ion yields a flawed view of moral agency and of others as sources of moral obligations. cosmopolitan justice perspective also funda mentally misconstrues the nature of moral responsibility by adopting im partial moral reasoning and hence systematically undervaluing contex tual elements crucial to moral assessment. Impartiality demands that concrete, supposedly extrinsic features of persons be kept external to moral deliberation. But often it is these contextual features of moral patients and moral situations that prove most important for responding well. In contrast to the cosmopolitan justice approach, cosmopolitan care incorporates con textual awareness and sensitivity in several regards. Cosmopolitan care 27Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, p. 4. 28Himmelfarb, The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism, p. 77. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.45 on Fri, 02 Sep 2016 05:31:44 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 398 Sarah Clark Miller understands moral patients—the subjects of the global duty to care—as embodied persons with context-specific needs situated, very importantly, in a nexus of relations of power and domination. Moreover, cosmopoli tan care registers the importance of contextual sensitivity for skills of moral perception and moral judgment, as well as for adequately carrying out one's moral obligation in particular situations. For these reasons, a relatively thick sense of situatedness—of moral agents and moral pa tients—enters moral deliberation from a cosmopolitan care perspective. Flaving examined the four main criticisms, proponents of cosmopoli tan justice might claim that although not the main focus of the theory, cosmopolitan justice can accommodate cosmopolitan care's concerns and incorporate the positive moral suggestions cosmopolitan care offers in response. That is, the response might be that theorists of cosmopolitan justice can take account of the criticisms and oversights I register, or that in any case, their approach does not preclude space for development of these views. Writing two decades ago in the midst of the justice-care de bates, Cheshire Calhoun provides a response to this claim that is still highly relevant and incisive: Although we can and should test the ethics of justice by asking whether it could consis tently include the central moral issues in the ethics of care, we might also ask what ideol ogies of the moral life are likely to result from the repeated inclusion or exclusion of particular topics in moral theorizing.29 In raising this challenge, Calhoun points to what she calls the nonlogical of the justice tradition, including giving theoretical priority to concepts such as impartiality, rationality, individualism, and autono my, concepts, in short, that form the core of cosmopolitan justice. Calhoun continues: Starting from the observation that the ethics of justice has had centuries of workout, I want to ask what ideological implications a concentration on only some moral issues might have and which shifts in priorities might safeguard against those ideologies. This particular tack in trying to bring the ethics of care to center stage has the double advan tage of, first, avoiding the necessity of making charges of conceptual inadequacy stick, since it does not matter what the ethics of justice could consistently talk about, only what it does talk about; and, second, of avoiding the question of what, from an absolute, ahis torical point of view moral theory ought to be most preoccupied with.30 We can apply Calhoun's approach to the current justice-dominated cos mopolitanism scene. Following Calhoun, I want to argue that whether or not cosmopolitan justice can accommodate the criticisms of cosmopoli 29Cheshire Calhoun, Justice, Care, Gender Bias, Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 451-63, p. 452. 30Ibid, p. 453. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.45 on Fri, 02 Sep 2016 05:31:44 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms A Feminist Account of Global Responsibility 399 tan care, a shift in theoretical priorities with the aim of safeguarding against dominating ideologies of global moral theory is warranted. What might cosmopolitan care call forth that cosmopolitan justice, guided by the intellectual constraints of the justice perspective, has underemphasized or altogether missed? Those aware of the justice-care debates might rightfully press at this point for a detailed account of the relationship I propose between cosmo politan justice and cosmopolitan care. Do I intend cosmopolitan care to supplant cosmopolitan justice or perhaps merely to modify it? Absent a complete theory of cosmopolitan care, such proclamations are not possi ble. And establishing cosmopolitan care as a full-fledged alternative to cosmopolitan justice would require additional work that I cannot com plete here. What I can offer, however, is one prominent feature of cos mopolitan care, namely, care understood as an obligation through the global duty to care. I develop the global duty to care with Calhoun's tack in mind, while aiming to respond to cosmopolitan justice's shortcomings of hyper-individualism, idealization, abstraction, and acontextuality with a relational, nonidealized, contextual, oppression-informed account of feminist global responsibility.