The Role of Mongolia in Multilateral Security Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Northeast Asia:Relevance of the 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD)' Initiative Jaehyuk Jang (bio) and Kisun Kim (bio) Factors for geopolitical conflict and power balance still exist potently in intra-regional politics in Northeast Asia. The role of a third country that could increase the possibility of creating an international regime as an institution is important. In the past, Mongolia did not receive a lot of attention in intra-regional or regional political affairs, as its military and economy were weak compared to other countries in the region. However, despite being a landlocked country surrounded by both China and Russia, Mongolia has used its geographical position strategically as a neutral state that can contribute positively to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia and proactively has proposed a constructive role and function for itself. As Mongolia aligns itself to the national interests of its regional neighbors and creates possibilities for regional cooperation, it is seeking a new role in Northeast Asia. Keywords Northeast Asia, multilateral security cooperation, Mongolia, Korean Peninsula, Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD) Although almost 30 years has passed since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia, and especially the Korean Peninsula, is still virtually in a state of cold war. Confrontational rhetoric, intimidating war games, nuclear weapons, and missile tests add to rising historical and territorial disputes. There is no institutional mechanism and a weak multilateral tradition to address these regional security challenges (Enkhsaikhan 2016). The dictionary definition of East Asia is the eastern region of Asia and the countries within the region, particularly China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia (Dictionary.com). As this definition [End Page 377] implies, Northeast Asia is not a concept that is rigorously defined. At the end of the global Cold War in 1990, Northeast Asia was left without a clear path forward for at least two reasons. First, the four assertive great powers—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—harbored clashing aspirations for the regional security order, especially with regard to the two intractable problems of divided nations—the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait—which stood little prospect of resolution without further exacerbation as the weaker side (North Korea and Taiwan) grew more important within the region as a result of the four great powers' clashing interests (Rozman 2004). Second, economic integration at breakneck pace not only came without answers for regional institutions and trust but actually fueled nationalism as some states turned confidence into pride while others found dependence tinged with anxiety (Rozman 2007). Over the last three decades, regionalism in Northeast Asia has been championed first by Japan, then by South Korea, and finally by China, with the United States often wary that this approach would become an exclusive framework. In 2005, opposition to East Asian regionalism reached its peak amid reports that the United States feared China would dominate any such grouping.1 Yet, after Southeast Asian states orchestrated the entries of India, Australia, and New Zealand into the new East Asia Summit (EAS), this danger seemed to fade. Recognition that the South Korean public was neither rife with anti-Americanism nor ready to sustain the South Korean government's assertive foreign policies also quieted the alarm regarding a strategic shift toward China. Missing, however, was a forward-looking regional strategy that made clear the US support for regionalism consistent with globalization and in equilibrium, without any dominator. The challenge of finding a balanced approach to national interests in the handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis overlapped with that of working first of all with China and Japan and then South Korea as well as Russia, and possibly some day North Korea, in making Northeast Asia the nucleus of regionalism (Rozman 2007). Another challenge in this connection is the lack of a regional security mechanism. The political, strategic, and military interests of the region's great powers and the two Koreas intersect with each one's economic interests. Bilateral alliances play a dominant role in diplomacy because multilateralism is weak. Hence, there is a high risk of strategic misunderstanding, especially in times of crisis. Establishing a Northeast Asian security mechanism would, like in...