Commitment Fees Research Articles

The Cost of Bank Regulatory Capital

Abstract Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar.

Bank stability and the price of loan commitments

Firms insure themselves from liquidity shocks by contracting on credit lines from banks. I document novel empirical evidence on how the risk of contract nonperformance by banks is priced. Firms pay a higher price for loan commitments from safer banks. A one standard deviation increase in the cross-sectional mean of bank capital increases the commitment fees by 5%. To investigate a potential causal effect of lender stability on commitment fees, I exploit exogenous variation in the market value of banks’ assets from natural disasters. The sensitivity of the fees is higher for firms with higher short-term liabilities and higher income uncertainty.

Credit line pricing under heterogeneous risk beliefs

We develop a model of a firm with multistage investment options and a bank providing a commitment for financing using a credit line. We analyze differences in beliefs between equity holders and the bank about the risk of assets and show that unfavourable beliefs by the bank reduce credit line capacity and lead to underinvestment. Constraints on alternative sources of financing cause firms to heavily rely on bank credit lines even when facing unfavourable beliefs by the bank about the risk of assets. Higher loan commitment fees, charged by the bank on the unused portion of the credit line, result in an acceleration of initial investment but may reduce follow-on investment and use of the credit line. Our analysis examines the optimal choice between accelerated versus sequential investment and provides predictions on the optimal drawdown of the credit line used to finance staged investments.

Debt maturity dispersion and the cost of bank loans

This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.

Supply commitment contract in capacity allocation games

This paper considers a supply chain with one supplier and two retailers. The supplier has limited normal capacity. When the orders of two retailers exceed the capacity, the supplier can satisfy the retailers with the limited normal capacity, or he can start an emergent production to increase his capacity in a short time with a high unit production cost. When the cost of quickly expanding capacity is lower than the market price, it is profitable for the whole system to start the emergent production. But the supplier has no incentives to do additional production if his cost is higher than the wholesale price. To resolve this issue, we propose a supply commitment contract that the supplier will fully fill a retailer’s order if the retailer pays a premium to the supplier. We consider a practical setting that each retailer has private information on her average demand. Two contracting scenarios of the supplier are compared: contracting with the two retailers simultaneously (the simultaneous scenario) and sequentially (the sequential scenario). It is shown that the retailers will adopt the threshold strategy based on their private demand information to pay the premium. By numerically studies, we further illustrate the supplier’s optimal contract choices and the consequent system performance. First, the suppliers always prefer the retailers to move simultaneous although the supplier’s profit is only slightly higher than that of the sequential scenario; second, the supplier sets a lower wholesale price and a higher commitment fee in the sequential scenario than those of simultaneous scenario; finally, the sequential scenario is a better choice from the perspectives of both the whole supply chain system and the retailers. Our research recommends the sequential moving in the supply commitment contract that it benefits the whole supply chain system with only slightly less efficient for the supplier.

Bank Syndicates and Liquidity Provision

We provide evidence that credit lines offer liquidity insurance to borrowers. Borrowers are able to extensively use their credit lines in recessions and ahead of credit line cuts. In fact drawdowns and changes in drawdowns predict internal credit rating downgrades and credit line cuts, suggesting substantial liquidity access before credit line cuts. Credit line cuts are concentrated on borrowers who do not use credit lines, and when they occur they still leave borrowers with funds to draw down. Building on this evidence, we develop a model where syndicates faced with liquidity shocks continue to support credit line commitments due to the continuation value of their relationship with borrowers. Our model yields a set of predictions that find support in the data, including the substantial increase in the lead bank's retained loan share and in the commitment fees on the credit lines issued during the financial crisis of 2008-09. Consistent with the model, credit lines with higher expected drawdown rates pay higher commitment fees, and lead banks often increase their credit line investments in response to the failure of syndicate members, reducing borrowers' risk exposure to bank failures.

Plug the Gap: Make Resolution Ready for Corona

Banks are not immune from COVID-19. The economic downturn may drive some banks to the point of non-viability (PONV). If so, is the resolution regime in the Euro-area ready to respond?No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis.The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind down strategy. That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.

Bank lines of credit as contingent liquidity: Covenant violations and their implications

We examine the relation between banks’ liquidity risk and their willingness to supply capital to borrowers under previously committed credit lines. We show that during the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last quarter of 2007 and the first half of 2008, banks with higher exposure to ABCP conduits renegotiated significantly tougher conditions on the outstanding credit lines offered to borrowers in violation of a covenant. Specifically, we find that borrowers faced higher spreads over the prime rate and LIBOR as well as higher commitment fees on undrawn amounts. Our paper suggests that an increase in lender liquidity risk can bear financial implications for firms that use credit lines as an instrument of liquidity management.

Case Note: Lenders’ Fees Not Linked to Loan Are Not Interest Income

This case note sets out the ruling by the Authority for Advance Rulings in Societe De Promotion Et De Participation Pour La Cooperation Economique that an appraisal front-end fee charged by the taxpayer to its client borrowers was not taxable in India as interest because it was not linked to the loan and not payable if the loan was not approved. However, all other fees (i.e. non-appraisal front-end fees, commitment fees, cancellation fees, monitoring fees and amendment fees) were taxable in India as interest income in terms of article 12(4) of the France-India Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1992) because they were payable only after the debt claim came into existence.

Bank Stability and the Price of Loan Commitments

This paper documents novel empirical evidence on how financial stability matters to firms. I find that firms pay a higher price for loan commitments (i.e., credit lines) from safer banks. A one standard deviation increase in the cross-sectional mean of bank capital increases the commitment fees by 5%. I further exploit exogenous variation in the market value of banks' assets from natural disasters to identify the effect of lender stability on commitment fees. The sensitivity of the fees to changes in the financial health of the bank are higher for firms with higher short term liabilities and higher income uncertainty. However, I do not find evidence that the effects depend on the size of the firm. These results indicate that firms internalize the uncertainty regarding accessibility of credit lines due to financial distress of their lender.

Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net—Review of the Flexible Credit Line and Precautionary and Liquidity Line, and Proposals for Toolkit Reform

protracted global uncertainty combined with frequent episodes of capital flow volatility have intensified demand for liquidity support. In response to calls from the IMFC and the G20, the Fund has identified gaps in the global financial safety net (GFSN) and the Fund’s lending toolkit for crisis prevention, including insufficient coverage against liquidity pressures resulting from volatile capital flows. The proposals in this paper draw on the previous Fund work on the adequacy of the GFSN, the review of the Fund’s current toolkit for crisis prevention, and extensive consultations with the membership. The review of the FCL concludes that the FCL has been effective in providing precautionary support against external tail risks. Successor FCL arrangements and associated access levels have been in line with the assessment of external risks and potential balance of payments needs. However, there is scope to strengthen the transparency and predictability of the qualification framework by adding indicator-based thresholds to complement and inform judgment. To enhance crisis resilience while improving the Fund’s toolkit coherence and resource use, the paper proposes three complementary reforms: The establishment of a Short-term Liquidity Swap to provide renewable and reliable liquidity support against potential short-term moderate volatility of capital flows. The proposed instrument is for members with very strong fundamentals and economic policies, and tailored to improve reliability and appeal to users. The use of a core set of indicators with thresholds to guide judgment in FCL qualification. This will improve predictability and transparency while keeping the standards unchanged. The elimination of the PLL to maintain a streamlined and coherent toolkit, given the low use of the PLL, likely reflecting issues of tiering with the FCL. The paper also discusses possible reforms of the current commitment fee policy to promote a more balanced use of Fund resources. Possible options include increasing the commitment fee at high access levels or introducing a new time-based commitment fee.

Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net—Review of the Flexible Credit Line and Precautionary and Liquidity Line, and Proposals for Toolkit Reform—Revised Proposals

in the Fund’s work stream on the Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN). The paper follows the Executive Board’s discussion of the Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net—Review of the Flexible Credit Line and Precautionary and Liquidity Line, and Proposals for Toolkit Reform on June 30, 2017 (the "June paper"),1 and presents revised reform proposals in light of Directors’ views. In the absence of sufficient Executive Board support for a new liquidity facility, the paper proposes to retain the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). It also proposes to introduce a Time-Based Commitment Fee (TBCF) in light of many Directors’ support for this feature. 2. This work is part of the Fund’s broader work stream to strengthen the GFSN . As such, it complements the new non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument and operational principles and framework for future Fund engagement with Regional Financing Arrangements.2 3. The paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the revised set of reform proposals. Section III sets forth issues for discussion, and proposes decisions to (i) complete the review of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the PLL; and (ii) introduce a TBCF. The paper also includes an Annex that describes a planned revision to the presentation of the Fund’s Forward Commitment Capacity (FCC) to provide a breakdown between precautionary and other Fund commitments.

Fee Structures in Private Equity Real Estate

Although fees in real estate are important for investors and fund managers, they have received little attention in the finance literature. In this paper, I examine fee structures for private equity real estate funds from an investor's perspective. Fee structures, as proposed by fund managers in placing documents, are used to calibrate the total fee load. The average total fee load for closed-end funds equals 2.7%, which is substantially lower than for private equity funds. Through regression and simulation, I show that core and value-add funds charge significantly lower performance fees compared with opportunistic funds, although there is no difference in management fees. Moreover, larger funds charge significantly less management fees. Investors can substantially reduce fees by controlling the amount of leverage and avoiding commitment fees and catch-ups.

Costs of corporate bond issue in coal mining companies

In Poland, more than 90% of electricity production is based on coal fuel. Meanwhile, the financial situation of the mining industry is quite challenging. Companies in this sector are in debt, generating losses caused by a sharp drop in coal prices and a simultaneous increase in extraction costs that result from descending into lower levels of coal deposits. At the same time, banks are reluctant to loan money because of the risk of a borrowing entity’s default. Increasingly, companies are turning to bond issue to maintain their liquidity and finance development projects. However, bondholders impose conditions in the form of covenants that are often difficult to satisfy, and the strictest relate to the level of a company’s indebtedness and ability-to-repay-debt financial ratios. This article discusses bond issue costs. The authors analyze the bond issue programs of three of the four mining companies operating in Poland. The fourth company did not issue any bonds. Bond issue costs are composed of interest payable to investors, issue preparation and support costs, collateralization costs, and the cost of recording and organizing the sale. The main cost involved in bond issuance is the coupon cost, which depends on the company’s financial health and its level of indebtedness, the purpose of the issue, its volume, and the type and quality of the safeguards against the risk of loss of funds invested by bondholders. Bonds issued by coal mining companies are assumed mainly by banks, which demand high interest due to the poor financial condition of the issuers. In addition to interest, companies also pay a capital commitment fee, an arrangement fee and a fee for early redemption. Altogether, in relation to the costs of capital raised through a bank loan, the bond issue results in significantly higher costs of raising capital.

Access to Liquidity and Corporate Investment in Europe during the Financial Crisis*

We use a unique data set to show how firms in Europe used credit lines during the financial crisis. We find that firms with restricted access to credit (small, private, non-investment-grade, and unprofitable) draw more funds from their credit lines during the crisis than their large, public, invest- ment-grade, profitable counterparts. Interest spreads increased (especially in ''market-based econo- mies''), but commitment fees remained unchanged. Our findings suggest that credit lines did not dry up during the crisis and provided the liquidity that firms used to cope with this exceptional con- traction. In particular, credit lines provided the liquidity companies needed to invest during the crisis.

Kemampuan Pemerintah Daerah Provinsi Lampung Dalam Membayar Pinjaman Daerah Di Era Otonomi Daerah

The purpose of this study was to calculate how much capacity the maximum loan amount area where the Provincial Government of Lampung make loans in accordance with the Government Regulation Number 54 of 2005, and to assess the ability to pay obligations (principal + interest) loan areas do. The hypothesis proposed is the author of Lampung provincial government can borrow to finance its budget deficit area in general accordance with the rules established by the Central Government. Research methods used are observation, documentation, and interviews. While analysis tools used is the approach that is descriptive quantitative analysis. Based on the results of calculations based on Government Regulation No. 54 Year 2005 on Regional Loan that the Provincial Government of Lampung in 2005-2007 had loans Limit or 60% general revenue budget the previous year average of Rp.632.461.846.102, - and limits the maximum loan for a period of 5 (five) years, the bank rate by 10%, and 1% commitment fee can not be done, because the resulting value does not reach the DSCR of 2.5 or more. To achieve the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of or equal to 2.5 for a period of 5 (five) years, 10% interest, and a commitment fee of 1% loan that can be done only by an average of Rp.342.583.020.438 , - or by 36% of the general acceptance APBDt-1 in 2005-2007.

Trends in Islamic Project and Infrastructure Finance in the Middle East: Re-Emergence of the Murabaha

This paper notes the increasing use of the murabaha structure in a wide range of financing transactions, including project financing transactions in the Middle East, since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007. The paper discusses the nature of the murabaha as a commodity sale structure and, in more recent times, as a financing structure. Essential elements of a valid murabaha are discussed. The use of commodities as vectors, and the use of murabaha and tawarruq transactions as loan substitutes, are discussed. A case study is presented (based upon a recent Middle Eastern transaction). That case study involves two murabaha agreements, one to effect a term financing and one to effect a revolving credit facility. Using that case study, the paper considers (a) enforceability issues pertaining to unconsummater murabaha transactions, (b) the use of variable rate structures, (c) structures to ensure the enforceability of commitment fees, profit participations and other accruing obligations, (d) the use of waivers, forgiveness and rebates of carried and accrued amounts, (e) conditions precedent to future murabaha transactions, including rollovers, (f) collateral security (rahn) matters, and (g) guarantees of murabaha obligations. Revised draft of November 17, 2012.

Access to Liquidity and Corporate Investment in Europe During the Financial Crisis

We use a unique dataset to show how firms in Europe used credit lines during the financial crisis. We find that firms with restricted access to credit (small, private, non-investment grade, and unprofitable) draw more funds from their credit lines during the crisis than their large, public, investment-grade, profitable counterparts. Interest spreads increased (especially in “market-based economies”), but commitment fees remained unchanged Our findings suggest that credit lines did not dry up during the crisis and provided the liquidity that firms used to cope with this exceptional contraction. In particular, credit lines provided the liquidity companies needed to invest during the crisis.

Commitment Fee Not Treated as Interest

The Australian Taxation Office has released an interpretative decision that clarifies the liability of non-resident lenders to withholding tax in Australia when a commitment fee is paid by a resident borrower. According to the decision, no withholding obligation will apply if the payment by the resident is in relation to the commitment by the lender to lend up to a pre-agreed limit.

NYSE listings and firm borrowing costs: An empirical investigation

This paper examines the relationship between borrowing rates and switching the listing of a firm's stock to the NYSE. Using a sample of syndicated corporate loans, we find that firms switching from either NASDAQ or AMEX to NYSE experience a significant decrease in borrowing rates for revolving loans and pay lower commitment fees for the unused portion of these lines. The results are robust when using a propensity score matching technique to identify non-switching firms that match switching firms along an array of loan and firm specific characteristics. The empirical findings in this paper have implications for the global markets, given the continued consolidation of international equity exchanges.