Civil Conflict In Sub-Saharan Africa Research Articles

Borders and the Feasibility of Rebel Conflict

Contemporary spatial research on civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has largely focused on border regions as spaces of limited political and economic opportunity. These studies largely adopt approaches that present borderlands as institutionally desolate regions lacking in governance, economic opportunity and political inclusion and giving rise to the feasibility of rebel conflict. While spatial analyses focus on territorially-based capabilities, such as state power projection, they typically overlook borderlands and their territorial distinctiveness with regards to rebel capabilities. This paper specifically explores the structural effects of borders on rebel capabilities and argues that Sub-Saharan Africa’s porous borders enhance the capabilities of rebels to operate in nearby territories. I empirically test this hypothesis with a zero-inflated negative binomial model and spatially disaggregated conflict events data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project dataset mapped to the PRIO-GRID 0.5-degree x 0.5-degree geographic data structure. In total, the analysis covers 14,120 georeferenced rebel conflict events in 37 countries between 1997-2019. The results provide strong evidence that territories nearer to borders are likely to experience more battle events relative to other territories, suggesting that borderlands may enable distinct conflict-related capabilities for rebels not found elsewhere. Additionally, the model also differentiates the effects that the border may have on conflict, testing the effect of rough terrain, resources, excluded groups, and towns at the border. Of the variables tested, the results suggest that territories with border towns significantly increase the capabilities of rebels to engage in conflict and suggest a more nuanced scholarly consideration of cross-border institutions that facilitate rebel conflict.

Real exchange rate misalignment and civil conflict: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract Real exchange rate (RER) misalignment, which is the deviation of the actual RER from its equilibrium, occurs frequently in developing countries. In this article, we show that civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) can be influenced by RER misalignment. To do so, we construct an RER misalignment index whose variation is driven by shocks to each country’s RER fundamentals. Based on a panel of 35 countries from 1975 to 2006, we find that RER misalignment may increase the incidence of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa on average. Crucially, this effect is present even when rainfall and commodity price shocks—two widely acknowledged causes of civil conflict—are controlled for. Therefore, our article suggests that RER stabilization can foster political stability in the region.

Did rainfall shocks cause civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa? The implications of data revisions

In their seminal paper, Miguel et al. (2004) found that negative rainfall shocks (measured as negative year-on-year rainfall growth) had caused civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the 1981–1999 period. Since then, the rainfall and conflict data they used had undergone multiple revisions. We show that rainfall shocks are no longer statistically significant for civil conflict when the revised data are used. This is true whether we employ a different functional form for rainfall, extend the sample to include more recent observations, use longer lags for rainfall shocks, employ dynamic panel regression, or panel regressions that take into account of cross-sectional dependence. Using rainfall shocks as instruments for growth, we also find that growth is insignificant for civil conflict if the revised data are used. Upon further investigation, we find that updates in the rainfall and conflict data for one or a few countries may alone cause rainfall shocks to lose statistical significance.

Crop, Culture and Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper provides an empirical exploration of the “rice theory of culture” which implies that rice cultivation promotes a culture of cooperation and peace. Using fine-grained, cross sectional data geocoded at 0.5 degree latitude by 0.5 degree longitude, I investigate whether rice cultivation is associated with civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and whether the results are more pronounced in regions with a longer history of rice cultivation, such as West Africa. I use a wide range of variables to define conflict, using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). In addition, I use agricultural data from the Spatial Production and Allocation Model (SPAM) for the year 2005. Overall, I find that areas that grow rice show lower instances of conflict. This result is even more pronounced for the West African region. The results are consistent with the predictions of the rice theory.

해외원조와 내전의 강도 - 사하라이남 아프리카를 중심으로 -

해외원조와 내전의 강도 - 사하라이남 아프리카를 중심으로 -

Conditional Relationships Between Drought and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Much of the literature on climate change adaptation claims the destabilizing consequences of environmental crises are mitigated by sociopolitical conditions that influence a state's susceptibility to scarcity-induced violence. However, few cross-national studies provide evidence of conditional scarcity-conflict relationships. This analysis of drought severity and civil conflict onset in sub-Saharan Africa (1962–2006) uncovers three sociopolitical conditions that influence the link between environmental scarcity and civil conflict: social vulnerability , state capacity , and unequal distribution of resources . Surprisingly, we find drought does not exacerbate the high risk of conflict in the vulnerable, incapable, and unequal states thought to be especially susceptible to increased scarcity. Instead, drought negates the peace-favoring attributes of stable states with less vulnerable populations. During severe drought, states with sociopolitical conditions that would otherwise favor peace are no less likely to suffer conflict than states with sociopolitical conditions that would otherwise increase the risk of violence. These findings, which are robust across several measures of these sociopolitical concepts, suggest environmental scarcity is most likely to increase the risk of conflict where populations have more to lose relative to periods with more favorable weather.

State History and Contemporary Conflict: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

I examine empirically the role of historical political centralization on the likelihood of modern civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. I combine a wide variety of historical sources to construct an original measure of long-run exposure to statehood at the sub-national level. I then exploit within-country variation in this new measure along with georeferenced conflict data to document a robust negative statistical relationship between local long-run exposure to state institutions and contemporary conflict. From a variety of identification strategies I provide evidence suggesting that the relationship is causal. I argue that regions with long experience with statehood are better equipped with mechanisms to establish and preserve order. Consistently with this hypothesis, I provide evidence that those regions are less prone to experience conflict when hit by a negative economic shock. I finally exploit contemporary individual-level survey data for 18 Sub-Saharan countries to show that within-country long history of statehood is linked to people’s positive attitudes toward local state institutions and traditional leaders.

Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

With climate change projections indicating a likely future increase in extreme weather phenomena, it is an urgent matter to assess the effect of drought on civil conflict. However, studies of this relationship so far provide inconclusive findings. One reason for this inconsistency is that existing research has not sufficiently taken into account the local vulnerability and coping capacity that condition the effect of drought. In particular, the exposure to sustained droughts undermines alternative coping mechanisms of individuals. Moreover, reliance on rainfed agriculture for income and food provision renders individuals particularly vulnerable to droughts. Based on these observations, I suggest that areas experiencing sustained droughts or depending on rainfed agriculture are more likely to see civil conflict following drought as individuals in these regions are more likely to partake in rebellion in order to redress economic grievances or to obtain food and income. Using novel high-resolution data on civil conflict events in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2008, this paper evaluates the relationship between sustained drought, rainfed agriculture and civil conflict violence at the subnational level. In line with the argument, areas with rainfed croplands see an increased risk of civil conflict violence following drought. There is also some support for the proposition that areas experiencing sustained droughts have a higher risk of conflict. The results are robust to a wide range of model specifications.

Estimating the Effect of Transitory Economic Shocks on Civil Conflict

Economists and political scientists have argued that differences in the risk of civil conflict across countries and over time may partly reflect differences in the opportunity cost of participating in civil conflicts. One way to test for the opportunity-cost channel is to examine civil conflict risk following transitory income shocks. In this paper I propose two instrumental-variables approaches to estimate the effect of transitory income shocks on civil conflict risk. I also show that approaches not tailored to transitory income shocks may lead to the conclusion that negative income shocks increase the risk of civil conflict - which would seem consistent with an opportunity-cost channel - when they actually lower civil conflict risk. I illustrate these issues by revisiting Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti's (2004) conclusion that negative income shocks increase the risk of civil conflict in Subsaharan Africa.

Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

The case study literature is ripe with examples of a positive association between inequality and civil war, but systematic country-level studies have largely failed to find a significant relationship. One reason for this discrepancy may be that large-N studies tend to ignore spatial variations in group welfare within countries, although civil wars often take place within limited areas. We address this gap in the literature by applying GIS operations to Demographic and Health Surveys to construct new disaggregated data on welfare and socioeconomic inequalities between and within subnational regions in 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. These measures are coupled with geographical data on the location of conflict zones for the period 1986–2004. We find that conflict onsets are more likely in regions with (1) low levels of education; (2) strong relative deprivation regarding household assets; (3) strong intraregional inequalities; and (4) combined presence of natural resources and relative deprivation.

Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly. 1 1 i.e., i.i.d. error structures in linear models, or conditional independence of observations in non-linear probit/logit type models. As a consequence, malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).

Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract The conventional discourse relating climate change to conflict focuses on long term trends in temperature and precipitation that define ecosystems and their subsequent impact on access to renewable resources. Because these changes occur over long time periods they may not capture the proximate factors that trigger conflict. We estimate the impact of both long term trends in climate and short term climatic triggers on civil conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that both operationalizations have a significant impact. Climates more suitable for Eurasian agriculture are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict, while freshwater resources per capita are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, positive changes in rainfall are associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict in the following year. We also assess the outlook for the future by analyzing simulated changes in precipitation means and variability over the period 2000–2099. We find few statistically significant, positive trends in our measure of interannual variability, suggesting that it is unlikely to be affected dramatically by expected changes in climate.

The history and problems in the making of education policy at the World Bank 1960–2000

The reports seem contradictory. With about three billion dollars per year in new loan commitments, the World Bank has become the single largest source of development capital in the field of international education. These resources help expand educational opportunities for young women in South Asia and rebuild primary schools following civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. They support textbooks, school meals, new curriculum, and teacher training in thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of locations in over 100 countries in six regions. But ‘the Bank’ as it is commonly referred to, is also the object of considerable criticism. Some argue that its loan covenants are too restrictive. Its policy reforms are based on narrow, neo-liberal assumptions about the role of the state. Local policy makers have become passive recipients of the Bank’s agendas. To obtain loans, countries have agreed to raise education fees, which has exacerbated divisions between rich and poor. How is it that a multilateral UN lending institution, managed by its owners in proportion to shares of equity, has become involved in education? How are educational lending priorities and policies actually established and how have they changed over time? Is there validity to the many criticisms of the World Bank in the field of education, and how has the Bank responded? Finally, what changes and recommendations might be considered to ameliorate the long standing tension between the interests which generate lending and those which stand for more intelligence or effectiveness of that lending? This article discusses how Bank lending priorities are established and loans designed and approved. It attempts to illustrate how and why the Bank, as opposed to other international organizations, has increasingly influenced the global education agenda. It highlights why the Bank’s policies on education have not been as effective as postulated, and in some cases have created significant educational distortions in a nation’s education sector. This analysis is predicated on the Bank’s tendency to become ‘captured’ by single methodologies beginning with manpower forecasting and later rate of return techniques. This tended to bias its views with respect to particular sub-sectors, educational functions and purposes. Some of these distortions can be traced back to its entry into the sector in the 1960s. The article raises the question of who should be held accountable when over time Bank policies prove to be dysfunctional. The article concludes that in spite of the importance of having intelligent education policies for social and economic development, there is no single international organization to effectively provide them. The article suggests three options for changing international organizations so as to deliver better analytic work, more intelligent policies and more effective programs of education assistance.

Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes

Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes

Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes

Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes