Clausewitz's Theory Research Articles

Industri Pertahanan Prancis dan Inggris Dalam Penguatan Aliansi Kekuatan Militer pada Perang Dunia I

World War I took place on the European continent between the Allies and the Central powers. In this war, the warring parties did not only rely on the troops quantity, but also their own technology. In addition, both sides had maximally empowered their strategic industries in building military forces for war. The article identifies the factors that supported the victory of France and Britain in World War I, thus encouraging the development of war technology and strategic industry which continues to present day. In that arena, France and Britain had the upper hand in the use of technology and industrial support for war. The theories used for this discussion are Carl von Clausewitz's theory of war, Morgenthau's balance of power theory, Liddell Hart's strategy theory and the theory of revolution in military affairs. The discussion was carried out using qualitative methods with an exploratory and historical approach which ultimately showed that the Allied defense industry had so far gained technological advantage from the influence of the victory in World War I.

Spór o filozoficzne źródła politycznej teorii wojny Carla von Clausewitza. W kręgu interpretacji współczesnych

The aim of this article was to discuss basic concepts of Clausewitz philosophy of war. At first, I wanted to present and criticize some older interpretations of philosophical assumptions which founded theoretical schema of On war. In the next part, I presented some recent interpretations based on the distinction between “early” and “old” (or “mature”) Clausewitz. They gave us new look on few theoretical problems included in Prussian’s general works and his attitude to many important Enlightenment philosophers like Kant and Hegel. Finally, I tried to prove that Clausewitz theory has dialectical character, which makes it open and worth further developments.

Broken Windows: Special Operations and Clausewitz—Theory, Politics, and State Military Violence in the Limited Wars of the Twenty-first Century

American societal enmity following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, drove the narrative of the Global War on Terror and its legal justification in the Authorization to Use Military Force. The commitment of regular and special operations military forces into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reflected this enmity that Carl von Clausewitz noted was the wellspring of war. As American enmity and these wars wind down after eighteen years, anxiety replaces enmity. Special operations become ever more the force of choice by policymakers in pursuit of objectives within the narrative to reduce societal anxiety over terror attack at home. Outside a theater of the active form of war that conforms to the model of the phenomenon of war in politics that Clausewitz defined, can Special Operations be a military task at all—or solely an actor in a world of broken windows—answering only to itself and to a political directive in response to society’s anxiety toward personal safety, crime in the form of terror, and a legal opinion.

Parameters – Full Issue – Autumn 2018

FEATURES: Challenges for Civil-Military Relations: "Policy Revolt: Army Opposition to the Korea Withdrawal Plan On Alliances and Coalitions" by Eric B. Setzekorn. "The Walter Reed Scandal and the All-Volunteer Force" by Richard G. Malish. On Alliances and Coalitions: "Fighting and Learning in the Great War" by Kelly A. Greico. "India-US Relations" by Vinay Kaura. "Toward a Whole-of-Government Approach" by Paul E. Vera Delzo. On Clausewitz: "Reclaiming Clausewitz's Theory of Victory" by Richard M. Milburn. "A Clausewitzian Response to 'Hyperwarfare'" by Brandon T. Euhus. Plus, Military History, Irregular Warfare, Security Studies, and Book Reviews!

Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict

This article considers whether Clausewitz’s account of the nature of war is universal to all wars, in order then to assess how far his concept of victory is universal. While aspects of Clausewitz’s concept of war are still universal, others are not. Accordingly, his theory of victory is not universal to all wars, and especially not to wars fought against transnational terrorist networks.

Clausewitz, o realismo estrutural e a paz democrática: uma abordagem crítica

Propõe-se a apreciação crítica do sistemático estudo da paz democrática realizado por Oneal e Russett em Triangulating peace - democracy, interdependence and international organizations (2001). O estudo de Oneal e Russett é importante e representativo porque oferece uma construção teórica para explicar um suposto "fato" internacional e porque tenta incorporar e controlar algumas variáveis identificadas com a principal abordagem rival: o realismo político. Argumentar-se-á que Oneal e Russett falham em suas duas principais tentativas de contribuição. O princípio causal identificado pelos autores não resiste ao entendimento, derivado da teoria da guerra de Clausewitz, da guerra como um fenômeno integralmente político. Incidentalmente, essa crítica também será válida para o empreendimento dos teóricos da paz democrática como um todo, na medida em que compartilhem os mesmos pressupostos. E os autores não são capazes de identificar e controlar as variáveis "realistas" como pretendido, não se precavendo, portanto, contra a crítica de epifenomenalidade.

Clausewitz y la teoría de las relaciones internacionales

This article examines the sources, structures and the possible meaning of Clausewitz's theory. The paper suggests an interpretation of Vom Kriege and provides a comparison with Goethe and Fichte. It points out that Clausewitz set the rationale of an integral politics theory, reintroducing human nature as opposed to culture and creating a classical conceptual order prevailing over Romanticism, as well as forging essential concepts for a critical view of liberalism.

Epistemologia, história e estudos estratégicos: Clausewitz versus Keegan

Contesta-se a pertinência da afirmação de que Clausewitz seria um "filósofo da guerra". Examina-se aqui a cientificidade da teoria clausewitziana da guerra à luz dos critérios de cientificidade da epistemologia de Lakatos, o que nos leva a uma confrontação, com base em uma situação histórica, entre a teoria de Clausewitz e uma teoria rival - a teoria da guerra como fenômeno cultural, de Keegan. A construção de Clausewitz possibilita-nos esperar uma situação que não é permitida pela obra de Keegan. Com base nisso, realiza-se um estudo do caso do Israel antigo, entre meados do século XIII e do século X a.C. Esse exame afere e atesta a cientificidade da teoria clausewitziana da guerra. A partir daí, argúi-se pela fundamentação dos estudos estratégicos com base na teoria clausewitziana da guerra.

War without End(s): The End of Clausewitz?

This article argues that both anti- and pro-Clausewitzians have tended to base their views on an incomplete understanding of Clausewitz. We claim that the so-called ‘new wars’ do not require a new analytical paradigm, as is suggested by anti-Clausewitzians like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. But this does not mean that the prevailing pro-Clausewitzian discourse cannot be challenged. Clausewitz, as is well-known, employed a dialectical method of arguing in extremes. But whereas we suggest that Clausewitz sought to situate actual war between extremes, the modern discourses share the mistake of seeing the extremes as incompatible alternatives. We argue that a deeper understanding of Clausewitz's theory, and in particular his views on the state, on policy and politics, as well as on his so-called ‘trinity’ of competing forces of war, provides a framework for analysis that is still valid. This also implies that the attempt to replace Clausewitz with another classical thinker, Sun Tzu, may not be necessary; it may in fact be unproductive. Our approach furthermore suggests that a strong strand in anti-Clausewitzian discourse, which sees the new wars as endemic and marked by irrational, barbaric, and purposeless violence, is at least partly mistaken. The wars of the future may be endless, but they are unlikely to be without ends.

The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz: All that is required so that the fighting force can be taken as a given

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.

Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship between War and Power

War is only a branch of political activity. Karl von Clausewitz Pathology is no more than a branch, a result, a complement of physiology, or rather, physiology embraces the study of vital actions at all stages of the existence of living things. Jean Begin The art of war is like that of medicine, murderous and conjectural. Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire Michel Foucault is well known as a theorist of Less established is his engagement with the theory of and war. His interest in these concepts became apparent only toward the end of his career. discipline and Punish, for example, partially examines the emergence of the art of military tactics in the eighteenth century, largely within French military-strategic thought. (1) His final work, The History of Sexuality, sees him attempt to develop a theory of the relation between war and power as well as the concept of a strategy of power. Close to death, Foucault declared, If God grants me life, after madness, illness, crime, sexuality, the last thing that I would like to study would be the problem of war and the institution of war in what one could call the military dimension of society. (2) These intentions were apparent also in the breadth of questions raised in Foucault's 1975-1976 course lectures at the College de France. At that point, Foucault posed the question of whether warfare is the general model of all social relations. What is the relationship, he asked, between the discourses of war and and the organization of modern power? This article acts as a response to both of those questions. As Paul Rabinow has argued, pursuing these lines of inquiry allows us to address some important questions in relation to the genesis of modern military-strategic thought. Why, for instance, modern military strategic theory formed along the lines that it did. Why, in particular, Carl von Clausewitz thought about in the seminal terms that he did as a conjunction between war and politics. (3) The naming of Clausewitz in this context is crucial. In his essay Governmentality, Foucault identifies a relationship between the emergence of Clausewitz's theory of and the shift in the organization of power that occurred in the early modern era. (4) For Foucault, the importance of Clausewitz's theory of extended far beyond the domain of the practice of war and statecraft. The conjunctive relation of war to politics, by which Clausewitz defines the art of strategy, was significant for Foucault in its representation of the basic principle upon which the strategic model of power operates within modern societies. That is to say, as far as Foucault was concerned, Clausewitz's theory did not apply primarily to war or practices of states in relation to other states. Its primary significance was its outline of the principle upon which a new form of political power had emerged, that which he sometimes called governmentality. Thus, it applied primarily to the ways in which the relations between states and populations changed with the birth of the modern era. Outlining the importance of that relation is largely the task addressed by this article. Surprisingly, contemporary strategic theorists have largely ignored the interest of Foucault in Clausewitz's work. That is because the concept of still tends to be defined within the domain of strategic studies as a form of instrumental rationality by which the relationship between means and ends is calculated to advance the interests of states and other actors. Obviously, Foucault's work is not amenable to the planning, waging, or winning of wars. He does provide, however, one of the most acute and influential studies of the workings and execution of strategic power of the late modern era. That said, he has tended to attract the attention of scholars concerned with providing a critical analytic of power, rather than with refining its strategic efficacy. …

Clausewitz's theory of war: An alternative view

Abstract In On War Clausewitz is dealing with the theoretical relationship between the political object and the military aim in war. War as a political act is a contention with force between political entities in which each has the object of restoring peace under favorable conditions, whether by dictate or by negotiation. The act of armed force to counter armed force, on the other hand, is a confrontation between military forces in which each has the aim of disarming the other in battle, actual or implied. Since the political object and the military aim are not the same and may or may not converge, the problem for theory is to reconcile the two in war as an act of policy. This is the strategic problem, the universal element in war with which the military theorist in every age ought above all to be concerned.