Commercial Paper Funding Facility Research Articles

How new Fed corporate bond programs cushioned the Covid-19 recession

In the financial crisis and recession induced by the Covid-19 pandemic, many investment-grade firms became unable to borrow from securities markets. In response, the Fed not only reopened its commercial paper funding facility but also announced it would purchase newly issued and seasoned corporate bonds rated as investment grade before the Covid pandemic. We assess the effectiveness of this program using long sample periods, spanning the Great Depression through the Great and Covid Recessions. Findings indicate that the announcement of corporate bond backstop facilities helped stop risk premia from rising further than they had by late-March 2020. In doing so, these backstop facilities limited the role of external finance premia in amplifying the macroeconomic impact of the Covid pandemic. Nevertheless, the corporate bond programs blend the roles of the Federal Reserve in conducting monetary policy via its balance sheet, acting as a lender of last resort, and pursuing credit policies.

The Commercial Paper Funding Facility

In mid-March, the Federal Reserve announced a slew of credit and liquidity facilities aimed at supporting credit provision to U.S. households and businesses. Among the initiatives is the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) which aims to support market functioning and provide a liquidity backstop for the commercial paper market. The domestic commercial paper market provides a venue for short-term financing for companies which employ more than 6 million Americans. Securities in the commercial paper market represent a key asset class for money market mutual funds. This post documents the dislocations in the commercial paper market that motivated the creation of this facility, and tracks the subsequent improvement in market conditions.

COVID Response: The Commercial Paper Funding Facility

The Federal Reserve reestablished the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF 2020) in response to the disruptions in the commercial paper market triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic shutdowns. The CPFF 2020 was designed to support market functioning and provide a liquidity backstop for the commercial paper market. This paper provides an overview of the CPFF 2020, including detailing the facility’s design, documenting its usage, and describing its impact on commercial paper markets. In addition, we compare the market conditions and facility design in CPFF 2020 to that of the original CPFF facility.

How New Fed Corporate Bond Programs Dampened the Financial Accelerator in the COVID-19 Recession

In the financial crisis and recession induced by the Covid-19 pandemic, many investment-grade firms became unable to borrow from securities markets. In response, the Fed not only reopened its commercial paper funding facility but also announced it would purchase newly issued and seasoned bonds of corporations rated as investment grade before the Covid pandemic at spreads roughly 1 percentage point above non-recession averages. A careful splicing of different unemployment rate series enables us to assess the effectiveness of recent Fed interventions in these long-term debt markets over long sample periods, spanning the Great Depression, Great Recession and the Covid Recession. Findings indicate that the announcement of forthcoming corporate bond backstop facilities have capped risk premia at levels 100 basis points above non-recession averages, akin to a “penalty rate” for lender of last resort interventions during financial crises. In doing so, these Fed facilities have limited the role of external finance premia in amplifying the macroeconomic impact of the Covid pandemic. Nevertheless, the corporate bond programs blend the roles of the Federal Reserve in conducting monetary policy via its balance sheet, acting as a lender of last resort, and pursuing credit policies.

Financial crisis solutions in the commercial paper market

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine programs designed to support the commercial paper market during the financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach The paper analyzes the participants in the two programs to determine why domestic financial institutions chose one program over the other. Findings Domestic financial institutions chose the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program over the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) while foreign financial institutions chose the CPFF. Practical implications The analysis is intended to support future policy debate on how to address a liquidity crisis in the money markets. Originality/value The authors are the first paper to examine the participants in these two programs. The value is the policy implications of this study.

The Federal Reserve's Financial Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities

During the summer 2007 the U.S. residential mortgage market began to decline sharply negatively impacting the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market, which often relied on mortgages as underlying support. Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs), significant investors in commercial paper (CP), quickly retreated from the market causing a substantial decline in outstanding ABCP. In September 2008, pressures on the markets severely escalated again, when the Reserve Primary Fund MMMF “broke the buck” and prompted run-like redemption requests by many MMMF investors. These disruptions resulted in higher rates and shorter maturities, practically freezing the market for term CP. Concerned about the impacts on the financial system and possible spillover to the greater economy, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) invoked its emergency powers to implement (i) the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Mutual Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and the (i) the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which collectively provided more than $1 trillion dollars to MMMFs and CP issuers and helped shore up the ABCP market, preserve the MMMFs, and eventually stimulate the CP market. This case discusses the two facilities and also demonstrates the interconnectedness between financial markets, the possibility of contagion that this creates, and how this proved challenging for the Fed in fighting the crisis.

Commercial Paper Funding Facility

On September 16, 2008, just a day after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, the Reserve Primary Fund money market mutual fund (MMMF) “broke the bank,” announcing a net asset value of less than $1 per share because of a large exposure to Lehman Brothers commercial paper (CP). As a result, the CP markets came under considerable pressure as other MMMFs began to experience run-like redemption requests and became reluctant to hold CP. The difficulties in the CP market lead to a severe shortening of maturities and increased rates that threatened to freeze these lending channels, which were widely used by financial and nonfinancial companies of all sizes to fund operating expenses and loans to small businesses and consumers. On October 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) intervened announcing the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which would backstop the CP market. Through the CPFF the Federal Reserve Bank of New York funded the indirect purchase of CP from issuers. The CPFF was highly utilized and at its early stages purchased the overwhelming majority of new term CP being issued. At its highest level it held $350 billion of CP, 20 percent of all outstanding CP. As markets improved, utilization of the CPFF waned and it expired on February 1, 2010, having helped to stabilize the CP markets.

How Effective Was the Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility? Evidence from Stock Performance and Loan Provisions

This paper investigates the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve Bank's Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) in facilitating lending from recipient banks to their relationship borrowers. I use dispersion in lender liquidity following the implementation of the CPFF to examine the change in the supply of credit on borrowers’ corporate policies. This paper first shows that (recipient) banks with access to the Commercial Paper Funding Facility have a higher probability of offering new loans and increase the amounts of loan provision to relationship firms than banks without the liquidity backstop. Second, the increases in bank lending is associated with higher employment growth for firms with significant business relationships to these banks. Therefore, the short-term funding facility generates positive spill-over effects from financial institutions to non-financial institutions.

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.

Did the commercial paper funding facility prevent a Great Depression style money market meltdown?

This paper analyzes how risk premiums altered the use of commercial paper relative to bank loans during the recent financial crisis. Consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature on how surges in risk premiums can induce plunges in under-collateralized credit or credit funded with noninsured sources, results indicate that a spike in risk premiums induced a plunge in commercial paper use during the recent crisis. This paper also finds that Federal Reserve interventions in the money market helped prevent the commercial paper market from melting down to the extent seen during the early 1930s.

Liquidity Backstop, Corporate Borrowings, and Real Effects

This research investigates the real effects of public liquidity provision. Using the Commercial Paper Funding Facility’s (CPFF) eligibility criteria for non-financial commercial paper issuers as the identification strategy, we show that firms with access to the CPFF were able to mitigate the financing disruptions caused by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the ensuing dysfunctional credit market. CPFF directly reduces risk of eligible firms, which in turn improved their financing and short-term profitability. We find liquidity spillover effects from CPFF-eligible firms to their customers through the increased use of trade credit, which propagates the real effects throughout the economy. JEL classifications: G18; G21; G28; G32; G38

Does Receiving TARP Funds Make it Easier to Roll Your Commercial Paper Onto the Fed?

The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) bought commercial paper from highly-rated issuers of U.S. dollar commercial paper during the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009. This is the only study to analyze the characteristics of firms selected for this Federal Reserve program. CPFF participants and non-participants differed little in terms of profitability, solvency, or liquidity ratios. Nevertheless, CPFF participants were significantly more likely to come from the financial sector, to pose greater systemic risks, and to have received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout. The baseline predicted probability of participation in the CPFF jumps from 37.2 percent to 65.9 percent if the commercial paper issuer participated in the TARP bailout.

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The Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility

The Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility

Did the Commercial Paper Funding Facility Prevent a Great Depression-Style Money Market Meltdown?

This paper analyzes how risk premia—and other factors affecting the comparative advantages of security-funded versus deposit-funded short-run debt—altered the relative use of debt funded by securities markets since the early-1960s and the relative use of commercial paper during the recent financial crisis. Results indicate that lower risk premia, higher information costs, and reserve requirement costs induce less relative use of commercial paper and short-run debt funded by securities markets. This paper also finds that Federal Reserve interventions in the money market helped prevent the commercial paper market from melting down to the extent seen during the early 1930s.

Government Support of the Short-Term Markets

The ongoing credit crunch has paralyzed the international debt capital markets for quite some time, but its tremors could be felt in the short-term debt capital markets as early as August 2007. Recognizing that the health and vitality of the short-term markets is a fundamental cornerstone of liquidity in the debt capital markets generally, both the U.S. and U.K. governments have taken unprecedented steps to help bolster the commercial paper markets. The U.S. government has, through the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury, implemented four short-term market support programs, namely, the ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility. The U.K. government promptly followed suit, establishing the Commercial Paper Facility and the Secured Commercial Paper Facility, both administered by the Bank of England. While these efforts have had limited success in “reviving” the shortterm markets, some of them have certainly been helpful in preventing a meltdown of the debt capital markets, which has continued to be a very real and grave risk. <b>TOPICS:</b>Legal and regulatory issues for structured finance, legal/regulatory/public policy

The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility

The Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) in the midst of severe disruptions in money markets following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. The CPFF finances the purchase of highly rated unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper from eligible issuers via primary dealers. The CPFF was a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper, and its creation was part of a range of policy actions undertaken by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to the financial system. This paper documents aspects of the financial crisis relevant to the creation of the CPFF, reviews the operation of the CPFF, discusses usage of the facility, and draws conclusions for lending of last resort facilities in a market based financial system.

Liquidity Backstop, Corporate Borrowings, and Real Effects

This research investigates the real effects of public liquidity provision. Using the Commercial Paper Funding Facility’s (CPFF) eligibility criteria for non-financial commercial paper issuers as the identification strategy, we show that firms with access to the CPFF were able to mitigate the financing disruptions caused by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the ensuing dysfunctional credit market. CPFF directly reduces risk of eligible firms, which in turn improved their financing and short-term profitability. We find liquidity spillover effects from CPFF-eligible firms to their customers through the increased use of trade credit, which propagates the real effects throughout the economy.

The Commercial Paper Funding Facility

The commercial paper market experienced considerable strain in the weeks following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, leading to liquidity pressures as investors such as money market mutual funds became increasingly reluctant to purchase commercial paper. As a result, the percentage of outstanding commercial paper that had to be refinanced each day rose rapidly during the Fall of 2008, interest rates on longer-term commercial paper increased significantly, and the volume of outstanding commercial paper declined sharply. A large share of outstanding commercial paper is issued or sponsored by financial intermediaries, and their difficulties placing commercial paper reduced their ability to meet the credit needs of businesses and households. The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) provides a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that purchases eligible three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper from eligible issuers using financing provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The SPV holds the commercial paper until maturity and uses the proceeds from maturing commercial paper and other assets of the SPV to repay its loan from the New York Fed. The paper discusses design issues, as well as measures of evaluation of the facility.