Class Arbitration Research Articles

Mass claims in international investment arbitration

Following the economic crisis in Argentina international investment tribunals faced a new challenge: mass claims characterized with multiple claimants bringing the significant amount of homogeneous investment protection claims against the host state. Neither the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, nor applicable bilateral investment treaties cover the tribunals’ power to resolve mass claims. They are silent on crucial questions of jurisdiction and consent and do not address important procedural issues either. In these circumstances arbitral tribunals face the inevitablegap-filling process, which boils down to the critically important question of legal nature of mass claims. If mass claims are nothing more than a mere variety of “ordinary” claims, than the issues of special or “secondary” consent are irrelevant, since the general consent for arbitration will suffice for the tribunal to find itself competent to resolve the dispute. By contrast, if mass claims are different in their legal nature from “ordinary” bi- or multiparty arbitration, they cannot “fit” into the scope of parties’ general consent. In controversial Abaclat decision the majority ruled that the questions of tribunal’s powers to decide on mass claim brought by Italian investors against Argentina pertain to the sphere of admissibility rather than jurisdiction. This analysis was not accepted by dissenting arbitrator G. Abi-Saab. Interestingly, other multi-party “Argentinian” awards followed the line of argument which significantly differed from both the majority opinion in Abaclat and G. Abi-Saab’s dissent. This only highlights the controversial nature of mass claims in international investment arbitration. This article is dedicated to analysis of jurisdictional issues raised in the course of “Argentinian” arbitrations. Since this analysis is strongly intertwined with two other systems of resolution of mass claims, namely American class arbitration and public international law mechanisms dealing with the compensations for states’ international wrongdoings, these two mechanisms are also explored to provide better context and understanding.

Regras procedimentais da arbitragem coletiva no âmbito dos direitos dos investidores no mercado de ações: contexto, undamentos e adaptações procedimentais

The article analyzes the procedural rules concerning class arbitration, elaborating processes for adapting the procedures relating to individual arbitration for class arbitration, as well as the rules themselves concerning class actions. The creation of this system of procedures aims to contribute theoretically to the field, but also to establish some guidelines regarding the practical application of the figure. The article deals with the main procedural aspects elaborated and/or adapted and, from that, presents theoretical-propositional conclusions when identifying and discussing conceptually about the main procedural aspects to be potentially applied in the scope of class arbitrations. Arbitration; Public Administration; state-owned companies; arbitrability.

Towards class arbitration in the consumer law in Colombia. A reference to the AT&T mobility llC v. Concepcion case

This article highlights a new discussion in Colombia, that is, the role that arbitration could play in consumer law. The paper also analyses a signature case in U.S. arbitration consumer law (AT&T Mobility v Concepcion), which offers the basis to open the debate of small claims contested during a ClassArbitral proceeding. It also weighs on the legal nature of Class Waiver Clause. It furthers on the possible sanctions that could be imposed on that clause, to conclude that Consumer Law in Colombia deserves a better and effective procedure favoring consumers by voiding with inefficacy a possible Class Waiver in an arbitration agreement.

The Supreme Court's Lamps Plus Arbitration Decision: A Fading Light for Class Actions

Since the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court has dramatically expanded the legal framework for arbitration, and through this expansion, the Court has minimized the role of the judiciary and reshaped the civil justice system. More specifically, the Court has enabled stronger parties with bargaining power, typically corporate parties, to opt-out of the traditional court system and create their own private system of justice, which is largely unsupervised and covers virtually every type of claim in America. Consequently, the civil justice system has become increasingly privatized and millions of ordinary consumers and employees have lost access to the courts, including the ability to proceed collectively as a class. During its October 2018 Term, the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a splintered decision involving the controversial issue of class procedures in the context of an employment dispute. As a result of Lamps Plus, a company can unilaterally limit its own class action liability through an arbitration clause. This Article has three main goals. First, the Article heavily criticizes numerous flaws with the majority’s decision. Second, the Article explores the limited opportunities that remain for class proceedings when a consumer or employee is bound by an arbitration clause. Finally, the Article examines an unanswered, critical question left open in Lamps Plus: whether an arbitrator or court should determine if an arbitration clause permits class proceedings. This Article proposes a novel solution, whereby both a court and arbitrator jointly collaborate to determine different aspects of the class arbitration problem.

The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration the Answer?

In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, the 2013 law enacted a public financing regime for securities fraud class actions and it is possible third-party financing will be permitted; these mechanisms may make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of contingency fees. It is still too early to tell. Yet, commentators are very pessimistic that the Indian securities fraud class action will do much good because the Indian court system is glacially slow. For example, it takes over six years on average to resolve some civil appeals. The solution to this problem in the 2013 law was to channel the securities fraud class action to a special tribunal, the National Company Litigation Tribunal (“NCLT”). Yet, this type of solution has been tried before in India: special tribunals tend to quickly take on the negative characteristics of the general courts. This may be why very few securities fraud lawsuits have been filed since the 2013 law was enacted. We propose a different solution to the problem of the Indian court system: class arbitration. As we explain, although class arbitration is not perfect, it may better facilitate robust private enforcement than the Indian court system.

Scotus Introduces a New Federal Arbitration Act Presumption Against Consent to Class Arbitration

The U.S. Supreme Court returned to the basics of class arbitration in April, examining whether consent to class arbitration may be inferred from ambiguous contract language.

The New York Convention and the American Federal System

Virtually all American states have statutes that make arbitration agreements and awards enforceable and that set out procedures for their enforcement in state courts. A number of states, including California, Texas, and Florida, have enacted international arbitration statutes to supplement their domestic arbitration laws.2 But this extensive body of state arbitration law has had only a “marginal impact” on American arbitration practice – particularly international arbitration practice because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts conflicting state arbitration laws, even in state court. Although we know that the FAA preempts state law, the scope of that preemptive effect is not clear. Indeed, a pair of United States Supreme Court cases have suggested a possible broader role for state law in arbitration matters. In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel Inc., the Court indicated in dicta that parties might be able to contract for expanded review under state law although the FAA does not permit them to do so.5 And in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court suggested that the arbitrators might not have exceeded their powers in construing an arbitration clause to permit class arbitration if they had relied on a state default rule permitting class arbitration. Whether state law can play a broader role in international arbitration matters in the United States depends on the extent to which the New York Convention and Chapter Two of the FAA (which implements the Convention) preempt state arbitration law. This article undertakes a preliminary analysis of that broad topic by examining several legal questions central to determining the preemptive effect of the New York Convention: (1) What effect, if any, does the federal-state clause (Article XI) have on U.S. obligations under the Convention? (2) To what extent does Chapter Two of the FAA apply in state court? and (3) Is the New York Convention self-executing? Part II briefly sets out background information on the New York Convention and its implementation in the U.S. Part III describes three models of how an arbitration convention might be implemented: the “exclusive spheres” model, the “federal preemption” model, and the “access” model. Part IV analyzes the legal questions identified above and considers their implications for the models. Part V discusses the extent to which parties can contract out of the FAA and into state arbitration law. Finally, Part VI identifies some possible implications of this analysis and concludes.

Enforceabillity of Class Arbitration Waivers; A Leap in the Dark

Class arbitration waivers are inserted in the arbitration agreement contained in a company contracts with their employees and customers stating that should dispute arise that affects the collective rights of the employers or the customers, affected parties should bring actions individually; this is basically to prevent people from suing as a group. This article undertakes the workings of class arbitration waivers, what it is used for and its disadvantages. The article examines the legality of class arbitration waivers and provides an overview of class arbitration waivers and their enforceability or otherwise. This article seeks to look at enforcement of class arbitration waivers in arbitration waivers from the sides of the companies who include it in their contracts with the employers and customers and also from the side of the employers and customers usually affected by the clause. The article discovered that most companies preferred the individual assessment to arbitration than group accessed arbitration in form of class arbitration. Finally, this article concludes that the use of class arbitration waivers should not be encouraged as it causes more injustice than justice.

Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers

Forced arbitration has long been controversial. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court expanded the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), sparking debate about whether private dispute resolution is an elegant alternative to litigation or a rigged system that favors repeat-playing corporations. Recently, these issues have resurfaced, as the Court has decided a rash of cases mandating that lower courts enforce class arbitration waivers in almost all circumstances. Critics argue that abolishing the class action insulates companies from wrongdoing, but businesses have predicted that pro se plaintiffs will flood the arbitral forum with their own low-value claims. The Obama administration responded to the Court’s FAA jurisprudence by regulating arbitration clauses in the employment, financial services, and healthcare fields. However, after the balance of power shifted in 2017, Republicans have repealed many of these rules. Despite this policymaking frenzy, we know little about what happens inside the confidential world of arbitration. This Article sharpens our understanding of this pervasive and polarizing institution by reporting the results of an empirical study of 40,775 cases filed in four major arbitration providers between 2010 and 2016. It highlights three main points. First, a wave of reforms has made arbitration surprisingly affordable for consumers, employees, and medical patients. Indeed, in leading arbitration providers such as the American Arbitration Association, JAMS, and the Kaiser Office of the Independent Administrator, a majority of plaintiffs pay no arbitration fees. Second, enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers — not pro se litigants — have taken advantage of arbitration’s open doors. In fact, some attorneys have filed class action-style cases, bringing dozens or even hundreds of related arbitrations against the same company. Third, although arbitration does indeed favor repeat playing businesses, that is just half of the repeat player story. Repeat playing plaintiff’s law firms also fare well. In fact, in a variety of settings, no variable affects win rates as dramatically as whether a plaintiff hires attorneys with arbitration experience. The Article then uses these findings to propose reform. For decades, state lawmakers have tried to protect substantive rights by exempting claims from arbitration. Yet because the FAA prohibits state law from discriminating against arbitration, these efforts have failed. Accordingly, this Article urges policymakers to reverse course and create incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to arbitrate. Specifically, jurisdictions should create an “arbitration multiplier”: a bounty for winning a case in arbitration. By encouraging skilled plaintiffs’ lawyers to capitalize on arbitration’s accessibility, this approach would counteract the corporate repeat player advantage. In addition, because the multiplier actually encourages arbitration, it would not be preempted.

Class Arbitration in Australia: A Bright Future or a Pipe Dream?

Class arbitration has been a hotly debated issue in academic circles since the turn of the century throughout the world. Much literature has recognized that class arbitration could be an effective means of resolving the ever-increasing number of mass claims with cross-border implication. However, the cross-border advantage of class arbitration is dependent on the legal community’s ability to craft a procedure that is acceptable across a diverse tapestry of legal systems around the world. In continental European legal systems there appears to be a jurisprudential battle underway with some supporting class arbitration, and many fundamentally objecting to it (some authors have even argued that class arbitration would be unconstitutional). These objections have not halted the development of alternative collective redress regimes in EU Member States, (albeit they are disparate and often incomplete) demonstrating an underlying appetite for collective redress. Australia has had a wealth of experience with judicial class actions, whilst there is little literature considering the possibility of class arbitration. This paper: (1) considers whether class arbitration would even be possible under Australian law, and (2) proposes a ‘less is more’ class arbitration regime that would be harmonious on an international level.

THE AVAILABILITY OF CLASS ARBITRATION FOR SILENT AGREEMENTS: CONTRACT INTERPRETATION THEORY OR ARBITRABILITY DOCTRINE?

Along with the increasing use of multi-party arbitration, mounting issues relating to it have recently become heated topics. One of the various facets concerning the availability of class arbitration has gathered overwhelming discussion in the US. According to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, whether class action is applicable is probably decided by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ intent when an adequately drafted arbitration clause is silent on this issue, regardless of the correctness of his/her construing of the contracts. The contract interpretation theory is a conclusion of existing jurisprudence while the question of arbitrability doctrine may be a hint or inkling from a recent court decision. Comparing these two sides, it is better to regard the availability of class arbitration for silent agreements as a matter of contract interpretation. Although it is preferable to regard the availability issue of class action as a contract interpretation question, some restrictions on the arbitrators’ broad contract interpretation needs to be imposed so that the parties’ real intent can be properly enforced.

The Issue Preclusive Effect of Arbitration Awards

Courts in the United States have two primary means (in addition to individual adjudication) by which to resolve disputes in which numerous claimants have claims against a defendant that raise the same or similar issues. The first is the class action, in which the class representative brings suit on behalf of similarly situated but absent plaintiffs. A judgment in the class action (assuming that a class has been certified) binds the defendant and the absent class members. Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors, however, businesses can reduce if not avoid the risk of class actions by using arbitration clauses with class arbitration waivers in their standard form contracts with consumers and employees. When businesses use such contract provisions, disputes are to be resolved in individual arbitration, with no aggregation of claims either in arbitration or in court. The second primary means of resolving duplicative litigation of similar claims is the doctrine of issue preclusion (also referred to as collateral estoppel). Issue preclusion bars a party from relitigating an issue that was resolved in a prior case involving the same party or parties. The issue must have been fully and fairly litigated and actually decided in the prior case, and only a party to the prior litigation or one in privity with a party is bound by the prior judgment. But a non-party to the prior case can, in appropriate circumstances, rely on issue preclusion against a party to the prior case (what is called “nonmutual issue preclusion”) and preclude relitigation of the issue — i.e., hold the other party bound by the resolution of that issue in the prior case. This paper examines the extent to which arbitration awards have issue preclusive effect, such that issue preclusion might substitute for class actions when businesses use arbitration clauses with class waivers. It further suggests that the law governing issue preclusion in arbitration might develop in ways parallel to the law governing class actions and arbitration: with businesses using “issue preclusion waivers” to avoid the issue preclusive effect of awards, consumers and employees challenging such waivers as unenforceable, and businesses relying on FAA preemption in response.

Agencies and Arbitration

This Essay examines the roles federal administrative agencies can and might yet play in response to the rise of mandatory bilateral arbitration. In recent years, scholars of regulation and civil procedure have noted the extent to which companies can erode their legal obligations by inserting binding arbitration provisions coupled with class arbitration bans into their contracts. Although scholars have expressed concern about what arbitration means for certain areas of substantive law — particularly those areas that have historically relied on private aggregation mechanisms for enforcement — less has been said about how public regulatory bodies should respond.Drawing on the insight that private enforcement and public regulation often work in tandem to produce regulatory outcomes, I argue that administrative agencies can, using existing tools, make compensating adjustments to partially offset some of the potentially ill effects of class arbitration bans. Most obviously, administrative agencies can use disgorgement remedies that mimic class actions to make companies internalize the costs of their statutory violations and, in some cases, to compensate those harmed. Agencies can also take on individual cases in order to set important precedents and contribute to the development of the law.Apart from these enforcement strategies, agencies have also started regulating arbitration agreements directly, using both explicitly and impliedly delegated authority. I argue that such area-specific regulation of arbitration by administrative agencies is superior to the current system, which involves a system in which the courts — led by the Supreme Court — set the rules, often by employing contestable assumptions about the role of litigation, including class litigation, in various regulatory regimes. The Essay also provides a novel doctrinal argument for why agencies should receive Chevron deference when they reasonably interpret ambiguous provisions of statutes they administer in order to ban or otherwise regulate arbitration.

Consumer Arbitration and Collective Dispute Resolution in the European Union, Is Class Arbitration an Alternative?

This paper is a master (LLM) thesis submitted in 2012 for the degree of Master of Laws and was graded 19/20. It has not been updated, but remains mostly relevant as it includes references to the ADR/ODR directives which were then under discussion.In a first chapter this thesis presents the origin of class arbitration in the US, its implications on consumers’ legal rights, the procedures and the current debate around class arbitration. After having examined the device itself, we turn to its application and to the scrutiny it may receive under the New York Convention. The result of this chapter shows that class arbitration may be recognized in Europe, but there are no guarantees. Most likely, due to national standards of public policy concerning fundamental procedural issues of notice and consent, recognition will depend on a case-by-case analysis of the factual circumstances.By measuring class arbitration against class litigation available in Europe, the second chapter of this thesis offers insights into the desirability of class arbitration. The debate is closely related to that of the fear around class litigation abuses. The conclusion is that while it may take several more years before a coherent judicial procedure is adopted at EU level, class arbitration is available today in virtually any format one may desire and is generally recognized throughout the world. The opposition it receives is therefore perhaps not justified.

Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law. By Stacie I. STRONG

Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law. By Stacie I. STRONG

'When I Grow Up I'll Be a Court': Understanding Investor-State Mass Claims Arbitration with the Help of Domestic Class Action Processes

The 2011 decision on jurisdiction and admissibility in Abaclat and Others v Argentina started the discussion on mass claims processes in investment treaty arbitration. The tribunal concluded that although the proceedings were initiated as aggregate, the continuance of the case did contain a representative feature, which led the tribunal to conclude that the applicable procedure in such mass claims arbitration had to be adapted. Today, the legacy of the Abaclat arbitration and the availability of mass claims devices in investment treaty arbitration remain questionable. This paper aims at answering the question whether investment mass claims arbitration can be qualified as “class-like”, and if so whether it satisfies the fundamental principles of arbitration (particularly the principle of consent). In order to do so, the paper takes a comparative approach to investment mass claims arbitration, on the one hand, and class actions processes existing in the United States of America, on the other. The paper argues that mass claims arbitration, as constructed by the Abaclat tribunal, cannot satisfy the fundamentals of arbitration, which remain the same even when class arbitration is concerned. Hence, it would be wrong to regard mass claims arbitration as a currently available device to investors in investment treaty arbitration.

Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval

INTRODUCTIONIn a string of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has made it harder for consumers to avoid arbitration clauses, even when businesses strategically insert provisions in them that effectively prevent consumers from being able to bring any claim in any forum. For example, when firms engage in illegal conduct that extracts small amounts of ill-gotten gains from millions of consumers, individual litigation (or arbitration) may cost more than the maximum possible recovery. In these scenarios, class action litigation or class-wide arbitration may be the only viable mechanisms for consumers to seek recovery. Yet, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,1 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state laws that rendered class arbitration waivers in arbitration clauses unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,2 an antitrust case, the Court held that class action waivers embedded in mandatory arbitration clauses were enforceable even when they had the effect of making it economically irrational for the victims of antitrust violations to pursue their claims.3Part I of this Article examines how courts initially treated antitrust claims as nonarbitrable. For decades, courts considered antitrust claims to be too complex and too important to trust to private arbitrators. By the 1980s, the Supreme Court permitted federal statutory rights, including antitrust claims, to be arbitrated so long as the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate their rights in the alternative forum (the so-called Effective Vindication Doctrine). In 2013, the Supreme Court in Italian Colors fundamentally weakened the Effective Vindication Doctrine when it held that arbitration clauses that precluded class actions and class-wide arbitration were enforceable even when they effectively prevented any victim from actually bringing an individual case.Part II details the problems of mandatory arbitration of antitrust claims. Arbitration differs from litigation in ways that harm the interests of consumer-plaintiffs. For example, arbitration limits discovery and has no meaningful appeals process. Furthermore, defendants draft arbitration clauses to prevent class actions and to undercut the pro-plaintiff features of antitrust law, including mandatory treble damages, meaningful injunctive relief, recovery of attorneys' fees, and a lengthy statute of limitations. With the Court's undermining of the Effective Vindication Doctrine in Italian Colors, defendants' efforts to dismantle these pro-plaintiff components of antitrust law may prove more successful in the future.Part III shows how the problems associated with antitrust arbitration are magnified in concentrated markets. Supporters of enforcing arbitration clauses assume that these contractual provisions are the result of an informed, voluntary bargain. But when a market is dominated by a single supplier or a small group of firms, consumers often find it impossible to purchase a necessary product while retaining the right to sue, especially since arbitration clauses are generally embedded in contracts of adhesion. This means that in the markets most likely to be affected by antitrust violations, consumers are least likely to be able to avoid mandatory arbitration clauses. Furthermore, when mergers result in concentrated markets, they can increase the problems explored in Part II.Finally, Part IV explains how antitrust authorities can address the problem of proliferating arbitration clauses. When evaluating mergers, officials at the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can threaten to challenge the merger unless the merging parties agree to specified conditions, such as the divestiture of certain assets. Because those mergers that pose the greatest risk of anticompetitive effects also magnify the problems associated with mandatory arbitration clauses, antitrust officials would be wise to condition merger approval on the merging parties' agreement to not require arbitration of antitrust claims. …

Post-Concepcion and the Status of Class Arbitration and ADR Waiver Clauses: What's Left for Consumers?

Since its ruling, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion has been the subject of scrutiny among many people in both the business and legal industries. The ruling’s significance denotes class arbitration is no longer a viable option in certain types of litigation matters. Yet, courts continue to defy this ruling. Post-Concepcion cases help in exploring why there is such a discord and confusion on whether class arbitration or any class alternative dispute resolution method are allowable. This article briefly examines AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and post-Concepcion cases and what remains for consumers and consumer law attorneys after Concepcion. The article also provides recommendations on bypassing the class arbitration hurdle brought on by the Concepcion ruling.

The extent of arbitrators’ power to order class arbitration

The United States (‘US’) Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen v AnimalFeeds (2010) shook up the American arbitration landscape. First, when justifying the annulment of the arbitral award, the Court’s ambiguous interpretation of section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) (under which courts may vacate an arbitral award where the arbitral panel exceeded its powers) raised doubts as to whether it departed from precedent by reviewing errors of law under this ground. Second, by narrowly approaching the power of arbitrators to order class proceedings, the Court indicated a new movement in the case law on class arbitration, fed by scepticism and hostility against this procedure. The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter (2013) clarified that an arbitrator’s erroneous interpretation of the parties' contract did not amount to an ‘excess of power’ under the FAA. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Oxford Health raised new questions, and certainly did not restore the pro-class arbitration approach previously adopted in Green Tree v Bazzle (2003). This article explores the concept of ‘excess of arbitral power’ so as to understand its purpose, content, and limits in light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court on class arbitration. Based on a thorough analysis of the case law and on a comparative law approach to the extent of arbitrators’ powers, it spells out where the limits of arbitrators’ power to order class arbitration are likely to stand in the US. US Federal Arbitration Act, Title 9 Arbitration (1925) Green Tree Financial Corp, Conseco Finance Corp v Bazzle and ors, US Supreme Court (2003) Stolt-Nielsen SA and ors v AnimalFeeds International Corporation, US Supreme Court (2010) AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, US Supreme Court (2011) American Express Co and ors v Italian Colors Restaurant and ors, US Supreme Court (2013) Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter, US Supreme Court (2013)

Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law, by SI Strong

Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law , by SI Strong, Oxford University Press, 2013. Stacie Strong is the leading world specialist of class arbitration. Her academic production in that field is impressive. Her book on class, mass, and collective arbitration was, therefore expected with great interest. It definitely meets our expectations. The book is a true encyclopaedia of class, mass, and collective arbitration. All their aspects and implications are thoroughly studied in this impressive treatise. Class and collective arbitration has drawn a lot of attention in national systems in recent years. Traditionally, class arbitration has been a US phenomenon, relatively unknown in other countries. Most legal systems have focused on what Strong refers to as ‘micro conflicts’, typically in the form of bilateral disputes between individuals or individual legal entities. While it is true that two parties’ concerns continue to dominate law and society, a lot of changes have taken place these recent years, both in terms of the types of injuries suffered and the ability to obtain legal relief. There are more and more situations where similar or substantially similar injuries can and increasingly do arise on a massive scale. When it is so, large numbers of individuals suffer identical or nearly identical injury. If, until recently, the USA was the main jurisdiction where procedural mechanisms had been developed to allow private individuals to bring substantive cases in the so-called class proceedings, other countries have started to adopt various forms of private relief to address large-scale legal injuries, generally in the form of collective redress. The book starts with a brief history of large-scale arbitration. Indeed, to appreciate the various procedures, policies, and practices surrounding large-scale arbitration, it is necessary to understand how the various devices arose, historically speaking. In …