Collective Choice Process Research Articles

The robustness mechanism of the rural social-ecological system in response to the impact of urbanization——Evidence from irrigation commons in China

Urbanization is essential for achieving rapid development. In this process, the labor outmigration from rural areas to cities caused by urbanization has diversified the impacts on the robustness of the rural social-ecological system. However, existing research has rarely discussed the internal mechanism of the response of the rural social-ecological system to the impact of urbanization. Based on the coupled infrastructure systems framework, in this paper, the internal interactions of the rural social-ecological system responding to the impact of urbanization are discussed. An empirical test is conducted using survey data from 123 villages of 14 Chinese provinces. Focusing on the specific practice of China, this paper further discusses how the robustness of the rural social-ecological system can be ensured under external impact. The main conclusions are as follows: under the impact of urbanization, the internal interaction paths with which the rural social-ecological system maintains robustness at the operational level are not unique. These different internal interaction paths may not only make the rural social-ecological system automatically realize a virtuous and robust cycle under the impact of urbanization, they may also cause a gradual collapse of the rural social-ecological system. Further, the discussion of China’s specific practice shows that it is key to provide institutional rules to guarantee the operational processes through the collective-choice process, thus ensuring the robustness of the rural social-ecological system under the impact of urbanization. The inspection of the interaction mechanisms in this study may obtain some restricted views on the general laws that may be contained in the complex interaction within the rural social-ecological system, and provide a theoretical basis developing countries can apply to realize rural revitalization when faced with the irreversible wave of urbanization.

Blockchain Networks as Constitutional and Competitive Polycentric Orders

Permissionless blockchains have been described as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange, with unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. We argue that conventional institutional economics analysis of blockchain networks is incomplete absent a more robust application of descriptive polycentric analysis. Though the distributed governance that permissionless blockchain protocols provide is novel, these networks nonetheless require ongoing coordination between stakeholders and are subject to competitive pressures much like other private organizations pursuing similar goals for a set of users who can choose among providers. We characterize change on blockchain networks as resulting from internal sources and external sources. These internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and the related need for collective choice processes to update protocols. In addition to law and regulation, competitive pressure is itself a critical external source of governance. Predominantly through analysis of two leading cryptocurrency networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing of blockchain as a polycentric enterprise enhances our predictive and descriptive understanding of these networks.

Social movements as key actors in governing the commons: Evidence from community-based resource management cases across the world

Abstract The international research on the benefits of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) regimes for sustainable development has raised concerns about the vulnerability of said regimes to globalization, shortsighted government regulations, marginalization, and other global political economy threats. This paper addresses the question of whether and how social movements contribute to the organization and robustness of CBNRM in the advent of those threats. To accomplish this, we carry out a qualitative meta-analysis of 81 cases worldwide. Our evidence shows that one of the most important effects of movements on CBNRM is the promotion and defense of community use and management rights against certain government decisions or actions by global corporations. We also find that movements can generate positive effects beyond the reaction to specific threats. Those effects include the democratization of communities’ collective choice processes, the reinvigoration of identity ties and local ecological knowledge, the promotion of economic development and autonomy, and the creation of nested user organizations. Exploring such potentially longer-term effects is a promising next step towards further connecting the social movement and CBNRM scholarships and better understanding the robustness of local management regimes in the context of global change.

Democracy by Discussion, Not Debate: James Buchanan on Freedom of Inquiry as a Methodological, not Ideological, Necessity

Abstract Freedom of inquiry remains one of the core tenants of the liberal project. However, in a 1960 letter, James M. Buchanan argued that free inquiry was important for more than just philosophical reasons. In fact, freedom of inquiry and the ability to participate in collective choice processes was at the heart of Buchanan’s methodological commitments to social science and foundational to the entire project of Virginia Political Economy. In this paper, we will show why freedom of inquiry assumes the central place that it holds in Buchanan’s methodology and research more broadly. Insisting on inquiry being open and free to all was not simply an ideological preference held by Buchanan—rather, to him it was the only way forward for Virginia Political Economy.

The Political Economy of Unfinished Development Projects: Corruption, Clientelism, or Collective Choice?

Development projects like schools and latrines are popular with politicians and voters alike, yet many developing countries are littered with half-finished projects that were abandoned mid-construction. Using an original database of over 14,000 small development projects in Ghana, I estimate that one-third of projects that start are never completed, consuming nearly one-fifth of all local government investment. I develop a theory of project noncompletion as the outcome of a dynamically inconsistent collective choice process among political actors facing commitment problems in contexts of limited resources. I find evidence consistent with key predictions of this theory, but inconsistent with alternative explanations based on corruption or clientelism. I show that fiscal institutions can increase completion rates by mitigating the operational consequences of these collective choice failures. These findings have theoretical and methodological implications for distributive politics, the design of intergovernmental transfers and aid, and the development of state capacity.

Intelligently Designing Deliberative Health Care Forums: Dewey's Metaphysics, Cognitive Science and a Brazilian Example

Imagine you are the CEO of a hospital [. . .]. Decisions are constantly being made in your organization about how to spend the organization's money. The amount of money available to spend is never adequate to pay for everything you wish you could spend it on, therefore you must set spending priorities. There are two questions you need to be able to answer . . . How should we set priorities in this organization? How do we know when we are doing it well?When people seek to achieve good public policy, the result will tend to be good public policy. In a collective choice process, public‐spirited individual participants produce good public policy by deliberating—talking with each other, listening to each other's arguments, and being willing to learn and change their minds based on such dialogue. –Steven Kelman (1992: 181) Public policy scholars agree that those persons (or agencies) vested with the authority to establish health care priorities should elicit public input before making rationing decisions. The two most common approaches are (i) consultation and (ii) deliberation. Though deliberation has obvious advantages over consultation, it falters in the face of the objection that ordinary citizens lack the cognitive resources for the extended, rigorous inquiry required of them in undertaking the priority‐setting task. To overcome this objection, I propose that deliberative forums for health care rationing should be designed so that they imitate the natural pattern of human experience. The experience of deliberation should encompass both prolonged periods of less‐demanding cognitive activity, in which citizens passively receive information, and briefer periods of more‐demanding cognitive activity, in which they engage in active problem‐solving. In arguing for this thesis, I rely on two theoretical sources and one practical case study, in the following order: (i) John Dewey's metaphysics of experience, (ii) cognitive science research on schemas and frames, and (iii) the Health Care Council in São Paulo, Brazil.

Is Numérairology the Future of Monetary Economics?

The paper discusses some fundamental problems in monetary economics associated with the determination and role of the numéraire. The issues are introduced by formalising a proposal, attributed to Eisler, to remove the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates by unbundling the numéraire and medium of exchange/means of payment functions of money. The monetary authorities manage the exchange rate between the numéraire (‘sterling’) and the means of payment (‘drachma’). The short nominal interest rate on sterling bonds can then be used to target stability for the sterling price level. The paper puts question marks behind two key bits of conventional wisdom in contemporary monetary economics. The first is the assumption that the monetary authorities define and determine the numéraire used in private transactions. The second is the proposition that price stability in terms of that numéraire is the appropriate objective of monetary policy. The paper also discusses the merits of the next step following the decoupling of the numéraire from the currency: doing away with currency altogether—the cashless economy. Because the unit of account plays such a central role in New-Keynesian models with nominal rigidities, monetary economics needs to devote more attention to numérairology—the study of the individual and collective choice processes that govern the adoption of a unit of account and its role in economic behaviour.

Cake Division by Majority Decision

We consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent.

La mesure du pouvoir de vote

How can we measure the voting power of individuals or groups of individuals in a collective choice process? The aim of this study is to review the various numerical answers that have been given to this question. A number of power indices are introduced and compared, not only through an application to the European Union Council, but also in terms of normative properties and probabilistic interpretations.

The safe minimum standard of conservation and endangered species: a review

The safe minimum standard (SMS) approach is a collective choice process that prescribes protecting a minimum level of a renewable natural resource unless the social costs of doing so are somehow excessive or intolerably high. Arguments for the SMS are typically invoked in settings involving considerable uncertainty and potentially irreversible losses. However, the SMS is most commonly viewed as existing only on the periphery of thought in traditional environmental and resource economics. The specific objectives are: (1) to define the SMS approach generally and examine theoretical support, particularly for its application in endangered species decision settings; (2) to examine the relationship between an SMS approach and benefit-cost analysis (BCA); (3) to examine the relationship between an SMS approach and non-market valuation; (4) to compare an SMS approach to alternative definitions of sustainability; and (5) to review the general consistency of the SMS approach with the USA's Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, as amended. Recent attention on this pragmatic policy approach has been something far greater than cursory, with advances and detailed discussions on theoretical considerations, philosophical underpinnings and case study applications. While the SMS emerges as a fairly coarse policy instrument, its pragmatic value is seen in complex environmental policy applications, such as endangered species protection.

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided.

Incorporating distributional considerations in the safe minimum standard approach: endangered species and local impacts

Explicitly incorporating current distributional concerns into the safe minimum standard (SMS) approach is the objective of this study. The SMS approach is a collective choice process that prescribes protecting a minimum level of a renewable natural resource unless the social costs of doing so are somehow excessive or intolerably high. More complete implementation of an SMS approach, if it is to be a pragmatic policy tool, requires that distributional considerations be included in determining whether the economic consequences of preservation actions are intolerable. Two case studies involving the US Endangered Species Act are used to illustrate how distributional concerns might be incorporated into the SMS approach.

Children as Income‐Producing Assets: The Case of Teen Illegitimacy and Government Transfers

This paper develops a classical model of the teen fertility decision in the presence of public income transfers. The theoretical model predicts that welfare payments will encourage fertility, holding constant other economic opportunities, and that better economic opportunities will discourage fertility. Considering the possible simultaneity of illegitimacy rates and benefit levels, due to the collective choice process, we confirm the theoretical model's predictions with state‐level data from 1980 through 1990. We find that including fixed effects in the regression to control for unobserved differences between states does not sufficiently control for endogeneity. After controlling for endogeneity, real welfare benefits are strongly and robustly related to teen illegitimacy. The point estimates of the elasticity with respect to changes in the illegitimacy rate are around +1.3 for white teens and +2.1 for black teens. Real wages for women with a high school education or less are negatively related to teen illegitimacy for white teens, with an elasticity of around ‐0.4. Finally, male wages appear to have little effect on the illegitimacy rate for white teens but appear negatively correlated with the illegitimacy rate for black teens in some model specifications.

Children as Income-Producing Assets: The Case of Teen Illegitimacy and Government Transfers

This paper develops a classical model of the teen fertility decision in the presence of public income transfers. The theoretical model predicts that welfare payments will encourage fertility, holding constant other economic opportunities, and that better economic opportunities will discourage fertility. Considering the possible simultaneity of illegitimacy rates and benefit levels, due to the collective choice process, the authors confirm the theoretical model's predictions with state-level data from 1980 through 1990. The authors find that including fixed effects in the regression to control for unobserved differences between states does not sufficiently control for endogeneity. After controlling for endogeneity, real welfare benefits are strongly and robustly related to teen illegitimacy. The point estimates of the elasticity with respect to changes in the illegitimacy rate are around +1.3 for White teens and +2.1 for Black teens. Real wages for women with a high school education or less are negatively related to teen illegitimacy for White teens, with an elasticity of around -0.4. Finally, male wages appear to have little effect on the illegitimacy rate for White teens but appear negatively correlated with the illegitimacy rate for Black teens in some model specifications.

On The Collective Choice Process of Civic Design with The Rule of Decision by Majority

Existing studies on the collective choice processes in planning have not dealt with the situation where each individual doesn't understand his/her interest of alternatives clearly.In this paper we build a model for the collective choice process with decision by majority with the group. In which the individual's preference is fracturing because of the propensity of following other's preference. As major finding of the model analysis, the strong following propensity makes supporter's distribution for each plans unstable. Also we find that the finally selected plans are not always the alternative that should be potentially ranked at the top.

L’Outil Quantitatif D’Aide A La Décision Comme Jeu Et Enjeu

AbstractThe multiplicity of uses that are made of a quantitative tool during a collective choice process implying several participants of an organization in the quasi-public sector, is examined. The metaphor of the game is proposed for purposes of this study. Results of the study show that the use of the quantitative tool extends beyond the role that one traditionally attributes it, that being to clarify a choice. For the various participants, the quantitative tool is an instrument that simultaneously enables and contrains. It is both the rule of the game and the stake. The consequences for both developers and users of quantitative tools, most notably as regards their training, are presented and discussed.

Market Failure and Government Failure

Aaron Levine suggests that income distribution, risk management and product-pricing problems warrant government intervention. It is important to use a comparative-institutions approach in assessing the effects of government action designed to correct such 'failures' of the market. The relevant comparison is between the outcomes of real-world markets and the results when government intervenes, taking into account the information and incentive problems that plague the collective choice process. If the state acts to correct the 'market failures' in the situation identified by Levine, the government creates problems that may be worse than the problems that existed before the government intervened.

Economics and the public policy process: What can economists do?∗∗

The potential for economists to contribute to the public policy process is explored. There are opportunities for improvement in public policy, and for economists to contribute to this process, as long as the political process is not perfectly coordinated. Traditional welfare economics and public choice theory, which hold that there is slack in the political process, imply that there is ample scope for economists to contribute to economic reform. Chicago political economy, on the other hand, holding that the political process is efficient in the sense that existing programs are superior to available alternatives, implies that there are no opportunities for economists to contribute to economic reform. In sharp contrast, it is argued here that economic ideas have consequences and that opportunities for economic reform abound because of information and incentive problems that are endemic in the collective choice process.

Economists and public policy: Chicago political economy versus conventional views

Both conventional welfare economics and public choice analysis suggest that economists have an important educational role to play in the public policy process — in improving the decision-making process. In sharp contrast, information and incentive problems related to voting rules, the bureaucracy, and the legislature do not arise in CPE because these processes are all perfect agents of interest groups. Consequently, the political process is efficient and there is no scope for beneficial economic analysis as it relates to the sugar program or other public policies. That is, the polity is efficient or it would be reordered by competing interest groups to make it so. But, as Mitchell (1989: 290) stresses, the important unanswered question in CPE remains: if there is no scope for improvement how and why does change occur? The analysis here suggests that the sugar program (and similar policies) may persist not because they are beneficial to the public at large but rather because information and incentive problems in the collective choice process lead to perverse results. Consequently, economic analysts can make a positive contribution to the public policy process by providing information about the responsiveness of alternative institutional arrangements to the values and choices of individual citizens (Wiseman, 1989). The Friedmans' “Tide in the Affairs of Men” view holds that economic analyses are important in changing public opinion, which is an important precursor to changes in public policy. In scores of studies over the past fifty years, economists have shown that the sugar and other argiculture price-support programs are inconsistent with the goal of open markets and provide most of the benefits to people with above-average incomes. Although only modest changes have been made in farm programs, deregulation of agriculture finally is being seriously discussed. For example, in 1987 the Reagan Administration proposed a sweeping initiative under the Uruguay Round of GATT to phase out all trade-distorting agricultural programs by the year 2000. The fact that the elimination of agricultural trade restrictions was seriously discussed under GATT auspices for the first time in forty years reflects the growing recognition that the sugar program and other domestic farm programs are better explained by rent-seeking than by a “what is, is efficient” view of agricultural policies. This change in intellectual climate is consistent with the thesis that ideas have consequ4ences and that economists can play an important role in affecting both the intellectual tide and the course of public policy.

Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation

Legislators' beliefs, preferences, and intentions are communicated in committees and legislatures through debates, the proposal of bills and amendments, and the recording of votes. Because such information is typically distributed asymmetrically within any group of decision makers, legislators have incentives to reveal or conceal private information strategically and thus manipulate the collective decision-making process in their favor. In consequence, any committee decision may in the end reflect only the interests of a minority. We address a problem of sharing information through debate in an endogenous, agenda-setting, collective-choice process. The model is game theoretic and we find in the equilibrium to the game that at least some legislators have incentives to conceal private information. Consequently, the final committee decision can be “incoherent” by failing to reflect the preferences of all committee members fully. Additionally, we characterize the subset of legislators with any incentive to conceal data.