Conscious Cognitive Strategies Research Articles

Deconstruction of disciplinary orthodoxy. On the 80th anniversary of Yu. N. Solonin

The article attempts to provide a comprehensive analytical review of the theoretical heritage of Yu.N. Solonin. Solonin is well known as a statesman, a successful organizer of the life of the Russian philosophical community, but his philosophical works have not yet received due attention from colleagues. This is largely due to the fact that the works written by him are very diverse in nature, subject, form and genre. In addition, they are scattered across various, sometimes difficult-to-access, special and small-circulation publications while also not being systematized. However, such an external randomness of ideas and forms of their textual fixation is not so much a consequence of professional negligence, but rather a conscious cognitive strategy. The methodological attitude towards systematicity, which is experiencing an obvious crisis together with the classical rationality that gave rise to it, can no longer fully satisfy modern demands. This fully applies to humanitarian knowledge, including philosophy. An alternative to this, essentially postclassical approach can be considered holistic. If from this position one approaches the consideration of the philosophical heritage of Solonin, then all the originality, depth and value of what he wrote becomes obvious. First of all, this concerns the style of constructing a philosophical discourse, in which each produced text is “embedded” in a situational predestination, continuing and developing a conversation on a certain topic that was once started. Thus, there is an “overlay” and “increment of meaning”, thereby establishing and revealing connections with other fragments. Secondly, the stylistic and thematic space is expanding, discrediting the conventional inviolability of the existing disciplinary, scientific and philosophical canon in the first place. It is possible to talk about a special, not exceptional but quite rare in history, type of philosophizing. The article demonstrates how this happens with such traditional thematic spaces for modern Russian philosophy as science, society, culture, and philosophy itself.

Attachment-Focused Psychotherapy and the Wounded Self

The concept of the “wounded self” (Wolfe, 2005) offers an integrative theoretical framework for self-wounds and their developmental origins. Alladin (2013, 2014, 2016) integrated hypnotherapy into this model to comprehensively address the unconscious protective mechanisms and maladaptive conscious cognitive strategies of the wounded self. The purpose of this article is to propose how an attachment-focused psychotherapy could be utilized in working with the wounded self. With its emphasis on developmental maturation through the frame of the attachment relationship, attachment theory is well-positioned to offer conceptual and treatment insights in treating the wounded self. E. B. Spiegel’s (2016) attunement, representation, and mentalization approach to attachment-focused psychotherapy described how hypnosis can be utilized across attachment processes of attunement, representation, and mentalization toward structural maturation and developmental repair of patients with histories of complex relational trauma. In this article, the attunement, representation, and mentalization attachment approach and associated interventions are further explicated in the treatment of self-wounds in the borderline and narcissistic spectrums of personality organization. These principles of conceptualization and treatment interventions are then applied in a case example.

Training Insight Problem Solving Through Focus on Barriers and Assumptions

ABSTRACTRecent research has reported successful training interventions that improve insight problem solving. In some ways this is surprising, because the processes involved in insight solutions are often assumed to be unconscious, whereas the training interventions focus on conscious cognitive strategies. We propose one mechanism that may help to explain this apparent disconnect. Recognition of a barrier to progress during insight problem solving may provide a point of access to the tacit constraining assumptions that have misled the solution process. We tested this proposal in an experiment that examined the effects of different training routines on problem solving. The experiment compared four training routines, focusing either on barriers and assumptions combined, barriers alone, assumptions alone, or goals, with two control conditions. Outcomes were measured using eleven spatial insight problems. The results indicated that training that combined focus on barriers and assumptions was significantly more effective than all other conditions, supporting the proposition that recognizing and reinterpreting barriers may assist in surfacing the unwarranted assumptions that prevent problem solving.

Neural mechanisms of the cognitive control of emotion.

Emotion regulation involves the initiation of new emotional responses and continual alteration of current emotions in response to rapidly changing environmental and social stimuli. The capacity to effectively implement emotion regulation strategies is essential for psychological health; impairments in the ability to regulate emotions may be critical to the development of clinical levels of depression, anxiety and mania. This review provides a summary of findings from current research examining the neural mechanisms of emotion regulation by means of conscious cognitive strategies of reappraisal. These findings are considered in the context of related concepts of emotion perception and emotion generation, with discussion of the likely cognitive neuropsychological contributions to emotion regulation and the implications for psychiatric disorders. Convergent evidence implicates an inhibitory role of prefrontal cortex and cingulate regions upon subcortical and cortical emotion generation systems in the cognitive control of emotional experience. Concurrent modulation of cortical activity by the peripheral nervous system is highlighted by recent studies using simultaneous physiological and neuroimaging techniques. Individual differences in emotion perception, generation of affect and neuropsychological skills are likely to have direct consequences for emotion regulation. Emotion regulation relies on synergy within brain stem, limbic and cortical processes that promote the adaptive perception, generation and regulation of affect. Aberrant emotion processing in any of these stages may disrupt this self-sustaining regulatory system, with the potential to manifest in distinct forms of emotion dysregulation as seen in major psychiatric disorders such as depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.

Conscious perception of brain states: mental strategies for brain–computer communication

Direct brain–computer communication utilises self-regulation of brain potentials to select letters, words or symbols from a computer menu. In this study a completely paralysed (locked-in) patient learnt to produce slow cortical potential (SCP) shifts to operate a binary spelling device. After hundreds of training sessions he gave a detailed description of his mental strategies for self-regulation. His cognitive strategies matched with the electrocortical changes perfectly. Thus he produced a contingent negative variation (CNV) with images of preparation such as an arrow being drawn on a bow. To produce a positive potential shift he imagined the arrow shooting up from the bow. To suppress potential shifts he tried to stop thinking. The study demonstrates that patients become sensitive for their brain states with increasing self-regulation practice. The use of conscious cognitive strategies may, however, be incompatible with the complete automatization of the self-regulation skill.

Proactive interference and intertrial interval in short-term retention of temporal visual information.

The main purpose was to examine the role of proactive interference in temporal short-term memory when subjects experienced time under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation, made without time-aiding techniques. Visual durations of 1, 4, and 8 sec. were estimated by 18 subjects under the method of reproduction. Three retention intervals were used: immediate reproduction, 15, and 30 sec. of rest. The three intertrial intervals were immediate, 15, and 30 sec. Constant error was used as an index of bias. The constant errors provided no indication that proactive interference was operating in temporal short-term memory. The lack of proactive interference was not associated with intertrial intervals; even when the intertrial intervals were shortened to 1 sec. no proactive interference was observed. Variable error was used to evaluate effects of forgetting. The variable errors for the 4- and 8-sec. durations seemed amenable to a trace-decay explanation.

Rehearsal of temporal visual information.

This study compared the short-term retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under either subject-defined or experimenter-defined rehearsal. Subjects were presented visual durations of 1 and 4 sec. and then required to reproduce these durations following a 15-sec. retention interval. To help maintain the durations in memory, subjects were asked to use either a conscious cognitive strategy or a mental counting strategy. It was predicted that experimenter-defined rehearsal would show less forgetting, as measured by variable error, but this prediction was not supported. There also was no evidence of any response bias or context effects in the temporal reproductions. These results were compared with two previous studies that utilized similar cognitive strategies.

Immediate reproduction of temporal information under four cognitive strategies.

The main purpose was to determine the retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under a retention interval of immediate reproduction and various cognitive strategies for time estimation. Four levels of cognitive strategy were used, viz., conscious, mental counting, counting aloud without auditory cues, and counting aloud with auditory cues. The latter three cognitive strategies were experimenter-defined, time-aiding techniques. Subjects were instructed to refrain from employing time-aiding techniques under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation. Visual durations of 1, 2, and 4 sec. were estimated by 12 subjects under the method of reproduction. Two measures of performance were computed, viz., variable and constant errors. The general conclusions were: (a) the effectiveness of mental counting, counting aloud without auditory cues, and counting aloud with auditory cues as cognitive strategies over conscious cognitive strategy in terms of variability depends on the duration used, and (b) in terms of accuracy and variability an increase in the number of cues under time-aiding techniques does not necessarily produce better performance.

Short-Term Retention of Temporal Information under a Mental Counting Cognitive Strategy

The main purpose was to determine the short-term retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under a time-aiding technique for time estimation, i.e., subjects were instructed to use a mental-counting cognitive strategy. Visual durations of 1 and 4 sec. were estimated by 12 subjects under the method of reproduction. Six levels of retention interval were used, viz., immediate reproduction, self-paced reproduction, 15 sec. of rest, 30 sec. of rest, 15 and 30 sec. of interpolated activity, i.e., counting backwards by threes. The variable error was used to evaluate effects of forgetting. When subjects hold durations of 1 and 4 sec. in memory for a period of 15 or 30 sec. with or without interpolated activity, they become more variable than if they recall the item immediately or at their own pace. The constant error was used as an index of bias. Subjects overestimated the 1 sec. and underestimated the 4 sec. durations. The results were compared with a prior study done under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation, i.e., subjects were instructed to refrain from employing time-aiding techniques.

Short-Term Retention of Temporal Visual Information

The main purpose was to determine the short-term retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation, i.e., subjects were instructed to refrain from employing time-aiding techniques. Visual durations of 1 and 4 sec. were estimated by 12 subjects under the method of reproduction. Six levels of retention interval were used, viz., immediate reproduction, self-paced reproduction, i.e., the subjects were allowed to recall whenever they wished, 15 and 30 sec. of rest, and 15 and 30 sec. of interpolated activity, i.e., counting backwards by threes. The variable error was used to evaluate effects of forgetting. When subjects held a duration of 4 sec. in memory for a period of 15 or 30 sec. of rest, they became more variable than when they recalled the item immediately, at their own pace or when the duration to be remembered was only 1 sec. long. When an interpolated task was required during the retention interval, its variability was similar to the results obtained under an unfulfilled retention interval for both durations. The presence of an interaction between duration and retention interval under the variable error was explained in terms of memory.

Short-term retention of temporal auditory information.

To determine the short-term retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation, i.e., subjects were instructed to refrain from employing time-aiding techniques, auditory durations of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32 sec. were estimated by 30 subjects by reproduction. Five levels of retention interval were used, viz., immediate reproduction, 30-sec. rest, 30-sec. interpolated activity with a response uncertainty of 0 bit per response, 30-sec. interpolated activity with a response uncertainty of 1 bit per response, and 30-sec. interpolated activity with a response uncertainty of 2 bits per response. Variable error evaluated effects of forgetting. When subjects hold durations of 8, 16, and 32 sec. in memory for a 30-sec. rest or 30-sec. interpolated activity, they become more variable than if they recall the item immediately. The variabilities between the 30-sec. rest and the 30-sec. interpolated activity retention intervals were similar. Two explanations for the presence of an interaction between duration and retention interval under the variable error were suggested. The constant error was used as an index of bias. Immediate reproduction of the retention interval had less mean constant error than 30-sec. rest retention under the 8-, 16-, and 32-sec. durations. That particular result was explained in perceptual terms.

Short-term retention of temporal information.

The main purpose was to determine the short-term retention characteristics of temporal information when subjects experienced time under a conscious cognitive strategy for time estimation, i.e., subjects were instructed to refrain from employing the time-aiding techniques. Visual time lengths of 4, 8, 16, and 32 sec. were estimated by 12 subjects under the method of reproduction. Three levels of retention interval were used, viz., immediate reproduction, 20 sec. of rest, and 20 sec. of interpolated activity, i.e., counting backwards by threes. The variable error was used to evaluate effects of forgetting. When subjects hold time lengths of 4, 8, 16, and 32 sec. in memory for a period of 20 sec. of rest or 20 sec. of interpolated activity, they become more variable than if they recall the item immediately. The variability between the 20 sec. of rest and the 20 sec. of interpolated activity retention intervals was similar. Two explanations for the lack of an interaction between time lengths and retention interval under the variable error were suggested. The constant error was used as an index of bias. Immediate reproduction of the retention interval had less mean constant error than 20 sec. of rest retention under the 32-sec. time length. The particular result was explained in perceptual terms.