Choice-induced Preference Change Research Articles

Externally Provided Rewards Increase Internal Preference, but Not as Much as Preferred Ones Without Extrinsic Rewards

AbstractIt is well known that preferences are formed through choices, known as choice-induced preference change (CIPC). However, whether value learned through externally provided rewards influences the preferences formed through CIPC remains unclear. To address this issue, we used tasks for decision-making guided by reward provided by the external environment (externally guided decision-making; EDM) and for decision-making guided by one’s internal preference (internally guided decision-making; IDM). In the IDM task, we presented stimuli with learned value in the EDM and novel stimuli to examine whether the value in the EDM affects preferences. Stimuli reinforced by rewards given in the EDM were reflected in the IDM’s initial preference and further increased through CIPC in the IDM. However, such stimuli were not as strongly preferred as the most preferred novel stimulus in the IDM (superiority of intrinsically learned values; SIV), suggesting that the values learned by the EDM and IDM differ. The underlying process of this phenomenon is discussed in terms of the fundamental self-hypothesis.

Neuromodulation of choice-induced preference changes: the tDCS study of cognitive dissonance.

Difficult choices between two equally attractive options result in a cognitive discrepancy between dissonant cognitions such as preferences and actions often followed by a sense of psychological discomfort known as cognitive dissonance. It can lead to changes in the desirability of options: the chosen option becomes more desirable, whereas the rejected option is devalued. Despite the ample experimental evidence to show this effect, the neural mechanisms and timing of such choice-induced preference changes are not fully understood. In this study, we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate the activity of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), which has been associated with conflict monitoring and choice-induced preference changes in neuroimaging studies. Prior to a revised version of Brehm's free-choice paradigm, participants in two experiments underwent cathodal (inhibitory) or anodal (excitatory) tDCS of the pMFC compared to sham (placebo) stimulation prior to the choice phase. Our results showed that cathodal tDCS significantly decreased the choice-induced preference change relative to a sham, but only in direct comparisons of rejected options. No significant effect of anodal tDCS in comparison with sham was observed. This study replicates the general behavioral effect of cognitive dissonance and provide partial support for the theory of the pMFC contribution to choice-related cognitive dissonance and subsequent preference changes, with possible limitations of an under-sampling for the obtained effect size and an asymmetry in the inhibitory-excitatory effects of non-invasive tDCS.

Neurochronometry of choice-induced preference changes: when do preferences actually change?

According to cognitive dissonance theory, a discrepancy between preferences and actions may lead to the revaluation of preferences, increasing preference for the chosen options and decreasing for the rejected options. This phenomenon is known as the spreading of alternatives (SoA), which results in a choice-induced preference change (CIPC). Previous neuroimaging studies have identified several brain regions that play a role in cognitive dissonance. However, the neurochronometry of the cognitive mechanisms underlying CIPC is a topic of debate. In other words, does it occur during the difficult choice, immediately after the choice, or when people encounter the options again? Furthermore, it remains unclear what is the exact time point, relative to the onset of facing options, either within the choice or after it, when the attitudes start to be revised. We argue that applying online protocols of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), during or immediately after the choice process, could be the most efficient way to better understand the temporal dynamics of the SoA effect. TMS allows for achieving high temporal and spatial resolution, modulating the activity of areas of interest, and examining the causal relationships. Besides, unlike the offline TMS, the online instrument allows tracking of the neurochronometry of attitude change, by varying stimulation onsets and durations with respect to the option stimuli. Based on scrupulous analysis of previous findings, employing online TMS studies of conflict monitoring, cognitive control, and CIPC neuroimaging results, we conclude that the use of online TMS is critical to examine the neurochronometry of CIPC.

Choice Reminder Modulates Choice-Induced Preference Change in Older Adults.

Choices not only reflect preference but also shape preference. The choice-induced preference change (CIPC) occurs when making a decision modifies people's attitudes about the options. When people rate a series of items and then must choose between 2 items rated as equally attractive, they later rate the unchosen item as less attractive than before. One explanation is that the choice and the equal preference for 2 options cause a psychological discomfort known as cognitive dissonance, which can be reduced by changing the preference. The current study aims to investigate the age-related differences in the CIPC effect, and how an explicit reminder of the previous choice modulates this effect. Using an artifact-controlled free-choice paradigm, with a sample of 79 younger and 76 older participants, we manipulated the choice reminder in 2 experiments. We found that compared with young adults, older adults are less susceptible to CIPC when their previous choices were not explicitly reminded. After boosting the salience of choice-preference incongruency by reminding participants of their previous choices, older adults showed comparable CIPC as young adults. Our results suggest that older adults tend to downweigh the information that leads to cognitive dissonance and use this strategy only when such information is relatively implicit. The diminished CIPC in older adults could be one of the emotional regulation strategies that older adults engage in to maintain positive emotional states when making difficult decisions.

Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions

Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased – rather than increased – certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters – decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions – can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create ‘basins of attraction’ which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics – by reducing the model's confidence in its actions – demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.

Trading mental effort for confidence in the metacognitive control of value-based decision-making.

Why do we sometimes opt for actions or items that we do not value the most? Under current neurocomputational theories, such preference reversals are typically interpreted in terms of errors that arise from the unreliable signaling of value to brain decision systems. But, an alternative explanation is that people may change their mind because they are reassessing the value of alternative options while pondering the decision. So, why do we carefully ponder some decisions, but not others? In this work, we derive a computational model of the metacognitive control of decisions or MCD. In brief, we assume that fast and automatic processes first provide initial (and largely uncertain) representations of options' values, yielding prior estimates of decision difficulty. These uncertain value representations are then refined by deploying cognitive (e.g., attentional, mnesic) resources, the allocation of which is controlled by an effort-confidence tradeoff. Importantly, the anticipated benefit of allocating resources varies in a decision-by-decision manner according to the prior estimate of decision difficulty. The ensuing MCD model predicts response time, subjective feeling of effort, choice confidence, changes of mind, as well as choice-induced preference change and certainty gain. We test these predictions in a systematic manner, using a dedicated behavioral paradigm. Our results provide a quantitative link between mental effort, choice confidence, and preference reversals, which could inform interpretations of related neuroimaging findings.

Cognitive dissonance resolution depends on executive functions and frontal lobe integrity

The free choice paradigm constitutes one of the most explored paradigms of cognitive dissonance research. Typically, once asked to choose between two similarly rated items, subjects subsequently exhibit an increased preference for chosen items and a decreased preference for rejected ones. Recent studies have demonstrated that such choice-induced preference change (CIPC) occur exclusively for remembered choices, suggesting a mechanism that ensures subjective coherence across time. In the present work we predicted that in order for CIPC to occur, not only must past choices be remembered, but executive networks responsible for detecting and solving conflicts must also be functioning. We confirmed this prediction in a group of patients with frontal lobe lesions. While non-dysexecutive (NODYS) patients behaved as their matched controls did, dysexecutive (DYS) patients failed to change their subjective preferences even when they could remember their previous choices. We have therefore demonstrated the crucial role of executive functions mediated by the frontal lobe in cognitive dissonance resolution.

Computational modeling of choice-induced preference change: A Reinforcement-Learning-based approach.

The value learning process has been investigated using decision-making tasks with a correct answer specified by the external environment (externally guided decision-making, EDM). In EDM, people are required to adjust their choices based on feedback, and the learning process is generally explained by the reinforcement learning (RL) model. In addition to EDM, value is learned through internally guided decision-making (IDM), in which no correct answer defined by external circumstances is available, such as preference judgment. In IDM, it has been believed that the value of the chosen item is increased and that of the rejected item is decreased (choice-induced preference change; CIPC). An RL-based model called the choice-based learning (CBL) model had been proposed to describe CIPC, in which the values of chosen and/or rejected items are updated as if own choice were the correct answer. However, the validity of the CBL model has not been confirmed by fitting the model to IDM behavioral data. The present study aims to examine the CBL model in IDM. We conducted simulations, a preference judgment task for novel contour shapes, and applied computational model analyses to the behavioral data. The results showed that the CBL model with both the chosen and rejected value's updated were a good fit for the IDM behavioral data compared to the other candidate models. Although previous studies using subjective preference ratings had repeatedly reported changes only in one of the values of either the chosen or rejected items, we demonstrated for the first time both items' value changes were based solely on IDM choice behavioral data with computational model analyses.

Choice changes preferences, not merely reflects them: A meta-analysis of the artifact-free free-choice paradigm.

One of the prominent, by now seminal, paradigms in the research tradition of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is the free-choice paradigm developed by Brehm (1956) to measure choice-induced preference change. Some 50 years after Brehm introduced the paradigm, Chen and Risen (2010) published an influential critique arguing that what the paradigm measures is not necessarily a choice-induced preference change, but possibly an artifact of the choice revealing existing preferences. They showed that once the artifact is experimentally controlled for, there is either no or very little evidence for choice-induced preference change. Given the prominence of the paradigm, this critique meant that much of what we thought we knew about the psychological process of cognitive dissonance might not be true. Following the critique, research using the paradigm applied various corrections to overcome the artifact. The present research examined whether choice truly changes preferences, or rather merely reflects them. We conducted a meta-analysis on 43 studies (N = 2,191), all using an artifact-free free-choice paradigm. Using different meta-analytical methods, and conceptually different analyses, including a Bayesian one, we found an overall effect size of Cohen's d = 0.40, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.32, 0.49]. Furthermore, we found no evidence for publication bias as an alternative explanation for the choice-induced preference change effect. These results support the existence of true preference change created by choice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

When Not Choosing Leads to Not Liking: Choice-Induced Preference in Infancy

The question of how people’s preferences are shaped by their choices has generated decades of research. In a classic example, work on cognitive dissonance has found that observers who must choose between two equally attractive options subsequently avoid the unchosen option, suggesting that not choosing the item led them to like it less. However, almost all of the research on such choice-induced preference focuses on adults, leaving open the question of how much experience is necessary for its emergence. Here, we examined the developmental roots of this phenomenon in preverbal infants (N = 189). In a series of seven experiments using a free-choice paradigm, we found that infants experienced choice-induced preference change similar to adults’. Infants’ choice patterns reflected genuine preference change and not attraction to novelty or inherent attitudes toward the options. Hence, choice shapes preferences—even without extensive experience making decisions and without a well-developed self-concept.

An Empirical Test of the Role of Value Certainty in Decision Making.

Most contemporary models of value-based decisions are built on value estimates that are typically self-reported by the decision maker. Such models have been successful in accounting for choice accuracy and response time, and more recently choice confidence. The fundamental driver of such models is choice difficulty, which is almost always defined as the absolute value difference between the subjective value ratings of the options in a choice set. Yet a decision maker is not necessarily able to provide a value estimate with the same degree of certainty for each option that he encounters. We propose that choice difficulty is determined not only by absolute value distance of choice options, but also by their value certainty. In this study, we first demonstrate the reliability of the concept of an option-specific value certainty using three different experimental measures. We then demonstrate the influence that value certainty has on choice, including accuracy (consistency), choice confidence, response time, and choice-induced preference change (i.e., the degree to which value estimates change from pre- to post-choice evaluation). We conclude with a suggestion of how popular contemporary models of choice (e.g., race model, drift-diffusion model) could be improved by including option-specific value certainty as one of their inputs.

Choosing what we like vs liking what we choose: How choice-induced preference change might actually be instrumental to decision-making.

For more than 60 years, it has been known that people report higher (lower) subjective values for items after having selected (rejected) them during a choice task. This phenomenon is coined "choice-induced preference change" or CIPC, and its established interpretation is that of "cognitive dissonance" theory. In brief, if people feel uneasy about their choice, they later convince themselves, albeit not always consciously, that the chosen (rejected) item was actually better (worse) than they had originally estimated. While this might make sense from an intuitive psychological standpoint, it is challenging from a theoretical evolutionary perspective. This is because such a cognitive mechanism might yield irrational biases, whose adaptive fitness would be unclear. In this work, we consider an alternative possibility, namely that CIPC is -at least partially- due to the refinement of option value representations that occurs while people are pondering about choice options. For example, contemplating competing possibilities during a choice may highlight aspects of the alternative options that were not considered before. In the context of difficult decisions, this would enable people to reassess option values until they reach a satisfactory level of confidence. This makes CIPC the epiphenomenal outcome of a cognitive process that is instrumental to the decision. Critically, our hypothesis implies novel predictions about how observed CIPC should relate to two specific meta-cognitive processes, namely: choice confidence and subjective certainty regarding pre-choice value judgments. We test these predictions in a behavioral experiment where participants rate the subjective value of food items both before and after choosing between equally valued items; we augment this traditional design with both reports of choice confidence and subjective certainty about value judgments. The results confirm our predictions and provide evidence that many quantitative features of CIPC (in particular: its relationship with metacognitive judgments) may be explained without ever invoking post-choice cognitive dissonance reduction explanation. We then discuss the relevance of our work in the context of the existing debate regarding the putative cognitive mechanisms underlying CIPC.

A common mechanism underlying choice's influence on preference and memory.

Individual control over learning leads to better memory outcomes, yet it is still unclear which aspects of control matter. One's sense of agency could be a key component, but it can be challenging to dissociate it from its consequences on the environment. Here we used a paradigm in which participants in one condition had the opportunity to choose between cues (choice condition) and in another were instructed which cue to select (fixed condition). Because the cues had no effect on the memoranda, we could isolate the effect of choice on memory. Participants also rated the cues for preference before and after encoding, allowing us to test how the number of times a cue was chosen affected its preference. By pooling multiple behavioral studies, we were able to use an individual differences approach to examine the relationship between choice effects on preference and memory. Replicating previous work, we found that immediate and delayed (24-h) recognition memory was higher for items encountered in the choice condition. We also found that cues that were selected more often increased their preference in the choice condition, but actually decreased their preference in the fixed condition, suggesting that choice engaged value-related processes. Critically, we found a positive across-subjects relationship between choice memory enhancements and choice-induced preference change for delayed but not for immediate memory. These data suggest that a shared value-based mechanism enhances preference for choice cues and memory consolidation of the choice outcomes. Thus, the value of choice may play an important role in learning enhancements.

Effect of aging on choice-induced cognitive conflict

When individuals are forced to choose between similarly preferable alternatives, a negatively arousing cognitive conflict occurs, and the preference attitudes toward the chosen and rejected alternatives diverge. This phenomenon, often referred to as “cognitive dissonance”, is of interest in psychological and decision neuroscience research. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is involved in representing the cognitive conflict induced by difficult-choice tasks. Previous studies have shown age-related decline of the dACC function. However, whether the heightened activity of the dACC regarding cognitive conflict, and choice-induced preference change that behaviorally occur in young subjects also occur in the elderly is unclear. Furthermore, recent studies have noted substantial methodological flaw with the free-choice paradigm that often used in studies focusing on cognitive dissonance. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a modified free-choice paradigm to formally test the effect of aging on choice-induced cognitive conflict. In the young participants, behavioral data confirmed the existence of cognitive conflict and preference change for the alternatives that they rejected in the difficult-choice trials. The imaging data revealed that the right dACC displayed an interaction effect associated with cognitive conflict. In contrast, we did not observe such effects in the elderly participants. These suggest a possibility that elderly people likely feel less cognitive dissonance.

Why does one’s preference change through own choice?: The factors regulating the occurrence and the degree of choice-induced preference change

Why does one’s preference change through own choice?: The factors regulating the occurrence and the degree of choice-induced preference change

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation of the Medial Frontal Cortex Modulates Choise-Induced Preference Changes

Cognitive dissonance arises as a reaction to conflict appearing in choices between two equally attractive options. It leads to changes in the desirability of these options. The chosen option becomes more desirable whereas the rejected option is devalued. Despite cognitive dissonance being largely used by social psychologists to explain social conformity and preference re-evaluation, little is known about the neural mechanisms of such choice-induced preference changes. In this study, we modulated the activity of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), which has been found to be involved in cognitive dissonance in neuroimaging studies. We influenced the activity of the pMFC before individual choices using both cathodal and anodal transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) during a revised version of Brehm's free-choice paradigm. Our results showed that cathodal tDCS over the pMFC significantly decreased the typical choice-induced preference change relative to a sham stimulation. On the contrary, no significant effect of anodal tDCS was observed. Our findings of the influence cathodal tDCS on preference re-evaluation highlight the central contribution of the pMFC in cognitive dissonance and provide evidence that pMFC plays a key role in the implementation of subsequent post-decision preference change.

Suggestion of self-(in)coherence modulates cognitive dissonance.

While cognitive dissonance is an influential concept of social psychology, its relations with consciousness and episodic memory remain strongly debated. We recently used the free-choice paradigm (FCP) to demonstrate the crucial role of conscious memory of previous choices on choice-induced preference change (CIPC). After choosing between two similarly rated items, subjects reevaluated chosen items as more attractive, and rejected items as less attractive. However such a CIPC was present exclusively for items that were correctly remembered as chosen or rejected during the choice stage, both in healthy controls and in amnesic patients. In the present work, we show that CIPC can be modulated by suggestive quotes promoting self-coherence or self-incoherence. In addition to the crucial role of memory of previous choices, we discovered that memory of the suggestive quotes was correlated to the modulation of CIPC. Taken together these results suggest that CIPC reflects a dynamic homeostatic regulation of self-coherence.

What is the factor that regulates the change in ratings of choice-induced preference change?

What is the factor that regulates the change in ratings of choice-induced preference change?

Relation between choice-induced preference change and depression.

Most experimental studies of depressive symptom effects on decision-making have examined situations in which a single correct answer exists based on external circumstances (externally guided decision-making, e.g., gambling task). In addition to such decision-making, for decision-making of other types, no correct answer exists based on external circumstances (internally guided decision-making, e.g., preference judgment). For internally guided decision-making, a phenomenon is known by which preference for the chosen item increases and preference for the rejected item is decreased after choosing between two equally preferred items which is designated as choice-induced preference change. Recent reports suggest that this phenomenon is explainable by reinforcement learning theory just as it is with externally guided decision-making. Although many earlier studies have revealed the effects of depression in externally guided decision-making, the relation between depressive symptoms and choice-induced preference change remains unclear. This study investigated the relation between depressive symptoms and choice-induced preference change using the blind choice paradigm. Results show that depressive symptoms are correlated with change in preference of rejected items (Spearman’s r = .28, p = .04): depressed individuals tend to show less decreased preference of rejected items. These results indicate that individual differences of depressive symptoms affect choice-induced preference change. We discuss the mechanisms underlying the relation between depression and choice-induced preference change.

Cognitive dissonance resolution depends on episodic memory

The notion that past choices affect preferences is one of the most influential concepts of social psychology since its first report in the 50 s, and its theorization within the cognitive dissonance framework. In the free-choice paradigm (FCP) after choosing between two similarly rated items, subjects reevaluate chosen items as more attractive and rejected items as less attractive. However the relations prevailing between episodic memory and choice-induced preference change (CIPC) remain highly debated: is this phenomenon dependent or independent from memory of past choices? We solve this theoretical debate by demonstrating that CIPC occurs exclusively for items which were correctly remembered as chosen or rejected during the choice stage. We used a combination of fMRI and intra-cranial electrophysiological recordings to reveal a modulation of left hippocampus activity, a hub of episodic memory retrieval, immediately before the occurrence of CIPC during item reevaluation. Finally, we show that contrarily to a previous influential report flawed by a statistical artifact, this phenomenon is absent in amnesic patients for forgotten items. These results demonstrate the dependence of cognitive dissonance on conscious episodic memory. This link between current preferences and previous choices suggests a homeostatic function of this regulative process, aiming at preserving subjective coherence.