Civil-military Relations In Turkey Research Articles

Martial Law as a Pulling Mechanism and Civil Military Relations in Turkey

Martial Law as a Pulling Mechanism and Civil Military Relations in Turkey

The Last Two Decades of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Under the Shadow of Courts

The Last Two Decades of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Under the Shadow of Courts

Revisiting Institutional/Occupational Model in Turkish Military

This article questions the applicability of Moskos’ institutional/occupational model in a non-Western country whose modernization process resembles that of Western countries. This may be important for two reasons: First, most military sociologists have based their theories on the military’s position and development in Western societies. Whether the historical military development in Turkey resembles Western militaries due to the 19th-century military modernization efforts through Western experts’ guidance with the military as leader in the nation’s modernization or whether this historical military development had a unique structure and mission involving founding the country is debatable. Second, most existing studies on the Turkish military and civil-military relations in Turkey have been conducted by journalists, political scientists, and historians and lack a background in sociological theory. Instead, these studies have discussed the direct or indirect interventions of armed forces in politics. This paper begins building the theoretical foundation for a discussion of the opportunities and challenges of reorganizing Turkey’s civil-military relations by examining the applicability of one Western model to this non-Western country.

The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: The EMASYA Protocol and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

The civil-military relations literature on Turkey focuses predominantly on the guardianship role of the Turkish military, its interventions, and the role of the National Security Council as the main institutional mechanism of military tutelage. Yet, the existing studies lack a much-needed focus on the law enforcement or policing missions of the Turkish military. To fill this gap, this study discusses the EMASYA Protocol ( Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma or Security and Public Order Assistance), a secret protocol signed in 1997. Emerging in the context of political instability and military tutelage of the 1990s, the Protocol enabled the military to conduct internal security operations without permission from the civilian authorities. This paper argues that the EMASYA Protocol provided a sphere of “reformulated new professionalism” for the Turkish military, enabled it to specialize in the war against rising internal threats such as reactionary Islam and Kurdish separatism, and created anomalies in civil-military relations in Turkey.

15 Temmuz’a Giden Süreçte Türk Demokrasisinde Sivil Asker İlişkileri

Preventing the institutionalization of democracy in Turkey, the main problem is the privilege of the military in the political system. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has intervened in civilian politics many times with the idea that it has a mission to protect the regime, and after each intervention, it has determined the conditions for transition to democracy while transferring power to civilians. After the coups, with the privileges obtained the military strengthened in the political system. With the legal arrangements, TAF has legitimized its political power by placing it on the legal ground. Periodic military interventions and the increased political autonomy of the military with each intervention have taken armed forces and their activities away from the point of democratic civilian control. Although significant reforms have been made in the EU process, the July 15 incident has shown that the issue of civilian military relations is still important in Turkey and military coups still threaten the country. It is important for the democracy that the armed forces depend on the elected civil authority and are subject to civilian oversight. The issue is remarkable in this respect. This study mainly examines the structure of civil-military relations in Turkey with the concepts of civil-military contestation and military prerogatives.

The Turkish Armed Forces and Civil-military Relations in Turkey after the 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt

This article places the 15 July coup attempt in Turkey into a wider context by examining the historical role of the Turkish military in politics, developments in civil-military relations since the turn of the millennium, and finally the implications of the recent coup attempt for relations between the military, the government, and society. It is argued that under Turkey’s new “strong” presidential system civilian political control and oversight of the armed forces will be strengthened, but there will not be any civilian democratic control and oversight as we usually understand this concept.

What makes coups outside the chain of command in Turkey succeed or fail?

ABSTRACT Existing work on civil-military relations in Turkey has left the question of coup outcomes understudied. Although coups organized in line with the military chain of command are automatically assumed most likely to succeed, not all coup attempts carried out by junior/mid-ranking officers are doomed to fail. While 27 May 1960 coup by junior officers succeeded, three other coups attempted outside the chain of command in 1962, 1963, and 15 July 2016 in Turkey failed. Why? This article uses ‘coordination game’ framework as a theoretical tool to provide an answer. These cases lend significant support to application of game theoretic models to the literature on military coup outcomes.

Turkey’s Play with Its Military

This essay attempts to elucidate the transformation of civil-military relations in Turkey since the failed coup of 15 July 2016. After presenting an overview of these relations prior to the coup, the essay focuses on emerging aspects of them in the postcoup environment and attempts to analyze a pattern. It argues that while a harsh domination has been established over the military by civilian politicians through massive efforts in structural, educational, and legislative domains, those efforts are far from being overarching. Whether it has produced a democratic form of civil-military relations and an irreversible transformation in the mindsets of officer corps is dubious.

From military tutelage to civilian control: an analysis of the evolution of Turkish civil–military relations

ABSTRACTThe Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been the main discussion topic in the political arena over the last decade in Turkey, with a focus on curtailing military supervision over political life. This article investigates the evolution of civil–military relations (CMR) in Turkey. Thus, the aim of this study is to explore the factors and dynamics that have led to the development and realignment of CMR in Turkey. The focus will be on how military tutelage in Turkey has been ended, what factors have caused this and finally whether Turkish CMR have been normalized.

Civil-Military Relations in Turkey During the A.K Party Era

The Turkish military has been maintaining a pivotal role in the political system of Turkish state. It has gained larger power in the consolidation and control of the government since the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923 by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk. Turkish Military considered themselves as the guardian of Turkish secularism and national interest which have much reliance in Kemalism. This kind of responsible nature enable them to intervene in the civil governance and internal political system. The democratic consolidation cannot be achieved without the subordination of a country’s military to civilian control and its allegiance to the democratic constitutional order. Turkey has been considered as a 'deep state' which associated with authoritarian, criminal, and corrupt segments of the state that function in a democratic regime by exploiting and reproducing its deficiencies. At the same time, the deep state derives legitimacy from that political regime in exerting a coup threat, instigating military interventions, and committing organized crime and extra-judicial killings within the boundaries of the formal security apparatus. But military's influence has been decreased in the essence since the emergence of AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) as the ruling power in 2002. Various means of containment taken by the ruling party mostly contributed to the gaining power of civil supremacy. This paper will analyze the civil-military relations in Turkey during the rule of AK Party.

Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in a Pakistan: Some Lessons from Turkey

Pakistan and Turkey enjoy great similarities in many aspects. Yet, the greatest similarity among them is the history of military interventions in domestic politics. The elected governments have been overthrown by the militaries in both the countries, imposing martial laws intermittently. However, since its gaining power in 2002, the government of Justice and Development Party (AKP) has taken series of steps to re-balance Turkish civil-military relations in favour of elected government, which have proved successful in thwarting coup attempts by the country’s military. Pakistan being a parliamentary democracy has no place for its military to indulge in domestic politics. However, Pakistan has remained under direct military rule for half of the country’s existence. For the remaining half, a fragile democracy existed with ominous threat of military rule. In this article, an attempt has been made to identify the causes of military’s intervention in domestic politics in Pakistan. Some parallels have been drawn to the transforming civil-military relations in Turkey, with a view to draw some pertinent lessons for Pakistan. This article suggests certain first and second-generation measures for democratic government in Pakistan for ensuring civilian supremacy in civil-military relations as enunciated by its constitution.

The Failed 2016 Coup d'état and the Birth of Post-Modern Turkey

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XL, No.4, Summer 2017 The Failed 2016 Coup d'état and the Birth of Post-Modern Turkey Uzi Rabi* Ben Mendales* On 15 July 2016, elements of the Turkish armed forces [Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri or TSK] staged an attempted coup d’état against the elected civilian leadership headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, and their ruling party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP).1 Despite some initial momentum, the coup quickly disintegrated in the face of massive civilian protest and effective resistance by loyal security forces, and had been decisively put down by the following day. This was not the first time that the Turkish military has moved to act against the elected civilian leadership. Between 1960 and 1997, the Turkish armed forces successfully intervened four times in national politics—either by coup, as in 1960 and 1980, or a threatened coup, as in 1971 and 1997. Each intervention was justified by the military’s self-defined mandate as the guardian of the Turkish Republic, a central tenet of which was Mustafa 22 *Uzi Rabi is the director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, a senior researcher at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, and the former Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, all at Tel Aviv University. His fields of specialization include Middle Eastern Geopolitics, the modern history of states and societies in the Persian Gulf, state formation in the Middle East, oil and politics in the Middle East, Iranian-Arab relations, and Sunni-Shi'i tensions. *Ben Mendales is a junior researcher and program officer at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak in the preparation of this article. 1 Known in English as the Justice and Development Party, the AKP is a socially conservative , Islamist-oriented party, which has dominated Turkish politics since its overwhelming victory in the 2002 elections. Erdoğan, as Prime Minister and later President, has served as the dominant political figure in Turkey and within the Party since 2003. 23 Kemal Atatürk’s legacy of secularism. Turkey became therefore an almost prototypical example of a praetorian state.2 The coup attempt of 15 July 2016 certainly bore a resemblance to those that preceded it. It also echoed the successful 2013 Egyptian coup, where the military stepped in to oust the popularly elected Islamist government of Mohammad Morsi. Yet, despite such cosmetic similarities, the 2016 Turkish coup attempt is distinguished most prominently by the extent of its failure. For the first time in Turkish history, the civilian government proved its overwhelming dominance over the military, put paid to the 20th century paradigm of civil-military relations in Turkey, and paved the way for the institutionalization of a new, hybrid model of governance in Turkey— neither Islamist nor secularist—but incorporating both to the political benefit of President Erdoğan. The Turkish Military’s Instrumentality in Turkish Politics Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of an independent Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk offered an “explicit rejection of the Ottoman model.” He abolished the role of religion in the governance of the modern Turkish state. Instead he promoted the six principles of his Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People’s Party], or CHP: “nationalism, populism, republicanism, revolutionism, secularism and statism.”3 During the single-party era, the Turkish military was inextricably linked with the state, and the regime, itself. While the CHP was not able to maintain an electoral majority following Turkey’s transition to multi-party elections in 1950, Atatürk’s legacy, and the military’s place as its guardian, was nevertheless enduring.4 Article 34 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law of 1935, and its successor, Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of January 1961, empowered the TSK to protect “the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution.”5 2 For an excellent theoretical background to the concept of a praetorian state, see Amos Perlmutter...

Popular Determinant on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Military influence on political life in Turkey is a widely known phenomenon in civil-military relations (CMRs) literature, and there are multiple studies reviewing Turkish military tutelage and its roots in the light of the theories developed in this field. However, dynamics of the increasing civilian control over the armed forces in the last decade still serves as a field for further studies. As put forward in CMRs theories, civilian control can be established and maintained through formal arrangements and informal practices. The source of power required to make changes in CMRs is also emphasized along with these control mechanisms. Following the coup in 1980, limited demilitarization process in Turkey was carried out partly with the help of the civilian leaders' personalities and partly with the support of the European Union membership procedures, which has been ineffective since 2005. How civilianization was accomplished since then still needs to be clarified. This article aims to explain the factor(s) that enabled the civilians to gain full control over the armed forces in this period. As a result, the role of popular support is identified as the leading factor for designing formal and informal mechanisms to control the military in Turkey since 2007.

The Impact of the European Union on the Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

This paper investigates the influence of Turkey’s European Union (EU) candidature on its civil-military relations. It argues that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of Turkey’s authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire have resulted in the democratization of civil-military relations and the empowerment of government in the Turkish political system. The findings indicate that harmonization reforms have deinstitutionalized and illegalized the coercive influence of the military in the Turkish political system and empowered the government in political decision-making by: (a) changing the functions, duties and composition of the National Security Council (NSC), (b) increasing the parliamentary control over, and transparency in, defense and military expenditure, and the civil judiciary control over the military, and (c) increasing the public support and trust to the civil institutions. It utilizes Europeanization, and the rational choice and historical versions of the new institutionalist theory as its theoretical framework.

Comparative Analysis of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and South Korea till early 2000s

In the process of achieving political, economic and social development, the essence of establishing sound civilian rule remains as one of the key factors in consolidating democracy alongside with reinforcing socio-economic factors. This process becomes ever more challenging as the developing countries are in desperate need to attain political and economic modernization simultaneously. In order to address this heated debate on the civil-military relations in developing countries the article undertakes to present a comparative insight on the role of the civil-military relations in socio-political and economic development by tracing the emerging motivations and balances for military’s involvement in politics. Although having markedly divergent historical backgrounds, Turkey and South Korea constitute leading examples for developing countries in the different regions of the world. Alongside with broadly common – developing country – notion, the development of civil-military relations in both countries provides substantial ground for comparison of the role of military in the modernization and democratization processes of these countries till early 2000s. With the aim of tracking the reasons and repercussions of military’s increasingly milder influence over politics the article begins with the introduction of theoretical framework for comparative analysis, and then proceeds with the application of comparative framework followed by the brief historical overviews of civil-military relations of respective countries. In the analysis part, the impacts of endogenous and extraneous factors to civil-military relations are comparatively examined. In order to track the motives and restrains for varying forms of military influence in the political processes of these developing countries the study employs Sundhaussen’s “Endogenous and Extraneous Factors”. Finally, the conclusion summarizes comparative findings, while outlining the implications of emerging civil-military relations in the development and democratization processes of these countries.

Towards More Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Les relations entre civils et militaires en Turquie ont traverse recemment une periode de transformation radicale. Le role dominant de l’armee turque dans la politique depuis 1960, par ses interventions directes et indirectes, ainsi qu’au travers de mecanismes institutionnels et non-institutionnels, a considerablement diminue. A partir du debut des reformes liees a l’adhesion europeenne visant a democratiser les relations civiles-militaires, puis d’une serie d’enquetes baptisees Ergenekon et Balyoz, dans lesquelles des officiers militaires ont ete accuses de planifier des interventions visant a renverser le gouvernement actuel, l’armee a perdu a la fois ses prerogatives en politique et sa credibilite aux yeux de l’opinion publique. Bien que les relations entre civils et militaires semblent aller dans un sens plus democratique, en soumettant fortement l’armee au controle civil, il semble cependant que les civils ne traitent pas les forces armees de facon juste dans les enquetes en cours. Par consequent, en depit de tous ces changements positifs, il n’est pas clair que la Turquie s’oriente vraiment vers une gouvernance plus democratique des relations entre civils et militaires.

A Reexamination of the Civil-Military Relations in Turkey (in Japanese) (Doctoral Theses in Middle East Studies)

A Reexamination of the Civil-Military Relations in Turkey (in Japanese) (Doctoral Theses in Middle East Studies)

Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?

In Republican Turkey, the military has always had respect for democracy. However, from 1960 onwards, the military intervened in politics on four occasions. This was because it felt responsible for dealing with internal as well external threats to the country. From 2002 onwards, however, the military began to openly question the very wisdom of intervening in politics. In the following years, the military seemed to have come close to thinking that the civilians “have the right to be wrong.”

Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980–2002

Based on the nature of the military's relations with social and political spheres and actors, this study delineates four types of militaries: professional, nation's army, predatory praetorian and popular praetorian. The article shows that the Turkish military constitutes one of the rare epitomes of popular praetorian military and discusses the current state and prospects of civil-military relations in Turkey.

Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey

For a better grasp of the role of militaries in political systems one should get beyond dichotomous approaches. This study identifies three distinct but interpenetrating realms in a polity: social, political and military. Based on the nature of the military's relations with social and political spheres and actors, it delineates four types of militaries: professional, nation's army, predatory praetorian and popular praetorian. This article also shows that the Turkish military constitutes one of the rare epitomes of popular praetorian military and discusses the current state and prospects of civil-military relations in Turkey.