Concept Of Deterrence Research Articles

Geopolitical competition of great powers in the Arctic

The article examines the complex issues of Arctic security arising from changing geopolitical realities; explores the new Cold War atmosphere in the region mixed with melting ice, which affects military planning and opens new economic opportunities and access to natural resources. Particular attention is paid to the reasons for the competition of great powers for primacy in the Arctic. It is noted that in recent years, the region has begun to shift from the principles of international cooperation and has quickly transformed into an arena of great power rivalry. The military presence has increased as well as the competing economic investments and political activity from significant political actors: Russia, China, and the United States of America. Now that all the great powers are investing in the Arctic, the concept of peace and cooperation is giving way to the concept of security and deterrence. To examine these factors, thе article uses a typical neorealist view of international relations, arguing that the driving force behind the rapid growth of the Arctic race is not the region itself, but the transforming structure of the international relations, which tends to effectively reproduce the causes of global competition. It the author’s view, peaceful rivalry in the Arctic may not last long, given the lack of effective institutions to address security issues in the region and the fact that changes in the global balance of power also affect local disputes and grievances.

Wanted: a strategy to integrate deterrence

ABSTRACT Integrated deterrence is a new term in the defence lexicon, introduced by members of the Biden administration to describe a key concept in current U.S. National Security Strategy. This article unpacks this concept by explaining why deterrence is no longer integrated. It identifies the technological, social, and environmental changes that produced this emergent demand for a fundamental assessment of the workings of deterrence today. The concept of deterrence itself, however, does not require reassessment. Rather, the focus here is on applying existing theory to a new strategic setting. The narrative surveys criteria suggested by various authors to guide the process of integration while explaining why some of these ideas are unsuitable as a starting point for integrating deterrence. The article then identifies several themes that should be incorporated into a future deterrence strategy and concludes with some observations about where the task of integrating deterrence might commence.

Structuring adaptations: Resilience, restrictive deterrence, and the Cunningham precursor control papers

Inspired by Giommoni's assessment of the Cunningham precursor control scholarship, we propose two concepts to help drug policy scholars think through the mechanisms that operate when market participants are faced with a change in precursor availability. The first is the concept of restrictive deterrence, that emphasizes risks mitigation strategies such as looking into changes in the frequency, methods, markets that may occur after different types of interventions. While restrictive deterrence is an improvement over current approaches in thinking through adaptations, it falls short in its narrower focus on the individual, rather than organizations or the market as a collective. The concept of resilience is then proposed as alternative that allows scholars to elaborate specific hypotheses and assess both organizations and markets based on their capacity to anticipate, cope, adapt and ultimately recover from disruptions. We finish by providing a reading of the Cunningham and colleagues precursor control papers with the resilience framework in mind, showing that many of the elements were already present in their work.

Dualisme Kebijakan Keamanan Nuklir Korea Utara Melalui Uji Coba Rudal Antar Benua Tahun 2021-2022

In 2021-2022, North Korea's nuclear developments surprised public. The testing of missiles over the past year produced the latest advanced nuclear. North Korea developing new an intercontinental nuke called "Hwasong-17". This article will discuss the dualism of nuclear policy carried out by North Korea through intercontinental missile tests to increase the national security in 2021-2022. The research focuses on two discussions. First, the movement of intercontinental nuclear tests and the response from world community. Second, the dualism policy impact for North Korea towards The Country's security. This article contain the Offense-Defense Theory, Nuclear Deterrence Concept with qualitative approach and descriptive research methods. The results of this article is to aim the impacts of North Korea's nuclear policy which used as main military strategy to maintain the country's security in positive and negative perspective

Deterrence lessons from Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Nostalgic for Cold War realism

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Yardsticks for deterrence

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Allies and partners: the role of Japan

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Why Indo-Pacific deterrence matters

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

The Philippines, Australia and other partners

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Taiwan and its predicament

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Danger, hiding in plain sight

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Consistent America, inconstant America

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’. In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Cross Domain Deterrence in Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region

Deterrence as a concept is deeply rooted in human nature and for a considerable time it was contested and jilted, yet it resurfaced in one way or the other. Nuclear weapons became the backbone of the concept of Deterrence. Due to the inherent dynamism of Revolution in Military Affairs, the supremacy of Nuclear is being challenged with the advent of the latest technologies which are acting as enablers and disruptors. The concept of Cross DomainDeterrence emerged a decade ago, took shape, and entered the strategic lexicon. It has enablers and drivers, while a gradual shift in this direction is visible. While remaining within the ambit of complex interdependence theory given by Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye. This article examines the applicability of Cross-Domain Deterrence in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region focusing on the US, China, India, and Pak to identify the need to look beyond the horizon and embrace the change.

Explaining Medical Cannabis Diversion Among Medical Cannabis License Holders: A Moderation Model

This study explores cannabis diversion and its associated factors through the lens of procedural justice theory and deterrence concepts. A quantitative research survey was conducted among 202 medical cannabis license holders in Israel to assess the prevalence, frequency, attitudes, trust in the healthcare system, and fear of punishment related to medical cannabis diversion. Our findings revealed that 60% of license holders engage in medical cannabis diversion, primarily driven by altruistic motives. Attitudes toward diversion were found to act as mediators between trust in the healthcare system, fear of punishment, and the act of diversion. The widespread occurrence of medical cannabis diversion underscores its significance and warrants focused attention. The disparity between criminal law and practical realities necessitates policy revisions concerning medical cannabis.

Navigating nuclear narratives in contemporary television: The BBC’s Vigil

Abstract This article explores the BBC television drama Vigil (2021) as a significant site for the construction of public knowledge about nuclear weapons. In doing so, it extends beyond discourse-oriented approaches to explore how nuclear discourses manifest in visual communication, everyday encounters, and popular imagination. In a close reading of Vigil, this article questions concepts of security, peace, and deterrence, revealing how the series (occasionally) challenges conventional discourses while reproducing gendered and racialised representations of nuclear weapons politics. The exploration asks questions of responsibility for nuclear decision-making, the portrayal of anti-nuclear activists, and the depiction of nuclear weapons as agents of both peace and destruction. While the BBC series reproduces existing (and problematic) discourses, it also provides a ‘thinking space’ for critical engagement. Amid the current geopolitical landscape, this article emphasises the urgency of studying contemporary representations of nuclear weapons and the need for scholarship that challenges traditional Cold War perspectives.

Sailing close to the wind: Japan’s forward deterrence posture toward the Taiwan Strait

ABSTRACT Some scholars claim that Japan’s 2022 documents mark a critical juncture in security policy. Is this the case? I argue for a positive answer but, based on deterrence concepts, not for the reasons advanced. Counterstrike capabilities and other aspects of the documents pinpointed by scholars are more adaptations of, than deviations from, past deterrence practices. An overlooked and more substantial evolution is taking place amid an intensifying deterrence-entrapment dilemma: the adoption of a forward deterrence posture aimed at preventing crises in the Taiwan Strait through the projection of general deterrent effects. This posture constitutes a critical juncture because it sets Japan on the path of becoming a potent regional security actor. It also raises questions about Tokyo’s ability to keep a balanced approach toward China.

Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion

Abstract Traditionally used within the context of hard military power in interstate relations, the concept of deterrence has been progressively extended to non-state actors and new issue areas. While scholarship on the social aspects of deterrence has expanded our understanding of this core international security practice, the focus of existing research has largely remained on physical security. This article argues that there is a phenomenon in international politics that can be called memory-political deterrence. Memory-political deterrence refers to the ways in which states seek to dissuade other political actors from taking actions that threaten the collective memory narratives that underpin the ontological security of the deterring actor. Memory-political deterrence works, for example, through political rhetoric, declarations, diplomatic insults, commemorative practices, and punitive memory laws. We illustrate the article’s arguments through empirical examples from Russia’s and China’s recent memory-political deterrence efforts toward Ukraine and Japan, respectively. In doing so, we elucidate the ways in which memory politics is intertwined with geopolitics, underpinning wider world-ordering aspirations.

PRIVATE-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN CYBER SPACE AS DETERRENCE TOOLS. THE TRANS-ATLANTIC VIEW

Nowadays technological development has brought new threats and risks that states need to face in cyberspace. Given the multitude of actors, reasons, strategies, various types of attacks, the classical way of viewing the state as the sole security provider no longer functions. In this framework, private companies gain more and more competencies and responsibilities, especially in the areas of critical infrastructure. The present article explores the role of public-private partnerships in the national cybersecurity strategies of each NATO member state as tools of deterrence. The paper starts by analysing the concepts of deterrence and resilience. Secondly, it emphasizes the view of NATO regarding the topic, this aspect being followed by each of the 31 NATO member states’ most recent national cybersecurity strategies, highlighting the objectives, measures, and examples of PPPs that each state has in order to highlight the status-quo at empirical level.

İran’ın Vekil Güç İnşasında İzlediği Kimlik Politikası: Azerbaycan İslami Direniş Hareketi (Hüseynçilər/Hüseyniyyun) Örneği

The Islamic Republic of Iran faced severe security problems shortly after the Islamic Revolution. The experiences gained from these threats have thoughtfully shaped Iran's defense strategy in the following years. Forward defense and deterrence concepts are essential toIran's defense strategy. The proxy power strategy, which has been actively carried out since the Revolution, can also be considered an extension of Iran's forward defense and deterrence concept. In this context, Iran is in contact with and manages many groups, large and small, over a wide geography, from Afghanistan to Nigeria and Yemen to Syria. Thus, it seeks to meet potential threats beyond its borders and increase its sanction power in these countries by building groups that will act in parallel with its own policies. He establishes affinity with these groups largely through an identity-based discourse. The Azerbaijan Islamic Resistance Organization (Hüseynçilər/Husayniyyun), which has started to work for the Republic of Azerbaijan since 2013 and whose activities have become visible since 2015, is one of the proxy forces that Iran supports within the scope of these policies. In this study, the background and organizational structure that form the basis of the discourse and activities of this organization, through which Iran is directed and managed within the scope of the proxy power strategy, will be discussed