In The Exclusive Society (1999) and The Vertigo of Late Modernity (2007) Young respectively discussed the rise of insecurities in the process of inclusion and exclusion, and the vertiginous insecurities in late modernity undermining basic securities of family, work and community. While writing Vertigo it dawned on Young that the positivist movement in social sciences abhorred any blurred results and craved for ‘clear lines and sharp demarcations’ (p.vii) stimulating the ultimate part of the trilogy, The Criminological Imagination. This book offers a critique of methods and measurement in criminological studies and sciences that traditionally focus on those universes that are ‘economically detached, spatially segregated and morally reduced’ … [which means that] ‘reality has been lost in a sea of statistical symbols and dubious analysis’ (p.viii). While focusing on criminological research, Young's critique turns to C. Wright Mills (1959) The Sociological Imagination, ‘to examine the way in which Mills’ predictions have panned out today, and to gauge the extent to which his warnings have been heeded’ (p.1). Economic and political inequities, indirect contact with data, and obtaining the truth through precision, are some of the factors that Young extracted from Mills's work and portrayed them as influential dynamics in obtaining the truth from research. Young presents modern criminological research as a datasaur that ‘… eats ravenously [data] but rarely thinks about the actual process of statistical digestion, his tail is small, slight and inconclusive’ (p.15, italics in original). Young describes that positivist research methods portray: ‘… an extensive discussion of measures, [and] the practicalities of measurement become more important than what is being measured, while data themselves are usually outsourced from some past study, or bought in from a survey firm, an obligatory regression analysis follows, an erudite statistical equation is a definite plus, and then the usually inconclusive results are paraded before us’ (p.16). Criminologists are increasingly overwhelmed by computer printouts and statistical manipulations rather than dealing with issues of ‘reflexivity, contradiction, tentativeness, change of opinion, posturing and concealment’ (p.17). This blight increases the distance between the reality of crime and the results obtained by criminologists expressing the hiatus between the demand of quantitative incomes and outcomes vis-à-vis concrete facts. Chapters 2 to 4 offer a political analysis of the current state and status of criminological knowledge, especially in its desire to render social life as mathematical equations. Quantitative results do not necessarily reflect the truth but ensure a source of funding and future investments in social sciences. Young calls this statistical weakness ‘skating on thin ice’ (p.30) and his argument culminates in the ‘bogus of positivism’ (Chapter 4) because a hyper-pluralistic world cannot be adequately reflected by scooping a sample without considering attitudes, ambiguities, and perspectives of interpretation of specific societies and their relative criminal justice systems. Chapters 5 to 8 formulate a cultural chronology of urban ethnography where Young explores how the unquantifiable factors, such as the nature and notions in cultures and subcultures, blurr the directness of quantitative results. Policy agendas embedded in criminological concepts, research methods and the related outcomes (Chapter 9) demand refined statistics but ‘the more sophisticated the statistics, the more [researchers] are distanced from what they are studying’ (p.13) he suggests. Considering the numerous factors that influence the criminological imagination, and other social science research, it is intriguing to note that the notion of ‘skating on ice of weak and risky research’ influences the methods of research while aiming to gratify policies and political agendas. In a critical, yet very readable, fashion, Young's work aims to provoke ‘a moment of hesitation and contribute somewhat to the growing scepticism with regards to the widespread desire to quantify every aspect of the human condition’ (p.ix). Young would have successfully reached his objective if social scientists would use their science and creativity to explore different complex and unforeseen angles of reality. Young's work brings new evidence to light, welcomes diverse tools and strategies, and aspires for broad, thorough and effervescent scholarly discussions that diminish the hiatus of science and hubris of positivism from the genuine research subject, and encourage researchers to get closer to reality.
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Oct 1, 2022
Lisa Bolin Hawkins 
Open Access
