Cognitive Penetrability Of Perception Research Articles

Knowledge and the Aesthetics of Nature

Abstract Conceptualism in natural aesthetics takes knowledge of natural objects to be necessary for their appropriate appreciation. Concentrating on animals, I explore a particular version of conceptualism – functionalism – in light of debates about the effects of cognition on perception - so-called ‘cognitive penetration of perception.’ I establish the claims about cognitive penetration to which functionalism is committed, and assess the implications of its assumptions for the normative claim that functional appreciation is most appropriate to nature. I argue that functionalism has not yet provided strong reasons for thinking that knowledge affects perception in the relevant ways, and in ways required by its normative claims.

Color Concepts as a Factor of Cognitive Penetration of Perception

The aim of the paper is to analyse the influence of linguistic concepts of an agent on the qualitative aspects of her perception. We examine conceptualist and non-conceptualist approaches to the problem of what the content of perceptions is. The conceptualist approach asserts that the content of perception is similar to the content of beliefs: both types of content are assumed to be expressible in language. The non-conceptualist approach to the content of perception assumes that the content of perception cannot be conceptualized due to too much information available to the agent through visual perception. However, the assumption about non-conceptual content of perception leads to some serious difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of cognitive penetration of perception. This is an empirically established fact that some cognitive states may influence on the qualitative aspects of agent’s perception. We show that cognitive penetration of perception implies that perception and those cognitive states which affect it should have comparable content and this mechanism is based on the influence of expectations on perception.

Stimulus visibility and uncertainty mediate the influence of attention on response bias and visual contrast appearance.

Although attention is known to improve the efficacy of sensory processing, the impact of attention on subjective visual appearance is still a matter of debate. Although recent studies suggest that attention can alter the appearance of stimulus contrast, others argue that these changes reflect response bias induced by attention cues. Here, we provide evidence that attention has effects on both appearance and response bias. In a comparative judgment task in which subjects reported whether the attended or unattended visual stimulus had a higher perceived contrast, attention induced substantial baseline-offset response bias as well as small but significant changes in subjective contrast appearance when subjects viewed near-threshold stimuli. However, when subjects viewed suprathreshold stimuli, baseline-offset response bias decreased and attention primarily changed contrast appearance. To address the possibility that these changes in appearance might be influenced by uncertainty due to the attended and unattended stimuli having similar physical contrasts, subjects performed an equality judgment task in which they reported if the contrast of the two stimuli was the same or different. We found that, although there were still attention-induced changes in contrast appearance at lower contrasts, the robust changes in contrast appearance at higher contrasts observed in the comparative judgment task were diminished in the equality judgment task. Together, these results suggest that attention can impact both response bias and appearance, and these two types of attention effects are differentially mediated by stimulus visibility and uncertainty. Collectively, these findings help constrain arguments about the cognitive penetrability of perception.

Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism

The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables that systematically affect processing. The relevant process type for a given token is given by the complete algorithmic characterization of the token, along with the values of all the causally relevant parameters. The typing that results is far removed from the typings of folk psychology, and from much of the epistemology literature. But it is principled and empirically grounded, and shows good prospects for yielding the desired epistemological verdicts. The paper articulates and elaborates the theory, drawing out some of its consequences. Toward the end, the fleshed-out theory is applied to two important case studies: hallucination and cognitive penetration of perception.

Does emotion influence visual perception? Depends on how you look at it

ABSTRACTOne of the biggest challenges in the study of emotion–cognition interaction is addressing the question of whether and how emotions influence processes of perception as distinct from other higher-level cognitive processes. Most theories of emotion agree that an emotion episode begins with a sensory experience – such as a visual percept – that elicits a cascade of affective, cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioural responses (the ordering and inclusion of those latter components being forever debated). However, for decades, a subset of philosophers and scientists have suggested that the presumed perception → emotion relationship is in fact bidirectional, with emotion also altering the perceptual process. In the present review we reflect on the history and empirical support (or, some might argue, lack thereof) for the notion that emotion influences visual perception. We examine ways in which researchers have attempted to test the question, and the ways in which this pursuit is so difficult. As is the case with the ongoing debate about the cognitive penetrability of perception, we conclude that nothing is conclusive in the debate about the emotional penetrability of perception. We nonetheless don rose-coloured glasses as we look forward to the future of this research topic.

Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naive realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive penetration less well-explained, even when formulated with so-called ‘standpoints’ or ‘third relata.’

Cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception.

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion.

Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

ABSTRACTOne sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of spatial attention. While the sceptic is correct that some putative cases are accurately deflected in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that attention might play in relevant contexts. This paper identifies alternative ways that selective attention might play a role in cognitive effects on perception. What emerges is a plausible and well-evidenced mental schema that describes attention-mediated cognitive penetration.

Empirical Perspectives on the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

Empirical Perspectives on the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

Reply to Macpherson: Further illustrations of the cognitive penetrability of perception

My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the very question of whether cognition affects perception becomes ill-posed, but this may be for the best.

Skill, Nonpropositional Thought, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

In the current literature, discussions of cognitive penetrability focus largely either on interpreting empirical evidence in ways that is relevant to the question of modularity (Pylyshyn Behav Brain Sci 22(3):343–391, 1999; Wu Philos Stud 165(2):647–669, 2012; Macpherson Philos Phenomenol Res, 84(1):24–62, 2012) or in offering epistemological considerations regarding which properties are represented in perception (Siegel Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 481–503, 2006, Philos Q 59(236):519–540, 2009, Nous 46(2):201–222, 2011; Prinz Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 434–460, 2006). In contrast to these debates, in this paper, I explore conceptual issues regarding how we ought to understand the “cognitive” side of cognitive penetrability. I argue that it is only on its most narrow construal that a full-fledged defense of cognitive impenetrability has been forwarded. Specifically, I argue that the defenders of modularity (DOM from hereon) have tacitly identified cognitive states with propositional states, and have thus only defended the idea that early perceptual systems are immune to the impacts of propositional knowledge. My aim then is to raise doubts about the identification of cognitive states with propositional ones. In particular, by focusing on skill, I will broaden the conceptual space for a greater number of states to have the potential to impact perceptual processing in a way that would constitute a genuine instance of cognitive penetrability.

Perception of Absence and Penetration from Expectation

I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.

Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity

Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic). The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system (defined as early vision) which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study in perceptual learning that provides empirical evidence that cognitive influences in the visual system produce neural reorganization in the primary visual cortex. The type of cognitive penetration can be synchronic and diachronic.

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

AbstractPerception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non‐trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, its theoretical consequences, and a variety of experimental results and possible interpretations of them. The paper concludes by proposing some constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability.

Unity of perception

Perceptual scientists have recently enjoyed success in constructing mathematical theories for specific perceptual capacities, capacities such as stereovision, auditory localization, and color perception. Analysis of these theories suggests that they all share a common mathematical structure. If this is true, the elucidation of this structure, the study of its properties, the derivation of its consequences, and the empirical testing of its predictions are promising directions for perceptual research. We consider a candidate for the common structure, a candidate called an “observer”. Observers, in essence, perform inferences; each observer has a characteristic class of perceptual premises, a characteristic class of perceptual conclusions, and its own functional relationship between these premises and conclusions. If observers indeed capture the structure common to perceptual capacities, then each capacity, regardless of its modality or manner of instantiation, can be described as some observer. In this paper we develop the definition of an observer. We first consider two examples of perceptual capacities: the measurement of visual motion, and the perception of depth from visual motion. In each case, we review a formal theory of the capacity and abstract its structural essence. From this essence we construct the definition of observer. We then exercise the definition in discussions of transduction, perceptual illusions, perceptual uncertainty, regularization theory, the cognitive penetrability of perception, and the theory neutrality of observation.