Color Realism Research Articles

Pautz on the laws of appearance, internalism, and color realism

ABSTRACT I focus on two of the challenges Pautz raises for representationalist theories of perception. The first is the challenge of explaining the necessity of certain principles which Pautz calls 'laws of appeaeance.' The second is based on the idea that the most promising versions of representationalism seem to lead to irrealism about the sensible qualities.

A Study in brown

Philosophers rarely write in an extended way about particular colors. So, why write about brown? We shall see that an investigation of brown unsettles some established ideas about color in significant ways. In particular, I will (i) explore reasons for thinking that brown is an elementary color, (ii) reassess attitudes in color science that are taken to rule that possibility out, and (iii) present a new reason for rejecting most forms of color realism.

Is Representationalism Committed to Colour Physicalism?

The circularity problem states that the representationalist about phenomenal consciousness gives a circular explanation if she adopts the classic view about secondary qualities, such as colours, that characterises them as dispositions to produce experiences with a specifi c phenomenal character. Since colour primitivism faces severe diffi culties, it seems that colour physicalism is the only viable option for the representationalist. I will argue that the representationalist is not committed to colour physicalism because she can adopt an anti-realist theory of colour. My diagnosis is that the alleged commitment to colour physicalism rests upon the acceptance of colour realism which is due to the approval of externalist versions of representationalism, such as tracking representationalism. I will argue that the representationalist can deal with the circularity problem by adopting figurative projectivism, which holds that colours are contingently non-instantiated properties that only figure in the representational contents of colour experiences.

TASTY ROADS TO FLAVOUR

The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez-Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to evaluative language. In particular, I want to defend the thesis that at least some aesthetic predicates can have non-evaluative reference. As an example, I will work with the predicate “tasty” (and its antonym “disgusting”) to argue that it some times refers to a non-subjective non-evaluative property, flavour, which is more fundamental that the relational property of being tasty to someone. In other words, some times, when we say of something that it is tasty, we are not saying how it tastes to us or whether we like it, but just how it tastes period.

Color and a priori knowledge

Some truths about color are knowable a priori. For example, it is knowable a priori that redness is not identical to the property of being square. This extremely modest and plausible claim has significant philosophical implications, or so I shall argue. First, I show that this claim entails the falsity of standard forms of color functionalism, the view that our color concepts are functional concepts that pick out their referents by way of functional descriptions that make reference to the subjective responses of perceivers. I then argue that, while some sophisticated forms of color functionalism can accommodate the a priori knowability of a truth like “redness is not identical to squareness,” they can only do so by abandoning color realism, the thesis that colors are instantiated by external material objects. In practice, color functionalists are almost invariably color realists. Thus, given extremely modest assumptions concerning what can be known a priori about color, we should conclude that color functionalism, at least in its typical realist form, is false.

In Defense of Color Realism

In this article, I argue that popular explanatory frameworks in perceptual psychology suggest the truth of color realism. I focus on perceptual judgments and their evidential basis: namely perceptual representation. I first draw a distinction between two sorts of normativities with respect to which we can evaluate representational capacities and systems: biological and psychological normativities. The former is defined in terms of evolutionary fitness, and the latter in terms of representational accuracy. Generally, representational systems achieve psychological and biological success (i.e., facilitate survival and reproduction and accurately represent the world) hand in hand, but in special circumstances, a representational system can be such that it serves the organism best while not generally furnishing the organism with accurate representations. I argue in this essay that an explanation how and why our ancestors developed color vision that cleaves its biological success conditions from its psychological success conditions cannot be given unless we are prepared to say the same about the visual perception of distance and other geometrical features of the world. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the anti-realist could begin to specify psychological success conditions for color representations. Hence, we ought to accept the biological utility of color vision as evidence that it is typically representationally successful, and regard our perceptual judgments about color as generally true.

Color Visualization of the Artistic Image as a Feature of G. R. Derzhavin’s Creative Method

The relevance of the problem is associated with the need to clarify the features of the creative method of G. R. Derzhavin. The novelty of the study is in the presentation of the colouristic polyphonism of Derzhavin’s poetics as a means of visualizing an artistic image. The article discusses the peculiarities of colour and black-and-white solutions of verbal portraits and landscapes in Derzhavin’s poetry, defines the technique for attracting pictorial elements into the poetics of the text, outlines a peculiar manner of Derzhavin’s vision related to the perception of the contemplated world as a picture. It is shown that Derzhavin, following his poetic doctrine that “poetry is speaking painting”, brings to the literature the techniques of visual art: the principle of color contrast, the reconstruction of a light-air perspective, the observance of the chosen colour palette. The article identifies the mechanisms of verbal colour transmission. It is proved that Derzhavin’s colour is represented in an abundance of semantic shades transmitted through complex colouristic epithets. Conclusions are drawn that, perceiving wildlife as an aesthetic object, Derzhavin represents the enormity of the universe in an abundance of variously coloured minute details. It is argued that the colours in Derzhavin’s poetry constitute a matrix of meanings. The dominance of the poetics of colour objectivity in Derzhavin’s work allows us to talk about colour realism as the basis of the poet’s artistic method.

Colours and afterimages

Using the example of afterimaqes the author tries to show that colour realism is not the appropriate theory for the explanation of ontological nature of colours. As a paradigmatic theory of colour realism the author has chosen the approach of the Australian Philosopher D. M. Armstrong. In the first Part of the paper author explicates Armstrong s wiews and in the second part argues that Armstrong s position faces serious ontological difficulties.

Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: a Physiological Objection

Using the results of the latest neurophysiological research on colour, the article rejects outright physicalism and dispositionalism as appropriate approaches to solving the problem of colour realism. Physicalism sees colour as a real property of objects, i.e. the reflectance profile, while dispositionalism takes subjects, objects and light as necessary elements for colour production. First, it briefly outlines the historical development of the theory of colour, pointing towards dispositionalism which, in some sense, considers colour as a real entity of the world, and then introduces the problem of colour realism, focusing on objections to physicalism as well as dispositionalism. After delineating the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the visual experience of colour, and with the help of the concrete results of practical neurophysiological experiments, the article points to why the physicalist and any dispositionalist theories of colour in the light of a new physiological objection do not present credible views on the nature of colour.

Color Matching and Color Naming: A Response to Roberts and Schmidtke

In their article ‘In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color’ P. Roberts and K. Schmidtke offer the results of an experiment supposed to show that if selection of colored samples representing unique hues for subjects (naming) has a greater inter-subject variability than identification of sample pairs with no perceptual difference between them (matching) the result provides support for the philosophical concept of color realism. On examining the results in detail, we find that, according to standard statistical methodology, the relative magnitude of inter-subject variability in the matching experiment is for both tested colors larger than that in the naming experiment, thus invalidating their claims. In addition, we point out several serious shortcomings in the experiment.

Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities

This paper outlines and defends a novel position in the color realism debate, namely structural realism. This position is novel in that it dissociates the veridicality of color attributions from the claim that physical objects are themselves colored. Thus, it is realist about color in both the semantic and epistemic senses, but not the ontic sense. The generality of this position is demonstrated by applying it to other “secondary qualities,” including heat, musical pitch, and odor. The basic argument proceeds by analogy with the theory of measurement. I argue that perceptual experiences are analogous to numerical structures in that they are suitable for measurement, but only report measured values after they have been linked to states of a measurement device via calibration. Since the calibration of our sensory apparatus varies with context, it is inappropriate to identify specific experiences with specific properties in the world. Rather, it is structural relations between possible experiences which represent relations between possible external properties, and it is at the level of these structural relationships that veridicality is appropriately assessed.

Automatic color realism enhancement for computer generated images

Photorealism has been one of the essential elements in producing computer generated imagery. The state-of-the-art techniques employ various rendering algorithms to simulate physically accurate light transport for generating a photorealistic appearance of scene. However, they require a labor-intensive tone mapping and color tunes by an experienced artist. In this paper, we propose an automatic photorealism enhancement algorithm by manipulating the color distribution of graphics so to match with that of real photographs. Our hypothesis is that photorealism is highly correlated with the frequency of color occurrence in real photographs; more often we observe more realistic we believe. Based on this hypothesis, we find principal color components by following two steps. First, we extract the most representative features from the color distribution of photographs. Then, we obtain the coefficients of the most distinguishable principal axis to separate the features of photographs and those of graphics. The distribution of these coefficients constructs the color distribution of graphics and real photographs, respectively. Then, we modify the statistical characteristics (orientation, variation and the mean of color distribution) of graphics according to that of photographs. Experiments and user study have confirmed the effectiveness of proposed method.

A Recovered Children’s Christmas Story by Mary E. Wilkins Freeman: “The White Witch”

To Mary E. Wilkins Freeman’s vast œuvre, a new story must be added. “The White Witch” appeared on Sunday, Christmas Eve, 1893, in the Boston Globe, Portland Oregonian, Philadelphia Inquirer, St. Louis Republic, and San Francisco Chronicle.1 Advertisements for the story ran in the Boston Globe for December 21–23, 1893. The story appeared with a series of illustrations, although not every edition reproduced all of them. “The White Witch” is a children’s story and a Christmas story, two possible reasons it has hitherto escaped the notice of Freeman’s bibliographers. As Mary Reichardt indicates in her introduction to The Uncollected Stories of Mary Wilkins Freeman, scholars have focused particularly on Freeman’s short fiction, which demonstrates her “expertise.” Reichardt indicates in her introduction that of Freeman’s “eighty-odd uncollected stories that do not appear” in her edition, “the majority are holiday tales.” Three holidaythemed stories do appear in Reichardt’s volume; however, she argues for their inclusion on the basis of their artistic merit, as stories that succeed in spite of being written expressly for and in the vein of the holiday story. As she explains, the three “achieve internal power and tension in spite of the overt holiday intent.”2 All three stories were written for an adult audience. Often regarded among her strongest works, Freeman’s short fiction is usually assigned to “either or both of the two following literary traditions: regional local color realism and proto-feminist writings.”3 Still, her œuvre as a whole remains difficult to characterize, given the sheer mass of her production and the number of genres in which she published and experimented: nonfiction, poetry, plays, novels, as well as stories for children and adults. Such scholars as James B. Carter and Karl J. Terryberry have recently

Perception, Color, and Realism

One reason philosophers have addressed the metaphysics of color is its apparent relevance to the sciences concerned with color phenomena. In the light of such thinking, this paper examines a pairing of views that has received much attention: color physicalism and externalism about the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that the latter is a dubious conception of the workings of our perceptual systems. Together with flawed appeals to the empirical literature, it has led some philosophers to grant color physicalism a scientific legitimacy it does not merit. This discussion provides a useful entry into broader points pertaining to debates about color realism and the relationship between philosophical theories of color and the relevant empirical literatures. A sketch of a novel form of color realism is offered, as is an example that fills in some details of that sketch.

Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection

Let colour relationalism be that form of colour realism according to which colours are constituted (partly) in terms of relations to subjects (possibly inter alia). Colour relationalism can be usefully contrasted with non-relationalist views according to which colours are, say, non-relational physical properties of objects (Byrne and Hilbert 2003; Tye 2000). One (historically important) way to bring out the conflict between these two sorts of views is to ask whether, in cases where subjects appear to disagree in the colours they ascribe to a common object, it must be the case that at most one of the ascriptions can be veridical. For example, suppose that you look at a ripe tomato, that it appears to be red and that you report as much when asked; and now suppose that an alien being, with very different perceptual apparatus, views the same ripe tomato, but that it appears to her to be green, and that she reports as much when asked. Would one of the two reports of the ripe tomato’s colour have to be mistaken, or is it possible that both of them could be correct? Anti-relationalist views about colour predict that, in such cases of perceptual variation with respect to colour, just as in the case where you and I disagree in (say) the shape we ascribe to an object, at most one report

A realistic colour realism

Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green 31 . Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a realist about the determinable colours of objects, and thus hold that most of the colour ascriptions made by competent speakers are literally true, while denying that there are any positive facts of the matter as to the determinate colours of objects. The result is a realistic colour realism that can certify most of our everyday colour ascriptions as literally correct, while acknowledging the data regarding individual variation.

Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences

We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the literature about color – anti-realism versus dispositionalism versus reductionism – are not well-founded at this stage of scientific inquiry. Our account of color is designed to be of use in the sciences and as such is driven largely by considerations of what the various sciences need in order to proceed appropriately. We argue that a scientific theory of colors need not regard colors as anything more than high-level statistical constructs built out of correlations between color experiences and other phenomena.

A Light Theory with Heavy Burdens

In “ A Light Theory of Color”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and David Sparrow argue that color is neither a primary quality of objects, nor a disposition that objects have, nor a property of our visual fields. Rather, according to the view they present, color is a property of light. The present paper aims to show, first, that the light theory is vulnerable to many of the very same objections that Sinnott-Armstrong and Sparrow raise against rival views. Second, the paper argues that the strategies that Sinnott-Armstrong and Sparrow use to avoid certain objections are also available to proponents of rival accounts. This might only seem to show that the light theory is in the same shaky boat as other theories: suffering from the same problems but having the same tools for solving them. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to why this is not the case, but why the existence of the light theory is nevertheless likely to bring increased clarity to the debate about color realism.

Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts

According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc. 1By ‘colour realism’, I mean the view that some material objects do have colour. These terms are employed in a variety of ways in discussions on colour. Boghossian and Velleman [1989], for instance, use them as I do. Some philosophers intend by ‘colour realism’ the stronger view according to which material objects have colour, and colour is a mind-independent property. Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory of ordinary colour judgement: ordinary judgements in which colour is ascribed to a material object are, strictly speaking, false. In this paper, I claim that colour irrealists who endorse the error theory cannot explain how we acquire colour concepts (yellow, green, etc.), concepts they must acknowledge we do possess. Our basic colour concepts, I argue, could not be phenomenal concepts that we acquire by attending to the colour properties of our experience. And, I explain, all other plausible explanations render colour concepts such that our ordinary colour judgements involving them are often true. Given the explanatory considerations upon which the irrealist's position is based, this is a severe problem for colour irrealism.

Color realism revisited

Our reply is in four parts. The first part, R1, addresses objections to our claim that there might be “unknowable” color facts. The second part, R2, discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part, R3, examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part, R4, takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience.