Color Incompatibility Research Articles

Wittgenstein’s Construal of “Numbers” as “Schemes” and the Color Incompatibility Problem

Este artigo trata do chamado “problema de incompatibilidade de cores”, enfrentado por Wittgenstein no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, em seus Manuscritos inéditos 105 e 106, e em seu único artigo publicado – “Some Remarks on Logical Forms” (SRLF). Nossa tarefa será dupla. Primeiro, pretendemos mostrar como e por que Wittgenstein ficou preso nesse dilema. Nossa segunda tarefa será muito mais específica.Tentaremos elucidar alguns detalhes sobre a impossibilidade de reduzir predicados de cor a unidades mais fundamentais de brilho, croma e intensidade. Nosso objetivo é mostrar como e por que os números tiveram que ser introduzidos na estrutura interna das proposições elementares. Também queremos investigar como Wittgenstein tentou fazer isso através da ideia de um “esquema” e uma operação nãover-funcional. Pretendemos também apresentar algumas vantagens que Wittgenstein obteve ao usar uma notação de barra para sua construção dos “esquemas”.AbstractThis paper deals with the so-called “color incompatibility problem”, faced by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in his unpublished Manuscripts 105 and 106, and in his only published paper – “Some Remarks on Logical Forms” – (SRLF, for now on). Our task will be a twofold one. First, we aspire to show how and why Wittgenstein got stuck into that dilemma. Our second task will be much more specific. We will try to elucidate some details about the impossibility of reducing color predicates to more fundamental units of brightness, chroma, and intensity. We aim to show how and why numbers had to be introduced into the inner structure of elementary propositions. We also want to investigate how he tried to do that through the idea of a “scheme” and a non-truth functional operation. We aim also to present some advantages Wittgenstein gained from using a bar notation for his construal of the “schemes”.

Is Colour incompatibility analytic?

AbstractIt is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much‐cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft‐ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place.

Knowing Opposites and Formalising Antonymy

This paper discusses knowledge of opposites. In particular, attention is given to the linguistic notion of antonymy and how it represents oppositional relations that are commonly found in perception. The paper draws upon the long history of work on the formalisation of antonymy in linguistics and formal semantics, and also upon work on the perception of opposites in psychology, and an assessment is made of the main approaches. Treatments of these phenomena in linguistics and psychology posit that the principles of minimal difference and invariance are centrally important. It will be suggested that the standard approach employing meaning postulates fails to capture the relevant notion of antonymy, in part because it is not informed by these principles, and in part due to a number of other problems with this kind of approach, many of which may be overcome by building in the central principles from the beginning. The paper also discusses the issue of whether we can know that opposites necessarily exclude each other and, if so, how. This issue is intertwined with what is known as the colour incompatibility problem that Wittgenstein wrangled with at various times during his life. The paper assesses various solutions to these problems including an approach that was first put forward by Jerrold J. Katz. The relation between this approach and the theory of determinables and determinates is also examined. A further development upon this approach is proposed and then applied to the case of the formalisation of antonymy. It is argued that this approach avoids the problems suffered by the main approaches discussed earlier in the paper.

Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic

After Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein realized that elementary propositions may logically conflict with each other, due to the fact that the most elementary measurements may contradict each other. This led to the view that logic consists of various calculi. A calculus consists of measurement scales, each scale being a rule for the application of numbers. These scales determine logical relationships between elementary propositions by reason of arithmetical relations. Attempts to reject Wittgenstein's change in viewpoint, which ignore the relevance of measurement and arithmetic, are remiss. In this light, I discuss Sarah Moss’s criticism of intermediate Wittgenstein.

Russell and Wittgenstein on Incongruent Counterparts and Incompatible Colours

Russell (in Principles of Mathematics) and Wittgenstein (in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) largely agree on the twin questions of why pairs of congruent objects cannot always be made to coincide and why surfaces can never be uniformly two colours at once. Both philosophers take space and colour to be mathematically representable, construe the relevant impossibilities as mathematical and hold that mathematical impossibility is at root logical. It is not by chance that Russell says nothing about the phenomena in his Introduction to the Tractatus or surprising that Wittgenstein was unmoved by the objection that his account of colour incompatibility puts paid to his early philosophy.

Wittgenstein 1929-1930 – the Color Exclusion Problem (in Polish)

Wittgenstein introduced his claim about colour incompatibility originally in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , where he stated that there could be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism when he realized the consequences of this claim. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. I will focus on two works of great significance for the claim: Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks . These two works were written between 1929 and 1930, which is the beginning of the “middle period” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will focus not only on Wittgenstein’s formulation of the colour incompatibility claim, but also on how this claim was justified. The explanation of Wittgenstein’s justification of this claim will help to understand his phenomenology and theory of philosophical grammar.

Wittgenstein 1929-1930 – problem dwóch kolorów w tym samym miejscu

The colour incompatibility claim was first introduced by Wittgenstein in the Tractaus . It states that there can be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism after he had understood the consequences of his colour incompatibility claim. The main goal of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein's phenomenology. I will focus on two works which are of great significance for the colour incompatibility claim, namely, Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks . The period between 1929 and 1930 is the time when these two works came into existence, and it is the beginning of the “middle period” of Wittgenstein's philosophy. My attention will not only concern the fact that Wittgenstein formulated the colour incompatibility claim, but I will also address the issue of how this claim was justified. The grasp of Wittgenstein's justification of the colour incompatibility claim will help to understand his phenomenology and his theory of philosophical grammar.

Color Relationalism, Ordinary Illusion, and Color Incompatibility

Relationalism is a view popularized by Cohen according to which the colors are relational properties. Cohen’s view has the unintuitive consequence that the following propositions are false: (i) no object can be more than one determinate or determinable color all over at the same time; (ii) ordinary illusion cases occur whenever the color perceptually represented conflicts, according to (i) above, with the object’s real color; and (iii) the colors we perceive obey (i). I investigate Cohen’s attempt to address these intuitive propositions with which his view struggles and find it to be incompatible with how he motivates his view.

Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Abstract A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red and green all over’ – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.

Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem

It is commonly held that Wittgenstein abandoned the Tractatus largely because of a problem concerning color incompatibility. In this paper, I solve the color incompatibility problem and argue that the central program of the Tractatus can in fact be accomplished.

Room Enough for One: Towards a Solution for Colour Incompatibility

L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'affirmation de la necessite de l'incompatibilite des couleurs releve de notre experience de la perception des couleurs et s'apparente donc a une necessite de la subjectivite (C. McGinn). Au-dela des positions contraires de C. L. Hardin et J. Westphal, respectivement fondees sur le mecanisme psychophysique de l'experience de la couleur et sur les proprietes de surface des objets percus (absorption et reflexion), l'A. montre que le probleme de l'incompatibilite souleve par Locke et Wittgenstein peut etre resolu par la propriete bi-dimensionnelle de l'etendue de la couleur selon laquelle deux couleurs ne peuvent survenir dans le meme espace sensoriel

Westphal on the physical basis of colour incompatibility

Westphal on the physical basis of colour incompatibility

Westphal on the Physical Basis of Colour Incompatibility

Journal Article Westphal on the physical basis of colour incompatibility Get access Marie McGinn Marie McGinn University of YorkHeslington, York Y01 5DD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 51, Issue 4, October 1991, Pages 218–222, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.4.218 Published: 01 October 1991

Acer rubrum Cultivars for the South

Nine budded Acer rubrum cultivars were evaluated from 1980-1988 for fall color, growth rate and bud union incompatibility. Fall foliar coloration was consistent with 'Autumn Flame', Tilford', 'Gerling', and 'Bowhall', but not with 'Red Sunset'. With the exception of 'Red Sunset', bud union incompatibility has occurred with all cultivars, especially 'Bowhall', 'Scarlet Sentinel', and 'Schlesingeri'. Annual height growth of these cultivars averaged 50-69 cm, with the exception of 'Autumn Flame' which averaged 40-45 cm a year. 'Armstrong', a fastigiate form, grew 60-65 cm annually. Two seedling selections, from south Alabama and Tennessee, were compared with the cultivars. Height and caliper growth of the seedlings were similar to most cultivars.