This article highlights G. Kennan’s strategic views on Ukraine, and his recommendations regarding the Ukrainian national factor in the U.S. strategy. These issues were studied against the background of Kennan's strategic thinking on the USSR, and development of “containment” strategy, mostly in 1946–1952. The conclusions emphasize that the ultimate goals of “containment” in Kennan’s interpretation were to make the USSR abandon expansionist foreign policy, and to change its concept of international relations by means short of war. He believed that the threat from the USSR existed as long as the totalitarian regime was in power, and advocated for gradual and peaceful changes in the USSR towards liberalization and modernization. He rejected the idea of its disintegration, and recognized the right to secede only for the Baltic republics. He did not recommend any policies, and did not support any activities to promote independence of Ukraine. But he did not object to the revival of national life of some peoples, including Ukrainians, and development views among them that would help change Soviet conduct. Kennan viewed the USSR as “Russia”, and believed that the U.S. should build its policy on cooperation with Russians. His personal sentiments, that is love for Russian people and Russian culture, also influenced his policy recommendations. For him, Ukrainians and Russians were too close ethnically, and their economic activities were tightly intertwined. Therefore, Ukraine's secession could cause a negative reaction and consequences for Russians. He predicted that sooner or later Russia would challenge an independent Ukraine, and Ukrainians would be forced to turn to the United States for military support. For these reasons, he viewed the future of Ukrainians in a federal union with Russians in the “new Russia”. Some Kennan's conclusions remain relevant today, and his strategic thinking on Russia and Ukraine continues to influence a significant number of U.S. political scientists and politicians.
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