Coalitional Scheme Research Articles

Toward Secure Data Sharing for the IoT Devices With Limited Resources: A Smart Contract-Based Quality-Driven Incentive Mechanism

With the rapid deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in various industries and fields, the massive amount of data produced by these devices can yield greater value through sharing. A critical challenge in the data sharing process is ensuring that the data is high quality. However, the quality of data provided by a large number of IoT devices is impacted by the variability of factors contributing to the data quality (DQ). Effective and safe sharing of perception data by the limited resources of IoT devices is a problem worth investigating. In this article, we propose a smart contract–based and DQ-driven incentive mechanism. First, a smart contract is proposed to realize security in the data-sharing process, while the proposed DQ evaluation mechanism ensures the quality of the shared data. Second, a two-layer Stackelberg game of Nested Coalitional(TLSNC) scheme is designed to obtain the maximum overall social welfare according to the trust score obtained during DQ evaluation while satisfying the limitation of loose and insufficient computing resources. Moreover, we designed a smart contract for automatic execution of the data-sharing transaction and used a trusted execution environment (TEE) to complete the security calculation of shared data. Finally, the numerical results reveal the effectiveness of the DQ evaluation mechanism and the security of our TEE-based model. Based on the proposed scheme, sustainable incentives for user participation and high-quality data sharing can be achieved. In addition, our system can significantly improve the overall social welfare compared to traditional solutions.

Transnational Coalition Building: The Role of The Yes I Do Alliance in Preventing Child Marriage Practices in Kediri Village, West Lombok

The practice of child marriage is an impact of gender-based discrimination, which reduces the value of women. Such discrimination might violate children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Traditional Sasak marriages, known as Merariq, are carried out by the abduction of the prospective bride by the prospective groom. This issue increases the number of child marriages in West Lombok. This phenomenon has been contributing to the increasing number of child marriages in West Lombok and has become a serious issue that requires strategic breakthrough involving particular actors from various levels. Through the concept of Transnational Coalition Building, this research examines and analyzes to what extend the transnational coalition within the Yes I Do Alliance play a significant role in preventing the practice of child marriage in West Lombok. Data for this qualitative-descriptive study were gathered primarily through interviews with three individuals affiliated with each organization of the Yes I Do Alliance. Additional data were gleaned from the Baseline and Midline report of the Yes I Do program and other published literature. This study concluded that despite efforts to prevent and address child marriage in West Lombok through the transnational coalition, the scheme’s execution flaws prevented it from realizing its full potentia to achieve the maximum output. This research highlights the consequences of power imbalances that are certain and must exist in realizing a successful transnational coalition scheme. However, fundamentally this has not been accepted by the actors involved in the Yes I Do Alliance itself.

Dancing me from South to South: on Wu-Kang Chen and Pichet Klunchun’s intercultural performance

ABSTRACT “Intercultural performance” elicits complicated power dimensions in an exchange between center and periphery. To address these power dimensions, this paper focuses on dance pieces Behalf (2018) and the Rama's House opening performance (2019), co-choreographed and performed by Taiwanese artist Wu-Kang Chen and Thai artist Pichet Klunchun. By using a comparative approach to uncover the other’s traditional dance training system, they cooperate to rewrite the conflicting history of performance in Southeast Asia—crossing several intricate borders. Their collaboration(s) can be viewed as a resistant imaginary in line with the “South-South” coalition scheme. That is, artists who share similar marginalized experiences under the hegemony of intercultural performance collaborate to create works based on equality and reciprocity, with respect for and curiosity regarding each other. This research explores how experiments in contemporary dance can liberate the body from the discipline of traditional cultural codes as well as colonial imperatives, and help reconstruct a new, tangible corporeality through South-South intercultural exchange.

Blockchain-based Trusty Buyer Coalition Scheme Using A Group Signature

Without trust, buyers may not join a coalition. Despite the tremendous need for trustworthy relationships in buyer coalitions, no current buyer coalition scheme explicitly tackles confidence issues with blockchain technology. This study proposes an algorithmic design, the blockchain-based trusty buyer coalition scheme, to satisfy the trust requirement among different actors while forming the coalition. All activities forming a coalition through a decentralized public ledger can be explicitly examined. Consequently, the proposed algorithm can ensure anonymity within a community, resulting in trusting relationships. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm can ensure correctness and accountability by recognizing misbehavior and enforcing alternative forms of punishment. Additionally, the discovered algorithm can be applied to mobile commerce applications.

Introducing Dynamic Programming and Persistently Exciting into Data-Driven Model Predictive Control

In this paper, one new data-driven model predictive control scheme is proposed to adjust the varying coupling conditions between different parts of the system; it means that each group of linked subsystems is grouped as data-driven scheme, and this group is independently controlled through a decentralized model predictive control scheme. After combing coalitional scheme and model predictive control, coalitional model predictive control is used to design each controller, respectively. As the dynamic programming is only used in optimization theory, to extend its advantage in control theory, the idea of dynamic programming is applied to analyze the minimum principle and stability for the data-driven model predictive control. Further, the goal of this short note is to bridge the dynamic programming with model predictive control. Through adding the inequality constraint to the constructed model predictive control, one persistently exciting data-driven model predictive control is obtained. The inequality constraint corresponds to the condition of persistent excitation, coming from the theory of system identification. According to the numerical optimization theory, the necessary optimality condition is applied to acquire the optimal control input. Finally, one simulation example is used to prove the efficiency of our proposed theory.

Retailers’ coalition and quantity discounts under demand uncertainty

Coalition of retailers is a nowadays phenomenon in retailing channels (RCs) that makes it possible for the retailers to enhance their business performance and respond to the consumers' needs more effectively. This paper discusses the retailers' coalition advantages and challenges in a two-echelon retailing channel consist of one wholesaler and two non-competing retailers who serve the consumers. The model is developed under a classic newsvendor problem where an all-unit quantity discount is offered by the wholesaler. Our investigations are conducted for both homogeneous/heterogeneous retailers under three different scenarios. In the developed models, the retailers start to make a coalition and make a joint order in order to gain more from the offered discount by the wholesaler, and then using a heuristic procedure they allocate the received order to serve their individual markets. The main objective of this study is to analyze and resolve challenges of the retailers' coalition when a quantity discount is offered in order to make them capable to meet consumers' needs in the best possible manner. Three models are developed: (1) no-coalition decentralized scheme, (2) decentralized coalition where the retailers coalesce, and (3) centralized coalition where not only the retailers but the wholesaler participate in the coalition scheme. Our paper contributes to the RC management literature by analyzing the benefits of the retail coalition in taking most advantage from an offered quantity discount. Results demonstrate that the optimal configuration of the retailers' coalition increases profits of both the retailers and the RC in comparison with the no-coalition scenario. Our findings help procurement managers to rethink their ordering policy toward forming coalition to gain more profits and enhance their service level to meet consumers’ needs.

Multi-agent coalition formation by an efficient genetic algorithm with heuristic initialization and repair strategy

Abstract In multi-agent systems (MAS), the coalition formation (CF) is an important problem focusing on allocating agents to different tasks. In this paper, three specific CF problems are considered, including the single-task single-coalition formation, the multi-task single-coalition formation, and the multi-task multi-coalition formation. The mathematical models of these three specific problems are formulated with the objective of minimizing the total cost while satisfying the ability requirement constraint. An efficient genetic algorithm with heuristic initialization and repair strategy (GAHIR) is proposed to solve the CF problem. Multiple initialization and repair methods, which utilize the prior knowledge of the specific problems, are proposed to improve the solution quality. Then, these methods are tested to prove their effectiveness. Finally, a comparison experiment about the proposed algorithm against several advanced algorithms is constructed. The results of statistical analysis by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test demonstrate that the proposed GAHIR can obtain better coalition schemes than its competitors in solving the CF problems. Furthermore, GAHIR has faster convergence speed in most instances.

Distributed Resource Allocation for D2D-Assisted Small Cell Networks With Heterogeneous Spectrum

Device-to-device (D2D) communication with increased spectral efficiency and reduced communication delay has undoubtedly become a general trend in future wireless networks. However, when D2D communication is incorporated into small cell networks (SCNs) with large number of randomly overlapped small cells, the co-channel interference between small cell users (SUEs) and D2D users is an inevitable challenge, especially with the heterogeneous spectrum, i.e., licensed spectrum bands and unlicensed spectrum bands. In this paper, we study the downlink channel allocation in D2D-assisted small cell networks with heterogeneous spectrum bands. By taking the required data rate of users and the interference constraint of SUEs into account, we formulate a channel allocation problem integrating channel selection and channel sharing to maximize the network utility, which is the service satisfaction of all users. To derive the solution, we decompose the optimization problem into two games: a potential game and a coalition game. Then, a potential game-based scheme using an interference graph and a coalition scheme with D2D user transferring is proposed to solve these two games, respectively. Based on these schemes, a two-stage distributed channel allocation algorithm is proposed and can converge with low computational complexity. Moreover, the simulation results reveal that the proposed algorithm could achieve high system throughput and network utility.

The Banzhaf value as a design tool in coalitional control

In this paper, the game theory solution concept known as Banzhaf value is applied to games in coalitional control schemes. In these schemes, the network topology is modified to achieve a trade-off between performance and communication burden. In particular, we show how to design a coalitional scheme with constraints regarding the Banzhaf value. Several similarities and differences of this value with respect to the Shapley value are stated, and the concept of amalgamated game is introduced in coalitional control as a means to relieve the computational burden. Finally, an academic simulation example illustrates the results obtained in this work.

Energy Efficient Approach in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Game Theoretic Approach and Ant Colony Optimization

In the cluster based wireless sensor network architecture, an effective way to optimize the energy consumption is to implement an energy efficient scheme amongst the participating nodes for major activities such as construction of the hierarchical structure on the regular interval and the data communication from a node to the base station. This paper proposes an energy efficient approach for a cluster based wireless sensor network architecture by employing the game theory and ant colony optimization technique. Initially, the proposed work forms various clusters within the network and thereafter, the coalitions are formed using the proposed algorithm based on the game theory. The proposed algorithm considers the extent of spatially correlated sensed data that are generated by neighbouring nodes in order to form a coalition within a cluster. The proposed coalition scheme reduces the number of transmissions across the network. It is compared with the competing clustering protocols. The simulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm achieves the increased network lifetime under the specified quality of service specification (QSS). The results of the proposed work are compared with that obtained through the existing low energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) and the deterministic stable election protocols (D-SEP). The overall improvement gain achieved by the proposed work is 31% and 10% at specified QSS, when compared with the LEACH and the D-SEP protocols respectively. Thus, the simulation results obtained in the proposed work confirm their superiority over the LEACH and the D-SEP protocols.

Evolutionary coalitional games for random access control

This paper considers a random access system with several users and one shared medium. Each user has its own queue (of packets) which can be empty or not. We propose an evolving coalitional game between the users and analyze the system outcomes. Unlike classical coalitional approaches that assume that coalitional structures are fixed and formed cost-free, we explain how coalitions can be formed in a fully distributed manner using evolutionary dynamics and coalitional combined fully distributed payoff and strategy (CODIPAS) learning. We introduce the concept of evolutionarily stable coalitional structure (ESCS), which, when it is formed, is resilient to small perturbation of strategies. We show that (1) the formation and the stability of coalitions depend mainly on the cost of making a coalition compared to the benefit of cooperation, (2) the grand coalition can be unstable and a localized coalitional structure is formed as an evolutionarily stable coalitional structure. When the core is empty, the coalitional CODIPAS scheme selects one element of the stable set. Finally, we discuss the convergence and complexity of the proposed coalitional learning in access control with different users’ activities. Some extensions to cognitive medium access control with queue management are provided.

A group signature based buyer coalition scheme with trustable third party

Despite the large number of existing buyer coalition schemes and increasing need for trusting relationship in buyer coalitions, no current buyer coalition scheme explicitly addresses trust issues within these schemes in a formalised manner. Without establishing a trusting relationships among various roles, many buyers may not be willing to join the coalitions. This study proposes a solution, in the form of an algorithmic design, as a response to the above need. Specific features of the proposed solution are: (i) the use of ‘group signature’ in order to guarantees anonymity within a group that results in trustfulness of the relationships and (ii) introducing a new role called ‘authority’ to maintain and implement anonymity. In addition, the proposed scheme is capable of maintaining ‘correctness’ and ‘accountability’ by both identifying misbehaved buyers as well as implementing various punishment methods.Knowledge domain of the study is the common space between three overlapping fields including Electronic Commerce, Communication Technologies and Information Systems.

Real-time energy exchange strategy of optimally cooperative microgrids for scale-flexible distribution system

This paper presents an optimal coalition formation mechanism of microgrids in a smart distribution system and analyzes the characteristics from the coalitional game theoretical perspective. Microgrids coalitions can (1) minimize the energy burden and dependency on the utility grid, (2) minimize the overall grid network power loss, and (3) maximize intra-coalition energy transfer. In order to form cooperative microgrids, a Hierarchical priority based Coalition Scheme (HRCoalition) is proposed. Given an intra-coalition distance threshold, the proposed HRCoalition mechanism can provide the optimal coalition that achieves the aforementioned objectives. The optimality is realized by reaching a state of cooperative equilibrium for all microgrids and coalitions. The optimality of the formed coalitions is proved by Coalitional Game Theory. A Greedy based strategy is designed to perform network constrained energy exchange (GreedEnEx) within a formed coalition. Thus, HRCoalition provides a higher level optimization while, GreedEnEx yields system level optimization using output of HRCoalition. The proposed HRCoalition scheme is computationally very efficient and can scale up to a huge number of microgrids and thus makes it suitable for near real-time operation. An equivalent pricing mechanism is designed to provide a form of economic incentive to the microgrids participating coalition formation. The performance of the proposed method is reported to scale up to 500 microgrids with a loss reduction ranging from 26% to 80%. The provided numerical simulation results back the claim of optimality as well as prove the effectiveness of the proposed coalition formation method.

Energy efficiency in wireless sensor networks

A coalitional game theoretic scheme is proposed that aims at maximizing wireless sensor network lifetime under specified QoS. Employing a small number of nodes of increased computing power and lifetime called representatives , an adaptive clustering scheme is proposed where neighboring nodes form coalitions in order to increase energy efficiency at the cost of controllable data-accuracy reduction. The coalition formation is globally optimized by the representatives. The spatial correlation of the sensed phenomenon measurements is exploited to formulate a cooperation scheme that reduces drastically the number of node transmissions. The specifications regarding the accuracy of the collected data determine the extent of coalition formation. The efficiency and stability of the proposed coalitional scheme are studied through simulations.

Spectrum sharing in multi-channel cooperative cognitive radio networks: a coalitional game approach

In this paper, we study a coalitional game approach to resource allocation in a multi-channel cooperative cognitive radio network with multiple primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs). We propose to form the grand coalition by grouping all PUs and SUs in a set, where each PU can lease its spectrum to all SUs in a time-division manner while the SUs in return assist PUs’ data transmission as relays. We use the solution concept of the core to analyze the stability of the grand coalition, and the solution concept of the Shapley value to fairly divide the payoffs among the users. Due to the convexity of the proposed game, the Shapley value is shown to be in the core. We derive the optimal strategy for the SU, i.e., transmitting its own data or serving as a relay, that maximizes the sum rate of all PUs and SUs. The payoff allocations according to the core and the Shapley value are illustrated by an example, which demonstrates the benefits of forming the grand coalition as compared with non-coalition and other coalition schemes.

Forming Buyer Coalition Scheme with Connection of a Coalition Leader

Despite the variety of existing theoretical models for buyers' coalition in the current e-commerce literature, no existing coalition scheme explicitly takes into consideration issues related to the leadership attributes of the coalition. By adopting a design science research methodology and utilizing theoretical groundings of the Social Networking and Game theory, the current article provides algorithmic design of a buyer coalition scheme with explicit focus given to the 'betweenness', 'centrality', and 'closeness' attributes of the coalition leader. Detailed steps for forming the proposed coalition are provided along with related algorithmic designs and explanations for each step. The execution of the proposed algorithmic design and its effectiveness compared to the situation where no leadership attributes is explicitly considered, are demonstrated by using a scenario and associated simulation programs. Results from the simulation programs confirm that the proposed model provides additional discounts for the buyers regardless the number of buyers within the coalition, and with no additional costs to the seller. It is also expected that sellers will benefit from the proposed model as a result of reduced transaction costs associated with the proposed scheme.

A collaborative platform for buyer coalition: Introducing the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system

A variety of buyer coalition schemes already exist in the current e-Commerce literature by which buyers form some sort of coalition in order to enjoy added discounts as a result of purchasing in larger bundles. One major problem in all existing schemes is that none of those schemes explicitly treat the coalition process as a collaborative business process; and as a result, the awareness and knowledge-sharing requirements are not explicitly recognized in the design process of the existing systems. This study proposes a conceptual framework for a buyer coalition system called the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system that allows a buyer to bid on the basis of various levels of awareness that s/he may have about other roles' actions/intentions. The study is an early attempt for explicitly considering awareness and knowledge-sharing requirements of various roles within the buyer coalition process. The theoretical foundations of the study are rooted in the fields of Game Theory, e-Commerce, and Knowledge Management. The research methodology adopted for the study is design science. Various existing buyer coalition algorithms were reviewed and their strengths and weaknesses identified in terms of addressing the information-sharing needs of collaborating buyers. Furthermore, the existing literature on Knowledge Management was reviewed in order to identify an appropriate process model for the proposed buyer coalition framework with specific emphasis on awareness and knowledge-sharing requirements of its collaborating actors. For validation of the proposed conceptual model simulation software was developed to demonstrate results of a variety of simulations for the proof of the concept.

Multi-Brand Loyalty Cards: A Good Idea

The UK's leading coalition loyalty card scheme was launched at a time when questions were raised regarding the viability of such schemes. Two years into the scheme, it is now appropriate to review the scheme's relationship with its' customers and judge its' success in terms of its ability to influence card holders' behaviour. To meet the objectives a survey methodology was adopted, and a new questionnaire devised for administration to a sample of coalition loyalty card scheme cardholders. The survey achieved 153 responses from the scheme members. Findings from the study revealed that coalition loyalty card scheme holders' exhibit weak bonds between the card provider and its customers and that customers display signs of low commitment, low trust and low perceived relational benefits. There is a decisive lack of awareness of many sponsors and this confusion seemed to be leading to the use of coalition loyalty card scheme as a single-brand card. Although usage rates are on a par with other loyalty schemes, a lack of involvement seems apparent; indicating that no considerable increase in share of customer had occurred. This is mainly down to poorly targeted communications and irrelevant reward offerings. Finally, there was little to suggest that coalition loyalty card scheme are currently having much influence over consumer behaviour, as the bonds between the two parties were not strong enough to encourage this. However, this does not indicate that the current market leader is currently unsuccessful, there is evidence to suggest consumers perceive real benefits in coalition schemes and that there is a willingness to alter their behaviour if the motivation is sufficient. Implications for future research include more specific investigations into the dynamic of the relationship between loyalty schemes and consumers and further research on coalition schemes per se.

Loyalty and Reward Schemes: How Much is Your Loyalty Worth?

Loyalty and reward schemes are one of the tools in customer relationship management. Consumers who register as loyalty scheme members allow businesses to record purchase transactions, and thereby grant implicit permission for businesses to use that data in exchange for modest rewards. Some loyalty schemes have more information about consumer behaviour and lifestyles, than that held by the consumers being profiled, and the potential for intrusion, infringement of privacy and manipulation is considerable. Two main sections in the article explore practice and research in relation to loyalty schemes respectively. Loyalty schemes can be grouped into the following categories; retailer schemes, coalition schemes, financial services schemes, online schemes, frequent flyer or travel schemes, and geographically based schemes, although individual schemes may bridge more than one category. Key aspects of the schemes are the means and processes whereby rewards, points or credits can be earned, and the options or deals through which points can be spent. Research on loyalty schemes centres on the question: 'Do loyalty schemes work?' This core question has led to discussion of the nature of loyalty and commitment, the value and application of loyalty scheme data, and the appropriateness and effect of rewards. The most recent research has urged a more strategic perspective on the contribution of loyalty schemes to customer relationship management strategy, and, more widely marketing and business strategy. This involves consideration of issues such as the customer experience of the scheme, customer lifetime value, targeting best customers, and brand building.

Coalition formation in transmission expansion planning

The study of a decentralized coalition formation scheme in a specific power systems transmission expansion scenario is the purpose of this paper. The authors define first who are the agents in the expansion game and provide a decentralized coalition scheme based on bilateral Shapley values. Finally, they allocate the total costs of expansion amongst the agents, based on the coalition history, and they compare their method with a centralized scheme.