Phil Watts and Richard J. Golsan: One of the objectives of our roundtable was to reflect on recent representations of the Second World War, and on works of fiction in particular. To begin, could you comment on this in France, regarding the memory of Vichy? Henry Rousso: When speaking of a phase, I am of course referring to the chronology I adopted in The Syndrome (the most recent American version was published in 1991), which I have since supplemented in Vichy: An Ever-Present Past (published in 1998) and in other, more recent works. (2) In The Syndrome, I had developed a periodization of the memory of after 1944. The term Vichy in this work covered the question of representations of the Petain regime and of the French state, the memory of various forms of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers during the Second World War, and the confrontation of the national conscience with the knowledge that French anti-Semitism had played a decisive role in the implementation of the Final Solution in France. Through this periodization, I identified four phases in the memory of until the beginning of the 1990s: the unfinished mourning phase (le deuil inacheve) from the Liberation to the mid-1950s; the repressions phase (le refoulement) of the 1960s; the Broken Mirror (le retour du refoule) in the early 1970s; and, finally, the obsessions phase (la phase obsessionnelle), characterized by the hypermnesia of memory, beginning in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the question of the memory of reached a new stage when it became a major and recurring public issue. Public opinion confronted the state with the past, demanding that it intervene and make decisions regarding its legacies. The state was put under pressure by various groups, particularly by associations striving for the recognition of crimes that had been committed against Jews by the Regime. This emergence of the impact of public opinion and public pressure, which had already become manifest with the extradition (1983) and subsequent trial (1987) of Klaus Barbie, effected a major shift in representations of the World War II past in France. From that point on, the debate about was focused exclusively, or almost exclusively, on its role in the Shoah. Following the forms of recognition established across the public sphere--wherein the issues of Vichy, of collaboration, and of anti-Semitism were constantly discussed, studied, taught, narrated, and treated in films--everything seemed to point to the idea of official reparation for the crimes that had been committed. Reparation was symbolic in the first instance, taking the form of Jacques Chirac's famous speech in July 1995, which acknowledged France's responsibility in the deportation and mass murder of the Jews. This acknowledgment was decisive for future developments. It acquired a significant legal dimension with the Papon trial of 1997 and 1998, during which, for the first time, a senior French civil servant (and former minister) was condemned for complicity in crimes against humanity. It acquired a financial dimension with the creation of the Matteoli Commission (1997), whose task it was to evaluate the financial damages resulting from the dispossession of Jewish goods. However, this far-reaching political quest for reparation provoked numerous controversies, especially as to whether or not the memory of the Shoah was a memory belonging to a specific community or if it was in fact a broader national memory. This provoked debates about the potential legal continuity between the Regime and the French Republic, which the presidents preceding Jacques Chirac had refused to acknowledge, echoing General de Gaulle's position in 1944. A decision by the Conseil d'Etat, the highest legal institution for administrative justice in France, finally settled the issue in April 2002 when, following the Papon trial, it recognized the civil responsibility of the current French Republic, requiring that it pay half of the damages and financial interests, nearly a million dollars, owed by Maurice Papon to his victims. …