Communist Constitution Research Articles

Importing Religion into Post-Communist Albania: Between Rights and Obligations

After the communist regime seized power in Albania in 1944, the vilification, humiliation, persecution and execution of clergy of all faiths, including Muslim, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox, were conducted publicly. Religious estates were nationalized in 1946, and around the same time, religious institutions were closed or converted into warehouses, gymnasiums, workshops or cultural centers. In the communist constitution of 1976, Albania became the first constitutional atheist state in the world. In Article 37 of the Constitution was stated “the state does not recognize any religion”. Albanians were forced to deny their religion, change their belief system and adopt the new socialist way of life that praised secular gods such as the Communist Party and its leaders. The image of the party leader replaced religious icons. Young people were encouraged to follow worldly pursuits, including offering their life for communist deities. With the fall of communism, Albanian clerics and foreign missionaries encouraged the revival of religiosity in the country. Because in Albania, religious institutions and clergy did not exist for more than 3 decades, foreign actors played a major role in the return of religion to social life and among young people. Post-communist Albania represents a quintessential case study of importing religion into a formerly atheistic country that lacked qualified clergy, religious institutions and strong religious beliefs. In the permissive post-communist Albania, people, especially young people, attributed different meanings to religion and religiosity. Mere investigations and surveys of faith communities along traditional lines would fail to provide useful insights into the significant transformations that have impacted the religious field in Albania after the fall of the communist regime and the current challenges faced by new and “traditional” denominations. The post-communist religious context is dominated by two opposing currents: The first trend is marked by the legal organization of religious practice in the public space, which grants freedoms and equality to the “traditional” religions recognized by the state, but autonomous and independent from it. The other trend is shaped by the rituals and practices of believers from abroad who are pushing for the creation of new autonomous religious communities. This paper is not investigating religious “communitarianism” along traditional lines but rather examines salient religious identification and societal relationships and discusses their implications. This analysis rests on survey data and free-flowing and open-ended interviews conducted mainly with students of the Political Science Department of the University of Tirana and of the European University of Tirana, as well as research of different social networks. The article is divided into three parts, which present the following: literature insights, the historical background of Albania’s secularization and current religious trends and practices.

The Study of Secularism in India: With regard to the Constitution, Constitutionalism in India and Society

Secularism in India has always been a topic of debate for time immemorial. The word “Secular” was added in the Preamble by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976 along with the word “Socialist” and “Integrity”. Even though, the word secular is not defined anywhere in the constitution but the Secular nature of our Constitution can be inferred from right to freedom of religion mentioned in Part III. Secularism is defined further in this paper but to put it in simple words, it can be said that a Secular State is one which does not have a religion of its own and treats all religions equally. The Indian Secularism is neither anti-religion like some of the socialist or communist constitutions, nor does it creates a wall of separation between the State and the religion as in the US. It is based on equal respect for all religion. This paper will explain the meaning of Secularism and will also give a brief historical background of Secularism in India. The paper will mention the methodology which is used by the author. The paper will also explain in depth the various Articles of the Indian Constitution which embodies the principles of Secularism in them with the help of various landmark judgments. The paper will also argue the relationship between Secularism and Politics. It explains how the political parties have kept religion as a basis in order to fulfil their political motive and fill their vote banks. In the conclusion, the paper will mention in briefly how Secularism in India can be saved with the joint effort of the State as well as the citizens and how can an atmosphere of harmony can be restored in the country.

The First Written Communist Constitutions in China and Hungary and the Influence of the 1936 Soviet Constitution: A Comparative Perspective

AbstractFollowing World War II, a series of Conferences were held among the great powers. Hungary, along with its neighboring countries, had to join the socialist bloc and transformed itself into a socialist system. The Communist Party adopted the communist Constitution as soon as they won the parliamentary election. In the Far East, the Chinese Communist Party also promulgated its Constitution after the first election of the National People’s Republic. In this article, the author will firstly examine how the Constitution adopted between China and Hungary followed by a comparative analysis of the two Constitutions will be employed. The author will give special attention on the text and structure of the Constitution in the respective countries. In the end, the relations with Soviet Union between China and Hungary influenced the two Constitutions will be considered.

Zakletva u istoriji srpske ustavnosti

The article deals with oaths in the constitutions of the Principality and the Kingdom of Serbia, of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/ Yugoslavia, of Yugoslav communist's constitutions and of post communist's constitutions of Republic of Serbia. In constitutions of the Principality and the Kingdom of Serbia, oaths were religious. Oaths in St. Vitus Constitution were religious also. However, in debates during the creation of this Constitution, there were many arguments against religious oath, but in favor of nonreligious affirmations. In the September Constitution (1931), the oath of representatives was nonreligious. In the communist constitutions the oaths were made according to Yugoslav communist ideology. In the post-communist constitutions the oaths were shaped according to ideology of human rights. In some situations oath was given an exceptional importance. Firstly (1859), the oath of counsellors was the first step in building independent state; secondly (1920/21), the representative's oath had the purpose to save monarchy; thirdly, presidential oath in the last Serbian Constitution (2006) was as important as guardian of part of state's territory (Kosovo i Metohija).

Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 278 pp. $95.00 cloth, $34.99 paper.

Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 278 pp. $95.00 cloth, $34.99 paper.What shape constitutions take in authoritarian regimes, when governmental power is not limited? Can even sham constitutions generate state legitimacy? If so, how? These related questions guide Ginsburg and Simpser's edited volume, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. This book begins with a concise introduction in which the editors explain why constitutions matter and they for authoritarian rulers. Specifically, constitutions solve problems of (p. 3) by creating incentives for different political actors to what authoritarian rulers wish them to do (p. 2). These documents can also help to set up governing institutions and build public trust. The political functions of authoritarian constitutions include coordinating competing oligarchs and subjects, establishing focal points, and even imprinting on rulers and citizens a set of common values, such as the boundaries of permissible and impermissible discourse (Ibid.).The remaining ten chapters are divided into four parts that showcase either theoretical frameworks or empirical cases. Two chapters focus on authoritarian constitutionalism, three on constitutional design, two on the contents of authoritarian constitutions, and three on the consequences of authoritarian constitutions. Generally, the overarching themes relate to the pathologies of authoritarian rule, why authoritarian constitutions exist, and how they might serve or harm democratic transition.Five of the chapters expose the democratic potential of authoritarian constitutions. Tushnet (Chapter 3) looks to Singapore to show how rules found in authoritarian constitutions commit even autocrats to particular courses of action, which may encourage stability and predictability. Using the Polish communist constitution of 1952, Przeworski (Chapter 2) shows how, even if autocrats are not good at following rules, constitutions set out structures for how a government operates and the relationship its constituent parts. Similarly, Hale (Chapter 10) turns to Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Ukraine to argue that democratic transition may come about even in highly paternalistic regimes in which rules are not always followed. Drawing on dozens of presidential elections in authoritarian regimes 1946 and 2008, Gandhi (Chapter 9) shows how constitutions may drive democratic transition by bringing about multiparty elections. Related quantitative research by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (Chapter 7) suggests that authoritarian and democratic constitutions are converging in form, particularly through their provisions of rights and judicial independence, which also suggests new ways to understand democratic transition.Authoritarian constitutions have insidious and darker sides, too. Law and Versteeg (Chapter 8) reveal that, with limited exceptions, authoritarian governments are likely to use constitutional rights provisions as shams or window-dressing, which creates a gap between a country promises ...and how it ... behaves (p. 187). Drawing on the role of constitutions as operating manuals, Albertus's and Menaldo's quantitative analysis (Chapter 4) of the effect of constitutions on regime survival in Latin America 1950 and 2002 reveals that constitutions actually help[ed] dictators consolidate power, increase investment, and boost economic development - all while generating a steady flow of rents for themselves...without empowering challengers (p. 53). In that way, governments can use constitutions to create autocratic coalitions that keep dictators in power (p. 79). Similarly, Negretto (Chapter 5) draws on Latin American dictatorships from 1900 to 2008 to argue that constitutions are critical for military rulers seeking major social transformation. And Stilt's analysis (Chapter 6) of Egypt's 1971 constitution and its 1980, 2005, and 2007 amendments illustrates how the governing document helped to cultivate images of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak as just and pious presidents who believed in the rule of law and the protection of private property-contrasting to Nasser's earlier excesses and helping to preempt opposition (p. …

Development of Education during the Years 1944 - 1948 in Albania

Upon taking power in late 1944, the communist regime gave high priority to reopening the schools and organizing the whole education system to reflect communist ideology. The regime's objectives for the new school system were to wipe out illiteracy in the country as soon as possible, to struggle against "bourgeois survivals" in the country's culture, to transmit to Albanian youth the ideas and principles of communism as interpreted by the party, and finally to educate the children of all social classes on the basis of these principles. The 1946 communist constitution made it clear that the regime intended to bring all children under the control of the state. All schools were soon placed under state management. At the same time, due to the lack of specialists in many fields of knowledge, a lot of young people were sent abroad to the countries Albania had diplomatic connections with (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania etc.) DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n4p423

The New Constitution of Hungary: Historical Narratives and Constitutional Identity

The new Hungarian Constitution manifestly strives for constituting a new constitutional identity, which does not reflect only aspirations to eliminate the traces of the communist constitution, in fact, it includes the suppression of republican tradition, in general. This has resulted in the voluntaristic exclusion of that particular historical identity tangibly present in contemporary Hungarian society, which stresses democratic autonomies. The most important expectation towards historical references in the constitution is that those should create coherent narratives that are able to relate to the principles of constitutionalism and, thereby, could contribute to the stability of constitutional identity. The historical constructions in the new constitution, nonetheless, rather increase the already existing discrepancies and dissonances between principles and actual legal practices, therefore, these constitute another source of uncertainty and instability.

Kingdoms, republics and people's democracies: legitimacy and national identity in European constitutions

This article uses constitutional texts to explore the models of national identity which elites in European states have apparently wished to endorse. It analyses three types of constitutions – of constitutional monarchies, democratic republics, and former revolutionary communist states – to establish how the primary principle of legitimacy is identified, and how the concept of ‘the people’ is understood. It concludes that these issues evoke a different response in the three types of constitution, suggesting a surprising survival of the implications of the monarchical-republican distinction, and a brief flowering of at least the principle of international proletarian solidarity in communist constitutions.

Parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe: Changing Legislative Institutions

Parliaments emerged as one of the key political institutions in the post- communist transition. Endowed with the significant power they acquired under the old communist constitutions, they were assigned the task of drafting and rat- ifying the new democratic constitutions in the transition period. Like most oth- er institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, parliaments have undergone im- portant changes in terms of how they function and in relation to their external environment. This article provides an introductory overview of the changing na- ture of parliaments in the region, focusing on two important areas of legislative studies. The first part of the article looks at the role of parliaments in represen- tation. The second part offers several generalisations about the relationship be- tween parliaments and their respective executive branches. By reviewing these two aspects of legislative process, some insights are also provided into the changing internal workings and procedures of CEE parliaments. Sociologický casopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3: 361-373

Post-Mao China: The Rule of Law?

Legal change is clearly the area of great achievement in post-Mao China, when compared with Mao’s China. Post-Mao legislative reforms and changes have led many China analysts to declare that the post-Mao regime has followed the model of some East Asian authoritarian countries and moved toward the “rule of law, “a process which has brought about a fundamental change in China’s legal system. However a careful examination of the evidence will suggest that the “rule of law” is only an illusion or wishful thinking that contradicts the central reality of the post-Mao legal system and misinterprets the nature of post-Mao legal changes and reforms. The assessment of the change in a legal system should not depend on how many laws have been passed but rather on how these laws operate within what kind of legal framework; who defines the principles, norms, and rules of the legal framework; and who makes the law The latter rather than the former determines the nature of the legal system, which actually constitutes one key aspect of the Chinese communist regime. The findings of this work suggest that the post-Mao legal and legislative reforms have not significantly changed the core norms and principles of the communist regime and the fundamental purpose of the Chinese communist legislature and law and therefore have not brought about a systemic or fundamental change in the legal system. All the fundamentals of the Chinese communist constitution and the nature of the Chinese communist legal system remain unchanged despite the lawmaking achievements made in the last decades.

Problems of Postcommunism: Toward a Civil Economy

Problems of PostcommunismToward a Civil Economy Richard Rose (bio) Postcommunist societies are simultaneously undergoing two massive and closely related transformations: the political shift from totalitarianism to democracy, and the economic shift from central planning to the market. It is widely recognized that these transformations cannot succeed without the development of a civil society. What is not sufficiently understood, however, is that their success also depends upon the development of a civil economy. Democracy presupposes a civil society, a recognition by the state that individuals, informal groups, and formal institutions should be free to pursue their interests and ideals independent of the state in most spheres of life. East of the old Iron Curtain, giant steps have been taken toward sustaining a civil society. These include the introduction of such basic civil rights as freedom of speech and association and freedom from arbitrary arrest, along with free elections and multiparty politics. Even if military coups occurred all across the region tomorrow, the new rulers would find it impossible to resurrect the apparatus of totalitarianism. A Stalinist system is not built easily; to destroy a civil society would require the use of brutal force for a long period of time. While most postcommunist governments have rejected central planning, it is not clear what kind of economy they are heading toward. To chart the possible paths of change, we need a conceptual framework that can do more than just distinguish between the old communist-style command economy and a Western-style market economy; we need to be able to identify other types of economies as well. In addition to the standard distinction between market and nonmarket economies, we must [End Page 13] also keep in mind a second critical distinction-that which divides economies operating within a clear legal framework from those that operate outside the law. By combining these two dimensions, we come up with the typology shown in Figure 1. Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. - A Typology of Economies The starting point for every postcommunist society is the command economy, which is both nonmarket and legal. Communist constitutions gave ownership and control of economic institutions to the state, and central planning was the job of an elaborate bureaucracy that decided who produced what, when, and why. Plan quotas were assigned to each enterprise, and progress was monitored through detailed periodic reporting. Planning under communism differed fundamentally from Western-style indicative planning, which seeks to complement the market, not supplant it. The command economy did not need prices; reports of the physical quantities of inputs and outputs were used as accounting and auditing mechanisms. Managers in command economies became expert at using "connections" and other irregular methods to secure the goods and services needed to meet production targets. Because failure to meet plan targets could be considered a crime, managers in command economies became masters of duplicity, cooking the books to make everything appear in order. The command economy could run without signals of demand and supply, but it could not run without the political power needed to replace market incentives with centralized allocation by the state. Communist regimes used their power to dispense with feedback from the marketplace as well as from the ballot box. That power fell with the Berlin Wall. What is to fill the vacuum? One logical possibility is a parasitical economy, which lacks both markets and legality. Goods can be allocated through seizure by force rather than through purchase or property rights. While history provides many examples of brigands, pirates, and border raiders preying on caravans, ships, or neighboring territories, all such freebooters must depend upon others to produce goods and services suitable for stealing, [End Page 14] and they often require markets to sell illegally seized goods. The activities of the "mafia" in Russia provide a current illustration of the expropriation of goods through coercion; the Moscow meat mafia, for example, was strong enough before Christmas 1991 to prevent the delivery of a British relief shipment containing hundreds of tons of meat that would have broken the mafia chokehold on the city's meat trade. But such groups are parasites; they depend upon unwilling producers and consumers whom they can exploit...

The Functions of Communist Constitutions: An Analysis of Recent Constitutional Developments

The Functions of Communist Constitutions: An Analysis of Recent Constitutional Developments