Combination Of Punishment Research Articles

The effect of combining punishment and reward can transfer to opposite motor learning.

Recent laboratory findings have demonstrated that, when imposed separately, punishment and reward have different effects on motor learning. In real-world applications, however, they are usually used in combination to improve human behavior. For instance, a student may be punished when failing an examination and rewarded when getting a high score. It remains unclear precisely how people are motivated when punishment and reward are combined. Moreover, whether it is possible for the effects of punishment and reward to transfer to other learning situations remains unknown. In the present study, four groups of participants were trained on a motor adaptation task under conditions of either punishment, reward, both punishment and reward combination, or a neutral control condition (neither). We tested what the effect of combining punishment and reward is on motor learning and memory. Further, we examined whether the effect could transfer to later opposite-direction learning in the absence of motivational feedback. Specifically, during the initial learning when there is motivational feedback, combining punishment and reward can not only accelerate learning rate, but can also increase learning extent. More interestingly, the effect can even transfer to later opposite-direction learning. The findings suggest that the combination of punishment and reward has a distinct advantage over pure punishment or reward on motor learning and the effect can transfer to opposite motor learning.

Replicator dynamics of public goods game with tax-based punishment

Punishment is a promising direction to cooperation and thus has been widely studied through evolutionary game theory, offering potential solutions to social dilemmas. As one of its applications in the real world, taxation could be a supporting mechanism for punishment. This study analyzes the replicator dynamics of the public goods game with tax-based punishment in an infinitely large, well-mixed population. The analysis results suggest that the combination of punishment and taxation can stabilize cooperation. Intriguingly, the results show that the tax-based punishment and the tax-based pure reward can have the same conditions for stabilizing the same cooperation level despite their completely opposite mechanisms.

Analysis and examination of terrorism crime legislation

In the past 10 years, China’s legislation on terrorist crimes has undergone great changes, which not only responds to the inherent requirements stipulated in the international conventions, but also refl ects the policy governing terrorist crimes. The legislation of terrorist crime presents new dimensions, specifi cally for the preventive strengthening, the increase of severity, the increase of rigour. Under the background of risk society, the legislation of terrorism crime has positive social signifi cance, which is embodied in the combination of punishment after the event and prevention before the event, the unity of behavior harm and personal danger. In the future criminal legislation, it is necessary to enhance the foresight of legislation, promote the scientifi c nature of legislation, and strengthen the effective connection between criminal law and anti-terrorism security law, which should be the development direction of terrorism crime legislation

Deviant or wrong? The effects of norm information on the efficacy of punishment

Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

Resurgence of a target behavior suppressed by a combination of punishment and alternative reinforcement

Differential-reinforcement-based treatments involving extinction of target problem behavior and reinforcement of an alternative behavior are highly effective. However, extinction of problem behavior is sometimes difficult or contraindicated in clinical settings. In such cases, punishment instead of extinction may be used in combination with alternative reinforcement. Although it is well documented that omitting alternative reinforcement can produce recurrence (i.e., resurgence) of behavior previously suppressed by extinction plus alternative reinforcement, it remains unclear if resurgence similarly occurs for behavior previously suppressed by punishment plus alternative reinforcement. The present experiment examined this question with rats. In Phase 1, a target behavior (lever pressing) was reinforced with food pellets. In Phase 2, the target behavior continued to be reinforced, but it also produced mild foot shock and an alternative behavior (nose poking) also produced food. Finally, all consequences were removed and resurgence of target behavior occurred. Resurgence did not occur for another group that similarly received punishment of target behavior in Phase 2 but not alternative reinforcement. These results indicate that resurgence was a product of the history of exposure to and then removal of alternative reinforcement and that the removal of punishment alone did not produce resurgence of target behavior.

Deviant or Wrong? The Effects of Norm Information on the Efficacy of Punishment

A stream of research examining the effect of punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. In such studies, the enforcement of a behavioral rule to cooperate originates from a single party. This feature may raise concern about the legitimacy of the rule and thereby make it easy for the agents to take a penalty and excuse their selfish behavior. We address the question of punishment legitimacy in our experiment by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with punishment mechanisms. We show that the separate enforcement mechanisms of punishment and norms cannot achieve higher cooperation rates. In fact, conformity is significantly increased only in those cases when social norms and punishment are combined, but only when cooperation is cheap. Interestingly, when cooperation is expensive we find that the combination of punishment and empirical information about others conformity can also have traceable detrimental effects on conformity levels. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

Deviant or Wrong? The Effects of Norm Information on the Efficacy of Punishment

Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

Leaving the loners alone: Evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment

The idea that voluntary participation may promote the evolution of cooperation and punishment in public good games has been recently called into question based on the study of the complete strategy set in which anyone can punish anyone else. If punishment actions are detached from contribution and participation in the game, the combination of punishment and voluntary participation no longer leads to high levels of cooperation. We show that this result crucially depends on specific details of the role of those who abstain from the collective endeavour, and only holds for a small subset of assumptions. If these loners are truly alone, cooperators who punish only defectors prevail, even when antisocial punishment is available.

Rumination in infancy: Recent behavioral approaches

The published literature on behavioral treatments of rumination is reviewed, and new case material on two recently reported procedures is presented. Rumination, a medical condition of infancy involving repeated regurgitation of previously ingested food, has historically been treated from a psychodynamic approach involving extended in-patient treatment by mother surrogates. This procedure is both time-consuming and very costly. The initial behavioral approach involved electric shock. Single-case studies reflect the utility of this procedure, but widespread resistance to this form of punishment makes this a difficult procedure to utilize. More recent behavioral procedures reported in single-case studies have included delivering aversive taste stimuli as consequences for ruminating. This procedure has met with mixed success, and has the added drawback of being difficult to implement technically and because of staff resistance. A combination of punishment by scolding, time-out, and reinforcement of retaining the food constitutes a useful alternative. This procedure has the added advantage of being more acceptable to staff and implementable at home. The possibility of individual differences among ruminators that might predict success is also raised.

Transfer of approach responding between punishment, frustrative nonreward, and the combination of punishment and nonreward

Rats trained to make an approach response with either partial reward, intermittent punishment, or a combination of partial reward and intermittent punishment, were tested for persistence to extinction, punishment with reward, or punishment during extinction. Partial reward, alone or with punishment, produced greates resistance to extinction, while intermittent punishment, alone or with partial reward, produced greatest persistence to punishment with reward. Transfer of persistence from partial reward to punishment with reward and intermittent punishment to extinction was also demonstrated. However, partial reward alone did not increase persistence to punishment during extinction, whereas intermittent punishment and partial reward combined with intermittent punishment did increase such persistence. These results were interpreted in Amsel's (1958, 1962) conditioning-model theory by extending the hypothesized similarity of frustrative nonreward and punishment.

Two-Choice Discrimination Learning in Children as a Joint Function of Incentive Level and Punishment

Abstract Sixty-five fourth- and fifth-grade boys were run in a two-choice discrimination learning task for punishment, high or low value reinforcement, or the combination of punishment with high or low value reinforcement. A significant main effect of reinforcement revealed that only Ss in the punishment group showed significant evidence of learning. The results were discussed as possibly being due to the distraction caused by tangible reinforcement; although, an alternative explanation was offered on the basis of previous findings that males perform better for punishment than for reward.