Congressional Foreign Policy Research Articles

Foreign policy free agents: how lawmakers and coalitions on the political margins help set boundaries for US foreign policy

Bipartisan consensus on many US domestic and foreign policy priorities has seemingly collapsed in recent decades, and political parties have become qideologically polarized and divided. While some contend that these dynamics are narrowing the space for congressional foreign policy innovation, we argue that factionalism often fosters creativity in the foreign policy process. Specifically, this article explores the role of ‘free agent’ progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans in foreign policy decision-making. These members at the ideological extremes of their parties are finding common ground in anti-establishment views and concerns about executive excess, and they are aligning to challenge traditional foreign policy positions. This paper conducts a plausibility probe of a model of congressional foreign policy free agency based upon roll call voting on war powers-related decisions in the Obama and Trump administrations. During both presidencies, our findings suggest that the free agency model has predictive value for foreign policy maneuvering and offers a non-traditional way of thinking about contemporary US foreign policy development.

From Washington without love: congressional foreign policy making and US-Russian relations under president Trump

ABSTRACTIn 2017, US Congress renewed the sanctions regime to punish Russia for its alleged cyberattacks during the 2016 elections and asserted its role in foreign policy making vis-à-vis President Donald Trump. To understand this case of Trump’s first significant foreign policy defeat, our analytical framework links two strands of the literature, the securitization concept and liberal International Relations theory. Previous studies underscored the ability of the executive branch to implement securitization discourses and practices. In this case, however, congressional entrepreneurs successfully securitized US-Russian relations despite presidential attempts to marginalize and de-securitize the issue. We trace the contested debates between the two branches of government to show how securitization processes by members of Congress forced the president to sign a new sanctions bill, which continued the policy towards Russia set by the Obama administration. Using qualitative content analysis, the paper highlights the ability of congressional actors to influence US foreign policy making despite high levels of polarization between the parties.

Representing All Women

Is sisterhood global? This study investigates if women in Congress are representing women worldwide by extending their surrogate representation of American women to women in foreign countries. Congressional research shows that race affects surrogate representation across borders via transnationalism. I test whether this also applies to gender when no shared “mother country” unites women, there are divisions over how to represent women, and American foreign policy is considered a stereotypically masculine policy domain. With an original dataset of three Congresses (2005–2010), I test if female House Representatives are more likely to introduce foreign policy legislation that targets foreign women and girls by applying regression analysis. Controlling for likely individual, electoral, and institutional incentives, I find that gender matters and that women in Congress are more likely to introduce legislation on behalf of women worldwide, acting as global surrogates. These findings offer new insights into the boundaries of surrogate representation, congressional foreign policy decision making, the influence of gender on international relations, and the impact of women in Congress.

Partisan polarization and US foreign policy: Is the centre dead or holding?

Scholars generally agree that most congressional decision-making behaviour has become characterized by partisan polarization. One area to which this consensus does not extend, however, is decision-making on foreign and national security issues. While a majority of scholars believe congressional foreign policy voting is now polarized, others insist that bipartisanship remains the norm. Examining roll-call votes in the House of Representatives from 1970 to 2012, this paper brings three new elements to bear on the dispute. Using a more comprehensive range of indicators, we re-examine the longitudinal data previously presented by scholars; we add an analysis of the roll-call data for the 2004–2013 period, and we utilize a static measure of polarization. Our analysis of the data reveals a cyclical trend of increasing and decreasing polarization and we conclude that it is too simplistic to characterize congressional voting on foreign and national security issues since 1970 as either partisan or bipartisan.

Are All Foreign Policy Innovators Created Equal? The New Generation of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship: Table 1.

This study revisits Carter and Scott’s model of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship (2004, 2009, 2010) to evaluate how a new generation of legislative innovators, including Senators Rand Paul and Ted Cruz, may influence US foreign policy. Specifically, this study proposes two new types of foreign policy entrepreneurs in Congress—“revolutionaries” and “mercenaries”—and examines their different motivations, policy objectives, and strategies to attempt to influence or change state behavior. Case evidence suggests that in a new era of partisanship and polarization, more complex models of players, strategies, and measures of success are needed.

(Ac)Counting (for) their dead: Responsiveness to Iraqi civilian casualties in the US House of Representatives

While the subject of wartime civilian casualties has been recognized as an important issue in International Relations (IR), foreign policy and IR scholars have not systematically examined why and how US politicians respond to civilian deaths. This article explores the ethics of and reasons for responsiveness to Iraqi civilian deaths among politicians in the US House of Representatives from 2003 to 2008. The article argues that legislative deliberative responsiveness to civilian deaths is integral to a just debate about war. It finds evidence that partisanship, ideology and sex are associated with responsiveness to civilian deaths, and reveals stark differences in the purposes and tone of Democratic and Republican rhetoric about civilian casualties. The article provides researchers with a more thorough understanding of how and why civilian costs of war emerge within debates among US politicians, and has implications for studies on discourse ethics, congressional war politics and US foreign policy.

The Not-So-Silent Partner: Patterns of Legislative-Executive Interaction in the War on Terror, 2001-2009

The conventional narrative surrounding the post-9/11 “War on Terror” tends to characterize the US Congress as a mostly inactive and compliant bystander, bowing to an aggressive assertion of unilateral presidential authority and power by the Bush administration. However, clarifying the conceptual framework used to examine legislative–executive interactions and congressional foreign policy behavior to account for varying patterns of interaction and varying avenues of influence yields an alternative explanation. While there is some truth to the conventional wisdom about a Congress rallying to support the president in time of war, applying the refined conceptual framework brings a more complex story into sharper focus. Viewed through this alternative lens, we see that members of Congress, and the institution as a whole, played a more discriminating and substantial—yet still predictable—role consistent with the context of the situation and the broad historical forces and patterns that combine to shape congressional foreign policy behavior and influence. Once the context and forces shaping congressional behavior and legislative–executive interactions are understood, congressional engagement (or lack thereof) in the War on Terror from 2001 to 2009 emerges as a relatively predictable sequence of initial compliance, (rallying) giving way first to competition and then to confrontation.

Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs. By Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. 312p. $84.95 cloth, $23.95 paper.

Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs. By Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. 312p. $84.95 cloth, $23.95 paper.

Understanding congressional foreign policy innovators: Mapping entrepreneurs and their strategies

Since World War II, a small group of assertive MCs have chosen to lead on foreign policy issues about which they care, without waiting on the administration to take action. Significant foreign policy innovation has been the result. From the coldest days of the Cold War to the changed circumstances after 9/11, important congressional initiatives attributable to a few key individuals can be found. Drawing on an original quantitative dataset of post-World War II congressional foreign policy activity, interviews with members and their staffs, and primary and secondary research, this paper: (a) discusses the characteristics and impact of these policymakers; (b) develops categories of entrepreneurs, drawn from issues to which entrepreneurs have devoted their attention; and (c) derives strategies of entrepreneurship drawn from the activities and avenues utilized by the entrepreneurs.

Choosing to lead: understanding congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs

Preface vii 1. Beyond the White House: Bringing Congress into the Foreign Policy Picture 1 2. From Problem to Policy: A Theory of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship 24 3. Surveying the Landscape: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs since World War II 52 4. The Rising Tide: Entrepreneurship in the Cold War Consensus Period, 1946-1967 77 5. Players in the Game: Entrepreneurship in the Cold War Dissensus Period, 1968-1989 115 6. Contending with the Thaw: Entrepreneurship in the Post-Cold War Period, 1990-2000 154 7. After 9/11: Entrepreneurs into the 21st Century 205 8. Part of the Landscape: Conclusions on the Entrepreneur Effect 221 Notes 247 Bibliography 255 Index 287

Never Surrender? How Women's Groups Abandoned Their Policy Niche in U.S. Foreign Policy Debates, 1916–2000

From World War I through the 1960s, U.S. women's organizations regularly trekked to Capitol Hill to influence congressional foreign policy debates. Yet by the 1990s, these groups had largely disengaged from international affairs. Why? Using an original data set of women's group appearances before Congress from 1916 to 2000, this study documents and explains this puzzling development by exploring the mutually reinforcing linkages among women's identity, claims to issue ownership, and interest group evolution. In the case at hand, the advent of citizen and economic groups competing with women's organizations for ownership of foreign policy questions, coupled with the declining legitimacy of gender “difference” arguments and the resurgence of “sameness” arguments, led women's groups to focus on the dimensions of foreign policy affecting women's rights and status, in particular, and to abandon less explicitly gendered foreign policy issues almost entirely. As multipurpose women's associations declined in vitality, and feminist groups fueled by newly available philanthropic dollars staked claim to women's rights-and-status questions, organized womanhood surrendered much of the foreign-policy issue space over which women had long claimed political authority, and women's groups' presence on Capitol Hill waned.

U.S. Senators’ Support for Israel Examined Through Sponsorship/Cosponsorship Decisions, 1993-2002: The Influence of Elite and Constituent Factors

This paper explores Senate policy-making toward Israel from 1993–2002. Previous scholarship suggests that congressional policymaking toward Israel is heavily influenced by the ethnic and religious identification of both legislators and their constituents, not simply by legislators' abstract perceptions of the national interest. Other literature de-emphasizes the likelihood that constituent interests will affect Congressional foreign policy making. We test for an impact of both elite and constituent characteristics on Congressional support for Israel, using sponsorship–cosponsorship decisions in the 103rd–107th Congresses. Israel's strongest supporters in this period are shown to be Jewish, conservative, Republican, and evangelical senators. Notably, elite characteristics (partisanship, ideology, and religion) matter more than constituency factors, with the exception of the Jewish population in senators' home states. While Jewish and conservative senators have long been vocal supporters of Israel, evangelical and Republican senators have not historically taken such a strong pro-Israel stance; hence they are relatively new additions to the active pro-Israel coalition. Thus the pro-Israel coalition shows both continuity and change as it has broadened to include new partners. However, we suggest that this coalition is not necessarily stable and may undergo further evolution in the future.

“Comfort to Our Adversaries”? Partisan Ideology, Domestic Vulnerability, and Strategic Targeting

Recent research on strategic conflict avoidance and targeting in the American case shows that states avoid militarily challenging presidents whose domestic situations might be improved by diversionary conflict, and that congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy invites increased challenges by decreasing other states' perceptions of likely American resolve. This article seeks to refine these lines of research by considering the intervening effects of partisan ideology. As previous scholarship indicates that diversion is a more attractive option for conservative than for liberal governments, there are likely greater incentives for other states to strategically avoid Republicans given lagging economic conditions. Conversely, the relative liberal aversion to military ventures means that the resolve-undermining effects of congressional opposition are likely more pronounced for Democrats. Analyses of the American foreign policy experience from 1949 to 2001 provide support for these hypotheses, as increases in the misery index are related to substantial decreases in the militarized targeting of Republican administrations and congressional foreign policy opposition acts are related to substantial increases in the militarized targeting of Democratic administrations.

Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline of Establishment Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy

Is establishment internationalism in decline? Conventional wisdom is becoming that structural shifts in the international environment along with generational, demographic, and cultural changes within the United States are inexorably leading to the decline of the broad, post-war internationalist consensus that dominated American foreign policy after 1945. Despite the frequent assertion that this change has taken place, very few studies have analyzed the extent to which establishment internationalism is in fact in decline. To answer this question, we first track trends in congressional foreign policy votes from the American Conservative Union (1970–2004) and Americans for Democratic Action (1948–2004). Our second set of indicators tracks the state of birth, educational profile, and formative international experience of a cross section of the U.S. foreign policy elite. Our third and fourth sets of indicators track elite attitudes as represented by presidential State of the Union addresses and major party platforms. We find support for increasing partisan polarization in Congress on foreign policy as well as increasing regional concentration of the parties. However, there is only mixed evidence to suggest that internationalism has experienced a secular decline overall. Support for international engagement and multilateral institutions remain important parts of elite foreign policy rhetoric. Moreover, we find that social backgrounds of U.S. foreign policy elites—save for military service—have not substantially changed from the height of the internationalist era.

アメリカ対外政策の継続と民主制度

The United States responded to the end of the Cold War by promoting trade with regimes that adopted market-oriented reforms but investing in weapons development to maintain superiority over non-democratizing military powers. This policy was sustained in Congress in spite of majority Party changes, divided government, and economic swings. This article constructs a framework that incorporates Presidential agenda setting, partisan debates over control of the agenda, and ideological overlap between the parties to identify the lawmakers behind this policy. This framework builds on Tsebelis’ veto player theory, which includes both institutional veto points and partisan veto players, and predicts voting patterns that differ from Krehbiel's pivotal politics model (focusing exclusively on institutional veto points), Cox and McCubbins’ partisan agenda model (examining only partisan veto players), or the two presidency thesis (emphasizing Presidential agenda setting). The framework is then applied to understand Congressional foreign policy voting patterns. An analysis of Congressional bills and resolutions on China trade, defense spending, and missile defense spending shows voting patterns that are in line with the predictions from this framework, rather than existing models and suggests that stable support for the above policy comes from a bipartisan, pro-business, and President-supportive group of lawmakers.

Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975-1996

Why are some foreign policy votes partisan and others bipartisan? The authors argue that an electoral connection drives partisanship in congressional foreign policy voting. Members of Congress depend on core supporters for mobilization and money, and primary voters are likely to follow the opinion cues of partisan elites; as a result, when Republican and Democratic opinion elites hold more distinct views on an issue, one may expect to observe more partisan behavior in Congress on both low and high-politics foreign policy issues. An empirical analysis of elite public opinion and congressional voting on foreign policy issues for six Congresses between 1975 and 1996 supports the elite opinion cleavage argument.

Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs In Post-World War II U.S. Foreign Policy

“Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs” are those legislators who initiate their own foreign policy agendas. These individuals seek to frame policy discussions and mobilize public and interest group interest; to direct congressional agendas toward specific foreign policy issues; to structure and influence the formulation of foreign policies by the executive branch; to revise, refocus, or reformulate foreign policies; to generate alternative and replacement foreign policies; and to fill policy vacuums with their own preferred foreign policies. This paper examines the evolution and impact of such entrepreneurs across the periods of the Cold War Consensus (1946–1967), the Cold War Dissensus (1968–1989), and the Post-Cold War (1990–2000). The paper first provides an overview of the concept of foreign policy entrepreneurs. It then turns to case studies of entrepreneurial initiatives from three prolific entrepreneurs whose careers span the post-World War II era: Senators Jacob Javits, Edward Kennedy, and Christopher Dodd. Together, the overview and cases shed light on the different avenues and activities that entrepreneurs use to address their preferred issues and the impact entrepreneurs have on policy, as well as highlight changes in both over time.

Taking the Lead: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in U.S. Foreign Policy

This article examines the characteristics of individual members of Congress who become “foreign policy entrepreneurs.” Rather than simply responding to an administration's foreign policy requests, such legislators try to lead Congress by initiating action on the foreign policy issues they care about rather than awaiting administration action. This study examines foreign policy entrepreneurs across a number of factors, including the parties to which they belong, the chambers in which they serve, the various legislative access points they employ, and the different legislative tactics they use. Also examined are the changes in such patterns over time. We test hypotheses about the characteristics and behavior of entrepreneurs using a data set of 2,621 instances of entrepreneurial behavior across the post‐World War II period. We conclude that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are increasingly salient players in the foreign policy process and are driven by policy disagreements and partisan calculations.

The Life of Milwaukee’s Most Popular Politician, Clement J. Zablocki: Milwaukee Politics and Congressional Foreign Policy

The Life of Milwaukee’s Most Popular Politician, Clement J. Zablocki: Milwaukee Politics and Congressional Foreign Policy

Acting on the Hill: Congressional Assertiveness in U.S. Foreign Policy

A controversy has developed in recent years pitting those who see a resurgent Congress in U.S. foreign policy against those who argue that Congress remains largely acquiescent and uninvolved. This article addresses the disagreement, using a database of congressional foreign policy activity from 1946 to 1997 to weigh the competing claims. Our results show that congressional foreign policy activity has declined over the post-World War II era while congressional foreign policy assertiveness, relative to the administration's requests, has increased during this same period. Congress is thus less active but more assertive. Based on these results, we offer a two-dimensional model of congressional foreign policy behavior that better reflects the variety of congressional roles in U.S. foreign policy.