Coherent One-way Research Articles

Hacking coherent-one-way quantum key distribution with present-day technology

Recent results have shown that the secret-key rate of coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distribution (QKD) scales quadratically with the system’s transmittance, thus rendering this protocol unsuitable for long-distance transmission. This was proven by using a so-called zero-error attack, which relies on an unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement. This type of attack allows the eavesdropper to learn the whole secret key without introducing any error. Here, we investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of zero-error attacks against COW QKD with present-day technology. For this, we introduce two practical USD receivers that can be realized with linear passive optical elements, phase-space displacement operations and threshold single-photon detectors. The first receiver is optimal with respect to its success probability, while the second one can impose stronger restrictions on the protocol’s performance with faulty eavesdropping equipment. Our findings suggest that zero-error attacks could break the security of COW QKD even assuming realistic experimental conditions.

Finite-key analysis for coherent one-way quantum key distribution

Coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a significant communication protocol that has been implemented experimentally and deployed in practical products due to its simple equipment requirements. However, existing security analyses of COW-QKD either provide a short transmission distance or lack immunity against coherent attacks in the finite-key regime. In this paper, we present a tight finite-key security analysis within the universally composable framework for a variant of COW-QKD, which has been proven to extend the secure transmission distance in the asymptotic case. We combine the quantum leftover hash lemma and entropic uncertainty relation to derive the key rate formula. When estimating statistical parameters, we use the recently proposed Kato's inequality to ensure security against coherent attacks and achieve a higher key rate. Our paper confirms the security and feasibility of COW-QKD for practical application and lays the foundation for further theoretical study and experimental implementation. Published by the American Physical Society 2024

Experimental demonstration of a reconfigurable free-space receiver implementing polarization routing and filtering for daytime quantum key distribution.

Free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are often designed to implement polarization-encoding protocols. Alternatively, time-bin/phase-encoding protocols are considerably more challenging to perform over a channel experiencing atmospheric turbulence. However, over the last decade, new and improved optical platforms have revived the interest in them. In this paper, we present a free-space multi-protocol receiver designed to work with three different time-bin/phase-encoding protocols highlighting its interoperability with different systems and architectures for potential satellite-based communications. We also present a detailed analysis of different experimental configurations when implementing the coherent one-way (COW) protocol in a free-space channel, as well as a polarization filtering technique showing how time-bin/phase-encoding protocols could be used for QKD applications in daylight conditions. We demonstrate secret key rates of several kbps for channels with a total 30 dB attenuation even with moderately high QBERs of ≈3.5%. Moreover, a 2.6 dB improvement in the signal to noise ratio is achieved by filtering background light in the polarization degree of freedom, a technique that could be used in daylight QKD.

Improved Coherent One-Way Quantum key Distribution for High-Loss Channels

The coherent one-way (COW) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a highly practical quantum communication protocol that is currently deployed in off-the-shelves products. However, despite its simplicity and widespread use, the security of COW-QKD is still an open problem. This is largely due to its unique security feature based on inter-signal phase distribution, which makes it very difficult to analyze using standard security proof techniques. Here, to overcome this problem, we present a simple variant of COW-QKD and prove its security in the infinite-key limit. The proposed modifications only involve an additional vacuum tail signal following every encoded signal and a balanced beam-splitter for passive measurement basis choice. Remarkably, the resulting key rate of our protocol is comparable with both the existing upper-bound on COW-QKD key rate and the secure key rate of the coherent-state BB84 protocol. Our findings therefore suggest that the secured deployment of COW-QKD systems in high loss optical networks is indeed feasible with minimal adaptations applied to its hardware and software.

In-lab demonstration of coherent one-way protocol over free space with turbulence simulation.

Over the last decade, free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), a secure key sharing protocol, has risen in popularity due the adaptable nature of free-space networking and the near-term potential to share quantum-secure encryption keys over a global scale. While the literature has primarily focused on polarization based-protocols for free-space transmission, there are benefits to implementing other protocols, particularly when operating at fast clock-rates, such as in the GHz. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a time-bin QKD system, implementing the coherent one-way (COW) at 1 GHz clock frequency, utilizing a free-space channel and receiver. We demonstrate the receiver's robustness to atmospheric turbulence, maintaining an operational visibility of 92%, by utilizing a lab-based turbulence simulator. With a fixed channel loss of 16 dB, discounting turbulence, we obtain secret key rate (SKR) of 6.4 kbps, 3.4 kbps, and 270 bps for three increasing levels of turbulence. Our results highlight that turbulence must be better accounted for in free-space QKD modelling due to the additional induced loss.

Foiling zero-error attacks against coherent-one-way quantum key distribution

To protect practical quantum key distribution (QKD) against photon-number-splitting attacks, one could measure the coherence of the received signals. One prominent example that follows this approach is coherent-one-way (COW) QKD, which is commercially available. Surprisingly, however, it has been shown very recently that its secret key rate scales quadratically with the channel transmittance and thus this scheme is unsuitable for long-distance transmission. This result was derived by using a zero-error attack, which prevents the distribution of a secure key without introducing any error. Here we study various countermeasures to foil zero-error attacks against COW QKD. They require either monitoring some additional available detection statistics or increasing the number of quantum states emitted. We obtain asymptotic upper security bounds on the secret key rate that scale close to linearly with the channel transmittance, thus suggesting the effectiveness of the countermeasures to boost the performance of this protocol.

Zero-error attack against coherent-one-way quantum key distribution

Coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distribution (QKD) held the promise of distributing secret keys over long distances with a simple experimental setup. Indeed, this scheme is currently used in commercial applications. Surprisingly, however, it has been recently shown that its secret key rate scales at most quadratically with the system’s transmittance and, thus, it is not appropriate for long distance QKD transmission. Such pessimistic result was derived by employing a so-called zero-error attack, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still the legitimate users of the system cannot distill a secure key. Here, we present an improved zero-error attack against COW-QKD that significantly outperforms previous approaches, and provides stronger restrictions on its maximum achievable distance in the absence of errors. This translates into an upper bound on its secret key rate that is more than an order of magnitude lower than previously known upper bounds.

Upper Security Bounds for Coherent-One-Way Quantum Key Distribution.

The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multiphoton pulses emitted by laser sources due to the photon-number splitting attack. Coherent-one-way (COW) QKD has been introduced as a promising solution to overcome this limitation, and thus extend the achievable distance of practical QKD. Indeed, thanks to its experimental simplicity, the COW protocol is already used in commercial applications. Here, we derive simple upper security bounds on its secret key rate, which demonstrate that it scales at most quadratically with the system's transmittance, thus solving a long-standing problem. That is, in contrast to what has been claimed, this approach is inappropriate for long-distance QKD transmission. Remarkably, our findings imply that all implementations of the COW protocol performed so far are insecure.

Quantum soft filtering for the improved security analysis of the coherent one-way quantum-key-distribution protocol

A precise security analysis of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is an important step for improving their performance. Here we consider a class of quantum soft filtering operations, which generalizes the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) technique. These operations can be applied as a basis for a security analysis of the original coherent one-way (COW) QKD protocol since their application interpolates between beam-splitting (BS) and USD attacks. We demonstrate that a zero-error attack based on quantum soft filtering operations gives a larger amount of the information for Eve at a given level of losses. We calculate the Eve information as a function of the channel length. The efficiency of the proposed attack highly depends on the level of the monitoring under the maintenance of the statistics of control (decoy) states, and best-case results are achieved in the case of the absence of maintenance of control state statistics. Our results form additional requirements for the analysis of practical QKD systems based on the COW QKD protocol and its variants by providing an upper bound on the security.

Implementation of a hybrid scheme for coherent plug-and-play quantum key distribution

We experimentally demonstrate a hybrid configuration for Quantum Key Distribution, that combines the simplicity of Distributed Phase Reference protocols with the self-referencing features and polarization insensitivity of the so-called Plug & Play system. Additionally, all the components are arranged in a server-client scheme to allow for practical key distribution. Blank, coherent pulse pair trains are generated at the reception end of the link by means of a pulse sequence and an unbalanced interferometer, and sent to the other end. The emitter writes the qubits by erasing one of the pulses from the pair as in a Coherent-One Way protocol. Detection, as well as eavesdropping monitoring is performed at the receiver side, using the same interferometer that was used to generate the initial phase-referenced pulses.

Analysis of coherent quantum cryptography protocol vulnerability to an active beam-splitting attack

We consider a new type of attack on a coherent quantum key distribution protocol [coherent one-way (COW) protocol]. The main idea of the attack consists in measuring individually the intercepted states and sending the rest of them unchanged. We have calculated the optimum values of the attack parameters for an arbitrary length of a communication channel and compared this novel attack with a standard beam-splitting attack.

An FPGA-Based 4 Mbps Secret Key Distillation Engine for Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables provably secure communication between two parties over an optical fiber that arguably withstands any form of attack. Besides the need for a suitable physical signalling scheme and the corresponding devices, QKD also requires a secret key distillation protocol. This protocol and the involved signal processing handle the reliable key agreement process over the fragile quantum channel, as well as the necessary post-processing of key bits to avoid leakage of secret key information to an eavesdropper. In this paper we present in detail an implementation of a key distillation engine for a QKD system based on the coherent one-way (COW) protocol. The processing of key bits by the key distillation engine includes agreement on quantum bit detections (sifting), information reconciliation with forward error correction coding, parameter estimation, and privacy amplification over an authenticated channel. We detail the system architecture combining all these processing steps, and discuss the design trade-offs for each individual system module. We also assess the performance and efficiency of our key distillation implementation in terms of throughput, error correction capabilities, and resource utilization. On a single-FPGA (Xilinx Virtex-6 LX240T) platform, the system supports distilled key rates of up to 4 Mbps.

A high-speed multi-protocol quantum key distribution transmitter based on a dual-drive modulator

We propose a novel source based on a dual-drive modulator that is adaptable and allows Alice to choose between various practical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols depending on what receiver she is communicating with. Experimental results show that the proposed transmitter is suitable for implementation of the Bennett and Brassard 1984 (BB84), coherent one-way (COW) and differential phase shift (DPS) protocols with stable and low quantum bit error rate. This could become a useful component in network QKD, where multi-protocol capability is highly desirable.

Lower bounds for the security of modified coherent-one-way quantum key distribution against one-pulse-attack

Upper bounds for the security of coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distribution protocols have been analyzed by considering the one-pulse-attack [Branciard C, Gisin N and Scarani V (BGS) New J.Phys. (2008) 10 013031]. However, their security analysis was based on long distance case, and the typical value of the transmission distance is larger than 50 km. Applying the sharp continuity for the von Neumann entropy and some basic inequalities, we provide lower bounds for the security of modified coherent-one-way quantum key distribution protocol against the most general one-pulse-attack by only considering photon number resolved detectors that will be used in the receiver's side. Comparing with BGS's security analysis, our security analysis can be satisfied with arbitrary distance case.

Continuous high speed coherent one-way quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first commercial quantum technology operating at the level of single quanta and is a leading light for quantum-enabled photonic technologies. However, controlling these quantum optical systems in real world environments presents significant challenges. For the first time, we have brought together three key concepts for future QKD systems: a simple high-speed protocol; high performance detection; and integration both, at the component level and for standard fibre network connectivity. The QKD system is capable of continuous and autonomous operation, generating secret keys in real time. Laboratory and field tests were performed and comparisons made with robust InGaAs avalanche photodiodes and superconducting detectors. We report the first real world implementation of a fully functional QKD system over a 43 dB-loss (150 km) transmission line in the Swisscom fibre optic network where we obtained average real-time distribution rates over 3 hours of 2.5 bps.

Upper bounds for the security of two distributed-phase reference protocols of quantum cryptography

The differential-phase-shift (DPS) and the coherent-one-way (COW) are among the most practical protocols for quantum cryptography, and are therefore the object of fast-paced experimental developments. The assessment of their security is also a challenge for theorists: the existing tools, that allow to prove security against the most general attacks, do not apply to these two protocols in any straightforward way. We present new upper bounds for their security in the limit of large distances (d≳50 km with typical values in optical fibers) by considering a large class of collective attacks, namely those in which the adversary attaches ancillary quantum systems to each pulse or to each pair of pulses. We introduce also two modified versions of the COW protocol, which may prove more robust than the original one.

Zero-error attacks and detection statistics in the coherent one-way protocol for quantum cryptography

This is a study of the security of the Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol for quantum cryptography, proposed recently as a simple and fast experimental scheme. In the zero-error regime, the eavesdropper Eve can only take advantage of the losses in the transmission. We consider new attacks, based on unambiguous state discrimination, which perform better than the basic beam-splitting attack, but which can be detected by a careful analysis of the detection statistics. These results stress the importance of testing several statistical parameters in order to achieve higher rates of secret bits.