Kierkegaard, we are often told, gives us philosophy, if we care to call it that, that is mystical, acosmic, indifferent to world of persons, one concerned only with subjective or inward reality that does not impinge on reality and inwardness of any one but that of isolated individual. An ethics that is based on wherein inwardness and subjectivity are identical with truth is ethics then that is arbitrary, deprived of any basis within reason, robbed therefore of any claim to being connected to philosophy and central concern of philosophy, that of rationality. Martin Buber famously leads attack against Kierkegaard on basis of this understanding of him, arguing that Kierkegaard's individual is preoccupied with God-relation, in its very obscurity, to exclusion of other relations, so that God-relation becomes an exclusive one . . . excluding other relations into realm of unessential,' concern that finds equivalent expression in H. R. Niebuhr, for whom Kierkegaard's is the exclusive of hermit . . . (wherein) theme of isolated individuality is dominant.2 The criticism leveled early on by Louis Mackey expands on this theme, contending that Kierkegaardian subjectivity-the tension of inwardness within itself-far from being concrete and existential, is but abstraction vibrating in vacuum.3 So too Richard Popkin regards Kierkegaard as anti-rationalist, one whose primary concern is to leap into this ontological vacuum with irrational faith that disdains world of common sense and rules of logic and order, common ground wherein philosophy must be rooted and in which any meaningful relation to God must originate.4 Additionally, Alasdair Maclntyre points to what he sees as arbitrariness of ethics based on radical choice,5 instead of on reason, arbitrariness that leads ethics to dead-end, regarding loss of rational argumentation, of relativism. Indeed Kierkegaard gives such interpretations ample ammunition and wide target toward which such critics can direct their concerns. Thus, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, through his philosophically disposed pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, claims that ethically . . . each individual will be isolated and compelled to exist for himself,6 that the only reality that exists for existing individual is his own ethical reality.7 And indeed Kierkegaard's non-pseudonymous writings echo this theme: all this chittering and chattering about community.... The first thing religious man does is to lock his door and talk in secret,8 and, in his Attack Upon Christendom Kierkegaard's rancorous side is on display without inhibition: Christianity . . . consists in loving God, in hatred to man, in hatred of oneself, and thereby of other men, . . . strongest expression for most agonizing isolation.9 Notoriously, Climacus appears to establish philosophical underpinnings for such exaggerated expression of individuality, arguing that religiosity consists in secret inwardness,10 and that subjectivity, inwardness, is truth.11 To of this Kierkegaard himself adds note of finality on issue, expressing wish: I would like 'that single individual' to be placed on my grave.12 Maddeningly for scholars, however, Kierkegaard offers with equal, or almost equal, passion opposite view. In Either/Or II, Kierkegaard (through so-called letters of Judge William) presents with sympathy, at least apparently, defense of traditional, ethical view of a social , civic self,13 one that is part of natural order14 or a rational order of things15 in which self must develop in ways that will allow it to fulfill its potential, to become self, and not just be immediate self of aesthetic life that Kierkegaard represents in notorious seducer of first part of work. …
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