This study examines the relationship between the firms’ derivative risk management and its financial constraints. Firms face a wedge between their internal and external financing for their investments. I test whether this wedge reduces firms’ financial constraints when they hedge using interest rate, foreign currency, and commodity derivatives. Using an event study and a difference-in-differences framework around implementing Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R, this study shows a strong causal relationship between derivative hedging and financial constraints. I find that net debt increases for the derivative hedging firms, on the other hand, cash holdings and net equity issuance decreases. When managers of non-financial corporations believe that their firm will face a liquidity shortage, they save more cash out of cash flow as a precautionary measure. Both cash flow-cash sensitivity and investment-cash flow sensitivity decrease. The analysis also shows that both the loan spread and the probability of covenant violation decrease after firms start derivative hedging. The main implication of the analysis is that risk management influences the asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers: the increase in risk management, the less the asymmetry.
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