Dual-use Concept Research Articles

Unmasking the Term 'Dual Use' in EU Spyware Export Control

Abstract Spyware has been heralded as an essential tool for law enforcement and intelligence operations. However, examples abound of states that use it in a manner that violates human rights as well as undermines democracy and the rule of law. Against this backdrop, the European Union (EU) Dual-use Regulation was recast in 2021. It now makes an effort to control the export of cyber surveillance technologies, including spyware, which it defines as dual use. What narrative is created by framing spyware as ‘dual use’? This article illustrates how the term 'dual use' roots in a distinction between ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’, or ‘civil’ and ‘military’ uses, and has gradually become associated with a broader dichotomy between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ purposes. Historically, this duality served not only to articulate the risks posed by certain technologies and indicate the rationale for their export control but also to justify their trade. Yet recourse by EU actors to dual use tilts the EU discourse on spyware export control towards state-centric security considerations and commercial interests over human rights. Unmasking how the term transposes a conceptually flawed, deceptive and empty duality to the spyware context, this article shows that the very concept of dual use may undermine human rights safeguards in spyware export control.

Characterization of Agrivoltaic Crop Environment Conditions Using Opaque and Thin-Film Semi-Transparent Modules

Agrivoltaics (APV), the co-location of agriculture and photovoltaics (PV), addresses an inherent competition for land usage. Taking the same dual-use concept to the urban landscape, rooftop APV can provide locally grown food in areas of need while providing distributed energy generation. In this multi-year investigation, different APV plots in northern Colorado, USA, were studied for crop metrics, light transmission, air temperature, soil/substrate temperature and moisture. Crops were grown under different solar panel types including opaque silicon and opaque and semi-transparent (ST) thin-film CdTe technologies. Growth conditions were characterized showing generally improved conditions and moderated temperatures under the panels. The ST-CdTe panels had increased photosynthetically active radiation (PAR) compared to both opaque panel types without a significant corresponding increase in temperature.

The global use of diverse medical systems.

In 1969, anthropologist Irwin Press introduced the concept of dual use in an attempt to lay to rest the idea that individuals in the real world must choose between allopathic and alternative systems. While providers of medical traditions have a vested interest in seeing the public use one system exclusively, individuals do not. Yet, utilization research generally follows a bifurcated research agenda. thwarting our understanding of how the population uses health care resources. Here, we frame a global analysis of individuals' yearly use of different medical systems. Using the Network Episode Model (NEM), we shift the focus to patterns of care and lay out seven hypotheses, testing whether socio-demographic, cultural, access and health factors are associated with use of one, another, or both system. Data from the 2011 International Social Survey Program's Health Module, reveals that the use of alternative systems alone has virtually disappeared as a pattern of care while dual use remains relevant. Using multilevel models to take into account country differences, we find that being older or younger (i.e., curvilinear effect), female, out-group member, employed, unsatisfied with last allopathic visit; or, reporting barriers to allopathic options, chronic illness, poor health, or positive assessment of alternative options are associated with dual use. Education, income, rural residence, or reporting sufficient insurance coverage are insignificant. Thus, nearly all hypotheses reveal the complexity of contemporary utilization behavior.

DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES OF CONCERN IN CONTEXT OF BIOSAFETY (review)

One of the main prerequisites for creation and dissemination of bioethics in the world was the concept of dual use in medical and biological sciences, which is defined as the direction of unintentional creation of biological threats in research or implementation of new biotechnologies. To determine the range of dual-use research that could potentially generate products, technologies, or knowledge whose misuse could harm large numbers of people or the environment and that are biosafety-relevant, the international term Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) is used. Actualization of the debate on the dilemma of dual use in biomedical sciences is due to, on the one hand, the international community's attempt to minimize the potential for destructive use of biomedical research, on the other hand, the active search for effective ways to raise awareness of their social and moral responsibility for implementation of the results of scientific developments in the field of life. This article considers the definition of terms that define the field of DURC in the context of biosafety, which in recent decades have undergone a number of semantic changes. The article also outlines the modern general concept of DURC, defines the categories by which DURC is defined, and outlines the scope of policy on the implementation of control over DURC. Informing the scientific community engaged in biomedical research about the problem issues of DURC biotechnology is a key component of biosafety. Modern biotechnology and related biosafety issues should be applied to society needs, but without compromising human and environmental safety. Systematic consideration of all these disputable questions of the dual-use dilemma with the involvement of all stakeholders will allow to form a rational biosafety policy for biotechnology.

Biological Dual-Use Research and Synthetic Biology of Yeast.

In recent years, the publication of the studies on the transmissibility in mammals of the H5N1 influenza virus and synthetic genomes has triggered heated and concerned debate within the community of scientists on biological dual-use research; these papers have raised the awareness that, in some cases, fundamental research could be directed to harmful experiments, with the purpose of developing a weapon that could be used by a bioterrorist. Here is presented an overview regarding the dual-use concept and its related international agreements which underlines the work of the Australia Group (AG) Export Control Regime. It is hoped that the principles and activities of the AG, that focuses on export control of chemical and biological dual-use materials, will spread and become well known to academic researchers in different countries, as they exchange biological materials (i.e. plasmids, strains, antibodies, nucleic acids) and scientific papers. To this extent, and with the aim of drawing the attention of the scientific community that works with yeast to the so called Dual-Use Research of Concern, this article reports case studies on biological dual-use research and discusses a synthetic biology applied to the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, namely the construction of the first eukaryotic synthetic chromosome of yeast and the use of yeast cells as a factory to produce opiates. Since this organism is considered harmless and is not included in any list of biological agents, yeast researchers should take simple actions in the future to avoid the sharing of strains and advanced technology with suspicious individuals.

Dual-Use Concept on Civil and Defense Uses of Outer Space

Dual-Use Concept on Civil and Defense Uses of Outer Space

Possibilities, intentions and threats: dual use in the life sciences reconsidered.

Due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax letters of a few weeks later, the concept of dual use has spread widely in the life sciences during the past decade. This article is aimed at a clarification of the dual use concept and its scope of application for the life sciences. Such a clarification would greatly facilitate the work of policymakers seeking to ensure security while avoiding undesirable interventions of government in the conduct of science. The article starts with an overview of the main developments in life sciences in relation to dual use. This is illustrated by discussions on synthetic biology and dual use. The findings lead to a reconsideration of the dual use concept. An area in need of further attention is to what extent threats and intentions should have impact on the definition of dual use. Possible threats are analyzed against the background of the phenomenon of securitization of health care and life sciences: considering these sectors of society in security terms. Some caveats that should be taken into account in a dual use policy are described. An acceptable, adequate and applicable definition of the dual use concept could help researchers, universities, companies and policy makers. Such a definition should build upon, but go beyond, the view developed in the influential Fink-report, which concentrates on the so-called ‘experiments of concern’, e.g. experiments that enhance the virulence of pathogens (National Research Council of the National Academies 2004) It will be argued that—in addition to these more technical aspects—a definition of dual use should include the aspect of threats and intentions.

Suggested repositioning of defence R&D within the French system of innovation

Are governments right to support technological progress through military R&D? If so, which are the most appropriate institutions and organizational patterns for a fruitful relationship between military R&D and the economy in general? A comparative analysis of the US and the French systems of innovation leads us to the idea that the answer lies in integrating civilian and military innovation structures around the key concept of dual use. Building on a model developed by Metcalfe and Saviotti (Res Policy 13 (1984) 141), the purpose of this article is to introduce organizational patterns and tools (so-called “pillars”) on which to build a dual-use policy. We then apply this model to the French case and formulate recommendations regarding the repositioning of its defence R&D.