Climate Coalition Research Articles

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences

This paper analyses the effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions in the standard two-stage game of self-enforcing international environmental agreements with identical countries. Altruism implies that each country values, to some extent, every other country’s welfare when deciding on its coalition membership and emissions policy. In the Nash [Stackelberg] game, the fringe [coalition] countries exploit the altruism of the coalition [fringe] countries so that altruism decreases [increases] the coalition size. In any case, global emissions and global welfare are close to the non-cooperative values. However, altruism narrows the gap between the individually optimal emissions and the socially optimal emissions, so altruism increases global welfare. The effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions crucially depends on its modelling: If altruism affects the membership decision but not the policy decision, or if each coalition country is more altruistic toward other coalition countries than toward fringe countries, altruism can stabilise large coalitions up to the grand coalition. Finally, altruism can stabilise small coalitions but destabilises large coalitions with asymmetric countries.

The possibility of a theory of change to tackle the climate crisis in a UK university

Purpose This paper aims to discuss the practical dilemmas of institutional change to tackle the climate crisis in a UK university, identifying key assumptions and issues that block meaningful change. The research was part of an initiative to define a theory of change (ToC) to meet the university’s institutional climate commitments. Design/methodology/approach The findings are based on interviews with members of an inter-disciplinary ToC working group, a staff–student climate coalition and student representatives at the university. Interviewees were purposively selected to gain insights into assumptions about the nature of the university and its role in tackling the climate crisis, which must be addressed for the university to effectively implement its climate plan. Findings This paper identified tensions between the university’s role as a public and commercial institution, a lack of clarity over decision-making processes and the difficulties in balancing (and being transparent about) actions with commitments to tackle the climate crisis. A democratic and flexible approach to change is essential to mitigate these issues, providing an opportunity to reflect on the diversity of the university community and openly debate goals and commitments. Originality/value In setting out the initial steps of a ToC in a UK university, this paper offers practical insights for higher education institutions looking to change practices. By highlighting assumptions at a particular institution, this paper also contributes a level of granularity to a growing field of research on efforts in higher education institutions to tackle the climate crisis.

Business In (Action): The International Chamber of Commerce and Climate Change from Stockholm to Rio

This paper engages with the literature that has looked at the historical response to climate change among industries positioned to have had a far-reaching impact on changing the course of the climate crisis. While much of the historical research in this domain has focused on the role of big oil companies, the utility industry and conservative think tanks in the manufacturing of doubt regarding climate science and opposing ambitions climate policies, our focus is on the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) – the world’s largest transnational business association. Unlike individual multinational corporations, the ICC developed a close ties and collaborations with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which made ICC positioned to influence international policy discussions. This study finds that the ICC developed a dual strategy, which set aside climate change as the focus for discussion and business action. One strategy, led by ICC Environment Committee, involved intense collaboration with the United Nations and developing a business agenda for sustainable development. At the same time, the creation of the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 and the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) in 1991, gave rise to a parallel strategy, led by ICC’s related oil companies. As this study finds, the ICC’s Energy Committee developed close ties to the Global Climate Coalition, a front group designed to combat the scientific evidence of climate change. The paper concludes that the ICC was able to delay meaningful regulatory response to climate change the between 1988-1992 by forming a broad coalition of competing interests and collaborating with agencies established under the auspices of the United Nations.

On breadth and depth of climate agreements with pledge-and-review bargaining

This paper analyzes the effects of partial cooperation on the breadth and depth of climate agreements in dynamic games in which countries emit, invest in green technology, decide to participate in a climate coalition and participants negotiate the contract duration. When choosing emissions reductions (pledges), coalition countries apply Harstad’s (2023a) pledge-and-review bargaining and partially cooperate. We distinguish between stock-independent and stock-dependent investment costs. It is shown that narrow-but-deep agreements may be welfare superior to broad-but-shallow agreements for signatories. In addition, if the degree of partial cooperation is sufficiently high, broad-and-deep agreements and even first best can be achieved.

Fossil fuel communities support climate policy coupled with just transition assistance

What are fossil fuel communities’ preferences over the design of just transition assistance accompanying climate policy? This study conducted survey experiments at Appalachian county fairs to answer this question, overcoming barriers that have limited previous attempts to measure preferences in these crucial regions. Comparing the responses to a new national survey, there is a divergence in preferences for policies encouraging relocation, but there is convergence behind support for policies that reduce costs to fossil fuel workers. The study also finds that an intervention to provide information about coal’s decline shifted preferences toward supporting the clean energy transition. Rather than public opinion being an immutable barrier to climate action, 66% of fossil fuel community residents would endorse climate policy if it were coupled with just transition assistance. Policy design and informational interventions could help to create climate coalitions, even in the places most affected by the clean energy transition.

Formation of climate coalitions and preferential free trade: the case for participation linkage

We study the endogenous formation of climate coalitions linked to a preferential free trade arrangement. In a multi-stage, micro founded strategic trade and participation game, coalition and fringe countries dispose of a discriminatory tariff on dirty imports as well as emission permits imposed on domestic producers. Permits are traded on a common permit market inside the coalition and on local markets outside, respectively. We provide an analytical solution for the general equilibrium and the policy game, in the three country case, while the participation game is solved by Monte Carlo simulation. Moreover, conditional probabilities are computed for the transition to coalitions of various sizes induced by free trade. Under various regimes analyzed, we find that preferential free trade can create strong incentives for building effective climate coalitions in terms of depth and breadth. This result even holds if fringe countries are given the option of trade cooperation as a retaliation devise and is driven by a favorable shift in the coalition’s terms of trade. As a policy implication, negotiations on international climate treaties and free trade arrangements should be interlinked.

SRM on the table: the role of geoengineering for the stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions

Geoengineering, including solar radiation management (SRM), has received increasing scrutiny due to the rise of climate extremes and slow progress in mitigating global carbon emissions. This climate policy option, even as a possibility, can have consequential implications for international climate governance. Here, we study how solar engineering affects the effectiveness and stability of a large set of regional coalitions through numerical simulations. We posit a requirement in terms of global political or economic power and analyze the exclusive membership coalition formation process when coalitions jointly decide on geoengineering and mitigation. We show that geoengineering can provide incentives for cooperation and partially solve the typical trade-off between stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions. However, temperature reduction mostly comes from deploying SRM within the coalition rather than from further emission reductions, thus exposing the world to relatively large-scale deployment of SRM with as of today uncertain potential side effects and risks.

The home state effect: How subnational governments shape climate coalitions

AbstractOrganized business interests often seek to block public interest regulations. But whether firms oppose regulation depends on institutional context. We argue that, in federal systems, sub‐national policies and politics can have a home state effect on firms' national policy preferences and the lobbying coalitions they join. State policies that force firms to absorb regulatory cost can reduce the marginal cost of national policies, leading to preference shifts. In addition, firms regulated at the state level have incentives to strategically align with their state governments to avoid future regulatory cost. We test our argument in the context of U.S. climate politics, matching original data on the positions of electric utilities toward the Clean Power Plan and data on ad hoc coalition membership with data measuring state policy stringency and state government positions. Quantitative evidence is consistent with hypotheses: both state policies and state politics influence utilities' positions on national climate policy. Qualitative evidence from elite interviews helps clarify the roles of different mechanisms. Our findings underscore the importance of sub‐national governments in shaping national lobbying coalitions.

Diffusion of global climate policy: National depoliticization, local repoliticization in Turkey

Although climate policy diffusion is widely studied, we know comparatively little about how these global policies and the norms that surround them are used by various political actors seeking to advance their own agendas. In this article, we focus on how global climate norms are diffused differently at national and local scales and used to repoliticize or depoliticize climate change. We focus on the case of Turkey, which carries the stark contrast of showing willingness to achieve global climate goals in the international arena but less so in domestic politics and actions. The article employs a novel methodological approach, using topic modeling and network analyses on a range of climate change–related policy documents, and interviews with high-level officers, conducted at the three jurisdictional levels in Turkey. The findings reveal that although global climate policy is diffused to both national and local governments, it is used in different ways at these levels. The national government uses climate policy diffusion to depoliticize climate change by creating ad hoc climate coalitions and limiting local climate actions to seeking external climate-related funds. Meanwhile, the metropolitan municipalities replicate nationally adopted climate goals, whereas the district municipalities domesticate ambitious climate norms and repoliticize climate change via local climate entrepreneurs and civic action. The paper contributes to understanding how climate policy diffusion and norm domestication can have different political outcomes in achieving global climate goals and argues for increased policy attention to the strategic use of climate policy diffusion for the depoliticization of climate change.

Global Girls Climate Coalition—A project to build a movement of girl‐centered climate action (DOS)

Federal Grants & ContractsVolume 47, Issue 5 p. 6-6 Grants Alerts Global Girls Climate Coalition—A project to build a movement of girl-centered climate action (DOS) First published: 31 January 2023 https://doi.org/10.1002/fgc.32842Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume47, Issue52 February 2023Pages 6-6 RelatedInformation

Demand- Versus Supply-Side Climate Policies with a Carbon Dioxide Ceiling

Abstract In a Hotelling model with a climate coalition and a free-riding fringe, we compare demand-side and supply-side climate policies aimed at keeping CO$_2$ concentration below a ceiling equivalent to global warming of $2^\circ{\rm C}$. With the demand-side policy, the coalition caps its fuel demand. The corresponding allocation is intra-temporally distorted. With the supply-side policy, the coalition purchases deposits. The corresponding allocation is inter-temporally distorted and the fuel extraction path can be discontinuous. In an empirically calibrated economy, a medium-sized (the grand) coalition is stable with the demand-side (supply-side) policy. If the coalition acts strategically, the stable grand coalition implements first best.

Carbon leakage in a small open economy: The importance of international climate policies

A substantial literature investigates carbon leakage effects for large countries and climate coalitions. However, little is known about leakage effects for a small open economy within a climate coalition. To fill this gap in the literature, we incorporate international climate policies relevant for a small open EU economy into the general equilibrium model GTAP-E. We focus our analysis on Denmark, but we show that our framework can be applied to any EU economy. We find substantial leakage associated with an economy-wide CO2e tax. This result is strongly affected by EU climate policies. We also present sector-specific leakage rates and find large sectoral differences.

Building diverse climate coalitions: The pitfalls and promise of equity- and identity-based messaging.

Building diverse climate coalitions: The pitfalls and promise of equity- and identity-based messaging.

Iconic 21st Century Activist "T-Shirt and Tote-Bag" Combination Is Hard to Miss These Days!

Iconic 21st Century Activist "T-Shirt and Tote-Bag" Combination Is Hard to Miss These Days!

Definitions and accounting of climate finance: between divergence and constructive ambiguity

ABSTRACT The Paris Agreement reaffirmed the commitment to provide USD 100 billion in international climate finance to developing countries by 2020, while COP26 agreed to set a new target by the end of 2024. However, in the absence of a clear, internationally accepted definition of climate finance, the estimates of the progress towards this objective wildly differ. This article provides an overview of different issues related to diverging definitions of climate finance, its main dimensions and proposes to distinguish between counting methods (e.g. Rio markers) and accounting frameworks of climate finance (e.g. by the OECD). We start by reviewing the existing definitions of climate finance both under the UNFCCC and beyond, followed by a discussion of the key dimensions of climate finance that affect definitions, as well as the main climate finance accounting approaches. In the context of the Paris Agreement, attaining a consensus among Parties on the definition of climate finance is crucial, but may result in watering down the level of ambition, for example, by including finance to activities that may not be in line with the latest climate science. Such convergence would require resolving all controversial dimensions of climate finance discussed in this article – notably, provider versus recipient side perspectives, eligible activities, inclusion of controversial sectors and technologies, public versus private finance, climate versus development finance, accounting for negative climate finance and so on. As most likely not all issues can be resolved through a consensual multilateral process, some level of ‘constructive ambiguity’ may be required in defining and accounting for international climate finance. Key policy insights There is no commonly accepted definition of international climate finance today, making it difficult to track progress. Climate finance accounting approaches differ depending on the interpretation of different dimensions of climate finance. A commonly accepted definition of climate finance should take into account the latest science on 1.5°C and net-zero scenarios. Climate clubs or coalitions may take up the issue of ‘muddled’ counting methods and accounting frameworks of international climate finance in ‘side deals’ of official negotiations. The Standing Committee on Finance is best positioned to authoritatively perform regular accounting for finance flows eligible under international climate commitments.

Creating Climate Coalitions: Mass Preferences for Compensating Vulnerability in the World’s Two Largest Democracies

Combating climate change requires large economic adjustments with significant distributional implications. To build coalitions of support, scholars and policy makers propose compensating individuals who will bear decarbonization’s costs. What are the determinants of public opinion regarding climate compensation and investment? We theorize that climate policy vulnerability and climate change vulnerability induce support for distinct types of climate policy. Fielding original surveys in the United States and India, we show that people who reside in coal-producing regions prefer compensation for lost jobs. The general public privileges diffuse redistribution mechanisms and investments, discounting compensation to targeted groups. Those who are both physically and economically vulnerable have cross-cutting preferences. Nevertheless, there is considerable support across our samples for policies that compensate different coalitions of climate-vulnerable citizens, in line with theories of “just energy” transition and embedded liberalism. We trace the distinctive compensatory preferences of fossil fuel communities to a logic of shared community identities.

Advocating inaction: a historical analysis of the Global Climate Coalition

ABSTRACT Ever since climate change became a political issue in the late 1980s, a number of industry coalitions have formed to oppose mandatory carbon emissions reductions. One key coalition was the Global Climate Coalition (GCC). This paper conducts a historical and empirical review of the activities of this coalition. This review shows that the GCC engaged in four distinct activities to obstruct climate action: 1) monitoring and contesting climate science, 2) commissioning and utilizing economic studies to amplify and legitimate their arguments, 3) shifting the cultural understanding of climate change through public relations campaigns and 4) conducting aggressive lobbying of political elites. Through these activities, the GCC played an important role in obstructing climate action, both in the U.S. and internationally. Further analysis of similar coalitions can aid in our understanding of the organized opposition to climate action.

The role of youth-led activist organisations for contemporary climate activism: the case of the Australian Youth Climate Coalition

ABSTRACT The SchoolStrike4Climate protests have renewed interest in youth political participation, but there has been little scholarly explanation for how young people came to be involved in such actions. While most studies focus on the motivations of participants, this paper considers the role of youth-led organisations in fostering political interest and action for climate justice among young people. Through a case study of the Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC), we argue that over 15 years this youth-led organisation has played a key role by building an enduring organisational base and using multiple strategies to foster understanding and commitment among young people in Australia towards issues of sustainability and action on climate change. Key to the AYCC approach is a climate justice narrative in which young people are legitimate political actors responding to the climate crisis. This narrative manifests in the organisational structure, youthful hybrid repertoires of action and peer-based, educative initiatives. From our analysis, we propose the concept of ‘educative movement-building’ to describe the unique way young people are making organisations and generating broad support for climate justice in Australia with implications for studies of environmental activism and democracy more broadly.

Unilaterally optimal climate policy and the green paradox

Consider a Hotelling model with exploration investments, a backstop technology and two groups of countries, a climate coalition and a free-riding fringe.If the coalition is price taker in the fossil fuel market, a higher marginal climate damage leads to a reduction of the coalition’s cumulative fuel consumption, which reduces the fuel price and, thus, induces carbon leakage. If the coalition is sufficiently small or its energy demand is sufficiently price sensitive, both the initial extraction and the cumulative discounted climate damages decrease (no weak/strong green paradox). This also applies if exploration investments are sufficiently productive, so that a lower fuel price leads to a considerably lower total extraction. If the coalition acts strategically in the fossil fuel market, it accounts for terms-of-trade and carbon-leakage effects. Then, a higher marginal climate damage can lead to an increase of the coalition’s cumulative fuel consumption, which prevents a weak green paradox, while a strong green paradox never occurs.In an empirically calibrated economy, we show that a strong green paradox can occur without a weak green paradox and vice versa with a price-taking coalition. With a strategically acting coalition, a weak green paradox can be part of a unilaterally optimal policy reaction.

Climate Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty and the Power of Information Design1

Climate Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty and the Power of Information Design1