Coalition Leader Research Articles

Invitation games and the politics of joining US-led coalition warfare: a small state perspective

How do status-seeking governments in small states mobilize parliamentary support for participation in US-led warfare coalitions? We argue that the formulation of official invitations by the United States plays an overlooked instrumental role in the domestic ratification game. Invitations can be a strategic tool for governments confronted with divided parliaments to secure support for contributions close to their position. Building on a modified and reversed version of Schelling’s tying hands strategy, we develop a novel invitation game to explain dynamics in the two-level game between coalition leader, government and parliament where governments tie their hands internationally rather than domestically. By signalling their intentions and strategic commitments to the coalition leader, small state governments can seek to influence the content of the coalition leader’s invitation, which they in turn can present as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to parliament. In this way, governments can raise the perceived abandonment costs to a level that outweighs parliament’s fear of entrapment, making the latter more willing to support a forceful commitment. We illustrate the plausibility of this invitation game model with empirics from Denmark’s past contributions to US-led coalitions, which show that the domestic value of these US invitations has so far been underestimated, even in a case where there exists a strong Atlantic security predisposition. In this way, this paper not only raises attention to the importance of studying how small states decide on costly military contributions, it also shows that understanding domestic contestation of military deployments requires taking into account the strategic importance of international signals.

Characteristics promoting behaviour change: physician experience with a coalition-led quality improvement initiative to reduce excessive laboratory test ordering

BackgroundAttempts have been made to reduce excessive laboratory test ordering; however, the problem persists and barriers to physician involvement in quality improvement (QI) remain. We sought to understand physician participation...

Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners

Why do states join wartime coalitions despite the absence of a salient threat or strong ties to the coalition leader? We argue states make unexpectedly high contributions to coalition warfare as a costly signal of their desire for a stronger relationship with the coalition leader. Conventional theories insufficiently explain why states without immediate security interests or strong ties to the lead state over-contribute relative to their capacity. Using newly compiled data on troop contributions to the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), we find states are most likely to contribute a higher share of their armed forces when their relationship with the US has unrealized alliance potential. States with under-performing alignments leave substantial room for subsequent gains to be had from signaling their commitment to the leading coalition actor. Our finding helps explain why states risk the costs of war—casualties and domestic accountability—by participating in coalition warfare.

Participatory Process for Implementing a Colorectal Cancer Screening Intervention: an Action Plan for Local Sustainability

INTRODUCTION METHODS Background: Rigid protocols can hamper translation of evidence-based interventions (EBIs) from research to real-world settings. Nevertheless, employing principles of community-based participatory research holds potential for successful implementation. The primary aim of this investigation was to develop procedures for modifying the study protocol of a colorectal cancer screening educational intervention implemented in African American communities to fit local needs while maintaining fidelity to its core elements. Methods: To ensure sustainability of the Educational Program to Increase Colorectal Cancer Screening (EPICS), four-hour guided discussions between researchers and 15 community coalitions were undertaken to include: 1) assessing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats; 2) establishing specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely goals; and 3) developing local action plans. Results: In the local action plans, adherence to core intervention elements (theoretical framework, educational content, and sessions) was maintained with adaptation to roles and responsibilities. For example, the coalition leader modified views to reflect local ownership of data and members accepted responsibilities for marketing, education, communication, and data management. Conclusions: Enhancing interactions between researchers and community partners and addressing weaknesses and threats ensure transition from efficacy to implementation and promote sustainability of interventions. Grant Support: NIH 1R01CA166785  Colorectal cancer (CRC) is the second leading cause of cancer-related deaths in the United States and the third most common cancer in men and in women. African Americans (AAs) have the highest over-all incidence, incidence of advanced stage at disease presentation, attributable mortality, and the lowest survival rates after diagnosis.  Although screening is an effective tool for reducing CRC mortality, differences in screening accounted for 42% of disparity in CRC incidence and 19% of disparity in CRC mortality between AAs and Whites.  EPICS is an EBI for increasing CRC screening rates among AAs. Core elements are listed in Table 1.  EPICS implementation is in partnership with community coalitions organized by the National Black Leadership Initiative on Cancer (NBLIC) in 15 communities across the United States.  Sustainability of the EBI is based on acceptability, capacity, and resources within the targeted communities, using an approach that is flexible enough for local relevance.  In the present study, investigators describe a method for enhancing dissemination by adjusting the EPICS study protocol to meet local contextual challenges. Guided by Glasgow’s Evidence Integration Triangle (EIT) [Fig. 1], a variety of issues faced at the 15 sites and the process by which the basic protocol was modified are described. 1. Discussions between investigators and leaders of each NBLIC community coalition to share information and develop action plans was completed. 2. SWOT Analysis (strengths or characteristics of community coalitions needed for delivery; weaknesses or challenges/ barriers to implementation; opportunities or elements that could be exploited; and threats or contextual risks to successful trial completion) was completed. 3. SMART (specific, measurable, actionable, realistic and timely) Goals related to facilitator and participant recruitment and retention were established. 4. Modification of the study protocol to reach SMART goals was completed. 1. Draft action plan was reviewed, revised, and distributed. 2. Final action plan was distributed.  Differences in priorities of the 15 participating communities inform challenges experienced.  Major themes emerging from the guided discussions included: 1) facilitator recruitment, training and roles 2) participant recruitment and retention  Specific challenges identified by coalitions were unique to each community, with synergy across sites.  Strategies outlined were based on the barriers identified, informed by community stakeholders [Table 2].  The community and its individual members constitute a “research participant”; it is appropriate that communities have the last word on the research approach that works best for them.  Multi-site research protocols may require adjustments.  Application of a conceptual framework (e.g., EIT model) is essential to maintaining integrity and ensuring fidelity to EBI core elements. DISCUSSION Table 2. Local EPICS Implementation Action Plan Element Approach Adaptation Option Theoretical Framework Diffusion of Innovations Theory Educational Content Guidelines for CRC (DRE*; FOBT*, Sigmoidoscopy; Colonoscopy); CRC Risk Factors (modifiable; nonmodifiable) Dietary and physical activity information adapted to fit the audience Sessions Group settings; three (3) one-hour sessions Size of group settings 3) Facilitators Public health professionals, cancer survivors and advocates, community members, church and civic leaders Other individuals interested in lowering CRC incidence and mortality Facilitator Training Training (11⁄2 day session) and TA* TA based on randomization Settings Churches, clinics and community sites Other settings Table 1. EPICS Core Elements RESULTS

Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.

Centre–State Relations and Intra-Party Dynamics in Malaysia: UMNO and the Case of Johor

As multi-level governance structures led by multiple political parties, democratic federal systems can experience two types of tensions—those between central and state governments, and those between parties in power at those different levels. This has made the study of centre–state relations in Malaysia challenging, as one coalition has been in power at the federal level since independence. Most visible centre–state conflicts have occurred in states led by the opposition or minor coalition members. However, the majority of state governments are led by the United Malays’ National Organization (UMNO)—Malaysia's most powerful political party and coalition leader. Given this, it is instructive to analyse centre–state relations in a state that has also been led by UMNO, as this enables the elimination of inter-party strife as a source of conflict. Johor lends itself well to this exercise. Like the federal government, it has been led since independence by the ruling coalition, and is intimately linked to UMNO. Despite this congruence, the Johor state government has experienced serious conflict with the central government, demonstrating that the same party affiliation does not eliminate clashes and highlighting the need to further explore centre–state relations in UMNO-led states.

Mainstream parties and the politics of immigration in Italy: A structural advantage for the right or a missed opportunity for the left?

The structure of the Italian party system pushes the mainstream right and left to adopt different strategies on immigration in spite of a certain ideological and definite policy convergence. First, in a context of bipolar competition, the mainstream right prefers to cooperate, rather than compete, with the anti-immigrant radical right. Second, while the mainstream left dominates the centre-left coalition, the mainstream right has found itself subject to and torn by the populist tendencies of the centre-right coalition leader Silvio Berlusconi. The analysis shows that the mainstream left has endorsed concerns over security and border control, while remaining open to the social, cultural and (to a lesser extent) political integration of immigrants. In contrast, the mainstream right has appeared increasingly split between a component ‘contaminated’ by Berlusconi, which makes some concessions to the radical right; and a moderate component, which is more sensitive to liberal ideas and/or to the solidaristic remarks of the Catholic Church. The reality of the Italian welfare system and labour market would appear to create more favourable conditions for the ideological approach of the mainstream left. However, the mainstream right has benefited from its alliance with the radical right as it has constantly owned the immigration issue.

Understanding the ‘failure’ of the Séléka rebellion

This paper examines the downfall of the Séléka rebellion, which staged a coup in the Central African Republic in March 2013. The coup plunged the country into violence and chaos, and there has been an uneasy quest for peace ever since. This article explains why the leader of the rebellion lost control over his troops and was finally pushed by regional actors to leave power. The article concludes that the Séléka rebellion was already fragile and, together with the poor leadership demonstrated by the coalition leader, the rebellion was unable to hold on to power.

Party, coalition, premiership: the role of Silvio Berlusconi in coalition dynamics and its determinants

Silvio Berlusconi has unquestionably been one of Italy’s most important political figures since the early 1990s. The general election campaign of February 2013 demonstrated that he is anything but out of the political game. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to examine Berlusconi as a prime minister and coalition leader. This article seeks to understand the extent to which he was able to command and guide his governing coalition, as Prime Minister, as well as his influence and the constraints on his actions. After presenting the theoretical framework, the article examines Berlusconi within the context of Italian political history and explores his impact on coalition governance by illustrating two cases of how he managed intra-coalition conflicts during his second term of office. Finally, it discusses the findings and highlights the resources Berlusconi was able to deploy ‘against’ his allies and the constraints he faced as Prime Minister. A brief comparison of Berlusconi and other Italian prime ministers is provided.

The Future of Australian Climate Politics

The preceding articles have shed light on the complex politics of climate change in Australia in a range of important ways. They have variously identified the obstacles to achieving and sustaining genuine public concern and willingness to support action; they have noted the importance of building partnerships with industry; they have pointed to the important function of the broader international context; and they have identified the pathologies of the Australian democratic political system and broader public debate that seem to militate against political consensus on the need to act on climate change.While applied generally to the dynamics of climate change since the mid-2000s to the present, a period of crashing public support and the fall of climate action proponents on both sides of Parliament, but also significant legislative breakthrough, these challenges will continue to animate the politics of climate change in Australia beyond. This concluding essay reflects on these challenges, with a particular focus on possible changes after the 2013 Federal Election, due at the time this Special Issue will go to print. With polls and analysts predicting a Coalition victory at the time of writing, and Coalition leader Tony Abbott promising an end to carbon pricing, the future for the climate change policy in Australia threatens to descend below current (largely inadequate) levels.We cannot predict the future, either the outcome of the election or the climate policy and politics that will follow it. What I can and will suggest here, however, is likely scenarios under different Governments, and domestic and international dynamics that might serve to enable or constrain the development of substantive climate change action in the Australian context...

Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining

How do coalition partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining? I analyze a model in which a potential coalition leader faces a trade‐off between signaling resolve to a target and retaining a partner's support by limiting the costs of war. The strength of the target conditions the partner's effect. When the target is strong, the need to ensure military cooperation reduces the probability of war by discouraging bluffing, though resolute types can signal resolve by foregoing coalitional support. When the target is weaker, a resolute coalition leader moderates threats to preserve military cooperation, foregoing the chance to signal resolve and increasing the chances of war, even as the partner successfully moderates the leader's bargaining posture. Thus, coalitions may face higher probabilities of war against weaker targets than stronger ones, coalitions are more likely against weak than strong targets, and partners can increase or decrease the probability of war.

Sustainability of the Communities That Care Prevention System by Coalitions Participating in the Community Youth Development Study

Community prevention coalitions are a common strategy to mobilize stakeholders to implement tested and effective prevention programs to promote adolescent health and well-being. This article examines the sustainability of Communities That Care (CTC) coalitions approximately 20 months after study support for the intervention ended. The Community Youth Development Study is a community-randomized trial of the CTC prevention system. Using data from 2007 and 2009 coalition leader interviews, this study reports changes in coalition activities from a period of study support for CTC (2007) to 20 months following the end of study support for CTC (2009), measured by the extent to which coalitions continued to meet specific benchmarks. Twenty months after study support for CTC implementation ended, 11 of 12 CTC coalitions in the Community Youth Development Study still existed. The 11 remaining coalitions continued to report significantly higher scores on the benchmarks of phases 2 through 5 of the CTC system than did prevention coalitions in the control communities. At the 20-month follow-up, two-thirds of the CTC coalitions reported having a paid staff person. This study found that the CTC coalitions maintained a relatively high level of implementation fidelity to the CTC system 20 months after the study support for the intervention ended. However, the downward trend in some of the measured benchmarks indicates that continued high-quality training and technical assistance may be important to ensure that CTC coalitions maintain a science-based approach to prevention, and continue to achieve public health impacts on adolescent health and behavior outcomes.

Forming Buyer Coalition Scheme with Connection of a Coalition Leader

Despite the variety of existing theoretical models for buyers' coalition in the current e-commerce literature, no existing coalition scheme explicitly takes into consideration issues related to the leadership attributes of the coalition. By adopting a design science research methodology and utilizing theoretical groundings of the Social Networking and Game theory, the current article provides algorithmic design of a buyer coalition scheme with explicit focus given to the 'betweenness', 'centrality', and 'closeness' attributes of the coalition leader. Detailed steps for forming the proposed coalition are provided along with related algorithmic designs and explanations for each step. The execution of the proposed algorithmic design and its effectiveness compared to the situation where no leadership attributes is explicitly considered, are demonstrated by using a scenario and associated simulation programs. Results from the simulation programs confirm that the proposed model provides additional discounts for the buyers regardless the number of buyers within the coalition, and with no additional costs to the seller. It is also expected that sellers will benefit from the proposed model as a result of reduced transaction costs associated with the proposed scheme.

Exogenous coalition formation in the e-marketplace based on geographical proximity

This paper considers a model for exogenous coalition formation in e-marketplaces. Using its informational advantage, an e-retailer creates coalitions of customers based on geographical proximity. Most of the literature regards this process as endogenous: a coalition leader among the buyers bundles eventual purchases together in order to obtain a better bargaining position. In contrast – and in response to what is typically observed in business practice – we analyse a situation in which an existing e-retailer exogenously forms customers’ coalitions. Results of this study are highly encouraging. Namely, we demonstrate that even under highly imperfect warehouse management schemes leading to contagion effects, the proposed combined delivery service may offer significant efficiency gains as well as opportunities for Pareto improvement.

Evaluation of community coalitions ability to create safe, effective exercise classes for older adults

This paper describes the evaluation of the Active Aging Community Task Force (AACTF) project that fostered the development of 25 community coalitions charged with creating safe and effective exercise classes for older adults. Periodic progress reports, site visits, personal interviews, and standardized questionnaires formulated the process evaluation. Functional fitness assessments were conducted on exercise class participants to document changes in fitness over time. Over 5 years, 36 workshops to train exercise class instructors were conducted, 153 new exercise classes were created, and over 7000 older adults participated in these classes. After 12–24 weeks of exercise class participation, consistent gains were observed in low back/hip range of motion, agility/dynamic balance, leg strength, and upper arm strength. AACTF members generally agreed/strongly agreed with statements regarding their coalition leader's competence, performance, support, and control, and they also gave high ratings for their coalition's progress toward meeting its objectives. No adverse events were reported for any AACTF exercise class participant. The adaptation of evaluation processes previously used to assess community coalition's prevention efforts proved successful and the information provided via these processes was of tremendous benefit in identifying areas of needed modification. The data also indicated that the AACTFs were effective in establishing safe and effective exercise classes for older adults.

Agenda Control, Intraparty Conflict, and Government Spending in Asia: Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan

In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations.

Policy Coalitions in the U.S. Congress: A Spatial Duration Modeling Approach

This paper applies spatial duration models to the analysis of cosponsorship coalitions in the U.S. House of Representatives. This approach provides a unique and simultaneous statistical analysis of ideological space (specifically, coalition formation) and geographical space. Typically, duration models are associated with temporal longitudinal data, but recently have been adapted to the spatial domain (Pellegrini and Reader 1996). In this paper, spatial duration models are further adapted to examine ideological space including a consideration of unobserved sources of spatial variation (or omitted variable bias).We examine two features of cosponsorship coalitions, breadth and clustering. Breadth is defined as the ideological distance between the two most extreme members of the coalition which is an important “signal” to the rest of Congress regarding the scope and broad appeal of the proposed legislation. In contrast, clustering refers to the distance between individual members of a coalition and reveals the tendency, or not, of ideologically similar members of Congress to support various bills. To examine breadth and clustering, we employ spatial duration models of cosponsorship that permit a multivariate analysis incorporating both the characteristics of members of Congress and the geographical regions they represent.Results indicate that cosponsorship coalition patterns are primarily determined by the content of the legislation, not the actions of the coalition leadership. While the leadership characteristics of sponsors have a limited effect on cosponsorship breadth, the size of the coalition is the primary determinent. Leadership characteristics also have little effect on cosponsorship clustering. Rather, clustering is due to members' policy preferences, as measured by distance to the coalition leader. In addition, the duration analysis results suggest that geographical proximity between members of Congress “overcomes” ideological distance. Finally, the spatial duration approach is noted as a fruitful methodology for examining explicitly spatial patterns in both ideological or geographical space.

Queering the State

The time has come to think about queering the state.' Lisa Duggan The year 1994 has set a record for antigay initiatives in the United States. At latest count, there are between eighteen and twenty-seven ballot battles gearing up, surpassing the previous record of sixteen in 1993. This rising tide of hate is partly a backlash against an increasing number of gay rights initiatives. Last year sixteen state legislatures took up measures to grant civil rights protection to gay men and lesbians or to repeal antisodomy laws (most of these proposals failed). But antigay initiatives are also part of a grander scheme to organize a right-wing voting block to take on issues such as abortion rights, school curriculums, and tax policies. This fight will be a daunting challenge to the organized lesbian and gay rights movement: the combined budgets of the six largest gay organizations total only about $12 million, compared to the more than $210 million in the combined budgets of the six largest right-wing religious organizations.2 The financial clout and cultural reach of these organizations should not be underestimated. For instance, Focus on the Family, based in Colorado Springs and founded by Dr. James Dobson, formerly a member of the Meese Commission on Pornography, boasts a $90 million annual budget and affiliated Family Councils in thirty states. It distributes the antigay video, The Gay Agenda, publishes nine magazines, and supports sixteen hundred radio programs. The Christian Coalition of Chesapeake, Virginia, distributed 40 million voter guides in the 1992 elections in its campaign to take over state and local Republican parties. It supports the Christian Broadcasting Network, the Family Channel, and the 700 Club, which reach millions of viewers daily, as well as two newsletters, Religious Rights Watch and Christian American. The Coalition's leader, Pat Robertson, situates their agenda squarely in the middle of party politics: We want . . . to see a majority of the Republican Party in the hands of profamily Christians by 1996. Finally, Citizens for Excellence in Education, an arm of the National Association of Christian Educators led by Robert Simonds and located in Costa Mesa, California, distributes the manual, How to Elect Christians to Public Office, and claims that thirty-five hundred Christians have been elected to school boards through its efforts. It is clear that the strategies of the religious right go well beyond the simple articulation of homophobic, racist, and antifeminist sentiments. Their targets are precise and their program well formulated, as is indi-

Queering the State

The time has come to think about queering the state.' Lisa Duggan The year 1994 has set a record for antigay initiatives in the United States. At latest count, there are between eighteen and twenty-seven ballot battles gearing up, surpassing the previous record of sixteen in 1993. This rising tide of hate is partly a backlash against an increasing number of gay rights initiatives. Last year sixteen state legislatures took up measures to grant civil rights protection to gay men and lesbians or to repeal antisodomy laws (most of these proposals failed). But antigay initiatives are also part of a grander scheme to organize a right-wing voting block to take on issues such as abortion rights, school curriculums, and tax policies. This fight will be a daunting challenge to the organized lesbian and gay rights movement: the combined budgets of the six largest gay organizations total only about $12 million, compared to the more than $210 million in the combined budgets of the six largest right-wing religious organizations.2 The financial clout and cultural reach of these organizations should not be underestimated. For instance, Focus on the Family, based in Colorado Springs and founded by Dr. James Dobson, formerly a member of the Meese Commission on Pornography, boasts a $90 million annual budget and affiliated Family Councils in thirty states. It distributes the antigay video, The Gay Agenda, publishes nine magazines, and supports sixteen hundred radio programs. The Christian Coalition of Chesapeake, Virginia, distributed 40 million voter guides in the 1992 elections in its campaign to take over state and local Republican parties. It supports the Christian Broadcasting Network, the Family Channel, and the 700 Club, which reach millions of viewers daily, as well as two newsletters, Religious Rights Watch and Christian American. The Coalition's leader, Pat Robertson, situates their agenda squarely in the middle of party politics: "We want . . . to see a majority of the Republican Party in the hands of profamily Christians by 1996." Finally, Citizens for Excellence in Education, an arm of the National Association of Christian Educators led by Robert Simonds and located in Costa Mesa, California, distributes the manual, "How to Elect Christians to Public Office," and claims that thirty-five hundred Christians have been elected to school boards through its efforts. It is clear that the strategies of the religious right go well beyond the simple articulation of homophobic, racist, and antifeminist sentiments. Their targets are precise and their program well formulated, as is indi-

Distant friends and nearby enemies: The politics of legislative coalition formation

It is usually thought that a coalition leader in a legislature will construct coalitions of legislators who are ‘close’ to each other in the policy space. However, if there is some ‘status quo’ or other reversion point that will hold if the coalition leader fails to construct a winning coalition, a counter-intuitive result about the nature of these coalitions emerges: the coalition leader may be forced to construct a coalition which includes legislators who are ‘distant’ from him and which excludes legislators who are ‘close’ to him.