Concept Of Epistemic Injustice Research Articles

Loneliness as lack of solidarity: The case of Palestinians standing alone.

This paper explores the notion of loneliness as lack of solidarity in relations to Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel, and the diaspora. Loneliness as lack of solidarity is defined as lacking someone to identify with and/or lacking someone who is willing to assist while carrying a burden. We describe the mechanism of lack of identification using the concept of epistemic injustice. The paper suggests that art may serve as a way to mitigate this kind of loneliness, and focus on the Freedom Theater, which was operating in Jenin Refugee Camp until recently.

Defining a Nation: Métis Nation Building in the Face of Epistemic Injustice

Abstract: Over the past four decades, Indigenous political claims "in" Canada have come increasingly to assume a nationalist form. Efforts at instilling a national identity play an abundantly clear role in Indigenous nation (re)building: they hold the potential to concretize internal solidarity, mobilize community to pursue long-term goals, and they aid in overcoming a host of collective action problems. However, for national claims to play such a role, it is necessary that outside groups recognize a community's national identity and accept it as distinct. That is to say, nationhood must be thought about in terms of its occurrence in an (unequally) relational context: claims to a national distinction occur in competition with other claims, in a field of struggle and competition in which actors possess varying abilities to enforce/support claims and to have those claims recognized by others. In this regard, the concept of epistemic injustice is especially useful to engage with the differential capacity of communities to claim and enforce national claims unto others. Our analysis, which focuses specifically on the case of the Métis, pays particular attention to the widespread misrecognitions that occur when a dominant social group marginalizes Métis claims to nationhood. Through this exploration, our article contributes to a better understanding of relational conditions overall and the ways in which identity and nationhood can support the process of Indigenous nation building.

Determining the scope of epistemic injustice within psychiatry

ABSTRACT In this article, we delve in debates around the usefulness of the notion of epistemic injustice in psychiatry to show that the concept has been misportrayed in the literature. We suggest that epistemic injustice should revolve around phenomenology and regard first and foremost the failure of mental health professionals to acquire and utilize information that service users are experts in, i.e. first-person testimony pertaining to what it is like to be them. We use this conceptualization to demonstrate the unique benefits that the concept of epistemic injustice can bring to psychiatric practice, and we illustrate these through specific case studies, focusing particularly on autism.

The epistemic injustice of borderline personality disorder

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) has been a controversial diagnosis for over 40 years. It was to be removed from the latest version of the ICD, only to be reintroduced as a trait qualifier as a result of last-minute lobbying. Retaining BPD as a de facto diagnosis keeps us stuck at a deadlock that undermines the voices of patients who have persistently told us this label adds ‘insult to injury’. Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice helps illuminate how this affects subjectivity and speech, hermeneutically sealing patients in ways of thinking that are not evidence-based, resulting in testimonial smothering (altering or withholding one's narratives) and testimonial quieting (dismissing a speaker's capacity to provide worthy testimony) that prevent more affirmative explanations.

Language as a Source of Epistemic Injustice in Organisations

AbstractAlthough there is now a substantial body of literature exploring the effects of language diversity in international management contexts, little attention has been paid to the ethical dimensions of language diversity at work. This conceptual paper draws on the concept of epistemic injustice in order to explore how language, and in particular corporate language policies, may act as a source of epistemic injustice within the workplace. It demonstrates how language competence affects credibility judgements about a speaker, and also considers how corporate language policies can create situations of hermeneutic injustice, in which marginalised groups are denied the vocabularies to understand their own experiences. Finally, ways in which such epistemic harms can be reduced are discussed, and the possibilities for management education to create epistemically responsible managers are highlighted.

Diversity and language technology: how language modeling bias causes epistemic injustice

It is well known that AI-based language technology—large language models, machine translation systems, multilingual dictionaries, and corpora—is currently limited to three percent of the world’s most widely spoken, financially and politically backed languages. In response, recent efforts have sought to address the “digital language divide” by extending the reach of large language models to “underserved languages.” We show how some of these efforts tend to produce flawed solutions that adhere to a hard-wired representational preference for certain languages, which we call language modeling bias. Language modeling bias is a specific and under-studied form of linguistic bias were language technology by design favors certain languages, dialects, or sociolects with respect to others. We show that language modeling bias can result in systems that, while being precise regarding languages and cultures of dominant powers, are limited in the expression of socio-culturally relevant notions of other communities. We further argue that at the root of this problem lies a systematic tendency of technology developer communities to apply a simplistic understanding of diversity which does not do justice to the more profound differences that languages, and ultimately the communities that speak them, embody. Drawing on the concept of epistemic injustice, we point to the broader ethico-political implications and show how it can lead not only to a disregard for valuable aspects of diversity but also to an under-representation of the needs of marginalized language communities. Finally, we present an alternative socio-technical approach that is designed to tackle some of the analyzed problems.

Using the concept of epistemic injustice and cultural humility for understanding why and how social work curricular might be decolonized

ABSTRACT The notion of decolonizing the curriculum is currently gaining momentum in Higher Education Institutions (HEI) across the world and in the United Kingdom (UK). Fuelled by the movements #RhodesMustFall, ‘Why is my curriculum White?’, and critical incidents such as the killing of George Floyd and the #BlackLivesMatter protests, campaigners for decolonizing the curriculum have all questioned the omission of other perspectives from dominant Eurocentric White curricula at universities around the world, including social work education. This paper reports the findings of a qualitative study that involved 20 in-depth interviews with social work academics, social work students and practice educators (field instructors) in an English HEI social work department about their perspective on decolonizing the curriculum in social work education. The concepts of epistemic injustice and cultural humility were used to examine the data. Findings suggest that social work education is not immune to the centering of a Eurocentric curriculum and White middle-class values and needs to change to embrace other epistemology. The paper concludes by arguing that the concepts of epistemic injustices and cultural humility are especially relevant for understanding why and how social work curricula might be decolonized.

On “epistemic injustice” and victimization in prisons

The article looks for reasons that explain the different results of criminal investigations conducted inside and outside prisons. We ask if and how the concept of epistemic injustice, as developed by Miranda Fricker, helps to understand those variations. The underlying hypothesis is that epistemic injustice is a symptom of a wider problem. The authors assume that the treatment of victims of violent crime inside prison has structural rather than interpersonal explanations. In a qualitative approach the study uses data from a series of semi-structured interviews with prisoners and prison officers (40 interviews in total). It explores the dynamics of the decision to report crime committed inside prisons and the role of different institutions involved in the investigation of these crimes from the perspective and experience of prisoners and prison officers. As result it is argued, that Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice is not very helpful when it comes to understand epistemic injustice suffered by victims of violent crime inside prison. It can be better understood in the terms of epistemic oppression used by Dotson. Thus, it is not about assigning blame but how to change the underlying social relations and institutions that subordinate prisoners on epistemic grounds.

Editorial of dossier “Epistemic Injustice in Criminal Procedure”

There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that the seed planted by Fricker has flourished into a rich field of study in which the concept is used to analyze many different phenomena in law, not always following the original characterization provided by her. This has led to a distinction between what we will call the narrow version of the concept, which is closer to Fricker’s original account, and the wider version of epistemic injustice, which is a more controversial notion because it is always on the verge of morphing into other well-known concepts like sexism, racial discrimination, oppression, silencing, and gaslighting. We will show that the value of the narrow version is mostly theoretical, and that in order to use the concept of epistemic injustice one must adopt a more liberal understanding of it.

"Som erfarenhetsforskare, då är man med och bestämmer i forskningsprojektet"

'As a community researcher, you get to make decisions in the research project’ – an autoethnographic study about a joint research processIn a participatory action research project, we emphasize experiences of collaboration between academic and community researchers by applying analytical autoethnography. The aim of the article is to describe the research process which involves both individual and collaborative processes, and to analyze challenges in relation to participation in the ongoing research process. We identified four themes: Start-up and initial challenges, Conditions and structural prerequisites for collaboration, Joint development of work methods and Power and role distribution. Our findings are presented in two separate analyses; a collaborative inductive analysis and an academic led theoretical analysis in which Arnstein’s ladder of participation and Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice are utilized in order to scrutinize challenges related to different degrees of participation in the research process. The results demonstrate that shared hermeneutic resources are necessary for the mitigation of epistemic injustice and enablement of mutual learning processes, such as collective writing processes. The results also indicate that a full participation for community researchers in the entire research process was difficult to achieve, both in relation to structural resources such as allocated time, and in relation to perceptions of meaning- making aspects, for example, individual interests and contributionsin terms of knowledge.

Psychiatrization, assertions of epistemic justice, and the question of agency.

Thus far, the concept of epistemic injustice in the context of psychiatry has been discussed more widely by clinical academics than by authors with personal experience of psychiatrization. It is from the latter perspective that I critique the practice of attributing testimonial injustice solely to the "stigma against mental illness", and point to psychiatric diagnosing itself as a principal enabler and re-producer of this form of injustice. In relation to hermeneutical justice, I take a closer look at initiatives seeking to incorporate (collective) first-person knowledge into the epistemic systems that currently dominate mental-health service provision and research. Highlighting the incompatibility of psychiatric knowledge claims with first-person ways of knowing, I discuss some of the issues and challenges involved in achieving epistemic justice for psychiatrized people and advancing our collective knowledge base. Finally, I turn to the questions of identity and agency in these processes.

Epistemic injustice and remedy: Can BHR ever really ‘centre’ rights holders?

ABSTRACT The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) encourage the use of non-judicial grievance mechanisms (NJGMs) as complementary avenues to litigation for remedying corporate human rights abuses. However, remedy through NJGMs remains challenging. Despite a growing narrative around ‘putting rights holders at the centre’ of remedy and accountability, critiques of the corporate influence in the field of business and human rights (BHR) remain. This paper argues that the conceptual language of epistemic injustice has much to offer BHR. Focusing on remedy through NJGMs through an epistemic injustice lens, it identifies select entry points for deeper examination. The concept of epistemic injustice can help identify exercises of discursive power and practices of marginalisation in deliberative spaces, which may explain gaps between increased numbers of participants in BHR spaces and the lack of change in their lived experiences. It can help point to where and how barriers to remedy are being reproduced, and it offers additional language for rights holders to articulate specific types of harms experienced in these settings. If BHR truly aims to put rights holders at the centre, the BHR community has an ethical obligation to interrogate and address epistemic injustice both at the individual and structural levels.

Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency1

AbstractExpanding Miranda Fricker's (2007) concept of epistemic injustice, recent accounts of agential epistemic injustice (Lackey, 2020; Medina, 2021; Pohlhaus, 2020) have focused on cases in which the epistemic agency of individuals or groups is unfairly blocked, constrained, or subverted. In this article I argue that agential epistemic injustice is perpetrated against marginalized groups not only when their group epistemic agency is excluded, but also when it is included but receives defective uptake that neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression. I identify two harms that such injustice inflicts on marginalized groups: epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of resistant epistemic group agency. My analysis shows how the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur through unfair epistemic exclusions in group dynamics, but also through forms of inclusion in group dynamics that distort or coopt the epistemic agency of the group. Following Emmalon Davis (2018) and her analysis of epistemic appropriation, I argue that the harms of agential epistemic injustice can occur when the resistant epistemic resources of a marginalized group are appropriated in a way that disempowers them and critically defangs their resistant epistemic agency. I use Taylor Rogers’ (2021) analysis of the epistemic appropriation of “#MeToo” and “intersectionality” to show how epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging work in unjust epistemic group dynamics. The article offers a diagnosis of the failures of epistemic responsibility involved in agential epistemic injustice, and some suggestions for resisting those failures and working toward more responsible and just epistemic group dynamics.

Epistemic injustice in Climate Adaptation

Indigenous peoples are disproportionally vulnerable to climate change. At the same time, they possess valuable knowledge for fair and sustainable climate adaptation planning and policymaking. Yet Indigenous peoples and knowledges are often excluded from or underrepresented within adaptation plans and policies. In this paper we ask whether the concept of epistemic injustice can be applied to the context of climate adaptation and the underrepresentation of Indigenous knowledges within adaptation policies and strategies. In recent years, the concept of epistemic injustice has gained prominence, indicating that someone has been unfairly discriminated against in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007, 1). We argue that many climate adaptation policies are epistemically unjust towards Indigenous peoples because of the underrepresentation of Indigenous knowledges by showing how the case of Indigenous knowledges in climate adaptation planning and policy satisfies five conditions of epistemic injustice. We further consider what challenges there are to integrating local and Indigenous knowledges within development in general, and climate adaptation strategies in particular and how these can be addressed. Whether the lack of Indigenous knowledges in climate adaptation policies constitutes an epistemic injustice matters because an injustice denotes an unfair (dis)advantage to one group – whether by design or default – that ought to be remedied and redressed.

POLİTİK EPİSTEMOLOJİDE EPİSTEMİK ADALETSİZLİK VE HİBRİT KÖTÜLÜK

This study claims that Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice can be extended in two ways. First, the excess of credibility can be evaluated as an epistemic injustice. Fricker suggests that a deflated level of credibility causes epistemic injustice. However, practices such as forcing false statements result from excess credibility and cause epistemic injustices especially during war and detention processes. In some hierarchical situations, social actors’ hearer and speaker roles may turn into a hegemonic relationship by suggesting that the speaker has knowledge. This kind of relationship motivates exclusion, marginalization and alienation due to identity bias. Then, it can be argued that not only the lack of credibility but also its excess is an epistemic injustice. In this study, the excess of credibility is accepted as the situation faced by “people who are interrogated with the claim of having knowledge.” Second, epistemic injustice can be defined as a hybrid evil. It refers to instances of evil that contain complex motivations such as political evil, since it can neither be reduced only to the character nor to the environmental conditions. Fricker’s proposal for resolving epistemic injustice is hybrid virtues such as intellectual and reflexive critical-social sensitivity. Therefore, while individuals’ situations and context provide reflexive thinking, they also support a normative critical attitude. Fricker offers hybrid virtues for the solution while she does not define the problem as hybrid. Thus this paper proposes to extend Fricker’s concept in two ways: first, including excess of credibility within the scope of the epistemic injustice, and second, defining such injustices as political hybrid evils. Then this expansion will give political epistemology an opportunity to reevaluate given theories of politics, ethics and epistemology and increase its normative contribution to them.

Blue Justice and the co-production of hermeneutical resources for small-scale fisheries

Blue Justice emerges as a counternarrative to the promise and commitment to Blue Economy and Blue Growth by shifting imperatives for growth and innovation to the central role played by small-scale fisheries and social justice in sustainable ocean development. To instrument Blue Justice, it is important to understand injustices experienced by small-scale fisheries people which can range from accusations of disregard for the environment to equating their fishing practices as illegal, or even the sudden usurpation of their customary fishing grounds and means of livelihoods. Drawing on Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, we examine how discrimination and lack of interpretative concepts to communicate unjust experiences wrongs small-scale fisheries people in their capacity as knowledge holders and subjects them to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. We examine 20 testimonies of injustices experienced by small-scale fisheries people collected by the Global Research Network “Too Big To Ignore” (TBTI) and suggest a glossary of new concepts that can be used to interpret these experiences. Our results exemplify the presence of epistemic injustice, emphasizing the need to associate injustices in small-scale fisheries with non-conventional terms or concepts. We discuss the contribution of transdisciplinary research for providing such concepts and the potential role of social scientists and action researchers to enhance collective hermeneutical resources and thereby advance the goal of Blue Justice for small-scale fisheries.

Epistemic injustice in the age of evidence-based practice: The case of fibromyalgia

The aim of this paper is to analyze epistemic interactions in healthcare practices. In clinical encounters, participants exchange and interpret knowledge. Patients suffering from fibromyalgia often report that healthcare professionals do not take their testimonies and interpretations seriously. Such experiences will be explored using the concept of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice is wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower. In healthcare settings, epistemic injustice occurs when patients experience an unjustified discrediting as unreliable informants of their own illness experiences. First, we will argue that patients’ epistemic marginalization can be reframed as an epistemological problem. There is a gap between patients’ lived experience of illness and professionals’ conceptualization of illness as disease. This gap leads to two distinct conceptualizations, possibly causing harm to patients’ capacity as first-hand knowers. Second, we will analyze epistemic injustice in light of the dominant model of knowledge translation in medicine and healthcare, namely evidence-based practice (EBP). EBP intends to diminish the gap between scientific knowledge and clinical practice. EBP prioritizes knowledge obtained through clinical research over other forms of clinical knowledge and has the potential for harmful epistemic devaluation of patients’ stories.

The epistemic foundations of injustice: lessons from the Young Marx

This article intends to show to what extent the early Marxian categories of alienation, ideology and proletariat can serve to better understand current forms of epistemic injustice, as well as, conversely, how the latter can illuminate some unclear aspects of such concepts. In the first part, it will be explained the extent to which Marx’s concept of alienation accounts for the experience of an individual in a world to whose norms she is subject, but which she cannot recognise as her own. It will be shown that Marx finds the answer in a form of emancipatory praxis linked to a transformative appropriation of social reality. In order to deepen the understanding of this idea of emancipation, the second part will analyse the Marxian concept of the proletariat. It will be argued that taking up some considerations about the Hegelian figure of the rabble, Marx distinguishes a “liberal” from a “human” form of emancipation. In the third part, a contemporary example will be used to show the usefulness of the young Marx’s analyses concerning this dimension of emancipation struggles. In the fourth part, these ideas will be developed further through the concept of epistemic injustice, which has gained great importance in the recent studies that Critical Theory carries out of the different socio-epistemic blocks of an ideological nature that prevent articulating, communicating and overcoming negative experiences that hinder individual self-realisation. In this sense, it will be shown the importance of the Marxian categories of alienation and ideology to theoretically address current forms of epistemic injustice, and, in relation to this, it will be explained the transformative and constitutive function of the excluded in the creation of new sectors of reality through which their demands can be met.

Decolonizing the Internet by Decolonizing Ourselves: Challenging Epistemic Injustice through Feminist Practice

Seventy-five percent of the world’s online population is from the global South, and nearly half is projected to be women. Yet public knowledge on the internet - exemplified by Wikipedia - is primarily constructed by (white) men from western Europe and North America. One in ten Wikipedia editors are estimated to self-identify as female. In other words, the internet of the majority is produced by the minority. But Wikipedia is only one example of the deeply skewed experience of the internet: from the design and architecture of the internet, to the production and reproduction of knowledge on the internet, this globalised “public sphere” not only reflects the structural and representative inequalities of our world, it can, in many ways, amplify and deepen them. Still, the internet’s socio-technical nature can also engender potentially emancipatory processes in which communities on the “margins” of both the physical and virtual worlds can produce and curate their own knowledge online. Whose Knowledge? is a global, multilingual campaign that aims to make public knowledge and the online experience less white, male, straight, and global North in origin. Using Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice and Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s exhortation to decolonize our methodologies, the Whose Knowledge? campaign has supported marginalised communities like Dalits from India and the diaspora, queer activists from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Kumeyaay Native American Nation, to begin centering their knowledge online. The authors are feminist scholars, organizers, and technologists, and we describe the practices of decolonizing ourselves in this effort, in particular our approach to embedding feminist and anti-colonial values as we decolonize design, process, and metrics. We offer these possibilities and provocations for thinking further about a future feminist decolonized internet(s).

Emerging (information) realities and epistemic injustice

AbstractEmergent realities such as the COVID‐19 pandemic and corresponding “infodemic,” the resurgence of Black Lives Matter, climate catastrophe, and fake news, misinformation, disinformation, and so on challenge information researchers to reconsider the limitations and potential of the user‐centered paradigm that has guided much library and information studies (LIS) research. In order to engage with these emergent realities, understanding who people are in terms of their social identities, social power, and as epistemic agents—that is, knowers, speakers, listeners, and informants—may provide insight into human information interactions. These are matters of epistemic injustice. Drawing heavily from Miranda Fricker's work Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, I use the concept of epistemic injustice (testimonial, systematic, and hermeneutical injustice) to consider people as epistemic beings rather than “users” in order to potentially illuminate new understandings of the subfields of information behavior and information literacy. Focusing on people as knowers, speakers, listeners, and informants rather than “users” presents an opportunity for information researchers, practitioners, and LIS educators to work in service of the epistemic interests of people and in alignment with liberatory aims.