Climate Migration Research Articles

Climate Vulnerability and Human Migration in Global Perspective.

The relationship between climate change and human migration is not homogenous and depends critically on the differential vulnerability of population and places. If places and populations are not vulnerable, or susceptible, to climate change, then the climate–migration relationship may not materialize. The key to understanding and, from a policy perspective, planning for whether and how climate change will impact future migration patterns is therefore knowledge of the link between climate vulnerability and migration. However, beyond specific case studies, little is known about this association in global perspective. We therefore provide a descriptive, country-level portrait of this relationship. We show that the negative association between climate vulnerability and international migration holds only for countries least vulnerable to climate change, which suggests the potential for trapped populations in more vulnerable countries. However, when analyzed separately by life supporting sector (food, water, health, ecosystem services, human habitat, and infrastructure) and vulnerability dimension (exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity), we detect evidence of a relationship among more, but not the most, vulnerable countries. The bilateral (i.e., country-to-country) migration show that, on average, people move from countries of higher vulnerability to lower vulnerability, reducing global risk by 15%. This finding is consistent with the idea that migration is a climate adaptation strategy. Still, ~6% of bilateral migration is maladaptive with respect to climate change, with some movement toward countries with greater climate change vulnerability.

Assessment of global warming impact on biodiversity using the extinction risk index in LCIA: a case study of Japanese plant species

There has been an increasing number of studies on species extinction because of global warming based on estimations of changes in species distributions. Life cycle impact assessment methods do not have a biodiversity damage factor for global warming that uses the extinction risk index. In this study, a method for determining the extinction risks of individual species per unit CO2 emission was proposed and test calculations of the extinction risks of 216 species of Japanese vascular plants were performed. We also examined the possibility of determining local and global extinction risk factors using this method. This method uses the Expected Increase in the Number of Extinction Species (EINES), which is defined as the inverse of the time to extinction, as the extinction risk index. Procedures for determining the extinction risks of individual species per unit CO2 emission (EINES/species/kg) are as follows. First, based on the base scenario of CO2 emission, a niche-based species distribution model is used to estimate species distribution areas in 2000 and 2100 and calculate the distribution area decrease over 100 years. The number of years before the zero distribution area is then determined by assuming that the decrease is constant. Extinction risk is defined as the inverse of this time. The final step is to determine the extinction risk at specific CO2 emissions in addition to the base emission scenario and divide the difference in the extinction risk by the additional amount of CO2 emissions. The distribution areas of 216 species of Japanese vascular plants having southern distribution limits were estimated to decrease by 40–85% in 100 years. The accuracy of the estimation was sufficient according to the value of area under the curve (AUC). Considering climate models and migration conditions, the extinction risk per unit CO2 emission was estimated between −0.6 × 10−18 and 4.7 × 10−18 (EINES/species/kg). We converted the normalization values of the extinction risk of Japan for the 216 species to compare impact of land use changes and waste processing with that of global warming on the species. We found that global warming has smaller impact compared with land use changes and larger impact compared with waste processing. A method for estimating the extinction risks of species per unit CO2 emission was proposed, and it can be used to determine the local and global extinction risk factors of CO2.

Podcast: A researcher seeks refuge, smart borders, and climate migration

Podcast: A researcher seeks refuge, smart borders, and climate migration

Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)politics of Adaptation

AbstractThe series of recent hecatombs in the Mediterranean, together with the regressive reactions we have witnessed in and around Europe, highlight the importance of posing the question of climate change and migration. Climate change will interact with a number of drivers of migration, and will hit hardest on the weakest and most exposed – which often include migrants as well as those too poor to move. However, how the climate‐migration nexus can be addressed in fair and equitable ways (with what concepts, in what fora, through what policies) is far from a simple question. This intervention proposes two main arguments. First, a brief overview of recent debates suggests that we are still far from any progressive approaches to ‘climate migration’ – those that have emerged are different expressions of biopolitical discourses on sustainable development and resilience. Second, this intervention invites to reconsider the widely held and depoliticising assumption that climate migration is a ‘problem to be solved’ ‐ for instance, by UNFCCC. Rather, the nexus should be seen as a set of open questions on different alternative climate futures, as well as a symptom of the irreducibly political tensions inherent in every form of mobility as much as in every attempt to discipline/govern it.

PACIFIC WALRUS PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING CLIMATE

This article identifies and evaluates strategies and policies for walrus management in both Chukotka and Alaska. As the climate and walrus migration continue to change, it is important to follow adaptable strategies that are not fixed to specific geographic areas. Many of the recommendations may be easier to accomplish in the United States, which offers more opportunities for co-management and stakeholder involvement. The United States government can implement most recommendations without making substantive changes to law. This was significant to most participants – hunters as well as regulators – who supported voluntary approaches over those requiring legal changes.

Domestic and International Climate Migration from Rural Mexico.

Evidence is increasing that climate change and variability may influence human migration patterns. However, there is less agreement regarding the type of migration streams most strongly impacted. This study tests whether climate change more strongly impacted international compared to domestic migration from rural Mexico during 1986-99. We employ eight temperature and precipitation-based climate change indices linked to detailed migration histories obtained from the Mexican Migration Project. Results from multilevel discrete-time event-history models challenge the assumption that climate-related migration will be predominantly short distance and domestic, but instead show that climate change more strongly impacted international moves from rural Mexico. The stronger climate impact on international migration may be explained by the self-insurance function of international migration, the presence of strong migrant networks, and climate-related changes in wage difference. While a warming in temperature increased international outmigration, higher levels of precipitation declined the odds of an international move.

One step forward, two steps back? The fading contours of (in)justice in competing discourses on climate migration

In recent debates on climate change and migration, the focus on the figure of ‘climate refugees’ (tainted by environmental determinism and a crude understanding of human mobility) has given ground to a broader conception of the climate–migration nexus. In particular, the idea that migration can represent a legitimate adaptation strategy has emerged strongly. This appears to be a positive development, marked by softer tones that de‐securitise climate migration. However, political and normative implications of this evolution are still understudied. This article contributes to filling the gap by turning to both the ‘climate refugees’ and ‘migration as adaptation’ narratives, interrogating how and whether those competing narratives pose the question of (in)justice. Our analysis shows that the highly problematic ‘climate refugees’ narrative did (at least) channel justice claims and yielded the (illusory) possibility of identifying concrete rights claims and responsibilities. Read in relation to the growing mantra of resilience in climate policy and politics, the more recent narrative on ‘migration as adaptation’ appears to displace justice claims and inherent rights in favour of a depoliticised idea of adaptation that relies on the individual migrant's ability to compete in and benefit from labour markets. We warn that the removal of structural inequalities from the way in which the climate–migration nexus is understood can be seen as symptomatic of a shrinking of the conditions to posing the question of climate justice.

Rethinking about Civilizations: The Politics of Migration in a New Climate

In this paper, I will lay out some useful conceptual/theoretical markets that will help us to understand, and resolve, significant political challenges to ‘action’ on climate change migration. Thus, while this paper is concerned with climate change and migration responses, it is also concerned with understanding how we understand migration in the context of climate change, and how climate change forces a radical shift in such understandings. To do so, I pick up on the work of Robert W. Cox and push it in a different direction. In particular, I am interested in his work on civilizations, and how this civilizational account of world politics opens up space for thinking about climate change broadly, and climate change migration specifically. I argue that Cox’s account of ‘inter-civilizational’ politics helps us to solve a pressing analytical problem: how to rethink the coordinates of contemporary cosmopolitics in the ‘Anthropocene’, and reconsider the frames of analysis that we adopt to understand and respond to climate change migration. I demonstrate this by considering two distinctly different ‘civilizational’ accounts of migration and mobility in the Asia-Pacific/Oceania region (one territorial and the other maritime), and consider how these might reveal an important source of future change. By sketching out this approach, my intention is to mobilize the resources offered by Cox in order to further his project of envisaging alternative world orders, and post-hegemonic political relations therein.

Climate variability and international migration: The importance of the agricultural linkage

While there is considerable interest in understanding the climate–migration relationship, particularly in the context of concerns about global climatic change, little is known about its underlying mechanisms. In the paper, we combine a rich panel data on annual bilateral international migration flows with an extensive data on climate variability across the countries to investigate in-depth the climate–migration link. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between temperature and international outmigration only in the most agriculture-dependent countries, consistent with the widely documented adverse impact of temperature on agricultural productivity. Further, the temperature–migration relationship is nonlinear and resembles the nonlinear temperature–yield relationship. In addition, migration flows to current major destinations are especially temperature-sensitive. Policies to address issues related to climate-induced international migration would be more efficient if focused on the agriculture-dependent countries and especially people in those countries whose livelihoods depend on agriculture.

International Climate Migration: Evidence for the Climate Inhibitor Mechanism and the Agricultural Pathway.

Research often assumes that, in rural areas of developing countries, adverse climatic conditions increase (climate driver mechanism) rather than reduce (climate inhibitor mechanism) migration, and that the impact of climate on migration is moderated by changes in agricultural productivity (agricultural pathway). Using representative census data in combination with high-resolution climate data derived from the novel Terra Populus system, we explore the climate-migration relationship in rural Burkina Faso and Senegal. We construct four threshold-based climate measures to investigate the effect of heat waves, cold snaps, droughts and excessive precipitation on the likelihood of household-level international outmigration. Results from multi-level logit models show that excessive precipitation increases international migration from Senegal while heat waves decrease international mobility in Burkina Faso, providing evidence for the climate inhibitor mechanism. Consistent with the agricultural pathway, interaction models and results from a geographically weighted regression (GWR) reveal a conditional effect of droughts on international outmigration from Senegal, which becomes stronger in areas with high levels of groundnut production. Moreover, climate change effects show a clear seasonal pattern, with the strongest effects appearing when heat waves overlap with the growing season and when excessive precipitation occurs prior to the growing season.

Climate migration and the politics of causal attribution: a case study in Mongolia

Migration is always multi-causal. Ascribing a specific cause to migration, such as through the concept of ‘climate migration’, participates consequently to a political exercise – a play of shade and light where attention is focused on the responsibilities of certain actors, rather than others. This is the case, this article argues, regarding internal migration in Mongolia, whereby, during the last two decades, nomadic or semi-nomadic herders as well as inhabitants from small urban centres come to settle in insalubrious suburbs of the capital, Ulaanbaatar. The Mongolian authorities are keen to highlight the changing environmental conditions that can be traced to climate change: a change in precipitation patterns and an increase in average temperatures contribute to cause large loss of livestock during harsh winters (dzud). Yet, a multitude of other factors concurrently influence the migratory behaviour of Mongolia’s nomads: unregulated and unsustainable pastoral practices, the insufficient provision of basic and support services in the countryside or, more generally, the lack of public support to the agricultural sector. Identifying the concurring causes of migration suggests alternative response measures, and this article argues that Mongolia should urgently rectify its development policies to provide a room for each of its citizens.

Climate change, migration and violent conflict: vulnerabilities, pathways and adaptation strategies

It has often been predicted that large numbers of people will be displaced by climate change and that this will lead to violent conflict. At the core of this prediction is a simple causal model which assumes that climate change will result in resource scarcities, which in turn will drive migration as well as violent conflict. Academic research into the links between climate change, migration and conflict has questioned such predictions; their theoretical foundation and empirical support are thin. This does not mean that climate change will be irrelevant for future patterns of migration, including migration that may be linked to violent conflict. However, it has become clear that the links between climate change, migration and conflict are complex and defy simple and sensationalist conclusions. After outlining the state of the art on climate migration and the environment–migration–conflict nexus, this article sketches the environmental, economic and sociopolitical consequences of climate change contributing to migration and the different functions of migration in this context, for instance as an adaptive strategy to environmental change. It then delineates the different theorized pathways from migration to conflict escalation, evaluates their analytical value and develops a more differentiated model of the assumed links between climate change, migration and conflict.

Migration in the UNFCCC Workstream on Loss and Damage: An Assessment of Alternative Framings and Conceivable Responses

AbstractDiscourses on ‘climate migration’ have played an instrumental role in initiating negotiations on loss and damage under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Yet, to date, the framing of climate migration has not been clear: it has been considered as a tool for reducing loss and damage (hence essentially a form of adaptation) or, alternatively, as a source of loss and damage for the migrants or for other concerned communities. Moreover, proposed approaches to address climate migration as a form of loss and damage have extended beyond compensation, and remain controversial among developed nations. In the highly politicized field of migration governance, however, this article submits that policy support and guidance in addressing loss and damage could prompt dangerous forms of political interference, such as the imposition of a Western objective of containing migrants to the Global South. It is thus suggested that top-down migration policies may not help vulnerable nations who face loss and damage in the context of climate migration.

Climate migrants as protestors? Dispelling misconceptions about global environmental change in pre-revolutionary Syria

ABSTRACTFor a growing number of commentators, the Syrian uprising is explained by a prolonged drought period immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011. In this narrative, the marginalized ‘climate migrants’ are seen as a decisive factor for the onset of conflict. In this paper the author dispels these assumptions by arguing for a more complex approach that takes into consideration pre-existing internal migration patterns – social, demographic, political and economic drivers of migration – as well as new local-level data showing that ‘climate migrants’ could not have orchestrated an uprising of this magnitude for lack of reliable social networks.

2016 to Be the International Year of Global Understanding

Last September, on the first day of the World Social Science Forum 2015 in Durban, South Africa, the International Council for Science (ICSU), the International Social Science Council (ISSC), and the International Council for Philosophy and Human Sciences (CIPSH) jointly announced that 2016 would be the International Year of Global Understanding (IYGU). The aim of IYGU is to promote better understanding of how the local impacts the global in order to foster smart policies to tackle critical global challenges, such as climate change, food security, and migration.

Contemporary world migration - towards new terminology, patterns and policies

In the last decades, after the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin wall, the strengthening of overall population mobility is evident on local, regional, national and global scale. In addition, there are changes in the scope and direction of migration, their structural characteristics and increasing in the number of determining factors and consequences, which affects the complexity of this phenomenon. It is important to point out the emergence of new forms of migration as a result of intensifying pace of globalization, which is an integral part of the migration. The total number of migrants in the world (internal and external) in the first decade of the XXI century reached the highest value in history and is around one billion, with small, but continuous increase in share of total population. This means that one in every seven person in the world has changed place of residence, either within their own country (about 700 million of internal migrants) or moved to another country (244 million international migrants). Therefore some authors points out that all of us are becoming migrants. Also, the number of irregular migrants recently has reached its highest amount, which implies an intensification of government actions to regulate migration through the creation of effective policies, spatial mobility and intensification of bilateral, regional and international negotiations in this domain. Estimates show that the number of migrants will continue to grow, especially the number of climate migrants, persons who left their homes due to changes in the environment. That is why it is of crucial importance in a first place to understand migrations properly and then to create the steps towards the best solutions in solving the problems caused by population movement in space and create proper migration policies.

Amplification or suppression: Social networks and the climate change—migration association in rural Mexico

Increasing rates of climate migration may be of economic and national concern to sending and destination countries. It has been argued that social networks—the ties connecting an origin and destination—may operate as “migration corridors” with the potential to strongly facilitate climate change-related migration. This study investigates whether social networks at the household and community levels amplify or suppress the impact of climate change on international migration from rural Mexico. A novel set of 15 climate change indices was generated based on daily temperature and precipitation data for 214 weather stations across Mexico. Employing geostatistical interpolation techniques, the climate change values were linked to 68 rural municipalities for which sociodemographic data and detailed migration histories were available from the Mexican Migration Project. Multi-level discrete-time event-history models were used to investigate the effect of climate change on international migration between 1986 and 1999. At the household level, the effect of social networks was approximated by comparing the first to the last move, assuming that through the first move a household establishes internal social capital. At the community level, the impact of social capital was explored through interactions with a measure of the proportion of adults with migration experience. The results show that rather than amplifying, social capital may suppress the sensitivity of migration to climate triggers, suggesting that social networks could facilitate climate change adaptation in place.

Climate migrants and new identities? The geopolitics of embracing or rejecting mobility

New evidence is emerging to suggest that climate change mobility is giving effect to changing forms of island identity among Tuvaluans and i-Kiribati. This nascent shift prompts a number of questions addressed in this paper. What, for example, does climate change migration mean for island identity and its geographic performance? How does the spatialization of identity inform shared experiences of climate change, and how does identity assist in the formation of shared positions from which to advocate for change? Drawing on discourses of sedentarism and mobilization among Tuvaluan and i-Kiribati, we explore performances of identity related to climate change being fashioned and refashioned in different contexts.

Impact of Climate Change on Migration from Vietnam to Russia as a Factor of Transformation of Geopolitical Relations

The article gives a brief description of the migration from Vietnam to Russia. The place of migration from Vietnam in global migration turnover is represented, as well as historical forms of migration and the relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and later Russia, on the other hand. As a result of climate change on the planet Vietnam faced with new challenges and threats. Geographical position peculiarity, relief and demographic potential of the territory led to the need of revision of the existing and well-established policy of resettlement of the population across the country. Speaking of global climate change on our planet, one implies the average temperature of the environment increase, including the temperature of the water of the World Ocean. This given phenomenon is also denoted as the term "global warming". Negative phenomena, frequent due to climate change, in the medium term outlook will require the development of a new concept of migration policy in Vietnam, mostly aimed at the resettlement of people from potentially dangerous places of residence, primarily coastal areas. When considering the stated problem, the authors show the gradation of concepts like "climate migrants", "environmental migrants", "environmental refugee". In implementing the most unfavorable forecasts, the country will face the need of resettlement of millions of people. In the conditions of the limited area of the country thousands of people will be looking for a new place of residence outside the country. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n3s2p202

Securitizing Water, Climate, and Migration in Israel, Jordan, and Syria

Protracted droughts and scarce water resources, combined with internal and cross-border migration, have contributed to the securitization of discourses around migration and water in much of the Middle East. However, there is no clear understanding of the conditions under which water, climate change, and migration are conceived of as security concerns or of their policy implications. This article explores the different means through which Israel, Jordan, and Syria have framed issues of water, climate change, and migration as national security concerns. Based upon an analysis of governmental and publicly available documents, coupled with field interviews with Israeli and Jordanian policymakers, experts, and nongovernmental organizations, we identify two different framings of the water–climate–migration nexus, depending on whether migration is largely external or internal. In Israel and Jordan, concern with influxes of external migrants elevated migration as a security issue in part through impacts on already-scarce water resources. In Syria, where severe drought in the early 2000s prompted large-scale internal migration, officials downplayed connections between scarce water resources, drought, and internal migration, part of a broader pattern of rural neglect. Unlike much of the conventional literature that has posited a linear relationship between climate change, decreasing water availability, and migration, we provide a more robust picture of the water–climate–migration nexus that shows how securitized framings take different forms and produce several unintended consequences.