Based on Claus Roxin’s reflections on the concept of culpability in Criminal Law and its dissociation from the theory of retribution, this study aims to outline considerations for the discussion on the recognition of culpability without punishment. After showing how retributivists and social defence theorists arrive at a dilemma regarding the need to impose deserved punishment, the solution developed by Roxin, which allows for the refusal of punishment even when culpability is established, is presented: the state action of imposing punishment must be justified, on the one hand, not in a retributive way, but by preventive purposes, and, on the other hand, limited – and not grounded – by the principle of culpability (which does not have a retributive character; hence the unilateral view of the principle of culpability). Finally, the political-criminal and dogmatic consequences of Roxin’s position are examined, and the reception of the thesis as well as the criticism addressed against it are analysed