Conscious Deliberation Research Articles

Commonsense morality and the bearable automaticity of being

Some research suggests that moral behavior can be strongly influenced by trivial features of the environment of which we are completely unaware. Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have argued that these findings undermine our commonsense notions of agency and responsibility, both of which emphasize the role of practical reasoning and conscious deliberation in action. We present the results of four vignette-based studies (N=1,437) designed to investigate how people think about the metaphysical and moral implications of scientific findings that reveal our susceptibility to automaticity and situational influences. When presented with lightly fictionalized narratives about these findings, participants exhibit no tendency toward changing judgments of freedom and responsibility compared to control groups. This suggests that people seem unwilling to adopt skeptical attitudes about agency on the basis of these scientific findings.

Interpretive Agency, Change, and the Role of Individuals in UN Peace Operations

ABSTRACT Much of what peacekeepers do on a daily basis is best understood through the lens of practice, and practice theorists have begun to explore the process by which practice change occurs in international organizations. Yet practice theory’s focus on tacit knowledge and ‘unthinking’ action raises important questions about agency. How can individual peacekeepers change their daily practices amid the myriad structural factors that dispose them to act in particular ways? Do changes in peacekeeping practice require conscious reflection on their part? Drawing on evidence from UN missions in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and the DRC, I argue that changes in practice often occur through interpretive agency as individuals determine what rules require in practice. Interpretive agency takes two distinct forms: practical agency and reflective agency. Reflective agency involves conscious deliberation, while practical agency occurs when peacekeepers make unthinking adjustments to existing practices. This article identifies conditions that are conducive to each type of interpretive agency, highlighting the impact of crisis, bureaucratic hierarchy, and the role of specialized knowledge. These findings improve our understanding of how individual agency shapes UN peace operations, while also contributing to wider debates about change and continuity in global governance.

Doing the right thing

The study explores the legal consciousness of young people in the context of COVID-19 pandemic, concerning the management of personal relationships vis-à-vis the legal regulation enacted by the Italian government. We aim to account for the forms of legality that have granted to sustain, criticize, engage, and resist the law, and to understand the mechanisms that contributed to shaping specific experiences of legality. We refer to a theoretical framework based on legal consciousness, the Neo-Bourdieusian approach to moral judgment and Douglas’s theory of risks. Based on the analysis of 70 narratives, our findings show different ways of experiencing the law by young people. Different recurring narratives can be identified: individual translation, trust in procedure, fatalistic claims, and cooperative criticism. These narratives are not fixed attributes of individuals but recurring repertoires of perceptions and practices that emerge from specific interaction contexts where pre-reflective dispositions and conscious deliberation intersect.

Non-consciously processed physical activity for survival versus consciously deliberated exercise for health.

Humans evolved to become dependent on physical activity for their survival, but they have not evolved to exercise today. Because survival in modern society is heavily reliant on conscious thinking, most people (54%) have evolved away from physical activity and become occasional exercisers. This transition from non-conscious to conscious processing prevents people from capitalizing on evolution's wisdom for survival and wellbeing as they consciously deliberate on the utility of health practices to achieve certain outcomes (e.g., weight loss). Unlike in early times, people today have a choice of not engaging in physical activity and yet surviving. As a result, they struggle with the question whether the gains from exercising are greater than losses from not doing it, weighing positive gains and losses against negative gains and losses. Such conscious deliberations, however, can easily be overridden by solving cognitive dissonance (e.g., "exercise is good for my health" vs. "I don't exercise") through conscious rationalizations and non-conscious dismissal. Today's exercise problem can only be solved by individually acquiring the mindset of early times of evolution when the initiation of physical activity was largely a matter of non-conscious thoughts and feelings.

Brain Activities Show There Is Nothing Like a Real Friend in Contrast to Influencers and Other Celebrities.

Especially for young people, influencers and other celebrities followed on social media evoke affective closeness that in their young minds seems real even though it is fake. Such fake friendships are potentially problematic because of their felt reality on the consumer side while lacking any inversely felt true closeness. The question arises if the unilateral friendship of a social media user is equal or at least similar to real reciprocal friendship. Instead of asking social media users for explicit responses (conscious deliberation), the present exploratory study aimed to answer this question with the help of brain imaging technology. Thirty young participants were first invited to provide individual lists including (i) twenty names of their most followed and loved influencers or other celebrities (fake friend names), (ii) twenty names of loved real friends and relatives (real friend names) as well as (iii) twenty names they do not feel any closeness to (no friend names). They then came to the Freud CanBeLab (Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience and Behavior Lab) where they were shown their selected names in a random sequence (two rounds), while their brain activities were recorded via electroencephalography (EEG) and later calculated into event-related potentials (ERPs). We found short (ca. 100 ms) left frontal brain activity starting at around 250 ms post-stimulus to process real friend and no friend names similarly, while both ERPs differed from those elicited by fake friend names. This is followed by a longer effect (ca. 400 ms), where left and right frontal and temporoparietal ERPs also differed between fake and real friend names, but at this later processing stage, no friend names elicited similar brain activities to fake friend names in those regions. In general, real friend names elicited the most negative going brain potentials (interpreted as highest brain activation levels). These exploratory findings represent objective empirical evidence that the human brain clearly distinguishes between influencers or other celebrities and close people out of real life even though subjective feelings of closeness and trust can be similar. In summary, brain imaging shows there is nothing like a real friend. The findings of this study might be seen as a starting point for future studies using ERPs to investigate social media impact and topics such as fake friendship.

Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will

<i>Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will</i>

A New Theory of Expectations

Expectations are essential for understanding the economic choices of individuals as well as cyclical developments in an economy over time. The initial theory of how people form their expectations was first introduced by Aristotle more than two millennia ago. The core elements he advanced were that forward-looking decisions must be based on expectations and those expectations must be formed by reason, free from the corrupting influence of passion. These guidelines have been formalized in theories of rational expectations. There has been no consensus among social scientists, however, about whether rationality should be defined by how expectations are formed (favored in psychology) or by the outcomes of the formation process (favored in economics). Data collected by the University of Michigan over the past half-century appear to support both views: the psychological thesis of bounded rationality in the formation of expectations by individuals as well as the unbounded rationality thesis of economics when applied to the expectations observed across the entire economy. The goal of this paper is to correct empirical misspecifications, and to incorporate recent advances in neuroscience, including the dominance of nonconscious processes over conscious deliberation, the critical role of affective evaluations, and the formation of expectations by a Bayesian updating procedure. The new theory highlights the importance of contextual factors, and provides a more accurate assessment of costs and benefits. Although these innovations represent a radical departure from orthodox theories, they are justified by the increase in explanatory power provided by this new theory of expectations.

Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Intuition, Reason, and Responsibility

According to one highly influential approach to moral responsibility, human beings are responsible (eligible to be praised or blamed) for what they do because they are responsive to reasons (Fischer &amp; Ravizza 1998). However, this amounts to a descriptive assumption about human beings that may not be borne out by the empirical research. According to a recent trend in moral psychology (Haidt 2001), most human judgment is caused by fast, nonconscious, and intuitive processes, rather than explicit, conscious deliberation about one’s reasons. And when humans do engage in explicit deliberation, it primarily serves to provide post hoc rationalization of their intuitive judgments (confabulation). If this is correct, it is tempting to conclude that most of our judgments—and the actions we perform on their basis—are not genuine responses to reasons. The reasons-responsiveness approach would thus appear to be committed to the implausible conclusion that we are not responsible for very much after all, including, most problematically, our implicit biases. I argue that the reasons-responsiveness approach can avoid this conclusion by showing three things: (1) that affective and intuitive processes can be reasons-responsive; (2) that the responsiveness of those processes can be bolstered by the agent’s environment; and (3) that practices like blame are one of the key ways in which human beings are attuned to reasons over time. I argue that the first and second of these items, despite their initial plausibility, are insufficient on their own to explain why humans can be held accountable for things like implicit biases, and that the way forward is to appreciate what holding each other accountable does—i.e., its effects.

How Trainees Come to Trust Supervisors in Workplace-Based Assessment: A Grounded Theory Study.

PurposeIn competency-based medical education, workplace-based assessment provides trainees with an opportunity for guidance and supervisors the opportunity to judge the trainees’ clinical practice. Learning from assessment is enhanced when trainees reveal their thinking and are open to critique, which requires trust in the assessor. If supervisors knew more about how trainees come to trust them in workplace-based assessment, they could better engender trainee trust and improve trainees’ learning experience.MethodFrom August 2018 to September 2019, semistructured interviews were conducted with 17 postgraduate anesthesia trainees across Australia and New Zealand. The transcripts were analyzed using constructivist grounded theory methods sensitized by a sociocultural view of learning informed by Wenger’s communities of practice theory.ResultsParticipants described a continuum from a necessary initial trust to an experience-informed dynamic trust. Trainees assumed initial trust in supervisors based on accreditation, reputation, and a perceived obligation of trustworthiness inherent in the supervisor’s role. With experience and time, trainees’ trust evolved based on supervisor actions. Deeper levels of trainee trust arose in response to perceived supervisor investment and allowed trainees to devote more emotional and cognitive resources to patient care and learning rather than impression management. Across the continuum from initial trust to experience-informed trust, trainees made rapid trust judgments that were not preceded by conscious deliberation; instead, they represented a learned “feel for the game.”ConclusionsWhile other factors are involved, our results indicate that the trainee behavior observed in workplace-based assessment is a product of supervisor invitation. Supervisor trustworthiness and investment in trainee development invite trainees to work and present in authentic ways in workplace-based assessment. This authentic engagement, where learners “show themselves” to supervisors and take risks, creates assessment for learning.

Reflective and non-reflective influences on cannabis use among undergraduate students: A qualitative study

Objective Around 40% of US university students use cannabis, 25% of whom present with cannabis use disorder, which endangers health. We investigated the concurrent contribution of reflective processes, which generate action via conscious deliberation, and non-reflective processes, which prompt behavior automatically, to undergraduates’ cannabis consumption. Participants Eighteen UK undergraduates who regularly consume cannabis (11 female, 7 male; mean age 20 y). Methods Semi-structured interviews explored cannabis motives, routines, cues, and decision points. Thematic analysis identified themes, in each of which reflective and non-reflective dimensions were coded. Results Four themes were identified: cannabis use for relaxation, social bonding, and symbolic-affective significance, and contexts and triggers. Some influences guided cannabis use reflectively in some settings, and non-reflectively in others. Even when cannabis use was consciously driven, non-reflective processes were deployed to execute subservient acts, such as rolling joints. Conclusions Findings highlight specific processes and pathways that might be targeted to reduce cannabis-related harm.

A Fresh Look at the Unconscious Thought Effect: Using Mind-Wandering Measures to Investigate Thought Processes in Decision Problems With High Information Load.

Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis, 2004) states that thinking about a complex problem unconsciously can result in better solutions than conscious deliberation. We take a fresh look at the cognitive processes underlying “unconscious” thought by analyzing data of 822 participants who worked on a complex apartment-evaluation task in three experiments. This task’s information-presentation and evaluation parts were separated by different kinds of filler-interval activities, which corresponded to standard conscious-thought and unconscious-thought manipulations. Employing experience-sampling methods, we obtained thought reports during and after filler-interval engagement. Evidence concerning the existence of the Unconscious Thought Effect was mixed, with such an effect being present in the first two experiments only. In these experiments, we further found less problem deliberation to be associated with better performance on the apartment task. Interestingly, this benefit disappeared when we probed participants’ thoughts during the filler interval. We suggested that explicit thought awareness diminishes the Unconscious Thought Effect.

The Pragmatic Intelligence of Habits

Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey’s pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment.

The reflective leg of an efl teacher’s journey

Reflection has a crucial role in learning to teach as a long developmental process. This case study focuses on the engagement of a teacher of English as a foreign language (EFL) in reflection. The teacher was engaged in a 12-week reflection process which included two-phase procedures repeated five times. The first phase of each procedure involved reflection on lexical problems through journals and peer discussions. The second was for reflection on classroom practice through journals and interviews. With a sequential exploratory mixed methods design, the study involved analysis of the teacher’s reflections first qualitatively and then quantitatively. The qualitative analysis was based on the taxonomies for descriptive and critical reflection presented in Ho and Richards (1993) and Farrell (1999). The quantitative side involved one-way goodness-of-fit chi-square test results. The results revealed that she referred to most of the topics in the taxonomy, and the top three were students’ problems, an approach/procedure, and positive evaluations of lessons. Overall, her critical reflection outnumbered her descriptive reflection, and was mostly related to evaluating teaching. The teacher also displayed development in the sense of critical reflectivity. All the quantitative analyses had statistically significant results. Globally, her reflection in journals, discussions, and interviews enabled her to respond to the context, engage in conscious deliberation, and integrate knowledge into the teaching act. In this way, the study is expected to contribute to the participant’s professional development.

The Effects of Kinship, Reciprocity, and Conscious Deliberation on the Level of Concern for Non-Humans: How Our Psychology Affects Levels of Concern for Non-Humans

AbstractAs hunter-gatherers, it is unlikely that humans evolved psychological tendencies to extend high levels of concern for predator or prey species. Our coalitional psychology, which evolved to regulate human interactions with other humans, might be the basis for the extension of ethical concerns to non-humans. This research identified three variables (kinship, reciprocity, and conscious deliberation) that affect our altruistic tendencies toward humans and tested them to see if they also affected our concern toward non-humans. Using a sample of 119 respondents from participants at animal auctions, the researchers compared levels of concern to: perceived the animals as family; received benefits from the animals; and/or consciously contemplated appropriate levels of concern. The data supported the hypotheses that concerns rise when animals are re-categorized as kin and/or when individuals have previously considered appropriate levels of concern, but it did not support the hypothesized connection between concern and reciprocity.

How do cognitive processes influence script concordance test responses?

The script concordance test (SCT) is a test of clinical decision-making (CDM) that compares the thought process of learners to that of experts to determine to what extent their cognitive 'scripts' align. Without understanding test-takers' cognitive process, however, it is unclear what influences their responses. The objective of this study was to gather response process validity evidence by studying the cognitive process of test-takers to determine whether the SCT tests CDM and what cognitive processes may influence SCT responses. Cases from an SCT used in a national validation study were administered and semi-structured cognitive interviews were conducted with ten residents and five staff surgeons. A retrospective verbal probing technique was used. Data was independently analysed and coded by two analysts. Themes were identified as factors that influence SCT responses during the cognitive interview. Cognitive interviews demonstrated variability in CDM among test-takers. Consistent with dual process theory, test-takers relied on scripts formed through past experiences, when available, to make decisions and used conscious deliberation in the absence of experience. However, test-takers' response process was also influenced by their comprehension of specific terms, desire for additional information, disagreement with the planned management, underlying knowledge gaps and desire to demonstrate confidence or humility. The rationale behind SCT answers may be influenced by comprehension, underlying knowledge and social desirability in addition to formed scripts and/or conscious deliberation. Having test-takers verbalise their rationale for responses provides a depth of assessment that is otherwise lost in the SCT's current format. With the improved ability to standardise CDM assessment using the SCT, consideration of test-makers improving the SCT construction process and combining the SCT question format with verbal responses may improve the use of the SCT for CDM assessment.

A Practice‐Focused Case for Animal Moral Agency

AbstractConsiderations of nonhuman animal moral agency typically base their reasoning and (very often negative) verdict on a capacity‐focused approach to moral agency. According to this approach, an entity is a moral agent if it has certain intrapersonal features or capacities, typically in terms of conscious reflection and deliberation. According to a practice‐focused notion of moral agency, however, an entity is a moral agent in virtue of being a participant of a moral responsibility practice (MRP). I argue that a practice‐focused approach to moral agency, combined with empirical evidence from research on canid social play and cognition, with support from The Function Argument, makes the notion of nonhuman animal moral agency more likely than usually indicated. However, the support is not absolute, as the practice‐focused approach itself may be put into question. I describe how this objection prompts us to critically assess any empirical, metaethical, or normative assumptions on these matters. These questions, in turn, raise a number of further questions of how we should conceive of, use, and evaluate whatever standards of moral agency we adopt.

Use of Simulation Methods in Social Work Research on Clinical Decision-Making

While simulation has become an increasingly sophisticated and standardized method of clinical teaching and performance assessment in social work, unlike other clinical and health care fields, it is not generally used in other areas of social work research. Yet, it has the potential to address challenges and limitations in several areas of social work research. For instance, in the area of professional decision-making, research has demonstrated high variability in the conclusions of not only different professionals encountering the same case, but also in a single professional encountering a case at different times. However, research that would elucidate differences in professional decision-making is complicated by logistical and ethical constraints of real-life practice, and the fact that professional decision-making occurs outside the realm of conscious deliberation rendering the individual unable to fully articulate the process by which they arrived at their final conclusion. Simulation research methods can address some of these challenges through providing the opportunity to: observe professional decision-making in real time; reflect on the decisional process while reviewing recordings; and compare the approaches of professionals to standardized cases. This paper reviews the use of simulation research methods in clinical and health science fields and the types of simulation research. It then describes the manner in which simulation methods have been applied to a specific program of social work research that examines professional decision-making in high stakes situations, contributing to clinical practice.

Huckleberry Finn\u2019s Conscience: Reckoning with the Evasion

Huck Finn’s struggles with his conscience, as depicted in Mark Twain’s famous novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (AHF) (1884), have been much discussed by philosophers; and various philosophical lessons have been extracted from Twain’s depiction of those struggles. Two of these philosophers stand out, in terms of influence: Jonathan Bennett and Nomy Arpaly. Here I argue that the lessons that Bennett and Arpaly draw are not supported by a careful reading of AHF. This becomes particularly apparent when we consider the final part of the book, commonly referred to, by literary scholars, as ‘the evasion’. During the evasion Huck behaves in ways that are extremely difficult to reconcile with the interpretations of AHF offered by Bennett and Arpaly. I extract a different philosophical lesson from AHF than either Bennett or Arpaly, which makes sense of the presence of the evasion in AHF. This lesson concerns the importance of conscious moral deliberation for moral guidance and for overcoming wrongful moral assumptions. I rely on an interpretation of AHF that is influential in literary scholarship. On it the evasion is understood as an allegory about US race relations during the 20-year period from the end of the US Civil War to the publication of AHF.

The Science of Habit and Its Implications for Student Learning and Well-being

Habits are critical for supporting (or hindering) long-term goal attainment, including outcomes related to student learning and well-being. Building good habits can make beneficial behaviors (studying, exercise, sleep, etc.) the default choice, bypassing the need for conscious deliberation or willpower and protecting against temptations. Yet educational research and practice tends to overlook the role of habits in student self-regulation, focusing instead on the role of motivation and metacognition in actively driving behavior. Habit theory may help explain ostensible failures of motivation or self-control in terms of contextual factors that perpetuate poor habits. Further, habit-based interventions may support durable changes in students’ recurring behaviors by disrupting cues that activate bad habits and creating supportive and stable contexts for beneficial ones. In turn, the unique features of educational settings provide a new area in which to test and adapt existing habit models.

Channelling the darkness: Group flow and environmental expression in the music of Black Sabbath and Joy Division

Although they superficially belong to different genres of music, Black Sabbath and Joy Division share a fundamental commonality in that their music was shaped by – and powerfully depicted – bleak urban industrial environments. This article highlights a number of specific ways in which both bands’ music depicted (and was influenced by) this environment, including an unusually bass-heavy sound, the repetitive and continuous quality of their music, an austerity of sound, the rigid structure of songs and performances and lyrical content. Both bands attained such a high – or pure – degree of environmental expression because they were examples of the phenomenon of ‘group flow’. I examine the aspects of group flow identified by psychologists and show how both bands exhibited these, including a highly cooperative creative process, a lack of conscious deliberation and a prolific and spontaneous output. It was their group flow that enabled the two bands to ‘channel’ their environment directly and powerfully.