Cognitive Modularity Research Articles

Setting the scene for boundary extension: Methods, findings, connections, and theories.

A previously viewed scene is often remembered as containing a larger extent of the background than was actually present, and information that was likely present just outside the boundaries of that view is often incorporated into the representation of that scene. This has been referred to as boundary extension. Methodologies used in studies on boundary extension (terminology, stimulus presentation, response measures) are described. Empirical findings regarding effects of characteristics of the stimulus (whether the stimulus depicts a scene, semantics of the scene, view angle, object size, object cropping, object orientation, object color, number of objects, depth of field, object distance, viewpoint production, scene orientation, motion, faces, emotions, modality, whether the scene is multimodal), characteristics of the display (aperture shape, aperture size, target duration, retention interval), and characteristics of the observer (allocation of attention, imagination, age, expectations and strategies, eye fixation, eye movements, monocular or binocular view, vantage point, confinement, prior exposure, expertise, arousal, pathology) on boundary extension are reviewed. Connections of boundary extension to other cognitive phenomena and processes (evolutionary adaptation, Gestalt principles, illusions, psychophysics, invariant physical principles, aesthetics, temporal boundary extension, normalization) are noted, and theories and theoretical considerations regarding boundary extension (multisource model, boundary transformation, mental imagery, 4E cognition, cognitive modularity, neurological mechanisms of scene representation) are discussed.

A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations Theory

ABSTRACT Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind contains modules (or “foundations”) that are functionally specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC) analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT’s cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty, Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm from moral foundation violations, and distinguished individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence for neural modularity and motivate further research on the novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.

Isolability as the unifying feature of modularity

Although the concept of modularity is pervasive across fields and disciplines, philosophers and scientists use the term in a variety of different ways. This paper identifies two distinct ways of thinking about modularity, and considers what makes them similar and different. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science, cognitive modularity helps explain the capacities of brains to process sundry and distinct kinds of informational input. For philosophy of biology and evolutionary science, biological modularity helps explain the capacity of random evolutionary processes to give rise to highly complex and sophisticated biological systems. Although these different ways of thinking about modularity are largely distinct, this paper proposes a unifying feature common to both: isolability, or the capacity of subsystems to undergo changes without resulting in substantial changes to neighboring or interconnected subsystems.

Modular path customization and knowledge transfer: Causal model learnings

Does a modular path customization stimulate the knowledge transfer output for IS users ? This study initiate the (factory based) products and (cognitive science based) cognitive modularity association, based over the transfer knowledge modularity path (Modular path customization). The theoretical framework is the knowledge based view (KBV) of the firm (Macher, 2006 ; Gray et al., 2010) and literature about modularity (Sanchez et al., 2010). To answer the question of (DMPC) relevance (Degree of Modular Path Custumization), a study was carried out among based over a population of 199 business school students, where data were collected from each individual school records online content management server (LMS) and web-based survey.

Developmental trajectories of pitch-related music skills in children with Williams syndrome

The study of music cognition in Williams syndrome (WS) has resulted in theoretical debates regarding cognitive modularity and development. However, no research has previously investigated the development of music skills in this population. In this study, we used the cross-sectional developmental trajectories approach to assess the development of pitch-related music skills in children with WS compared with typically developing (TD) peers. Thus, we evaluated the role of change over time on pitch-related music skills and the developmental relationships between music skills and different cognitive areas. In the TD children, the pitch-related music skills improved with chronological age and cognitive development. In the children with WS, developmental relationships were only found between several pitch-related music skills and specific cognitive processes. We also found non-systematic relationships between chronological age and the pitch-related music skills, stabilization in the level reached in music when cognitive development was considered, and uneven associations between cognitive and music skills. In addition, the TD and WS groups differed in their patterns of pitch-related music skill development. These results suggest that the development of pitch-related music skills in children with WS is atypical. Our findings stand in contrast with the views that claim innate modularity for music in WS; rather, they are consistent with neuroconstructivist accounts.

Pitch Processing in Children with Williams Syndrome: Relationships between Music and Prosody Skills.

Williams syndrome (WS), a genetic neurodevelopmental disorder, has been taken as evidence that music and language constitute separate modules. This research focused on the linguistic component of prosody and aimed to assess whether relationships exist between the pitch processing mechanisms for music and prosody in WS. Children with WS and typically developing individuals were presented with a musical pitch and two prosody discrimination tasks. In the musical pitch discrimination task, participants were required to distinguish whether two musical tones were the same or different. The prosody discrimination tasks evaluated participants’ skills for discriminating pairs of prosodic contours based on pitch or pitch, loudness and length, jointly. In WS, musical pitch discrimination was significantly correlated with performance on the prosody task assessing the discrimination of prosodic contours based on pitch only. Furthermore, musical pitch discrimination skills predicted performance on the prosody task based on pitch, and this relationship was not better explained by chronological age, vocabulary or auditory memory. These results suggest that children with WS process pitch in music and prosody through shared mechanisms. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of cognitive modularity. The implications of these results for intervention programs for individuals with WS are also discussed.

Comparaison des profils initiaux d’atteinte cognitive de la démence fronto-temporale, démence sémantique et maladie d’Alzheimer

The study of music cognition in Williams syndrome (WS) has resulted in theoretical debates regarding cognitive modularity and development. However, no research has previously investigated the development of music skills in this population. In this study, we used the cross-sectional developmental trajectories approach to assess the development of pitch-related music skills in children with WS compared with typically developing (TD) peers. Thus, we evaluated the role of change over time on pitch-related music skills and the developmental relationships between music skills and different cognitive areas. In the TD children, the pitch-related music skills improved with chronological age and cognitive development. In the children with WS, developmental relationships were only found between several pitch-related music skills and specific cognitive processes. We also found non-systematic relationships between chronological age and the pitch-related music skills, stabilization in the level reached in music when cognitive development was considered, and uneven associations between cognitive and music skills. In addition, the TD and WS groups differed in their patterns of pitch-related music skill development. These results suggest that the development of pitch-related music skills in children with WS is atypical. Our findings stand in contrast with the views that claim innate modularity for music in WS; rather, they are consistent with neuroconstructivist accounts.

Environmental sound recognition by timbre in children with Williams syndrome

Anecdotal reports have described children with Williams syndrome (WS) as presenting outstanding skills for recognizing environmental sounds by their timbre. This has led to suggest that the skills for environmental sound recognition by timbre are highly developed in WS. Furthermore, the term hypertimbria has been proposed to refer to this feature. However, no academic research has assessed these skills in WS. This study therefore aimed to contrast the reports on the highly developed skills for environmental sound recognition by timbre in children with WS. An environmental sound recognition task was administered to children with WS, children with Down syndrome of the same chronological age and cognitive level, and chronological age-matched typically developing children. Participants with WS performed significantly lower than their typically developing peers and no significant differences were found between the WS and Down syndrome groups. Unlike previous reports, this study points out that in WS environmental sound recognition by timbre does not constitute a phenotypic strength either in absolute or relative terms. Results suggest that children with WS do not present hypertimbria or preserved skills for timbre recognition. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of cognitive modularity.

Prosociality and the military

In this paper, I consider a body of observational evidence not commonly studied by social scientists, namely the behavior of men and women (mostly men) in the military. I focus here on two issues: first the behavioral foundations for creating an effective military unit and second, evidence that infantrymen have historically been reluctant to fire on the enemy and how this reluctance has been overcome in the last half century through changes in military training. The evidence in each of these areas reinforces the appeal of the idea of cognitive modularity, the view that thought and behavior are influenced by different “mental organs.” With respect to behavior, these usually align in the counsel they provide. But not always, and focusing on circumstances where guidance conflicts—Prisoners Dilemmas are examples—offers a route towards building a behavioral science with greater explanatory and predictive success.

The place of cognitive modularity in the explanation of animal innovation

The place of cognitive modularity in the explanation of animal innovation

Prosocial Behavior: Lessons from the Military

In this paper, I consider a body of observational evidence not commonly studied by social scientists, namely the behavior of men and women (mostly men) in the military. I focus here on two issues: first, the behavioral foundations for creating an effective military unit, and second, evidence that infantrymen have historically been reluctant to fire on the enemy and how this reluctance has been overcome in the last half century through changes in military training. The evidence in each of these areas reinforces the appeal of the idea of cognitive modularity, the view that thought and behavior are influenced by different “mental organs.” With respect to behavior, these usually align in the counsel they provide, but not always, and focusing on circumstances where guidance conflicts — Prisoners Dilemmas are examples — offers a route towards building a behavioral science with greater explanatory and predictive success.

Culture, embodiment and genes: unravelling the triple helix.

Much recent work stresses the role of embodiment and action in thought and reason, and celebrates the power of transmitted cultural and environmental structures to transform the problem-solving activity required of individual brains. By apparent contrast, much work in evolutionary psychology has stressed the selective fit of the biological brain to an ancestral environment of evolutionary adaptedness, with an attendant stress upon the limitations and cognitive biases that result. On the face of it, this suggests either a tension or, at least, a mismatch, with the symbiotic dyad of cultural evolution and embodied cognition. In what follows, we explore this mismatch by focusing on three key ideas: cognitive niche construction; cognitive modularity; and the existence (or otherwise) of an evolved universal human nature. An appreciation of the power and scope of the first, combined with consequently more nuanced visions of the latter two, allow us to begin to glimpse a much richer vision of the combined interactive potency of biological and cultural evolution for active, embodied agents.

Neurophysiology of functional imaging

The successes of PET and fMRI in non-invasively localizing sensory functions had encouraged efforts to transform the subjective concepts of cognitive psychology into objective physical measures. The assumption was that mental functions could be decomposed into non-overlapping, context-independent modules that are operated on by separable areas of a computer-like brain. The failures of cognitive modularity and of a very localized phrenology are generally, but not universally, accepted; but in their place, and usually not distinguished from the original revolutionary hopes of clarification, experimental results are being interpreted in terms of rather flexible definitions of both cognitive concepts and the degree of localization. In an alternative approach, we have connected fMRI, 13C MRS, and electrophysiology measurements of brain energy to connect with observable properties of mental life (i.e., awareness). We illustrate this approach with a sensory stimulation experiment; the degree of localization found in BOLD signals was related to the global energy of the brain which, when manipulated by anesthetics, affected the degree of awareness. The influence of brain energy upon functional imaging maps is changing the interpretations of neuroimaging experiments, from psychological concepts generating computer-like responses to empirical responses dominated by the high brain energy and signaling at rest. In our view “baseline” is an operational term, an adjective that defines a property of a state of the system before it is perturbed by a stimulus. Given the dependence of observable psychological properties upon the “baseline” energy, we believe that it is unnecessarily limiting to define a particular state as the baseline.

Division du travail cognitif et quasi-marchés de la connaissance

Résumé Le but de cet article est de mettre en évidence les mécanismes qui sont à l’origine de la division du travail cognitif. La modularité cognitive favorise la décentralisation de la connaissance. L’apparition de structures modulaires se justifie par la production d’externalités auxquelles elle donne lieu. Ce sont ces mécanismes qui constituent les fondements des marchés de la connaissance, que nous interprétons comme des quasi-marchés en raison de l’exigence d’une coordination qualitative entre le producteur et l’utilisateur de la connaissance nouvelle.

Mencius's Vertical Faculties and Moral Nativism

This paper compares and contrasts Mencius's moral philosophy with recent development in cognitive science regarding mental capacity to understand moral rules and principles. Several cognitive scientists argue that the human mind has innate cognitive and emotive foundations of morality. In this paper, Mencius's moral theory is interpreted from the perspective of faculty psychology and cognitive modularity, a theoretical hypothesis in cognitive science in which the mind is understood as a system of specialized mental components. Specifically, Mencius's Four Beginnings (the basic human emotions that serve as the foundations of morality) are interpreted as vertical faculties, comparable to Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid's moral faculties.

Reconstructing Reason and Representation.

In Reconstructing Reason and Representation, Murray Clarke offers a detailed study of the philosophical implications of evolutionary psychology. In doing so, he offers new solutions to key problems in epistemology and philosophy of mind, including misrepresentation and rationality. He proposes a naturalistic approach to reason and representation that is informed by evolutionary psychology, and, expanding on the massive modularity thesis advanced in work by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, argues for a modular, adapticist account of misrepresentation and knowledge. Just as the reliability of representation can be defended on the basis of an account of the proper function of cognitive modularity, misrepresentation can be explained through an appeal to the gap theory, by noting the divergence between the proper and actual domains of cognitive modules in a massively modular mind.Clarke argues for an externalist, modular reliabilism by suggesting that evolution has equipped us with generally reliable inferential systems even if they do not always produce true beliefs. He argues that reliable deductive and inductive inference occurs only when cognitive modules deal with actual domains that are sufficiently similar to their proper domains. This psychologically informed, naturalized adapticism leads to the suggestion that knowledge is a set of natural kinds housed in the modules of a massively modular mind. Typically, the proper function of these cognitive modules is to provide us with truths that enable us to satisfy our basic biological needs. Beyond reasoning modules, other cognitive modules discussed include the ability to orient ourselves in space, and our abilities with language, numbers, object reasoning, and social understanding. Clarke also defends Cosmides and Tooby's massive modularity hypothesis against such critics as Jerry Fodor by demonstrating that these critics consistently misrepresent Cosmides and Tooby's position.

Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity, and Evolvability

I examine an argument that has recently appeared in the cognitive science literature in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of Fodorian-type cognitive modules; an argument that concludes that a mind that is massively composed of classical cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular is more evolvable than a mind that is not cognitively modular (or that is scarcely cognitively modular), since a cognitive mechanism that is cognitively modular is likely to be biologically modular, and biologically modular characters are more evolvable. I argue that the notion of cognitive modularity needed to make this argument plausible will have to be understood (at least partly) in terms of the biological notion of variational independence, as follows: a cognitive feature is cognitively modular only if few or no other morphological changes (cognitive and not) are significantly correlated with variations of that feature arising in members of the relevant population as a result of ontogeny. I also argue that most of the connotations contained in a cluster of notions of classical cognitive modularity (e.g., domain specificity, encapsulation, functional specialization, etc.) are, as far as we know, irrelevant to the argument, and that only the presence of selective impairments—also known as cognitive dissociations—can be considered as strong indicators of the type of modularity that genuinely enhances evolvability.

Evo-devo, modularity, and evolvability: Insights for cultural evolution

Evolutionary developmental biology (“evo-devo”) may provide insights and new methods for studies of cognition and cultural evolution. For example, I propose using cultural selection and individual learning to examine constraints on cultural evolution. Modularity, the idea that traits vary independently, can facilitate evolution (increase “evolvability”), because evolution can act on one trait without disrupting another. I explore links between cognitive modularity, evolutionary modularity, and cultural evolvability.

Diversity and Unity of Modularity

Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed different approaches to modularity and argued for the unity of modularity. Modularity is a multidimensional property consisting of features from several dimensions specifying different aspects of cognition. Among those, there are core features of modularity, and these core features form a cross-dimensional unity. Despite the diverse and liberal characterizations, modularity contributes to cognitive science because of the unity of the core features.

Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity

Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor's influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose operations are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to equate such features with computational devices in general and therefore to assume, as Fodor does, that higher cognitive processes must be non-computational. Of the many possible non-Fodorean architectures, one is explored here that offers possible solutions to computational problems faced by conventional modular systems: an 'enzymatic' architecture. Enzymes are computational devices that use lock-and-key template matching to identify relevant information (substrates), which is then operated upon and returned to a common pool for possible processing by other devices. Highly specialized enzymes can operate together in a common pool of information that is not pre-sorted by information type. Moreover, enzymes can use molecular 'tags' to regulate the operations of other devices and to change how particular substrates are construed and operated upon, allowing for highly interactive, context-specific processing. This model shows how specialized, modular processing can occur in an open system, and suggests that skepticism about modularity may largely be due to failure to consider alternatives to the standard model.