Coercive Sanctions Research Articles

SANKSI UNI EROPA TERHADAP RUSIA ATAS PELANGGARAN TERITORIAL UKRAINA: PENDEKATAN MULTI-TUJUAN

Sanctions or restrictive measures have become a useful tool of the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in responding to Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. While there are shortcomings in existing literature on how the EU as a supranational organization imposes sanctions, this article provides accounts of going beyond the rigid behavioral change approach. Drawing from the multi-purpose approach, highlighting three functions of sanctions, namely coercing, constraining, and signaling/stigmatizing, we argue that these three functions of sanctions can better explain the imposition and extension of EU sanctions on Russia during the period from 2014-2016. If coercive sanctions seem to be less likely to work in changing Russia’s behavior in a given context, constraining sanctions and signaling/stigmatizing sanctions can take a greater role in suppressing Russia both to a domestic audience and the international community, stigmatizing or isolating Russia for violating international norms and law.

Analysis of the Political Situation of the Protests: Cuba, between Disenchantment and Deprivation

Abstract This article seeks to provide a brief reflection on the causes of the recent social protests in Cuba that took place in July 2021, addressing in a special way the deprivation of services and rights as the main trigger for satiety and claims. As in 1994 protests were marked by the “special period”, in 2021 protests were set by the covid-19 pandemic and the unilateral coercive sanctions of the United States with an impact on three fundamental areas: tourism, remits and fuel supply.

Coercion, function, and the “why” of law

In Coercion and the Nature of Law, Kenneth Einar Himma offers a methodical analysis of the role of coercion in understanding the nature of law. Himma’s work combines conceptual analysis, artifact theory, and functional analysis, ultimately concluding that for a social system to be “law” it must include coercive sanctions. The present article offers an overview of Himma’s arguments, ultimately focusing on the discussion about law’s function. In considering the problem of law’s function, the article contrasts Himma’s view with the views of John Finnis and Mark Greenberg.

Legal Offerings Increase the Effectiveness of Determination of Coercive Money and Administrative Sanctions on State Administrative Decisions

Legal Offers In Improving the Effectiveness of Forced Money Determination Efforts and Administrative Sanctions On the warning of a valid verdict that is not carried out by the defendant. The assessment of the formulation of the problem in this study is how the legal culture in Indonesia to the application of Article 116 paragraph (4) of Law No. 51 of 2009 on State Administrative Justice. In this paper the author also provides an understanding of the comparison of the State Administrative Law system (Indonesia) with Verwaltungsgerecht (Germany) in order to realize legal justice for the community. By using paradigms in terms of epistemological and axological aspects. In the implementation has not been found a special authority in overseeing the existence of the State Administrative Decision (KTUN) that has been validly decided by the judge, there are still some cases of defendants who do not carry out the warning of the verdict against the verdict. The defendant must pay forced money or administrative sanctions against it. From these cases, there should be special authority in supervising the KTUN that has been decided by the judge. The author in this paper offers a legal offer to improve the effectiveness in the implementation of the KTUN in improving legal certainty and guarantee of legal protection in the field of State Administrative Justice. The authors of this paper use descriptive doctrinal research methods, descriptive legal research that explains what should be communicated with the law in the review of das sollen and das sein.

Coercion and the Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law

This article examines the role of coercion in grounding a prima facie duty to obey the positive law. I argue that there is at least a weak prima facie duty to obey the positive law in a minimally effective and just legal system. The fact that a norm holds positive legal status within a minimally effective and just legal system gives people presumptive reason to believe that the norm is a salient and reasonable means of social coordination and therefore that they have pro tanto reason to follow it. Coercive sanctions may bolster the salience of social norms by giving people incentive to follow them. They also make it more likely that an agent’s decision to follow a particular norm will be reasonable, by creating the prospect that the reasons supplied by the sanctions will override any deficits in the salience or reasonableness of the norm itself. A legal system with strong coercive enforcement is therefore more likely than a less coercive system (other things being equal) to present its subjects with both prima facie and pro tanto moral obligations. This reliance on coercion, however, carries a significant moral hazard, since it may bootstrap inefficient or unreasonable norms into a position of epistemological and moral weight.

International Law as a Coercive Order: Hans Kelsen and the Transformations of Sanction

This Article presents an account of the development of several key concepts in the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, whose views (and persona) remain highly influential in current international law scholarship. It argues that Kelsen in his writing during and after World War II extensively adapted his “pure theory of law,” including changing the definition of the all-important Grundnorm (“basic norm”), primarily in order to justify changes in the institutional architecture for the enforcement of international law through coercive sanctions. Specifically, Kelsen profoundly revised his ideas in order to accommodate the ex post facto sanctions imposed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as practices of military intervention under the newly-created UN Charter system. As a result, he developed a unique and characteristically thorough lens through which to study international law as a Zwangsordnung (“coercive order”). The “late Kelsenian” perspective on international sanctions and their justification retains utility today as a lens on issues including the use of force, the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, and the sources of international law. In particular, the idea that the basic norm of the international system resides in customary international law is best viewed in connection with his related concept of “negative custom” (negative Gewohnheit), or (as here defined in light of its logical implications) the power to retroactively justify acts of sanction that contravene existing law. In its ability to account for new forms of sanction Kelsen’s late system is both internally consistent and realistic, but also implies a radical and potentially troubling potential for hegemonic actors to “revaluate” (umwerten) existing legal norms.

Unfinished Business of International Law: The Questionable Legality of Autonomous Sanctions

Enforcement by way of unilateral economic sanctions has been described as “one of the least developed areas of international law.” The term “sanctions” is notoriously difficult to define and does not itself appear in the key international instruments. With economic sanctions regularly referred to as President Trump's “weapon of choice,” and with opposition to such measures growing, greater certainty is needed in this area of law if the legitimacy and effectiveness of sanctions are to be preserved. This essay distinguishes UN-authorized sanctions from three types of “autonomous” sanctions (collective corrective sanctions, unilateral corrective sanctions, and unilateral coercive sanctions) and argues that many uses of unilateral sanctions are either unregulated or based on questionable legality.

Repression After Liberalization: Organizational Embeddedness and Protest Policing in a Hybrid Context

Hybrid non-democracies may repress their civil societies less than full authoritarian regimes, but we know little about the elite strategies guiding the use of state violence against protest groups in a hybrid context. This paper develops an event-level model of protest policing centering the role of social movement organizations (SMOs) in shaping elite threat perceptions and, hence, the likelihood that affiliated protest events will face repression. More than public protest per se, I argue that elites fear the rise of independent organizations capable of initiating and sustaining mobilization. In a hybrid context, SMOs will vary widely in their level of embeddedness with state institutions, ranging from anti-system groups to newer organizations that work collaboratively with the state to legacy civil society groups that served as corporatist brokers of mass representation prior to the onset of liberalizing reforms. Unable to control ex ante which groups become active in civil society, elites apply coercive sanctions to protests by less-embedded CSOs in order to channel mass participation towards friendlier groups. I illustrate these arguments with micro-level sub-national analysis of the Morocco Contentious Event Database (MCED), a unique dataset of protest events and coercive responses collected from local Arabic-language news sources over a ten-year period. Three nested analyses exploit different scales of comparison and contextualize these findings with a sociological account of civil society in Morocco.

International Organization Membership and Militarized Conflict: A Distributive Perspective

What explains the correlation between membership in International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and the occurrence of militarized disputes? Existing theories argue that IGOs provide information, solve commitment problems, and socialize states. I offer an alternative take, which highlights the distributive implications of IGO memberships. The international environment is both competitive and interdependent. If some states create a social surplus through institutionalized cooperation, then this may redefine the competitive landscape and create disadvantages for other states. First, IGOs typically advance principles, norms, rules, and policies that fit the ideologies of some actors better than others. Effective IGOs both increase coordination among members and intensify gaps with excluded parties. Second, IGOs sometimes insulate members from coercive sanctions and enhance opportunities for collective actions against outsiders. I examine two observable implications of this theory. Shared IGO memberships correlate with reduced conflict onset among pairs of states that include a major power but not among contiguous states or states involved in territorial disputes. Second, divergence in overall IGO membership portfolios correlates with conflict. An implication is that more IGOs do not necessarily mean more peace. IGO memberships affect the distribution of conflict.

The problem with problem-solving justice: coercion vs. democratic deliberation

AbstractProblem-solving justice is analysed in terms of democratic theory about the conditions under which courts are justified in applying coercive sanctions. The guilty plea process forces defendants to forego evidentiary proof and accept treatment and surveillance. All problem-solving ‘courts', which actually are corrections agencies, operate this way. This violates the legitimating triadic structure in which judges adjudicate, not medicate. Two popular problem-solving models are therapeutic justice and restorative justice. The therapeutic model is individualistic and emphasises personal responsibility, consistent with neoliberal penality. The restorative model is socially and communally oriented, but in practice it must be legally constrained from applying unwise popular prejudices. Habermas's theory of communicative action and discourse ethics of democratic deliberation presents an alternative to both models. Communicative interaction implies a commitment to factual truth, sincerity, and normativity ...

Law and Coercion

AbstractThough political philosophers often presuppose that coercive enforcement is fundamental to law, many legal philosophers have doubted this. This article explores doubts of two types. Some legal philosophers argue that given an adequate account of coercion and coerciveness, the enforcement of law in actual legal systems will generally not count as coercive. Others accept that actual legal systems enforce many laws coercively, but they deny that law has a necessary connection with coercion. There can be individual laws that lack coercive sanctions, and it is at least conceptually possible for there to be a legal system that lacks coercive enforcement altogether. This article then examines why most political philosophers and some legal philosophers have been reluctant to treat the conceptual possibility of non‐coercive law as significant.

Enforcing International Law: States, IOs, and Courts as Shaming Reference Groups

We seek to answer the question as to whether international law imposes meaningful constraints on state behaviour. Unabated drone strikes by the dominant superpower in foreign territories, an ineffective United Nations, and persistent disregard for international law obligations, as evidenced by states killing their own citizens, all suggest that the sceptics have won the debate about whether international law is law and whether it affects state behaviour. We argue that such a conclusion would be in error because it grossly underestimates the complex ways in which IL affects state behaviour. We argue that scholars who claim that the lack of coercive power in IL is fatal to it being law err in imagining that the types of physical coercion typically used in domestic law enforcement are the only types of coercion available for the enforcement of legal rules. Incarceration is not the only type of coercion available for the enforcement of legal rules. To be sure, depriving the offender of his liberty by locking him up in jail has severe expressive, deterrent, retributive, and incapacitative effects, but that does not itself lead to the conclusion that other punishments cannot achieve the same purposes and be just as coercive. If these alternative punishments can be shown to achieve the aforementioned effects, the central argument against IL being law falls. We aim to do this by focusing on a relatively neglected kind of sanction in IL – shaming. We show that IL is enforced by states, courts, and international organizations by the imposition of shame sanctions on offenders and that these sanctions affect state behaviour in the same ways that traditional coercive sanctions do. In doing the above, we also develop the concept of a shaming reference group.

Copenhagen and Beyond – How to Provide the New Climate Deal with a State-of-the-Art Non-Compliance Mechanism

The article discusses perspectives for designing non-compliance procedures for the new post-2012 climate-change regime. Different multilateral environmental agreements are evaluated against the backdrop of their sanctioning system whilst the discussion prominently focuses on the Kyoto Protocol’s non-compliance system – the Marrakech Accords. According to this assessment, this blend of different approaches as it was performed within the Marrakech Accords is in line with compliance theories and practical experiences with previous multilateral environmental agreements. A combination of coercive sanctions and facilitative measures is needed where parties are demanded for meeting tight commitments. The ameliorations which are considered indispensable in view of providing the post-2012 climate change regime with an effective sanctioning system, mainly concern procedural and organizational matters as well as its legal nature. The article pleads for a simplification of the decision-making process on determination of non-compliance, providing for a directly-triggered sanctioning process. In addition, legally binding sanctions are necessary to apply public pressure on non-complying parties. Eventually, measures that guarantee a fast reinstatement of compliance are highly favourable due to the need of mitigating the greenhouse effect.

Coming to America: the extraterritorial reach of US judicial process

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore situations in which US Federal Courts may impose severe fines and sanctions to compel the disclosure of information maintained outside the territorial limits of the USA by enforcing either a grand jury subpoena or an Internal Revenue Service administrative summons.Design/methodology/approachThe paper presents a memorandum of law summarizing and analyzing relevant US legal precedents, including In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), a case that has come to be eponymous for any US judicial process calling for the production of foreign records: “Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas.”FindingsThe paper finds that, in appropriate circumstances, US Federal Courts have been willing to impose coercive fines and sanctions on individuals or entities that have failed to produce records and other information that is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the USA.Research limitations/implicationsThe analysis is focused on two US legal precedents that exemplify the factors considered by US Federal Courts in arriving at a decision. Many other cases are cited but not examined in depth.Practical implicationsThe paper is of interest to anyone engaging in cross‐border activities with the USA, particularly multi‐national financial organizations.Originality/valueThe paper provides an insight into the US law enforcement tools that may be deployed against multi‐national organizations.

Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion

International law provides an ideal context for studying the effects of freedom from coercion on cooperative behavior. Framers of international agreements, no less than the authors of private contracts, can choose between self enforcement and coercive third-party mechanisms to induce compliance with the commitments they make. Studies of individual contracting provide some evidence that coercive sanctions may crowd out self enforcement, implying that too great a propensity by external actors to intervene in the contractual relationship may produce welfare losses. We explore the possibility that too much coercive third-party enforcement similarly can reduce the value of international agreements. We argue that, in spite of the obvious differences between state and individual decisionmaking, enough similarities exist to make the inquiry worthwhile. Using analytic moves worked out in the context of private contracts, we make two general claims about international agreements, one conventional and one controversial. First, we maintain that one usefully can evaluate efforts to frame and implement international agreements in terms of optimal enforcement structure. Choosing from a broad range of normative criteria, one still can distinguish between better and worse enforcement strategies. Second, we argue that the optimal enforcement structure for any particular international agreement will depend on both the goals of the agreement and the context in which it designed and implemented. Because these goals and contexts are diverse, the set of optimal enforcement structures is heterogenous. Some optimal enforcement structures will depend largely on self enforcement, while others will not. Central to our claim is an appreciation of the interaction of self enforcement and third-party coercion including binding arbitration, use of international courts, and enforcement by domestic actors. We maintain that in a far from trivial number of instances subject to international agreement, self enforcement and coercive enforcement may be rivalrous and the optimal enforcement structure would preclude or limit coercive enforcement. In particular, we argue that good theoretical arguments buttress the general tendency of domestic courts not to extend their coercive powers to implement an international agreement without a clear signal from the framers of the agreement that this coercion is desired.

The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes

In the first half-decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UN Security Council repeatedly decreed mandatory economic sanctions programmes under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Some of the programmes were severely criticized for their allegedly disproportionate effects on the populations of target states. The authors identify economic sanctions as a coercive instrument and assess the applicability of international law standards. Including the traditional criteria of necessity, proportionality and discrimination, to mandatory UN economic sanctions programmes. After an overview of the theory of economic sanctions and their place among strategic Instruments of enforcement, the authors review the Instances of mandatory UN economic sanctions programmes, assessing their effects on the populations of the target states and the extent of the Council's consideration of international legal norms In designing and carrying out sanctions. Concluding that the Council has given Inadequate consideration to International law standards In Implementing these programmes, the authors propose five legal principles for mandatory economic sanctions programmes: that highly coercive sanctions follow prescribed contingencies; that they be necessary and proportionate; that the sanctloners reasonably maximize discrimination between combatants and non' combatants; that sanctions programmes be periodically assessed; and that relief bt provided to Injured third parties.

Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions

Examines the strategy of strengthening the non-proliferation regime through coercive means, both economic and military, and analyzes the conditions under which each might succeed or fail, using the lessons of Iraq and North Korea.

Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions

Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions

Crime, Justice, And Underdevelopment: The Palestinians Under Israeli Control

Orthodox theories of crime in the Third World and in regions of uneven economic development offer a unilinear explanation of the relationship between economic development and increased crime rates. Simply stated, this Durkheimian position views the transition from traditional to modern society as being associated with the weakening of mechanical forms of solidarity and the emergence of secular and impersonal role structures based on a complex division of labor. Universalistic and achievement criteria replace ascriptive and particularistic values, and deviance-derived social control models based on formalized coercive sanctions substitute for traditional and community-based forms of control. Anomic behavior, frustration of expectations, and norm violation are considered an expected, if transitory, outcome of social change, and are explained on the basis of a clash between modern and traditional value systems.

Capital Punishment in Egalitarian Society: The Meta' Case

Executions in egalitarian societies represent an important yet neglected topic in the anthropology of law. Although isolated cases have long been on record, theorists of legal and political evolution have not incorporated this evidence adequately into their models. This is in part due to the lack of detailed analyses of the operation of these legal procedures within specific social systems. The present paper seeks to fill this gap by analyzing the utilization of ultimate coercive sanctions in precolonial Meta' society of the Cameroon highlands of West Africa.