Christian Theism Research Articles

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Journal Article REVIEWS Get access Christian Theism. A Study in its Basic Principles. By HUW PARRI OWEN. Pp. viii³151. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1984. £8.95. BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Theological Studies, Volume 36, Issue 2, October 1985, Pages 546–547, https://doi.org/10.1093/jts/36.2.546 Published: 01 October 1985

Jewish and Christian Theories of Usury in the Middle Ages

Jewish and Christian Theories of Usury in the Middle Ages

Review of Book: Christian Theism

Review of Book: Christian Theism

Morality and Christian Theism

The relation between morality and religion has often been discussed. However, it is not always recognized that the relation varies greatly according to the variety of religions. I shall here be concerned solely with Christian theism in its traditional form. I take the latter to signify, essentially, belief in a morally perfect Creator who exists in the threefold form of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and who, in the person of the Son, became man in Christ for our salvation. I thus exclude from consideration all non-theistic accounts of God or the Absolute (such as pantheism or process thought). Also I shall consider, not simply bare theism of the kind that Christians share with Jews and Muslims, but also the distinctively Christian form of theism that is generated by distinctively Christian revelation. Many otherwise sound descriptions of the relation between morality and theism are defective because they fail to consider the distinctively Christian contribution to the theistic concept of God and of his relation to the world.

Evil and the theistic hypothesis: A response to Wykstra

Wykstra's paper, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering," is both conceptually rich and an important advance to our understanding of the evidential argument from evil. Its conceptual richness lies in its analysis of the epistemic notion of "appears" and its advancement of a necessary condition (CORNEA) for being entitled to make the claim: "It appears that p (not-p)." Its advance in our understanding of the evidential argument from evil consists in his application of CORNEA to the very starting point in the justification of the first premise of the deductive argument against theism I presented in the article of which his essay is a critique. My response will assume the conceptual contribution Wykstra has made, focussing mainly on the question of whether he has shown that CORNEA is in fact not satisfied when we make claims such as, "It appears that there are instances of suffering that do not serve outweighing goods otherwise unobtainable by an omnipotent, omniscient being." To this end it is important to begin with a distinction that will play a crucial role in my discussion. Let's call standard theism any view which holds that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being who created the world. Letting "0" abbreviate "an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being," standard theism is any view which holds that 0 exists. Within standard theism, we can distinguish restricted theism and expanded theism. Expanded theism is the view that 0 exists, conjoined with certain other significant religious claims, claims about sin, redemption, a future life, a last judgment, and the like. (Orthodox Christian theism is a version of expanded theism.) Restricted theism is the view that 0 exists, unaccompanied by other, independent religious claims. I will return to this distinction, but at the outset I want to focus on restricted standard theism the view that 0 exists. Consider the following proposition:

Why Petition an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Wholly Good God?

Orthodox Christian theists frequently petition God in the sense that they ask him to bring about some state of affairs which they believe may not occur without divine intervention. Such petitions basically fall into three categories: (i) requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly the natural environment – e.g. calm a hurricane, (2) requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly the lives ofother individuals – e.g. reconcile the broken marriage of friends, and (3) requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly his or her own life – e.g. soothe his or her troubled mind.

God or Christ? The Excesses of Christocentricity by Jean Milet

BOOK REVIEWS 628 God or Christ? The Excesses of Christocentricity. By JEAN MILET. New York: Crossroad, 1981. Pp. x + 261. $12.95 (Translated by John Bowden from Dieu ou le Christ? Paris: Editions de Trevise, 1980.) The fundamental putative insight on which this book is based is that Christianity is a religion with two polarities: belief in God and belief in Christ. Each polarity is typologically characterized at the beginning of the study. Belief in God, or theocentricity, involves a faith which concentrates on a transcendent Supreme Being, a morality which values obedience and the maintenance of order, a concept of authority which is strongly hierarchical, a liturgy which has a predilection for the magnificent and the "triumphal," a spirituality which favors contemplation, and a type of political action which supports paternalistic structures. Belief in Christ, or christocentricity, has opposing traits : a faith historically rooted in Jesus Christ, love-centered morality, charismatic authority, intimate liturgy , action-oriented spirituality, and critical, reform-minded political activity. After describing how the two polarities were kept in tension through the dominance of theocentricity from the 4th to the 17th centuries (the first three centuries are somewhat vague), Milet delineates the emergence of christocentricity from its beginning in Ignatius of Loyola's emphasis on the humanity of Christ to its triumph and extreme forms in the death of God and liberation theologies of our own day. His basic thesis throughout this historical review, which comprises the bulk of the book, is that christocentricity has been carried to unfortunate excess; the book ends with a call for a redress of the balance in favor of theocentricity. (In the imaginative last section, the symbol of renewed balance is the altar, .once again turned ' towards God ' rather than the congregation, with the sacred mystery veiled not by wrought iron grilles but by the more contemporary technology of laser beams). Of the myriad problems which this work presents, the gravest is that of its fundamental premise. To dichotomize God and Christ, to set ' them' up as two polarities, to call on believers to choose between faith in one and faith in the other endangers the heart of the Christian reality, of the Christian experience supported by Christian theory that God and Christ while distinct are yet one. To Milet's " For it is God who is to be sought for himself and in himself-and not Christ" (231) .must be counterposed the "God was in Christ" of Scripture, the "homoousios" of Nicaea, the " vere Deus/vere homo . . . in una persona" of Chalcedon, and the basic Christian conviction which has perdured through the centuries that in dealing with Jesus Christ one has to do with the God who is the one, true, and good God. Christian faith is not simply faith in God, but in 6~4 BOOK REVIEWS God who has shared our lot, our history, and thereby redeemed us. If Christian faith is bi-polar, the polarities are those of the divine and the human, or of transcendence and history, with the unity of both centered in Jesus Christ. It is nothing short of the destruction of the entire Christian message to separate-or worse, oppose-God and Christ. The methodology of the book is likewise problematic. The author, neither a sociologist nor a psychologist, uses a method of "social psychology " without ever delineating its principles or criteria. How can his claims be checked' His repeated assurances that he is an objective, impartial observer, assurances which this undefined method reputedly allows, are belied not only by the fact that there can be no presuppositionless observation but also by the explicit option which he has made for the cheocentric polarity. In effect, this is a book critical of certain characteristics of the contemporary Church but ingenuously cast in the guise of an impartial study. While not a theological work (ix), this study ventures into heavily theological territory. From this angle the project is marred throughout by the author's ignoring (unwittingly or not) virtually all recent biblical, patristric, and systematic christological scholarship. What is one to say of a work in which Old Testament exegesis is drawn from studies done in 1929 and 1931; in which New Testament exegesis...

Kommentar zu Hegels Logik in seiner "Enzyklopädie" von 1830 (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 317 with scriptural revelation. With most men of letters in the early eighteenth century, Whiston considers Newton's system as delineated in the Principia to be certain, and he utilizes the results of Newton's scientific investigations to corroborate the merely probable testimony of historical revelation. He delineates this view in a book dedicated to his mentor, Newton, and to the rest of the members of the Royal Society-Astronomical Principles of Religion, Natural and Reveal'd (1717). Attfield is correct in his view that secular science (or secular morality or belief in God independently of scripture on purely rational grounds) is compatible with Judeo -Christian theism. But in arguing historically he prises his "secular" authors out of their historical context for the purpose of his own argument and inevitably distorts their positions in the process. He uses his historical characters as if all they represent is a prospectus of positions, a grab-bag of technical concepts and arguments independent of all historical circumstance and particularity. Such semantic atomism is useful to a person making a case for his own philosophical position, which is the best part of what Attfield is doing, but it is dangerous for an accurate historical understanding. Attfield's conclusion about the compatibility of theism with independent reason would stand on its own, and he ought to have written the book as a straightforward essay in the philosophy of religion. But in insisting that he must delineate "in some measure the theories, attitudes and the spirit of the secularisers" he does violence to them and to the way they link reason to their own religion beliefs. By calling them "secularizers," by his definition, he simultaneously distorts their philosophies and begs the question. JAMES E. FORCE University of Kentucky Bernhard Lakebrink. Kommentar zu Hegels Logik in seiner "Enzyklopi~die" yon 183o. Vol. 1, Sein und Wesen. Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, 1979. Pp. 453. DM 48.oo. Kant's hermeneutical claim of understanding other philosophical authors "better" than they would understand themselves seems to fail when applied to that philosopher who tried to reverse by his understanding the entire philosophical tradition-Hegel . There are, of course, various interpretations, explanations, or transformations of Hegel's Logic. However, it seems that nearly all interpreters' managed to avoid the most simple requirement of a commentary, to "spell out" (buchstabieren) the text itself. Lakebrink's book, ~which is the first German commentary on Hegel's Logic, tries to fill this gap. "Nirgendwo verlangt zudem ein vorliegender Text ein solches Ausmass an Ann~iherung und Angleichung wie eben hier" (p. 23). This pretension has to justify its own validity with regard to a hermeneutical tradition going back to Hegel's own time. ' The only exception is A. L6onard, Commentairelittoralde la LogiquedeHegel(Paris-Louvain, 1974); see the review in Journal of the Historyof Philosophy 16 (1978):125-28. 2 See B. Lakebrink, HegelsdialektischeOntologieund die Thom.~itischeAnalektik(Cologne, 1955); Die EuropgdscheIdee der Freiheit,vol. 1, HegelsLogik und die Traditionder Selbstbestimmung(Leiden, 1968); and Studien zur MetaphysikHegels(Freiburg, 1969). 318 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The text in question is the Encyclopedia Logic, of 183o, and--at least to a certain extent--the corresponding passages of the Great Logic of 1812-13. The first part of the commentary covers the sections on "Being" (Sein) and "Essence" (Wesen); it is announced that a second volume, on the logic of "Concept" (Begrif]), is to follow. The book begins with a systematic introduction (pp. I 1-96) discussing the current tendencies of topics such as hermeneutics (p. 11), language and thought (p. 2 t), universality and singularity (p. 26), spirit and history (p. 29), the finite and the infinite (p. 46), logic and eschatalogy (p. 56), and the problem of metaphysics with reference to idealism and realism (p. 76). These introductory chapters try to place Hegel's Logic in the tradition of the leading themes of classical philosophy. In this respect, the commentary follows a retrospective line by constructing a possible dialogue between Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Hegel. On the other hand, one may regret that there are only a few points of contact that might facilitate a comparison between Hegel's dialectics and the conceptions of modern...

The Breaking of the Image: A Sociology of Christian Theory and Practice.

The Breaking of the Image: A Sociology of Christian Theory and Practice.

The Impassibility of God and the Problem of Evil

According to a certain strand in the orthodox Christian theist tradition, God's impassibility is engendered by his immutable nature. For if God cannot change then he cannot experience pain or sorrow. This fundamental principle was appropriated from Plato, who maintained that a being who is perfect can experience neither sadness, pain, nor sorrow. Some modern Christian theists, however, concede that this is perhaps the most questionable aspect of certain forms of orthodox Christian theism.

Dimensión universal de la sacramentalidad de la Iglesia

The author considers the relation existing between the Church and the salvation of hall men in the light of the doctrine on the sacramentality of the Church as laid down in the Constitution Lumen Gentium of Vatican Council II. The contributions of the present worn are aimed at placing the axiom «extra Ecclesiam nulla salus», received from Tradition, within the new framework which offers the doctrine of the Church as sacrament of salvation. 1. The author begins by briefly stating the patrimony of traditional doctrine concerning this matter and places special emphasis upon doctrinal developments which have taken place above all from Pius IX and onwards, and, later on, with the Encyclical «Mystici Corporis» and the Letter to the Archbishop of Boston of 1948. 2. The second part is dedicated to the exposition of the doctrine of Vatican Council II in the Constitution Lumen Gentium. The author points out that the formulae which are equivalent to the ancient axiom and which the Council now uses are neither negative nor exclusive but rather positive: «Ecclesia necessaria ad salutem» and «Ecclesia Sacramentum universale salutis». He maintains that the category «sacramentum» as applied to the Church is essentially functional and dynamic. From this fact does the Council underline, above all, the fundamental missionary action of the Church, precisely because the Church is «necessaria ad salutem». On the other hand, since the Church is a universal sacrament of salvation, this implies the ecclesiological nature of the salvation of all men and requires a deeper insight of this essential dimension. 3. Finally, the author discards three interpretations of salvation which he esteems as being incompatible with the sacramentality of the Church: the Theory of Anonymous Christianity put forth by K. Rahner, the polarization in collective aspects of salvation, and within the latter, radical postures found in certain liberation theories.

The Breaking of the Image: A Sociology of Christian Theory and Practice.David Martin

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsThe Breaking of the Image: A Sociology of Christian Theory and Practice. David Martin Martin E. MartyMartin E. Marty Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 87, Number 2Sep., 1981 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/227484 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1981 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

In the Image of Man Create they God: A Challenge

Christian theists have not normally wished to deny either of the following tenets:T1: God creates human agents such that they are free with respect to certain actions and, therefore, morally responsible for them.T2: God is an omniscient, wholly good being who is omnipotent in the sense that he has (sovereign, providential) control over all existent states of affairs.Why this is so is quite obvious. If T1 is denied, it is difficult to make sense of the standard Christian belief that God can justifiably discipline human agents when they perform actions which violate his commands — i.e., it is difficult to make sense of the basic Christian concepts of sin and punishment. T2 is equally important. If it is denied, it is difficult to make sense of such standard Christian beliefs as (1) God is in control of the significant aspects of our lives, (2) God will bring about his desired goals regardless of the action of human agents, and (3) God is capable of responding in a positive manner to any petitionary prayer that is in keeping with his will.

Classical Theism and Pantheism: A Reply to Professor Quinn

I am grateful to Philip Quinn for his thorough and penetrating critique of my paper on classical theism and pantheism. He has given me much to think about, and it would be philosophically remiss of me not to acknowledge that – in the light of his remarks – the argument which I employed in defence of the thesis that classical theism implies a version of pantheism might well benefit from some amendment. However, the purpose of this brief counter-rejoinder is to establish that the nexus of my argument has emerged from his commentary in reasonably robust health, i.e., to demonstrate that if the argument of my former paper is to be rejected, it will take something more than Professor Quinn's critique to make that clear. Very concisely, then, my response is as follows:(1) At a preliminary point, Professor Quinn claims that my argument ‘merits careful scrutiny’ because, if it succeeds, ‘something shockingly at variance with received views’ will have been established (p. 290). I find this to be somewhat odd. For it seems clear that St Paul was a ‘classical theist’, indeed a very special one in so far as the shaping of Christian theism is concerned. And while his famous and oftcited dictum that God is the One in Whom ‘we live, move, and have our being’ may be such that it is permissible to construe it in ways which do not imply any version of pantheism, it clearly seems unjustified to maintain that pantheistic doctrines are ‘shockingly at variance’ with that most intriguing statement of St Paul's.

Christian theism and the free will defence

Christian theism and the free will defence

Divine Suffering in Contemporary Theology

Can God suffer? Can God feel real pain, anguish, or disappointment regarding the human situation? The answer of most classical Christian theists has been negative. Early in Christian history theologians began to develop the notion of divine impassibility, i.e. that God cannot suffer. This position was crystallised in the third century debates over patripassianism, a view proposed by Praxeas and Noetus that God the Father suffered and died in the crucifixion of Christ. Mainstream Christianity rejected this view because of its failure to maintain a clear distinction among the members of the trinity. In later Christological controversies, theopaschitism was also condemned for arguing that God suffered. In the twentieth century, however, numerous philosophers of religion, Biblical scholars, and theologians have criticised the doctrine of divine impassibility. Now it is not surprising to find a theologian arguing this way: ‘The concept of divine suffering is not only the core of our faith but the uniqueness of Christianity.’One reason for the frequent debate over the impassibility of God is the kind of language used in the Bible to describe God. Many passages affirm the radical difference between divine and human natures (e.g. Isaiah 40.18, 25; Hosea 11.9). Other passages freely use anthropomorphic language to describe God, i.e. human form is attributed to God. God walks, talks, smells, hears, writes, and has a back side that Moses can see. Especially important for the impassibility discussion are the passages that use anthropopathic language for God, i.e. they attribute human moods, feelings, or emotions to God.

Jonathan Edwards and the Language of God

Part 1 shows that while Edwards and Berkeley both regard nature as God's discourse and speak of this discourse in similar ways, Edwards differs from Berkeley in believing that the signs of this discourse signify spiritual and divine realities. Part 2 explains why Edwards thought it reasonable to believe that our world is a world of types and images. Because our world is a world of resemblances and imitations, because spiritual things are its alpha and omega, and because its beauty is a reflection of God's beauty, our world can be expected to contain images or shadows of divine things. Scripture provides evidence that this expectation is realized. Part 3 shows that these images are not symbols but emblems, and that because emblems are consciously invented, their occurrence implies theism. Part 4 attempts to show that, given the assumptions of classical Christian theism, it is in principle no more difficult to decipher the meaning of the book of nature than to decipher the meaning of an allegorical poem or tale. Part 5 criticizes Perry Miller. Edwards's reflections on types were not influenced by the new science. He did not anticipate Coleridge on the imagination, nor did he elevate nature to a level of authority coequal with revelation. William J. Wainwright is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He is the author of Philosophy of Religion: An Annotated Bibliography of 20th Century Writings in English (Garland, 1978). Recent articles have appeared in Sophia, Philosophical Studies, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, and elsewhere. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.114 on Thu, 26 May 2016 06:25:35 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 520 William J. Wainwright S n this paper I shall attempt to do five things: first, show that although Edwards and Berkeley both regard nature as God's discourse and although both speak of this discourse in similar ways, Edwards differs from Berkeley in believing that the signs of this discourse signify spiritual and divine realities; second, show why Edwards thinks it reasonable to believe that the world of nature and ordinary human affairs is a world of types and images; third, show that these images are emblems, not symbols, and that this implies theism; fourth, show that, within the context of classical Christianity, the investigation of the meaning of types need not be subjective or capricious; finally, suggest that Perry Miller's interpretation of Edwards's reflections on images is a paradigm case of overreading. My purpose in doing this is to cast light upon an aspect of his work which Edwards clearly thought important, correct an influential misinterpretation, viz., Miller's, and show that, in spite of the fact that typology is no longer taken seriously, the investigation of types is reasonable given the assumption that classical theism is true and Scripture accurate.

Science and Christian Theism: A Mutual Witness

The theme, science and Christian theism, is most likely to evoke today a curious mixture of reactions, mostly negative. While a celebration of warfare between science and Christianity is no longer a fare of the day as it was a century ago, Christianity is often taken for a vanquished enemy or for a successfully tamed beast. Such seems to be the case of the relation between science and religion in the Western World where science sprang into prominence a few centuries ago and where an atmosphere of intellectual and religious freedom is a part of daily life.

Some reflections on predestination, providence and divine foreknowledge

It might appear to be beyond question, for Christian theism, both that God is omniscient and that omniscience includes knowledge of future truth. For it seems obvious that if P is true, then an omniscient being knows that P. P, in this propositional function, is entirely general, and must therefore include propositions of the form: ‘it will be the case that X’. If, truly, it will be the case that X, then God knows that truth.

Human freedom and divine providence: some new thoughts on an old problem

Christian theists have not normally wished to deny either of the following tenets:T1 God creates human agents such that they are free with respect to certain actions and, therefore, morally responsible for them.T2 God is an omniscient, wholly good being who is omnipotent in the sense that he has (sovereign, providential) control over all existent states of affairs.