Computer-mediated Negotiation Research Articles

Comparison of Unassisted and Smart Assisted Negotiation in B2B Relationships from the Perspective of Generation Y

The current trend in the European Union (EU) is to support the development of online dispute resolution (ODR) that saves financial and human resources. Therefore, research articles mainly deal with the design of new ODR solutions, without researching the social aspects of using different kinds of ODR solutions. For this reason, the main aim of the article is an empirical evaluation of two kinds of ODR solutions in business-to-business (B2B) relationships from the perspective of a selected social category. The article focuses on: (1) comparing unassisted and smart assisted negotiation while using the artificial intelligence approach; (2) the satisfaction and attitudes of Generation Y members from the Czech and Slovak Republic towards different ways of negotiating. The conclusions of this study can help researchers to design or improve existing ODR solutions, and companies to choose the most suitable managers from Generation Y for B2B negotiation. The results show that Generation Y members prefer computer-mediated communication as compared to face to face negotiation; the participants were more satisfied with the negotiation process when using smart assisted negotiation. Through a computer-mediated negotiation, even sellers with lower emotional stability can maintain an advantageous position. Similarly, buyers with lower agreeableness or higher extraversion can negotiate more favorable terms and offset their loss.

The benefits of collaboration in computer-mediated preference exchange in teams: A psychological perspective

Computers are increasingly used in teams in various contexts, for example in negotiations. Especially when using computer-support for decision-making processes, it is an important question whether active collaboration within the team – for example via audio-conference – has additional benefits beyond the supply of full task-relevant information via computer. In team negotiations, team representatives are only able to represent the whole team, if diverse preferences of the team members are aligned prior to the negotiation. In an experimental study with 150 participants, we provided team members with the complete information about each other's preferences during an either collaboratively (computer-mediated) or separately conducted computer-supported negotiation preparation and subsequently asked them for their priorities as representatives of the team. Our results showed that providing complete task-relevant information via computer is insufficient to compensate for the absence of active collaboration within the team: Representatives who could collaborate within the team during the computer-mediated negotiation preparation phase (1) moved away more from their initial individual preferences, (2) stated more similar priorities within the team, (3) assessed more accurately the importance of different negotiation issues for the team, which was mediated by the similarity of priorities within the team, and (4) were more satisfied.

Procedural Frames in Negotiations: How Offering My Resources Versus Requesting Yours Impacts Perception, Behavior, and Outcomes: Correction to Trötschel et al. (2015).

Reports an error in "Procedural frames in negotiations: How offering my resources versus requesting yours impacts perception, behavior, and outcomes" by Roman Trötschel, David D. Loschelder, Benjamin P. Höhne and Johann M. Majer (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2015[Mar], Vol 108[3], 417-435). In the article "Procedural Frames in Negotiations: How Offering My Resources Versus Requesting Yours Impacts Perception, Behavior, and Outcomes" by Roman Trötschel, David D. Loschelder, Benjamin P. Höhne, and Johann M. Majer (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2015, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 417-435. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000009), rounding errors in p values occur in the Results under the Concession rate section of Experiment 4a and in the Outcome profits section of Experiment 5. The second sentence of the Discussion section of Experiment 4a should read as follows: Averaged across roles (i.e., buyers and sellers) parties made lower concessions and achieved higher individual outcomes when offering rather requesting resources. The last sentence of the Concession rates section of Experiment 5 should read as follows: This pattern was reversed when animals from zoo Y were addressed first, although this contrast effect did not reach significance. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2015-09924-002.) Although abundant negotiation research has examined outcome frames, little is known about the procedural framing of negotiation proposals (i.e., offering my vs. requesting your resources). In a series of 8 experiments, we tested the prediction that negotiators would show a stronger concession aversion and attain better individual outcomes when their own resource, rather than the counterpart's, is the accentuated reference resource in a transaction. First, senders of proposals revealed a stronger concession aversion when they offered their own rather than requested the counterpart's resources-both in buyer-seller (Experiment 1a) and in classic transaction negotiations (Experiment 2a). Expectedly, this effect reversed for recipients: When receiving requests rather than offers, recipients experienced a stronger concession aversion in buyer-seller (Experiment 1b) and transaction negotiations (Experiment 2b). Experiments 3-5 investigated procedural frames in the interactive process of negotiations-with elementary schoolchildren (Experiment 3), in a buyer-seller context (Experiments 4a and 4b), and in a computer-mediated transaction negotiation void of buyer and seller roles (Experiment 5). In summary, 8 experiments showed that negotiators are more concession averse and claim more individual value when negotiation proposals are framed to highlight their own rather than the counterpart's resources. (PsycINFO Database Record

Orthogonal strategy based computer-mediated negotiation: Principles and example

Previous efforts to improve stakeholders’ involvement in planning and decision-making processes mostly put planners and decision makers as the ones who decide which solution is the best for the decision problems. In bottom-up planning and decision-making processes that supposedly involve stakeholders as much as possible, the most common practice is that when stakeholders have different preferences about the decision issues, supra decision makers such as planners and experts gather stakeholders’ preferences, and then, using their expertise and experience, decide what is the best choice for stakeholders. We approach the involvement of stakeholders in planning and decision-making not by relying on planners’ expertise but from a negotiation perspective. Previous works related to stakeholders’ negotiation mostly require stakeholders to engage in a face-to-face negotiation that seldom involves a computer system to improve the process. In this paper, we develop a negotiation system to support multi-issue and multi-stakeholder decision-making problems. In our approach, stakeholders do not directly interact with each other. Their proposals are submitted to a system that produces counter-proposals to reduce the differences among stakeholders’ proposals. Therefore, stakeholders do not exchange their preferences directly, but rather preference elicitations are mediated by the system. This approach is called computer-mediated negotiation. The system itself is based on the principle of an orthogonal strategy. Our computer-mediated negotiation protocol consists of two main phases. The first phase is the preference elicitation phase, which measures stakeholders’ utility functions. The second phase is the e-negotiation phase, in which stakeholders make their proposals and the computer system provides suggestions to improve them. To simulate real-world negotiations where stakeholders make proposals and counter-proposals in a series of negotiation rounds, we implemented the indifference curve approach to enable stakeholders to make incremental changes of their proposals during negotiation. The results from our experiment suggest that our method can produce an optimum solution for a multi-issue and multi-stakeholder decision problem by moving stakeholders’ proposals closer to one another.

Mindfulness is detrimental to performance in computer-mediated interdependent tasks

In today's organizations interdependent tasks (e.g., negotiations or group-decision makings) are often conducted with computer mediation. Two experiments examined whether mindfulness, known to improve face to face negotiations and decision makings, influences the performance in computer-mediated interdependent tasks. In Study 1, manipulated mindfulness led to a worse outcome in a simulated computer-mediated negotiation compared to a control group. In Study 2, induced mindfulness undermined the decision performance of dyads interacting via text-based computer-mediated communication compared to a no-mindfulness control group. At the same time attention to the social relation was higher in the mindfulness condition. Hence, mindfulness is detrimental to performing on interdependent tasks if interaction partners use it in computer-mediated communication, although it fosters attention to interpersonal relations. Implications for mindfulness research and for research on computer-mediated communication are discussed.

Context matters: The social effects of anger in cooperative, balanced, and competitive negotiation situations

When does expressing anger in negotiations lead to concessions? Although research has begun to address this question, it has not yet examined the influence of the negotiation context. We propose that the effect of expressing anger depends on the competitiveness of the negotiation situation. Specifically, when the negotiation situation balances cooperative and competitive elements, expressing anger elicits larger concessions than no anger, and responses are driven by cooperation-inducing strategic inferences (e.g., a perception that the anger expresser is tough and threatening). However, when the negotiation context is predominantly cooperative or predominantly competitive, expressing anger does not elicit larger concessions than no anger, and responses are driven by cooperation-inhibiting affective reactions (e.g., reciprocal anger and a desire to retaliate against the anger expresser). Results from two computer-mediated negotiation experiments using different negotiation scenarios, different manipulations of the competitiveness of the situation, and different subject populations supported our hypotheses.

Anger Suppression in Negotiations: The Roles of Attentional Focus and Anger Source

The purpose of this study was to investigate the intrapersonal effects of anger suppression in negotiations. Specifically, we examined when and how anger suppression influences negotiation effectiveness, proposing that suppressing anger may reduce negotiators’ ability to focus on the negotiation and increase their cognitive exhaustion, both of which would in turn lower negotiators’ performance. In addition, we proposed that suppressing anger integral to the negotiation is more costly than suppressing anger incidental to the negotiation. Data were obtained from a controlled laboratory experiment in which a total of 204 undergraduate students participated in a computer-mediated negotiation. Negotiators who suppressed their anger, compared to those who did not, were less able to focus on the negotiation, which in turn decreased their negotiation performance. The indirect negative effect was only significant when negotiators suppressed anger integral rather than incidental to the negotiation. The findings suggest that negotiators should be aware when it is (not) detrimental to suppress anger in negotiations. Particularly, negotiators need to be careful and may adopt strategies to maintain their attentional focus when they attempt to suppress anger that is induced by the negotiation process. Integrating research on emotion regulation with negotiation research, this study is one of the first to investigate the intrapersonal effects of anger suppression in negotiations. More significantly, this study identified both an important psychological mechanism and a moderator of the effects of anger suppression on negotiations.

The Effect of the Negotiator's Social Power as a Function of the Counterpart's Emotional Reactions in a Computer Mediated Negotiation

A negotiator’s own power and their counterpart’s emotional reaction to the negotiation both influence the outcome of negotiations. The present research addressed the question of their relative importance. On one hand, social power should be potent regardless of the other’s emotions. On the other hand, the counterpart’s emotional reactions inform about the ongoing state of the negotiation, and as such are more diagnostic than the more distal power cue. In a simulated computer mediated negotiation, 248 participants assumed the role of a vendor of computerized avionics test equipment and their objective was to negotiate the price, the warranty period, and the number of software updates that the buyer will receive free of charge. Participants negotiated the sale after being primed with either high or low power or not primed at all (control condition). They received information that their counterpart was either happy or angry or emotionally neutral. The findings showed that even though power was an important factor at the start of negotiations, the informative value of emotion information took precedence over time. This implies that emotional information may erase any advantage that counterparts have in a negotiation thanks to their higher social power.

The role of mimicry on outcome distribution in computer-mediated negotiation

This study on whether and how individuals can optimize negotiation outcomes by fostering positive emotions in a computer-mediated communication, without the verbal and nonverbal cues inherent in a face-to-face setting, is based on a sample of 76 graduate students. Grounded in social contagion and communication adaptation theories, this study finds evidence that linguistic mimicry does lead to more positive negotiation outcomes and that this relationship is mediated by feelings of rapport and liking evoked by the mimicker from the mimickee, but not trust. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings in the light of more and more parties rely on online negotiation platforms for negotiating today’s commercial transactions.

You are Doing Great! The Interpersonal Effect of Positive Emotions in Integrative Bargaining

Being happy helps the negotiator who has to carry out an integrative negotiation. If his counterpart is happy, two alternative situations may occur. The emotional contagion hypothesis predicts that the negotiator will adopt his counterpart’s happiness, and as a consequence he will do well. Alternatively, the positive emotions of the counterpart can be seen as a signal indicating room for a higher personal gain, which would yield a lower joined gain in the integrative negotiation. An experimental study was carried out to investigate the effect of happiness at the intra- and inter-personal level in a computer-mediated integrative negotiation task. The study showed that enhancing intra-personal happiness facilitates finding integrative solutions. It also leads to higher personal and joined gains. These higher gains were also found at the interpersonal level, although it was unsure to what extent these results could be explained by the opponents’ positive emotions. These results and alternative explanations will be discussed.

Hot or cold: Is communicating anger or threats more effective in negotiation?

Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? Recent research has emphasized the effectiveness of anger communication, an emotional strategy. In this article, we argue that anger communication conveys an implied threat, and we document that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger. In 3 computer-mediated negotiation experiments, participants received either angry or threatening messages from a simulated counterpart. Experiment 1 showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effect of anger (vs. a control) on concessions. Experiment 2 showed that (a) threat communication elicited greater concessions than anger communication and (b) poise (being confident and in control of one's own feelings and decisions) ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of threat compared to anger on concessions. Experiment 3 replicated this positive effect of threat over anger when recipients had an attractive alternative to a negotiated agreement. These findings qualify previous research on anger communication in negotiation. Implications for the understanding of emotion and negotiation are discussed.

How intragroup dynamics affect behavior in intergroup conflict: The role of group norms, prototypicality, and need to belong

This study explores the role of intragroup dynamics in intergroup conflict. In a computer-mediated negotiation experiment (N = 107), we investigated how a group representative’s standing in the group, group norm, and the representative’s need to belong influence behavior in intergroup negotiations. We hypothesized that the extent to which peripheral representatives adhere to group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical representatives behave in norm-congruent ways regardless of their need to belong. In support of this idea, results showed that prototypicals behaved more cooperatively when the group norm prescribed cooperation rather than competition. By contrast, peripherals only adhered to the group norm when they had a high need to belong. These findings suggest that peripherals only represent the interests of their group when doing so furthers their self-interest. We discuss implications for theorizing about prototypicality, social exclusion, and conformity to group norms.

Cultural Variance in the Interpersonal Effects of Anger in Negotiations

The current research is the first investigation of how the effects of expressing discrete emotions in negotiations vary across cultures. In a hypothetical negotiation scenario (Study 1) and a computer-mediated negotiation simulation (Study 2), expressing anger (relative to not expressing anger) elicited larger concessions from European American negotiators, but smaller concessions from Asian and Asian American negotiators. A third study provided evidence that this effect is due to different cultural norms about the appropriateness of anger expressions in negotiations: When we explicitly manipulated anger expressions to be appropriate, Asian and Asian American negotiators made larger concessions to the angry opponent, and their concessions were as large as was typical for European American negotiators; when we explicitly manipulated anger expressions to be inappropriate, European American negotiators made smaller concessions to the angry opponent, and their concessions were as small as was typical for Asian and Asian American negotiators. Implications for current understanding of culture, emotions, and negotiations are discussed.

Power and Concession in Computer-Mediated Negotiations: An Examination of First Offers

Negotiation is increasingly being conducted over computer media, such as e-mail and instant messaging, because of the potential for time savings and monetary benefits. However, these media can affect negotiators' behaviors as they engage in what is called concession making, which is a process by which they make offers that yield benefits to their opponents. In this paper, we focus on how and why conducting negotiations via computer media can affect this process, especially when negotiators have unequal power. Our research model is based on theories from the information systems, negotiation, and social psychology literatures. Via a laboratory experiment, we find that concessions made by the first individual to make an offer (the first mover) were not typically reciprocated by his/her negotiating opponent (the second mover). Thus, in the context of computer-mediated negotiation, it appears that second movers are, among other things, more likely to violate the well-established norm of reciprocity. This can result in significant disadvantages for the first mover, independent of power differences between negotiators. In addition, we find that, contrary to face-to-face negotiations, increased power of one negotiator resulted in his/her having less influence in terms of getting larger concessions from the other negotiator. In general, these findings support the notion that computer-mediated negotiation can be significantly different than face-to-face negotiation.

Anger and flaming in computer-mediated negotiation among strangers

The present study explores the antecedents of the antinormative hostile communication of emotion, termed flaming, in the context of computer-mediated negotiation. We find that flaming is associated with anger directed toward the negotiating context; this can occur when a negotiator becomes frustrated due to problems with communication channel characteristics or due to uncertainty surrounding the negotiation task. We also find that flaming is associated with anger directed toward a negotiator's partner, which can occur when a negotiator perceives that the partner is being unfair. We find further that anger totally mediates the relationships between flaming and its antecedents. These findings provide the basis to argue that anger reduction can effectively decrease flaming, independent of the existence of flaming antecedents, such as unfairness. We therefore provide suggestions that can help with the reduction of anger in such circumstances.

What Other's Disappointment May Do to Selfish People: Emotion and Social Value Orientation in a Negotiation Context

The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientation moderate responses to other's expressions of disappointment in negotiation. The literature suggested competing hypotheses: First, prosocials are more responsive to other's disappointment because they have a greater concern for other; second, proselfs are more responsive because they see other's disappointment as a threat to their own outcomes. Results of a computer-mediated negotiation in which a simulated opponent expressed disappointment, no emotion, or anger supported the second prediction: Proselfs conceded more to a disappointed opponent than to a neutral or angry one, whereas prosocials were unaffected by the other's emotion. This effect was mediated by participants' motivation to satisfy the other's needs, which disappointment triggered more strongly in proselfs than in prosocials. Implications for theorizing on emotion, social value orientation, and negotiation are discussed.

Longer-Term Consequences of Anger Expression in Negotiation: Retaliation or Spill Over?

Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? The reputation spill-over hypothesis predicts that negotiators demand less from a partner who had expressed anger during a previous negotiation, because they perceive the other as tough. The retaliation hypothesis posits that negotiators demand more from a partner who had previously expressed anger, because they develop a negative impression of the other and want to set things straight. In Experiment 1, participants first negotiated with a simulated partner who expressed anger during a computer-mediated negotiation. Participants subsequently demanded less in a second negotiation when they dealt with the same rather than a different partner. In Experiment 2, participants demanded less in the second negotiation when their partner in the first negotiation had expressed anger rather than no emotion and the second negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spill-over hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner's limits.

Expressing anger in conflict: When it helps and when it hurts.

Do expressions of anger in conflict elicit competition or cooperation? To reconcile inconsistent results obtained in previous research, the authors developed and tested a dual-process model that proposes that power and the appropriateness of the expressions of anger jointly determine whether an individual facing an angry antagonist competes by demanding value or cooperates by conceding value. In a scenario study and a computer-mediated negotiation simulation, (a) participants with lower power claimed less value from an angry adversary than from a nonemotional one, regardless of the appropriateness of the expressions of anger, and (b) participants with higher power demanded more value when the adversary's expressions of anger were inappropriate than when they were appropriate or when the adversary was nonemotional. The theoretical and practical implications of the model and findings are discussed.

Group member prototypicality and intergroup negotiation: How one's standing in the group affects negotiation behaviour

How does a representative's position in the group influence behaviour in intergroup negotiation? Applying insights from the social identity approach (specifically self-categorization theory), the effects of group member prototypicality, accountability and group attractiveness on competitiveness in intergroup bargaining were examined. As representatives of their group, participants engaged in a computer-mediated negotiation with a simulated out-group opponent. In Experiment 1 (N=114), representatives with a peripheral status in the group sent more competitive and fewer cooperative messages to the opponent than did prototypical representatives, but only under accountability. Experiment 2 (N=110) replicated this finding, and showed that, under accountability, peripherals also made higher demands than did prototypicals, but only when group membership was perceived as attractive. Results are discussed in relation to impression management and strategic behaviour.

Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation

Emotions such as anger and happiness have pervasive interpersonal effects in negotiations. We propose that the nature of the effects depends on the target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a specific behavior. In a computer-mediated negotiation ( N = 87), participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, which were either behavior-oriented or person-directed. Behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness, whereas person-directed anger elicited smaller concessions than person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed to the strategic value of the emotional expression, which was higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the person-directed condition. These findings show that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness depend critically on the target of the emotion.