Cognitive Neuroscience Of Consciousness Research Articles

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Methodological considerations for the neurophenomenology of dreaming: commentary on Windt's "Reporting dream experience".

Windt (2013) eloquently and compellingly presents an anti-skeptical approach to the use of subjective dream reports in empirical research (the “transparency view”). On this view, dream reports are “trustworthy sources of evidence about the occurrence and phenomenal character of experience during sleep, at least when gathered under ideal reporting conditions.” Her paper is an example of the changing tides in the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, and is a welcome valorization of the utility of subjective reports. The long-standing distrust of verbal reports of private mental processes is gradually giving way to realization of the necessity for incorporating first-person reports into objective, third-person paradigms in mutually informing ways (Varela and Shear, 1999)—a methodology often embraced by the term “neurophenomenology” (Lutz and Thompson, 2003). But what are “ideal reporting conditions?” Taking Windt's “transparency view” as a starting point, we discuss a number of methodological considerations for neurophenomenological research on dreaming. We agree with Windt that it is crucial for empirical dream research to establish the extent to which dream reports are “transparent” accounts of subjective experiences; indeed, such transparency is the sine qua non for conducting meaningful qualitative and quantitative research on dream content. However, whereas dream experiences may be disclosed to the dreamer—or at least appear in the dreamer's memory—in a transparent way, important individual differences exist in introspective skills and in ability to articulate the breadth or depth of experience accurately in verbal or written form (Fleming et al., 2010; Sze et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012). We may need to ask then, on both practical and epistemological levels, whether we wish to uncover what is “typical” in dreams of a certain socio-cultural population (the “breadth” of dreaming), or what is “possible” in the dream state (the “depth” of dreaming). In light of this distinction, the “ideal conditions” for reporting dreams may well be different depending on whether the purpose of a study is to assess breadth or depth of dream experience. Accordingly, and to further integrate dream studies within the nascent neurophenomenological framework, we outline two methodological elements that support more reliable elicitation, collection and analysis of dream reports: (1) specific and rigorous laboratory conditions for dream collection; and (2) introspective training and/or solicitation of “expert” participants.

Consciousness and the 21st Century Operating Room

Consciousness and the 21st Century Operating Room

In Reply:

In Reply:

Conscious and unconscious proportion effects in masked priming

The global neuronal workspace theory [Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79, 1–37.] proposes that it is impossible for an unconscious stimulus to be used strategically to enhance task performance (bottom–up effect), while a fully consciously perceived stimulus can be used to improve task performance (top–down effect). Two experiments were designed to investigate these hypotheses. In a first experiment we investigated whether a manipulation of the proportion of Arabic/number word targets had a top–down effect. Since the subjects were fully aware of the target, we expected that this manipulation could be used to enhance task performance. In a second experiment we determined whether a manipulation of the proportion of Arabic/number word primes had a bottom–up effect. Since the subjects were unaware of the prime, we hypothesized that they would be unable to use the manipulation to enhance task performance and therefore the manipulation would have no effect. Both hypotheses were largely confirmed.

The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness. Cognition. Special Issues.Edited by Stanislas Dehaene. A Bradford Book. Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press. $40.00 (paper). v + 243 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 0–262–54131–9. [Reprinted from Cognition: International Journal of Cognitive Science, Volume 79, Numbers 1–2, April 2001.] 2001.

<i>The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness. Cognition</i>. <i>Special Issues.</i><i>Edited by </i>Stanislas Dehaene. <i>A Bradford Book. Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press.</i> $40.00 (paper). v + 243 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 0–262–54131–9. [Reprinted from <i>Cognition:</i> <i>International Journal of Cognitive Science,</i> Volume 79, Numbers 1–2, April 2001.] 2001.

Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these ‘workspace neurons’ can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.

Prospects for a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness

AbstractIn this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.