Chinese International Relations Research Articles

Images of a Statist Ethic in “Western” and Chinese IR Theory: Locating (and Deciphering) the “Moral Realism” of the Tsinghua Approach

Abstract In this article, we identify—and interrogate—one thematic thread that is intricately woven through prominent positions within classical realism, normative international relations (IR) theory, and what Zhang Feng (2012) has called Chinese IR’s “Tsinghua approach.” This thread is the often-controversial notion of a statist ethic for international politics or an ethical perspective that grants priority to one’s state, fellow citizens, and the national interest. Positions within each of these theoretical traditions—what we label “egoistic realism” and “responsible realism” within the classical realist tradition, “communitarian realism” and “impartialist statism” within normative IR theory, and what others have described as “moral realism” within the Tsinghua approach—share a commitment to an ethical approach variously defined in terms of the protection of, and preference for, one’s state and compatriots. We take this rich collection of positions, and the points of comparison that it affords, as an opportunity to better understand the possibilities and limits of a statist ethic for international politics. Specifically, we endeavour to illustrate four points: (1) that a morality defined in terms of the priority of the state, one’s fellow citizens, and the national interest is neither impossible nor a contradiction in terms; (2) that such a perspective can constitute a sophisticated theoretical position; (3) that it can be conceived in radically different ways, including with respect to the source of value to which it appeals and who it deems to matter; and (4) that these differences have profound practical consequences. In terms of contributing to a conversation between Western and Chinese IR theory, this analysis helps us not only to explore how the “moral realism” of the Tsinghua approach relates to positions within classical realism and normative IR theory but also to evaluate the practical implications of its points of theoretical convergence and divergence.

The Chinese School of IR Theory: Ignored Process, Controversial Progress, and Uncertain Prospects

Abstract This article reviews issues relevant to the Chinese School of International Relations (IR) theory. After 20 or more years of relentless effort, the Chinese School has achieved concrete breakthroughs, evident in the emergence of Relational Theory, Moral Realism, and Symbiosis Theory. The Chinese School has thus entered a new stage, its primary task having been upgraded from theory innovation to theory development. But to proceed further, the Chinese School needs critical responses from its Western counterparts. Owing primarily to the language barrier, as well as to the non-confrontational academic tradition within Chinese IR, and the ethnocentrism that both sides practice, the few dialogues that have taken place between the Chinese School and Western theories have tended to be problematic, with important issues either ignored or misrepresented. In order to further study a comprehensive and intensive exchange of ideas between the Chinese School and Western theories, this article categorises issues relevant to the Chinese School into three areas. They are: process of evolution; progress in theoretical studies; and the Chinese School’s future relationship with other theoretical entities (in particular, Global IR). Predominantly reliant upon the discourse analysis of Chinese School publications, this contribution seeks to provide a foundation for further exchanges between Western theories and the Chinese School.

The Rise of China in the Historical Context

To understand the rise of China in the current era, it is important to understand its rise in the historical context, especially, its political, economic, and military history. The article takes the Qing dynasty as a starting point for its study because of its significance as one of the most advanced dynasties in the history of China and because the Qing dynasty represents the larger China of the current era. The internal weaknesses of China led to the incursion of the western powers that ultimately led to the Opium War of 1840, which resulted in an increase in the western sphere of influence in China. China considers it a century of humiliation. The establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 and the CCP revolution of 1949 depict that China wants a complete hold over its territory with no external influence in its domestic affairs. Furthermore, the reforms made by Mao, Deng, and Xi have had an impact on the rise of China. Do all these reforms made in the post-Mao era manifest Chinese expansionist designs as perceived by the western powers and the neighboring countries? The article is of the view that China’s domestic problems would make it less possible for to challenge major powers and neighboring countries. The article is descriptive while enlightening the Chinese research students that current Chinese international relations behavior has its roots in the past.

China and the pursuit of harmony in world politics: understanding Chinese International Relations theory

China and the pursuit of harmony in world politics: understanding Chinese International Relations theory

Fantastic Theories and Where to Find Them: Rethinking Interlocutors in Global IR

How can we appreciate non-Western agency in theorising world politics without reintroducing parochialism and exceptionalism, thus reproducing the very problem that motivated global international relations (IR) in the first place? In this article, I explore an alternative approach to engaging with non-Western IR theories, which I refer to as the embedded observer approach. First, taking the scholarship on Chinese IR as an example, I argue that the present predicament of global IR is in part attributable to the way scholars engage with non-Western political thought. Drawing from discussions in critical IR and Comparative Political Theory, I propose a methodological adjustment for the study of non-Western theories. Specifically, I argue that by shifting focus from isolated scholars and texts to critical dialogues among autochthonous intellectuals, the researcher has the chance to learn about and appreciate the clashes of ideas, analytical perspectives, and methodological tools that together constitute the living intellectual tradition in a non-Western society. As a demonstration, I analyse the People’s Republic of China (PRC) scholars’ critical reaction to Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia System through the lens of three key topics in the debate over the thesis. The discussion highlights the need to rethink interlocutors in global IR and the utility of an embedded observer approach for engaging with knowledge traditions beyond the West, both in IR and beyond. 神奇理论在哪里？反思全球国际关系学中的对话者

Towards Guanxi? Reconciling the “Relational Turn” in Western and Chinese International Relations Scholarship

In recent years, the “relational turn” in International Relations (IR) theory has attracted extensive attention. However, the limitations of the substantialist ontology of mainstream (Western) IR theory means that it encounters difficulties and dilemmas in interpreting the evolving international system. Against the background of the rapid development of globalization and regional integration, the reality of world politics is constantly changing, and increasingly shows obvious characteristics of interconnection and high interdependence. In this context, there is insufficient research comparing the Western and non-Western versions of the “relational turn”. Relational ontology may be able to provide a bridge between Chinese Confucian philosophy, Western philosophy, Western sociology, and mainstream western IR theories capable of generating productive synergies. However, there are major theoretical and cultural obstacles to be overcome if a reconciliation of the Western and Chinese versions of relationalism is to be achieved.

Understanding the Belt and Road Initiative from the Relational Perspective

Western International Relations (IR) theoriests have examined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through different theoretical lenses and produced inconclusive interpretations. This paper suggests that the relational theory of world politics, developed by the Chinese IR scholar Qin Yaqing, tends to look at IR from a different perspective. The logic of relationality and the relational concepts, such as relational management, relational governance and relational system, are applied to analyze the BRI. First, the relational perspective sheds light on Beijing’s efforts to manage and improve the relations with its neighbouring countries, rather than to pursue regional domination and compete with Washington. Second, the relational perspective suggests relational governance as a new possibility of regional governance to facilitate regional development and cooperation, which is different from the Western rule-based governance. Last, should BRI be carried out successfully, there might exist a relational international system in Asia, which is also different from the Westphalian nation-state system.

Saving National IR from Exceptionalism: The Dialogic Spirit and Self-Reflection in Chinese IR Theory

Abstract This study proposes an analytical framework for explaining how national IR (international relations) can keep exceptionalism at bay and join global IR in promoting common understanding. Building on the premise that dialogue is key to bridging the self–other divide, it stresses that self-reflection lies at the heart of a true “dialogic spirit,” which urges the self to recognize its own shortcomings by learning from the other's point of view. By embracing the dialogic spirit and self-reflection, therefore, national IR can distance itself from exceptionalist claims that the “national self” is intrinsically superior to others and so its preferences and interests must outweigh those of the latter. Applying this framework to the nascent Chinese IR theory, this study finds that its leading exponents do try to avoid identifying with such exceptionalist claims, though the complications of their work further illustrate the promise and difficulty of self-reflection in the shadow of rising power.

English School—“Chinese IR” Engagements: Order, Harmony, and the Limits of Elitism in Global IR

Abstract This article addresses ongoing discussions across the English School (ES) of International Relations (IR) theory and IR theory drawing on Chinese philosophical traditions and Chinese history as exemplifying a “Global IR” approach. However, common interests in long-run history, non-material forms of power, and an international social structure have not yet led to sustained discussion of normative issues important to both approaches. Showing how analytical commonalities between ES and “Chinese” IR accounts of international societies and concepts of order and harmony focus on elite-level perspectives and priorities, I draw on critical and decolonial aspects of Global IR to argue for alternative accounts. Unexplored potential for this exists within the distinct methodological bases of ES and “Chinese IR,” opening space for normative engagement that can provide a model for other inter-tradition encounters in Global IR.

Friendship in Chinese International Relations

Confucian friendship adds to the literature on friendship distance sensibilities and aims to maintain and even reinforce the Confucian ethical order, whereas contemporary international politics fails to provide any clear ethical order. The use of friendship and the concomitant creation of a friendly role by China indicate an intended move away from the improper order, including the tributary system, the Cold War, imperialism, and socialism. Confucian friendship continues to constitute contemporary Chinese diplomacy under the circumstance of indeterminate distance sensibilities. It highlights the relevance of the prior relations that are perceived to have constituted friendship. This article explores several illustrative practices of a Confucian typology of friendly international relations, divided into four kinds of friendship, according to (1) the strength of prior relations and (2) the asymmetry of capacity, including the policies toward Russia, North Korea, and Vietnam, among others. Such a Confucian friendship framework additionally alludes to foreign policy analysis in general. The US policies for China and North Korea are examples that indicate this wide scope of application.

How Should China Respond to Trump’s New Round of Trade War? An Unprecedented Debate Among Chinese IR Scholars

The US-China trade war finally broke out in 2018 after more than a decade of gradual decline in bilateral relations. This article reviews the fierce debates among China’s most prominent international relations (IR) scholars and, respectively, some economists and business elites on various topics related to US-China relations, in particular, the trade war, from 2017 to 2020. Specifically, it addresses four topics: the causes for the decline in US-China relations, Beijing’s policy and strategy for dealing with Trump’s trade war, the impact of the ‘decoupling’ on China and the prospects for future bilateral relations. Intellectual elites try to influence government policies by participating in debates while the government also applies various means to influence scholars’ views and shape public opinion on the Internet. The article finds that Chinese scholars’ discussions on the trade war and Beijing’s policies were actually influenced by factors other than trade. If Washington adopts appropriate policies in the future, Beijing may still make concessions in the interests of the United States on trade and security issues.

Alliances in Chinese international relations: are they ending or rejuvenating?

ABSTRACT What are Chinese views of international security alliances? Some scholars argue that the idea of alliance formation has become obsolete in contemporary international relations (IR), while others predict that China will eventually return to alliance formation, as major power competition intensifies. This study analyzes 1,403 articles addressing China’s foreign relationships published in the top five Chinese IR/political science journals between 1990 and 2019. We use automatic content analysis to identify key concepts and measure trends in Chinese alliance thinking. Our findings challenge the view that alliances are obsolete in contemporary Chinese IR. Alliance debates have increased in prominence during Xi’s administration. Since the 1990s, however, the partnership concept has emerged as an alternative to the alliance concept. We examine the application of these concepts through cases of China’s relations with the United States, Russia, and India.

Building a Common Language in Pluralist International Relations Theories

Abstract This article aims to contribute to the gradual building of a common scientific language within the world International Relations (IR) epistemic community. The author shares the objective, indicated by many leading Chinese scholars, of a pluralist IR theory that goes beyond Western-centric mainstream theories to provide a European continental perspective. Such a perspective takes stock, on the one hand, of the legacy of Gramsci, Bobbio, and Habermas, and, on the other, of the theoretical implications of European unity as a sophisticated instance of regional cooperation. Since the dialogue must be at the highest possible theoretical level, the author selects as main partners two leading theories from the increasingly rich and internally various Chinese IR scholarship: the books recently published in English by Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong, who represent—not only in China, but at world level—two fundamental references in the international theoretical debate. They lead two innovative approaches: Qin’s relational theory and Yan’s theory of moral realism. The author discusses their main theses and concepts regarding IRT and global governance in a free, open, and dialectic way, notably, the balance between background cultures and multilateral convergence; and the differences between the crucial concepts of hegemony, domination, and leadership, as well as alternative perspectives on global governance within a multipolar world—a new post-hegemonic multilateralism? Or a bipolar global power structure competing for leadership?

The study of Chinese scholars in foreign policy analysis: an emerging research program

A review of studies of China’s foreign policy reveals three dominant methods: the area studies approach, the IR theory method, and the integrated approach. We suggest that it is time to pay close attention to an emerging research program focusing on the study of Chinese international relations (IR) scholars, especially their internal debates, as a new venue to understand China’s foreign policy. Although Chinese IR scholars are normally quoted as valuable sources in the study of Chinese foreign policy in general, there is no systematic study of China’s IR scholars per se. In order to transform the study of Chinese IR scholars to a full-fledged research program, researchers need to pursue theoretical innovations on the relationship between different types of IR scholars and foreign policy inquiries, advance multi-method research designs across the different methods of field interviews, textual analysis, and opinion surveys, as well as encourage international collaboration between Chinese scholars and non-Chinese scholars.

Grown from within: Building a Chinese School of International Relations

Over the years, this author has been involved in the ‘Chinese school of International Relations (IR)’ debate. In this article I try to reflect on these discussions or debates from which some insights can be retrieved to inform future research and further growth of a Chinese School of IR. Should a Chinese school be set as the goal? If so, how should this be pursued? This debate and the relevant efforts have proved to be a promising movement in the Chinese IR community, demonstrating that a Chinese school of IR is inevitable and it actually is evolving. A theory is a generalization or cluster of generalizations. This article argues that from the ‘Tsinghua approach’, a ‘moral realism’ has sprung up. Qin Yaqin’s theorizing is centered around relationality and has been productive. A theory of symbiosis in the world community is being developed by a group of Shanghai-based scholars, and a ‘symbiosis school’ has grown up. Overall, four distinct theories of Chinese origins, i.e., relational theory, moral realism, tianxia theory and gongsheng/symbiotic theory, have appeared. Thus, IR theory-building in China in the first two decades of the 21st century has rendered the question ‘why there is no IR theory in China’ obsolete.

Is China's IR Academic Community Becoming More Anti-American?

Is China's IR Academic Community Becoming More Anti-American? Meng Weizhan It is my impression that the majority of American scholars who study China and the majority of Chinese scholars who study the United States are committed to promoting friendly relations between the two countries and to helping their own people understand each other better. Unfortunately, their efforts are often misunderstood. Starting at the end of 2018, a disturbing rumor began to circulate in China's international relations (IR) academic community: several scholars told their peers that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was prohibiting them from visiting the United States. By April 2019, a report in the New York Times confirmed that "the FBI has mounted a counterintelligence operation that aims to bar Chinese academics from the United States if they are suspected of having links to Chinese intelligence agencies. … As many as 30 Chinese professors in the social sciences, heads of academic institutes, and experts who help explain government policies have had their visas to the United States canceled in the past year, or put on administrative review, according to Chinese academics and their American counterparts" (Perlez 2019). According to a report in the Global Times (Fan 2019), more than 280 Chinese scholars have been investigated or harassed by the FBI. These incidents have shocked academic circles in both China and the United States. Perhaps the US government assumes that this is fair treatment for Chinese scholars because many American scholars have complained that they have been banned from entering China due to expressing views that offend the Chinese government. I fully support academic freedom and believe that all governments should be tolerant of any views expressed by scholars. Nevertheless, it is puzzling that the Chinese scholars whose visas have been canceled include some of those best known for their balanced views of the United States and its foreign policy. In order to verify this, we should explore whether the Chinese scholars whose US visas have been canceled have said anything that would harm the interests of the United States. If they have not done so, then they have been treated unjustly. [End Page 139] I will also examine the changes in the perceptions of the US among mainstream IR scholars in China since President Donald Trump took office, focusing in particular on the period after the Sino-US trade war that began in June 2018. Despite the trade war, there is no evidence of a trend toward greater hostility among mainstream IR scholars in Beijing toward the United States. Many doves (wen he pai) with respect to US policies openly and strongly advocate pacifism, oppose nationalism, and call for maintaining friendly relations with the United States. Some well-known hawks (qiang ying pai) have also expressed their views that the Chinese government should seriously reflect upon its own domestic and foreign policy decisions to consider how it may prevent China from becoming isolated. In short, my conclusion, from extensive reading of these scholars' writings and listening to their public remarks, is that an overwhelming majority of Chinese IR scholars do not regard the United States as an enemy at all, and I argue that China should continue to reform its economic system and be more open to better integration with the Western-led international economic system. My assessment is that few among them advocate that the Chinese government should adopt tougher policies toward the United States or promote anti-American sentiment among the general public. China's state media and public opinion are indeed becoming increasingly anti-American, but mainstream IR scholars rarely publish extreme views in newspapers or new media. In this essay, I examine the public views of IR scholars at universities and research institutions in Beijing. The vast majority of Chinese IR scholars and the editorial departments of academic and policy research journals on this subject are based in Beijing, and they are likely to have a direct impact on decision making within the Chinese government. In Beijing, there are only ten universities and institutions with a true academic and policy influence on China's strategies, including policies toward the United States. Four of these are top universities, namely Peking University...

That Is Not Intervention; That Is Interference with Chinese Characteristics: New Concepts, Distinctions and Approaches Developing in the Chinese Debate and Foreign and Security Policy Practice

AbstractThere is among Chinese international relations scholars an intense debate about how China can protect and promote Chinese global presence and interests while at the same time continue to adhere to the principle of non-intervention. New concepts, distinctions and approaches are developing as the debate progresses. The current Chinese foreign and security policy practice reflects a more flexible and pragmatic Chinese interpretation – and implementation – of the principle of non-intervention with different degrees and types of intervention. This article explores the search for “legitimate great power intervention” characterizing both the debate among Chinese international relations scholars and the current Chinese foreign and security policy practice, and uses this case as the departure point for a more general discussion of the drivers of change – and continuity – in Chinese foreign and security policy.

The Eurasian Land Bridge: linking regional value chains along the New Silk Road

This article argues that the establishment of the China–Europe Land Bridge predated the announcement of China’s One Belt One Road (Belt and Road Initiative) and has been market-driven, as service providers identified and responded to demand for efficient freight services along pre-existing railway lines. Governments’ role was trade facilitating, that is reducing delays and costs at border crossing points, rather than investing in hard infrastructure. Service providers responded by linking European and Asian value chains (for example in automobiles and electronic goods) and reducing costs for traders shipping between China and Europe. In sum, market forces were the catalyst for the rail links between China and Europe that are often analysed in the context of China’s economic rise and Chinese international relations.

Introduction

Introduction Benjamin Tze Ern Ho (bio) Of late, Chinese scholars have argued for the need to incorporate traditional Chinese ideas into mainstream international relations (IR) theory, which is seen as privileging a Western-centric reading of international affairs. Given the global prominence of China, it behooves scholars and policymakers alike to consider how these ideas are being translated into contemporary Chinese conceptions of international order and influencing China's foreign policy practices. The four essays in this roundtable attempt to do just that. First, Feng Zhang adopts a historical perspective on the study of China's engagement with the international order and examines the implications of the Xi Jinping doctrine for the country's foreign policy. Second, Xiaoyu Pu discusses China's policies and actions in the Indo-Pacific, including its strategic calculations, its perceptions of the U.S. role in the region, and the sources of rising tensions between the United States and China. Using a "status dilemma" framework, Pu argues that Sino-U.S. competition is fueled by concerns in the United States and China that the other side seeks domination and regional hegemony, respectively. Third, Beverley Loke analyzes Chinese and U.S. discourses of great-power management. She examines how each country sees itself as a responsible stakeholder and assesses their respective approaches to a "new model of great-power relations." Finally, Catherine Jones argues that, despite the use of grand political slogans, Beijing's foreign policy practices reflect more modest objectives, not unlike the behavioral strategies of middle powers. Taken together, these essays provide important analytical insights for better understanding China's foreign policy actions and the extent to which Chinese ideas concerning international affairs are playing out in practice. The rest of this introduction provides a brief sketch of Chinese thinking about international relations in light of China's rise and its importance for our understanding of Chinese political worldviews. [End Page 2] China's prominence in international relations has emboldened Chinese IR scholars in recent years to advocate a "Chinese way" of thinking about international relations and incorporate traditional Chinese ideas into mainstream IR scholarship. Qin Yaqing, the president of the China Foreign Affairs University, observes that efforts to develop Chinese IR theory have gathered momentum since the start of the 21st century, given China's growing economic strength and international influence.1 While these concepts have yet to obtain universal traction and are still largely in an embryonic stage, the ability to theorize, as Qin puts it, "is a sign of intellectual maturity."2 Chinese scholars are increasingly using indigenous resources to articulate what they view as a unique Chinese contribution to the wider discipline. The importance of articulating a Chinese approach to IR theory lies in part in the need to establish and present Chinese national interests to the international community. In a study of the relationship between China's global ascendancy and its IR theory, Hung-Jen Wang identifies the three main features of Chinese scholarship as "identity, appropriation, and adaptation."3 In the first phase of scholarship, the identities of Chinese IR scholars were shaped by China's political systems, cultural values, and historical experiences. Such work emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s following China's reintegration into the international system. Chinese scholars next began to appropriate Western IR theories using the Chinese principle of ti-yong (substance-function)—that is, by combining Chinese concerns with the learning of foreign concepts. The third phase saw Chinese scholars adapt these concepts of Western IR scholarship (such as "balance of power" and "nation-state") to analyze events in China. To this end, Wang observes that "repeated cycles of learning and appropriation may ultimately relativize the universal values of those and other concepts found in Western IR theories so as to transform their original Western meanings."4 Similarly, in his survey of the development of IR theory in China, Qin argues that the development of IR as an academic discipline in China has moved from pre-theory to a theory-learning (or theory-deepening) stage. The theory-innovation phase, whereby scholars "seek to explain reality and understand social phenomena from a distinctly Chinese perspective," [End Page 3] has yet to materialize...

Community of common destiny: China’s “new assertiveness” and the changing Asian order

This essay will discuss China’s re-emergence as a great power through the lens of the English School. Following Ian Clark, I reconceptualize international society as a set of historically changing principles of legitimacy. I argue that China’s “new assertiveness” under Xi Jinping is best explained by China’s pursuit of legitimacy in an international arena where norms of legitimate modes of governance, development, and ordering principles have long been defined by the West. Furthermore, this essay will examine one recent development in Chinese International Relations theory, gongsheng, which purports to offer an alternative normative basis for interstate order, and probe its relationship to Xi Jinping’s recent declaration to build a “community of common destiny” in Asia.