Conditionality In IMF-supported Programs Research Articles

Expenditure Conditionality in IMF-supported Programs

This paper studies the impact of expenditure conditionality in IMF programs on the composition of public spending. A granular dataset on different government expenditure conditions covering 115 countries for the 1992-2016 period is compiled. The results support the view that while conditionality on specific elements of spending could help achieve a program's short-term objectives, it is structural conditionality which delivers lasting benefits. Structural public financial management conditionality (such as on budget execution and control) has proven to be effective in boosting the long-term level of education, health, and public investment expenditures. The results further indicate that conditionality on raising such spending may come at the expense of other expenditures. Finally, the successful implementation (and not mere existence) of the conditionality is crucial for improved outcomes. These findings are relevant for policy makers targeting achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Expenditure Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

This paper studies the impact of expenditure conditionality in IMF programs on the composition of public spending. A granular dataset on different government expenditure conditions covering 115 countries for the 1992-2016 period is compiled. The results support the view that while conditionality on specific elements of spending could help achieve a program’s short-term objectives, it is structural conditionality which delivers lasting benefits. Structural public financial management conditionality (such as on budget execution and control) has proven to be effective in boosting the long-term level of education, health, and public investment expenditures. The results further indicate that conditionality on raising such spending may come at the expense of other expenditures. Finally, the successful implementation (and not mere existence) of the conditionality is crucial for improved outcomes. These findings are relevant for policy makers targeting achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Does Conditionality Mitigate the Potential Negative Effect of Aid on Revenues?

This paper assesses whether conditionality in IMF-supported programs has helped offset the potential negative effect of foreign aid on tax revenues. The analysis—carried out on panel data covering 1993–2012 for 111 low- and middle-income countries—shows that growing use of revenue conditionality by low-income countries partially offsets the depressing effect of foreign grants on tax revenue, particularly on taxes on goods and services. The impact of conditionality is strong in countries where aid dependence is high and where institutions are strong, suggesting that revenue conditionality cannot substitute for weak institutions in mitigating the negative effect of aid on tax revenue collection.

Does Conditionality Mitigate the Potential Negative Effect of Aid on Revenues?

This paper assesses whether conditionality in IMF-supported programs has helped offset the potential negative effect of foreign aid on tax revenues. The analysis - carried out on panel data covering 1993-2012 for 111 low- and middle-income countries - shows that growing use of revenue conditionality by low-income countries partially offsets the depressing effect of foreign grants on tax revenue, particularly on taxes on goods and services. The impact of conditionality is strong in countries where aid dependence is high and where institutions are strong, suggesting that revenue conditionality cannot substitute for weak institutions in mitigating the negative effect of aid on tax revenue collection.

Does conditionality in IMF-supported programs promote revenue reform?

This paper studies whether revenue conditionality in Fund programs had any impact on the revenue performance of 126 low- and middle-income countries during 1993–2013. The results indicate that such conditionality had a positive impact on tax revenue, with strongest improvement felt on taxes on goods and services, including the VAT. Revenue conditionality matters more for low-income countries, particularly those where revenue ratios are below the group average. Moreover, revenue conditionality appears to be more effective when targeted to a specific tax. These results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity, sample selection bias, and when revenues are adjusted for economic cycle.

Does conditionality in IMF-supported programs promote revenue reform?

This paper studies whether revenue conditionality in Fund-supported programs had any impact on the revenue performance of 126 low- and middle-income countries during 1993-2013. The results indicate that such conditionality had a positive impact on tax revenue, with strongest improvement felt on taxes on goods and services, including the VAT. Revenue conditionality matters more for low-income countries, particularly those where revenue ratios are below the group average. Moreover, revenue conditionality appears to be more effective when targeted to a specific tax. These results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity, sample selection bias, and when revenues are adjusted for economic cycle.

Does Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs Promote Revenue Reform?

This paper studies whether revenue conditionality in Fund-supported programs had any impact on the revenue performance of 126 low- and middle-income countries during 1993-2013. The results indicate that such conditionality had a positive impact on tax revenue, with strongest improvement felt on taxes on goods and services, including the VAT. Revenue conditionality matters more for low-income countries, particularly those where revenue ratios are below the group average. Moreover, revenue conditionality appears to be more effective when targeted to a specific tax. These results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity, sample selection bias, and when revenues are adjusted for economic cycle.

2011 Review of Conditionality and the Design of Fund-Supported Programs - Concept Note

The Fund regularly assesses conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with the next formal review planned for 2011. This paper summarizes previous assessments of conditionality, outlines staff’s proposed approach to the forthcoming review, and seeks Directors’ early views on the approach.

Third Periodic Monitoring Report on the Status of Implementation Plans in Response to Board-Endorsed IEO Recommendations

Periodic Monitoring Reports (PMRs) were established by the Executive Board in January 2007 to ensure the systematic monitoring of those IEO recommendations that the Board has endorsed. The first PMR was discussed by the Executive Board in January 20081 and the second PMR was discussed by the Evaluation Committee (EVC) in November 2008.2 This third report updates the status of the performance benchmarks related to IEO evaluations covered in the first and second PMRs and listed in Periodic Monitoring Report on the Status of Implementation Plans in Response to Board-Endorsed IEO Recommendations, Table 5. It also updates the implementation status of the management implementation plan (MIP) for Board-endorsed recommendations stemming from the IEO evaluation of "Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs."

Implementation Plan in Response to Board-Endorsed Recommendations Arising from the IEO Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

Implementation Plan in Response to Board-Endorsed Recommendations Arising from the IEO Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

Application of Structural Conditionality - 2008 Annual Report

This report provides an update, based on objective indicators, of the application of structural conditionality in Fund-supported programs. Such annual reports on structural conditionality are one element of the management implementation plan (MIP) prepared in response to the Board-endorsed recommendations made in the IEO evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs. This annual report covers Fund arrangements approved during the period 1995–2007 (and their reviews through April 30, 2008), extending therefore the dataset contained in the recent IEO report by about three years (from 2005 to 2007). In addition, this report examines experience with Policy Support Instruments (PSIs), which were introduced in October 2005, and thus not covered in the IEO evaluation.

Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time

Using a historical case study this article provides an example of how heterogeneity of interests within a government may affect the interplay between country ownership of reforms and conditionality in IMF-supported programs. The case study also highlights how pro-reformers’ preferences may be conditional on reforms advancing their personal agendas. This suggests a new issue to be addressed by formal models of conditionality. Two main themes emerge from the analysis: (a) the importance of a clear hierarchy to unify heterogeneous interests among decision makers; and, (b) a flexible country-tailored approach to conditionality can contribute to domestic ownership of reforms.

Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to own a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.

Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in Imf-Supported Programs

IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to own a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.

Strengthening the Global Financial Architecture and the Reform of IMF and the World Bank

The paper firstly analyses the agendas and progress in strengthening the architecture of the International Financial System after the Asian crises, including introduction of prudential regulation, promotion of private involvement, quest of adequate exchange regime, prevention of financial crisis etc.Secondly the paper discusses the function focusing of the two Breton Woods institutions.IMF would restructure its role to play in macro-economic surveillance and lend in the short span, and the World Bank would take initiative in poverty alleviation and development.Thirdly the paper reviews the recent increase in number and scope of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs and proposes the radical change from the viewpoint of ownership and participation.

Implementation of Monetary Policy and the Central Bank's Balance Sheet

This paper discusses how the choice of central banks' operating targets influences the use of their monetary policy instruments and how the latter affect the central bank's balance sheet. This is of particular interest, since the monetary conditionality in IMF-supported programs has traditionally been linked to central bank balance sheet items. Quantity targeting tends to be practiced today mostly in countries in which money markets are not yet well-developed or a monetary aggregate is used as the intermediate target. Most other central banks prefer to target a short-term interest rate, which results in day-to-day changes in balance sheet items becoming endogenous.

Implementation of Monetary Policy and the Central Bank's Balance Sheet

This paper discusses how the choice of central banks' operating targets influences the use of their monetary policy instruments and how the latter affect the central bank's balance sheet. This is of particular interest, since the monetary conditionality in IMF-supported programs has traditionally been linked to central bank balance sheet items. Quantity targeting tends to be practiced today mostly in countries in which money markets are not yet well-developed or a monetary aggregate is used as the intermediate target. Most other central banks prefer to target a short-term interest rate, which results in day-to-day changes in balance sheet items becoming endogenous.