are socialized into acting, often violently and without reflection, to conscious ethical reasoning, which soldiers have historically been socialized not to engage in. The analysis of this veteran's narrative, informed by ethnographic research on veterans’ experiences of combat and return after deployment, outlines how structural and linguistic components of the narrative engage shifting modes of moral experience. As such, the article provides a critical discussion of moral injury, as well as a potential model for the study of language and morality.

Artificial Consciousness: Misconception(s) of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Nobody Wants

The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has produced prophets and prophecies announcing that the age of artificial consciousness is near. Not only does the mere idea that any machine could ever possess the full potential of human consciousness suggest that AI could replace the role of God in the future, it also puts into question the fundamental human right to freedom and dignity. This position paper takes the stand that, in the light of all we currently know about brain evolution and the never-stopping formation of adaptive neural circuitry for learning, memory, decision making and, ultimately, fully conscious reasoning and creativity in the human species, the idea of an artificial consciousness appears misconceived. The paper highlights some of the major reasons why. While awareness to external stimuli for processes such as perception, recognition, and operational problem solving is under the direct control of functionally specific brain networks associated with sensory and cognitive functions across animal species, consciousness is a unique property of the human mind. Potentiated by brain evolution, consciousness has come to be when humans became able to represent, and reflect on, the Self in relation to past, present and future, and to project these representations into possible worlds by drawing and other forms of conceptual and creative expression. Epigenetically determined, shaped by experience, capable of representing real and non-real world states, consciousness is enabled by context-dependent adaptive brain circuits that have evolved on the grounds of self-organizing functional interactions at different levels of integration in a from-local-to global functional brain design. The evolution of the latter being continuous, the limits of consciousness are unpredictable. If cracking the computational code to human consciousness were possible, the resulting algorithms would have to be able to generate temporal activity patterns simulating long-distance signal reverberation across the brain and the de-correlation of spatial signal contents from their temporal signatures. In the light of scientific evidence for complex interactions between implicit (non-conscious) and explicit (conscious) representations in learning, memory, and the construction of conscious representation, the code would have to be capable of making all implicit processing explicit. Algorithms would have to be capable of a progressive, less and less arbitrary selection of temporal activity patterns in a continuously developing neural network structure akin to that of the human brain, from synapses to higher cognitive functional integration. The code would have to possess the self-organizing capacities that generate the brain signatures of phenomenal consciousness. In the biological brain, consolidation or extinction of these temporal brain signatures is driven by external event probabilities according to the principles of Hebbian learning. Consciousness is constantly fed by such learning, capable of generating stable representations despite an incommensurable amount of variability in input data, across time and across individuals, for life-long integration of experience data. Artificial consciousness would require probabilistic adaptive computations capable of emulating all the dynamics of human learning and memory that enable human intelligence and creativity. No AI is likely to ever have such potential.

Motives for driving after cannabis use: A scoping review

ContextUnderstanding the motives for driving after cannabis use (DACU) is crucial to improve road safety and develop effective prevention programs to reduce this behavior. ObjectiveTo synthesize and categorize motives for DACU reported in the scientific literature, using the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) as a basis for motive classification and conceptualization. MethodThis scoping review followed the methodological guidelines proposed by Arksey and O’Malley (2005), Levac et al. (2010) and the PRISMA Extension for Scoping Reviews (Tricco et al., 2018). The algorithms used to extract relevant information about the motives for DACU in the scientific literature were designed for Medline, Embase, Web of Science, and PsycINFO search engines. To be included in the review, articles had to describe motives for cannabis use as the main substance used before driving a non-commercial road motor vehicle. Any psychological justification or conscious reason was considered as a motive. A total of 30 articles were selected. A descriptive quantitative analysis and a thematic qualitative analysis were used to synthesize the results. ResultsThe studies mainly originated from the USA (k = 14), Canada (k = 6), Australia (k = 6), the UK (k = 3) and Spain (k = 1). Thirty-two motives for DACU have been classified into six themes: (1) general risk perception; (2) driving is seen as the only possible option; (3) low risk given the road or traffic conditions; (4) risk-seeking; (5) possibility to compensate for the effect of cannabis and (6) subjective norms (i.e., perception if DACU is approved or committed by others). Risk perception was by far the most frequently reported motive. ImplicationsPrevention programs could greatly benefit from a better understanding of the motives for DACU. Increasing risk awareness appears to be one of the main objectives in addition to providing efficient alternative means of transport and development of prevention initiatives tailored for cannabis users.

Moral Intuitions About Stigmatizing Practices and Feeding Stigmatizing Practices: How Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory Relates to Infectious Disease Stigma.

Despite extensive stigma mitigation efforts, infectious disease stigma remains common. So far, little attention has been paid to the moral psychology of stigmatizing practices (i.e. beliefs, attitudes, actions) rather than the experience of being stigmatized. Addressing the moral psychology behind stigmatizing practices seems necessary to explain the persistence of infectious disease stigma and to develop effective mitigation strategies. Our article proposes building on Jonathan Haidt's moral foundations theory, which states that moral judgements follow from intuitions rather than conscious reasoning. Conceptual analysis was conducted to show how Haidt's five moral foundations can be connected to (i) moral judgements about stigmatizing practices and (ii) stigmatizing practices themselves. We found that care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation intuitions can inform moral judgements about stigmatizing practices. Loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation intuitions can sometimes also feed stigmatizing practices. Authority/subversion intuitions can inform moral judgements and stigmatizing practices towards people who disrespect authoritative rules meant to protect public health. Moral dumbfounding and posthoc reasoning might explain the persistence of stigmatizing practices. In conclusion, this study demonstrates the relevance of Haidt's approach to infectious disease stigma research and mitigation strategies. We hope that this study motivates researchers to further test and assess this approach.

Between Michigan and Rochester: Identity-based thinking is cognitively primary

This article synthesizes a large body of research in the social and cognitive sciences to develop a distinctly cognitive understanding of political identity. Building on dual-process and computational theories of mind, the article defends three claims about the mental and behavioral implications of identity in political domains: (1) identity-based thinking is people’s default (often fast, automatic, and cognitively inaccessible) way of mentally representing politics and of drawing inferences based on those representations; (2) people are not limited to identity-based thinking and can sometimes learn to override it via slow, volitional, and conscious reasoning; and (3) the cognitive complexity of identity-based thinking is in-between the levels of mental sophistication that the Michigan and Rochester Schools in political science posit. This account of political identity illuminates, inter alia, why even low-information voters can quickly identify their political allies and opponents, why even high-information politicians can misperceive their constituents, why affective polarization has been increasing in the United States in recent decades, and why many normative theories of justice advise people to override identity-based thinking.

Revisiting Neuroscientific Skepticism about Free Will

Benefiting from recent work in neuroscience, this paper rebuts a pair of neuroscience-based arguments for the non-existence of free will. Well-known neuroscientific experiments that have often been cited in support of skepticism about free will are critically examined. Various problems are identified with attempts to use their findings to support the claim that free will is an illusion. It is argued on scientific grounds that certain assumptions made in these skeptical arguments are unjustified—namely, assumptions about the times at which decisions are made and the times at which the point of no re­turn for the making of a decision is reached. It is argued as well that alleged findings about decisions of the kind featured in these experiments—arbitrary decisions made in the absence of conscious reasoning about what to do—fail to support certain crucial claims about non-arbitrary decisions made after careful deliberation. The paper also examines a fallback position for skeptics about free will. Some scientific skeptics about free will contend that free will, by definition, depends on the existence of immaterial souls. Survey-style studies that bring free will down to earth are brought to bear on this contention.

A dissociation between conceptual prominence and explicit category learning: Evidence from agent and patient event roles.

We investigate whether linguistic categories have the same structure as categories used to conceptualize the world outside of language. We focus on the event roles Agent and Patient (in the sentence Murray ate the ice cream, Murray is the Agent and the ice cream is the Patient). These categories appear to be tightly linked across language and cognition: they are encoded robustly in the world's languages and have been argued to be highly prominent conceptually, even part of innate core knowledge. This view predicts (a) that Agent and Patient categories will be readily accessible to adults in explicit categorization tasks and (b) that these categories have similar structure across semantic and conceptual domains. We tested these predictions across four experiments in which adult speakers of English had to induce Agent and Patient categories from visual illustrations of events (e.g., one figure kicking another). We found that 25% to 40% of participants failed to induce the categories, suggesting that prominent concepts are not always easily accessed for conscious reasoning. At the same time, for those participants who did induce the categories, they generalized these categories in ways predicted by previous analyses of English syntax. This finding supports the view that Agent and Patient are domain-general, spanning both conceptual and linguistic representation, though not necessarily used by participants in explicit categorization tasks. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Thinking through talking to yourself: Inner speech as a vehicle of conscious reasoning

ABSTRACT People frequently report that their thought has, at times, a vocal character. Thinking commonly appears to be accompanied or constituted by silently ‘talking’ to oneself in inner speech. In this paper, I argue that inner speech ‘utterances’ can constitute occurrent propositional attitudes, e.g., occurrent judgments, suppositions, etc., and, thereby, we can consciously reason through tokening a series of inner speech utterances in working memory. As I demonstrate, the functional role a mental state plays in working memory is determined in a flexible and context sensitive manner by metacognitive monitoring and control procedures. An inner speech utterance functions as an occurrent judgment (and, thus, as a premise, lemma, or conclusion in a line of conscious reasoning) when it is experienced with a level of certainty that exceeds one’s threshold of confidence for acceptance. In virtue of an agent experiencing an inner speech utterance with a sufficient level of certainty, the utterance plays the functional role of an occurrent judgment through, e.g., terminating inquiry and causing overt actions (like overtly asserting the words rehearsed in inner speech).

Effects of developing prompt scaffolding to support collaborative scientific argumentation in simulation-based physics learning

ABSTRACT Argumentation scaffolding can be used to enhance the formulation of logical arguments as well as the performance of such arguments. This study presents a web-based synchronized scientific argumentation environment integrated with prompt scaffolding to support simulation-based physics learning for elementary school students. To investigate the effects of prompt argumentation scaffolding, two sixth-grade classes totaling fifty-five students worked in small groups to complete a simulation-based physics learning activity regarding the principle of leverage. One class was allocated to an experimental group that received prompt argumentation scaffolding, whereas the other class was assigned to be the control group not receiving prompts. Learning achievements such as science conceptual understanding and scientific explanation skills were examined, and lag sequential analysis (LSA) was used to compare the argumentative behavioral patterns of the two groups. The results showed that the students in the experimental group outperformed those in the control group in terms of their capacity to produce scientific explanations, though no significant difference in their understanding of physical concepts. Furthermore, the LSA results revealed that the experimental group demonstrated more coherent, evidence-based arguments and conscious reasoning, whereas the control group displayed more of a conversational tone and was unstructured in its debates with others.

Sentic Activation: A Two-Level Affective Common Sense Reasoning Framework

An important difference between traditional AI systems and human intelligence is our ability to harness common sense knowledge gleaned from a lifetime of learning and experiences to inform our decision making and behavior. This allows humans to adapt easily to novel situations where AI fails catastrophically for lack of situation-specific rules and generalization capabilities. Common sense knowledge also provides the background knowledge for humans to successfully operate in social situations where such knowledge is typically assumed. In order for machines to exploit common sense knowledge in reasoning as humans do, moreover, we need to endow them with human-like reasoning strategies. In this work, we propose a two-level affective reasoning framework that concurrently employs multi-dimensionality reduction and graph mining techniques to mimic the integration of conscious and unconscious reasoning, and exploit it for sentiment analysis.

Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self

This essay presents the conditional probability of co-contribution account of the individuation of cognitive systems (CPC) and argues that CPC provides an attractive basis for a theory of the cognitive self. The argument proceeds in a largely indirect way, by emphasizing empirical challenges faced by an approach that relies entirely on predictive processing (PP) mechanisms to ground a theory of the cognitive self. Given the challenges faced by PP-based approaches, we should prefer a theory of the cognitive self of the sort CPC offers, one that accommodates variety in the kinds of mechanism that, when integrated, constitute a cognitive system (and thus the cognitive self), to a theory according to which the cognitive self is composed of essentially one kind of thing, for instance, prediction-error minimization mechanisms. The final section focuses on one of the central functions of the cognitive self: to engage in conscious reasoning. It is argued that the phenomenon of conscious, deliberate reasoning poses an apparently insoluble problem for a PP-based view, one that seems to rest on a structural limitation of predictive-processing models. In a nutshell, conscious reasoning is a single-stream phenomenon, but, in order for PP to apply, two streams of activity must be involved, a prediction stream and an input stream. Thus, with regard to the question of the nature of the self, PP-based views must yield to an alternative approach, regardless of whether proponents of the predictive processing, as a comprehensive theory of cognition, can handle the various empirical challenges canvassed in the preceding section.

How graphic designers rely on intuition as an ephemeral facility to support their creative design process

ABSTRACT Graphic design is a specialized form of creative practice in which images, typography, texts, shapes and other visual elements are created, selected, developed and integrated to form a coherent whole that conveys an intended message and user experience. Anecdotal evidence suggests that intuition is critical in this practice, but exactly how graphic designers rely on their intuition to support their creative design process is poorly understood. Using cultural probes and semi-structured interviews, this qualitative study evidences how twelve professional graphic designers relied on intuition as what we will call an ephemeral facility. Intuition was discerned as a feeling that briefly enters into consciousness and reinforces ongoing, nonconscious decision making, or causes a shift toward conscious reasoning strategies. The study reports how the graphic designers applied intuition throughout their creative design process––for obtaining and selecting information from clients, filling in informational gaps, envisioning a starting point and guiding subsequent actions and evaluations necessary for developing the design. This offers new empirically based insight into the role and relevance of intuition for progressing the creative graphic design process, including the social and material interactions therein.

Speaking with virtual humans: Assessing social cognition in traumatic brain injury with a second-person perspective task.

This study is one of the first to investigate social cognition in participants with traumatic brain injury (TBI) using a task that actively engaged the participant in a real interaction with a partner. Previous results have reported altered social cognition in TBI patients, but social cognition was mostly assessed through traditional tasks involving conscious and deliberate reasoning about characters' mental states (i.e., a third-person perspective). Our goal was to present a new paradigm which allowed the assessment of social cognition in conditions closer to real life meaning that participants were actively engaged in an interaction (i.e., second-person perspective) in order to capture more implicit use of social cognition processes. This study used three tasks to evaluate social cognition. We designed a task, called EVICog, in which participants were engaged in real audio-visual conversations with two virtual humans who expressed emotions and produced speech content that required the participants to make inferences about the characters' mental states. The two other tasks are standard in the literature; they use photographs to test participants' recognition of emotions and short comic strips to test their attribution of intentions. Our results showed that TBI participants presented a significant deficit of social cognition compared to control participants. The ROC analysis showed that EVICog has a high discrimination power compared to the other tests. These results further confirm that social cognition is altered in TBI participants even in real interactions and further support the use of ecological settings to investigate social cognition.

Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning

AbstractPeople frequently report that, at times, their thought has a vocal character. Thinking commonly appears to be accompanied or constituted by silently ‘talking’ to oneself in inner speech. In this paper, we explore the specifically epistemic role of inner speech in conscious reasoning. A plausible position—but one I argue is ultimately wrong—is that inner speech plays asolelyfacilitative role that is exhausted by (i) serving as the vehicle of representation for conscious reasoning, and/or (ii) allowing one to focus on certain types of objects or relations, e.g., causal relations, abstracta, counterfactuals, etc., or to consciously entertain structured propositional contents that it would be hard (or impossible) to focus on or entertain with representations in other (e.g., imagistic) formats. According to this position, inner speech doesn't figure as a justificatory element in our reasoning or as the partial epistemic basis of our conclusions—it merely facilitates reasoning through (i) and/or (ii). In contrast to the view that inner speech is amerefacilitator, I establish that (outside of potentially playing roles (i) and/or (ii)) the language we use itself serves as a crucial source of information in reasoning. In other words, we reason from propositions about the language we use in inner speech as opposed to exclusively reasoning from the semantic contents of the speech. My conclusion follows from how we use language as a cognitive tool to keep track of information, e.g., the contents of premises, lemmas, previous reasoning results, etc., in reasoning.

Thinking Fast and Slow: A CBR Perspective

In a path-breaking work, Kahneman characterized human cognition as a result of two modes of operation, Fast Thinking and Slow Thinking. Fast thinking involves quick, intuitive decision making and slow thinking is deliberative conscious reasoning. In this paper, for the first time, we draw parallels between this dichotomous model of human cognition and decision making in Case-based Reasoning (CBR). We observe that fast thinking can be operationalized computationally as the fast decision making by a trained machine learning model, or a parsimonious CBR system that uses few attributes. On the other hand, a full-fledged CBR system may be seen as similar to the slow thinking process. We operationalize such computational models of fast and slow thinking and switching strategies, as Models 1 and 2. Further, we explore the adaptation process in CBR as a slow thinking manifestation, leading to Model 3. Through an extensive set of experiments on real-world datasets, we show that such realizations of fast and slow thinking are useful in practice, leading to improved accuracies in decision-making tasks.

Mental fatigue, anticipated effort, and subjective valuations of exercising predict choice to exercise or not: A mixed-methods study

ObjectivesThis study examined the effects of mental fatigue on people's decisions to engage in an acute bout of exercise quantitatively, through a sequentially mediated pathway consisting of perceived effort and benefit vs. cost valuations and qualitatively, using exit interviews to survey the conscious reasoning behind participants' choices. DesignMixed methods, randomized, experimenter blind to group. MethodParticipants (N = 84, Mage = 19.07 ± 1.86 years) completed either a high cognitive demand (incongruent Stroop) task or low cognitive demand (documentary viewing) task for 12 min. Before and after the cognitive task, participants rated their anticipated effort and subjective evaluations (benefits and costs) of engaging in a 20-min moderate-to-vigorous intensity exercise task. After completing the latter ratings, participants chose between the exercise task or a non-exercise task (seated “free time” and use of smartphone or computer). Participants were led to believe they would actually engage in the task; however, once their choice was made, they were not required to complete the task but were invited to complete a semi-structured interview to probe the reasoning behind their choice. ResultsSerial mediation analyses revealed a significant indirect effect from mental fatigue to choice through perceived effort and benefit vs. cost valuations (95% C.I. = −0.01 to −0.0004). Qualitative data, organized by categories based on group/choice pairings, yielded twelve unique codes explaining how the cognitive tasks affected choice. ConclusionsResults demonstrate mental fatigue alters decision-making through a sequentially mediated process including subjective perceptions of effort, benefits, and costs. Interview responses also highlight the individual-level consequences of completing cognitively demanding and non-demanding tasks on effort-based decision-making. Future research should explore additional feeling states as they relate to people's choices to engage in exercise or sedentary behaviors.

Action Modulates the Conscious Reasoning Process of Moral Judgment: Evidence From Behavior and Neurophysiology.

Moral judgment can be highly affected by the action and intention factors on a behavior level. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the intention factor can modulate both the affective and cognitive processing of moral judgment. The present event-related potentials (ERP) study examined how the action factor modulated the neural dynamics of moral judgment under a newly developed moral dilemma paradigm including three different conditions: harm caused by action (i.e., doing harm), harm caused by omission (i.e., allowing harm), and no harm. Behavior data showed that participants preferred utilitarian judgments and spent less time on the allowing harm condition than for the doing harm condition. ERP results revealed that, compared with the doing harm and no harm dilemmas, the allowing harm dilemmas elicited an enhanced N450 response associated with cognitive control and/or cognitive effort processes, but attenuated a late positive potentials (LPP) response associated with top-down control of attention and cognitive “rational” control processes. Such LPP amplitude differences were positively correlated with the C-score of the moral competence test which indexed the cognitive aspect of moral judgment competency. These findings suggested that people have a strong omission bias, and such an action factor modulates the conscious reasoning process during moral judgment, including the cognitive control and/or cognitive effort, and attentional allocation processes.

ANÁLISE DAS LIMITAÇÕES

This study analyzes the conditions for limiting freedom of thought and expression. A distinction is proposed in two phases, one internal in the mind of the person who thinks, will, thought, conscious reasoning, weighing the consequences, decision and expression of thought by any means, and another external after expressed, with valuation by third parties, either by acceptance, rejection or indifference. Perspectives of freedom of expression are also presented through the theories of Justice of Michael Walzer and John Rawls. It was concluded that both freedom of thought and freedom of expression can suffer self-limitation, rationally and consciously, by those who think. So, freedom of thought should not be limited by others, unless rationally and consciously acquiesced, freedom of expression may be limited against the will of the thinker as long as it is observed: which relevant values ​​should prevail between the expresser and the potential recipient, and who can thus limit that freedom. For the first question, it is necessary to understand which values ​​or social interests are being put into evidence. And for the second, ultimately relying on the Judge State to impose certain limits. And because it is a mere essay, it does not claim to be complete or exhaustive, to admit probable and expected limitations by third parties for future studies.