Comparison Of Information Structures Research Articles

On comparisons of information structures with infinite states

Blackwell's theorem on the comparison of information structures is by now sufficiently well-understood for a finite state space, but important gaps remain in the infinite case. While the equivalence of (i) sufficiency and (ii) more-informativeness is known, we present a comprehensive theory that establishes equivalences between these two orders (in both their original and almost all versions) and three additional prior-dependent criteria on general (Polish) state spaces. We consider (iii) Bayesian preference, (iv) convex dominance, and (v) mean-preserving-spread (dilation) for all priors as well as for a given full-support prior. We provide counterexamples to underscore the necessity of the assumptions underlying some of our findings, and offer a generalization of the Hirschleifer-Schlee theorem as an application.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

We de…ne and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the information structure is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

This paper studies the impact of an improvement of information structure upon the perfect public equilibrium payoff set in discounted stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. We first suggest three partial orders on information structures in stochastic games. Although each of them reduces to the notion of garbling in repeated games (Kandori in Rev Econ Stud 59:581–593, 1992), we find that an improvement of information in terms of our two garbling notions does not imply an expansion of the equilibrium payoff set for some games. We also show that more informativeness in terms of our third notion of garbling is sufficient for the expansion, thereby extending the well-known monotonicity result in Kandori (1992) to stochastic games.

Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game. We characterize the set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub Bayes correlated equilibria. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in imposing (incentive) constraints on behavior.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the information structure is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We introduce a partial order on many player information structures -- which we call individual sufficiency -- under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games and of the partial order on information structures to others, including Blackwell's for the single player case.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium.A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. We describe a partial order on many player information structures — which we call individual sufficiency — under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games and of the partial order on information structures to others, including Blackwell's for the single player case.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Comparison of information structures and completely positive maps

A theorem of Blackwell about comparison between information structures in classical statistics is given an analogue in the quantum probabilistic setup. The theorem provides an operational interpretation for trace-preserving completely positive maps, which are the natural quantum analogue of classical stochastic maps. The proof of the theorem relies on the separation theorem for convex sets and on quantum teleportation.

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures

Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures. © 1999 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.