Chinese Communist Party Policies Research Articles

Do political affiliation and economic wellbeing thwart religious identification in China?

Abstract While the Chinese government's stated position is to support religious freedom, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is officially atheist. Individuals who profess faith are typically unable to join and members who practice a religion face expulsion and a loss of benefits. This paper analyzes the extent to which the CCP's policies regarding religion may influence religious identification over the life cycle in China. To do so, we contrast changes in religious affiliation before and after retirement for CCP members and non-CCP members. We find a significant increase of religious activities and religious faith in CCP members after retirement – suggesting: (1) people's acknowledgment of religious belief is significantly influenced by CCP regulations and (2) the biggest influence from a material benefits perspective occurs for those CCP members employed in the Chinese government system.

Mao's Cambodian Legacy: An “Ideological Victory” and a Strategic Failure

Abstract Drawing on untapped Chinese primary sources, including archival documents, the biographies and memoirs of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials involved in managing policy toward the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and, in particular, the memoirs of members of Huayun (an ethnic Chinese revolutionary movement) in Cambodia, this article shows that under Mao Zedong the CCP's policies toward the Khmer Rouge were subordinated to Mao's political needs and indistinguishable from his domestic policies. The Khmer Rouge's victory in Cambodia was significant to Mao in light of the tense relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet bloc. In 1973 and 1974, Chinese leaders rejected U.S. proposals to restore Prince Sihanouk to power in Cambodia and later refrained from any criticism of the mass slaughter perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, including the systematic killing of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia. As a result, the post-Mao leaders were unable to disengage from Cambodia or to restrain the Khmer Rouge. Mao's “ideological victory” eventually translated into a strategic debacle for the PRC.

Sanjiao Heyi and Tibet

This paper considers Chinese Communist Party policies in Tibet from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist perspectives. I first explain how these three traditions are unified in the sanjiao heyi, but I contend that this practice has been neglected in favor of state repression. I then elucidate Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism with respect to their general principles and application in Tibet. I conclude that a fuller embrace of the sanjiao heyi where Confucian tenets are balanced by insights from Daoism and Buddhism would cultivate an anti-oppressive response to governmental control.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЇ МАРКСИЗМУ В ПРАКТИЦІ КПК

B a c k g r o u nd . The article focuses on the study of modern adaptations and modifications of Marxist principles in the context of the practice of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Focusing on the process of modernization, the article explores how Marxism developed and adapted to China's unique socio-political and economic landscape. Through an in-depth analysis of the CCP's policy and ideological changes, the article sheds light on the distinctive features characterizing the modernization of Marxism in the Chinese context. The study covers not only theoretical aspects but also practical aspects, providing a refined understanding of the specifics of the relationship between Marxist ideology and the dynamic realities of Chinese governance. M e t h o d s . The article uses an in-depth analysis of the politics, ideological changes, and practical aspects of the CCP. The research is based on an analysis of primary sources, including official documents, political speeches and ideological narratives. R e s u l t s . The authors found that the ideology of the CCP is based on Marxism, but adapted to the unique historical context of China, often framed in the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics". This adaptation reflects the CCP's recognition of China's special conditions, cultural heritage, and development needs. At its core, Marxism provides the theoretical foundation for the ideology of the CCP, emphasizing class struggle, historical materialism, and the ultimate goal of achieving a classless communist society. However, the CCP recognizes that the application of Marxist principles must take into account the specific realities of China, distinguishing its path from the classical Marxist trajectory. C o n c l u s i o n s . The study highlights that the CCP recognizes the importance of adapting Marxist principles to the specific conditions of China. Acceptance of the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" defines a pragmatic approach to the integration of Marxist ideology with the conditions of the country, taking into account its path of economic development and modernization.

Making a Coastal Revolution: Farmers, Fishers, and Socialism, 1946–1959

This article reveals the uneven and locally differentiated process of the Chinese Revolution and socialist construction by examining the Chinese Communist Party's policies and their effects on coastal villages in Northeast China from 1946 to 1959. It focuses on two rural reforms conducted almost simultaneously in the area, namely land reform and fishery reform. The former shows conflicting party imperatives originating from different levels of leadership, as well as the impact of the postwar Soviet occupation on rural land policies. Fishery reform drew inspiration from land reform but also incorporated invented practices and values to win support from fishers. Although the party-state attempted to adjust its revolutionary programs to accommodate the local realities in coastal villages, tension emerged in response to changes centering on the division of labor between men and women and the pay disparity between farmers and fishers.

China's Corporate Social Credit System and the Dawn of Surveillance State Capitalism

Chinese state capitalism is transitioning toward a panoptic, technology-assisted variant that we call “surveillance state capitalism.” The mechanism driving the emergence of this variant is China’s corporate social credit system (CSCS) – a big data project to evaluate the “trustworthiness” of all business entities registered in the country. The CSCS is linked to a system of corporate rewards and punishments, representing a futuristic strategy of automated screening to determine which enterprises are allowed market access and benefits. In this paper, we explore the conceptual and operational linkages of the CSCS to three contemporary phenomena in the global political economy: the surveillance state, surveillance capitalism, and state capitalism, and their assemblage in China into a big-data-driven corporate behavior modification program in service of the party-state. We provide the first empirical analysis of the CSCS scoring system, based on its recent rollout in Zhejiang Province, one of the first to implement the CSCS at the local level. A key finding is that while the CSCS is a facially neutral means of measuring legal compliance, politically connected firms (regardless of their status as state-owned or private enterprises, or the extent of state equity ownership) receive higher overall scores in Zhejiang. The channel for this result is a “social responsibility” category that valorizes awards from the government and contributions to Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-sanctioned causes. We find no significant evidence that better-governed firms or more profitable firms receive higher overall scores, although highly leveraged firms, subject to higher default risks, are associated with lower total scores. These results underscore the potential of the CSCS to nudge corporate fealty to government and CCP policy, raising the specter of high-tech central planning at the dawn of Chinese surveillance state capitalism. While our findings, based on the first available scores from a single province, have clear limitations, they provide an early window into the design characteristics, operation, and potentially far-reaching implications of the CSCS for the country as a whole.

Institutional governance of Chinese private universities: the role of the communist party committee

ABSTRACT The relationship between the state and the university is predominantly shaped at a national level which tends to reflect the specific traditions and circumstances of individual countries. In China the Communist Party has played a crucial role in university governance making it different from any other country. However the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in universities, particularly in private universities, has rarely been discussed in English literature. This paper examines how the University Communist Committee of the Party (UCCP) is set up and works within private universities, and the various patterns of institutional governance that can emerge. It draws extensively on documents of the CCP and interviews with 32 senior managers on 44 separate occasions. The study shows that while allowing private entrepreneurs considerable freedom to invest in higher education, the CCP still has control over the private universities in their socialist development. This is partly achieved through the requirement that every private university must have a UCCP to oversee the implementation of CCP policies in the university.

Judicial enforcement of intellectual property rights in China — from technical improvement to institutional reform

ABSTRACTChina is one of the most controversial fora for intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. The current IPRs enforcement in China is the result of a combination of external pressure and internal drive, of the paradox of technology reliance and indigenous innovation, and of a mixture of incompatible history and culture with gradually changing social norms. This article aims to provide a critical assessment of the latest development in judicial enforcement of IPRs in China, including improving the professionalism and efficiency of the judicial process, increasing the adequacy of remedies and reducing judicial local protectionism. It concludes that the technical development of the IPRs judicial system is obvious and the remaining problems are relatively easy to correct. However, although China has also adopted measures to increase the power and independence of courts, the structural weakness of courts continues to remain. The Chinese judicial system, institutionally, is not independent, and judgments are influenced by the policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although the contemporary policy in China is to improve judicial protection of IPRs, the possible influence of the CCP policy in courts remains a concern for the long-term transformation of the IP system.

Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?

ABSTRACTIn the Introduction to this special issue, I first provide an overview of the programme of 'de-extremification' and mass internment in Xinjiang since early 2017. I then situate this development against the ‘ideological turn’ in Chinese Communist Party policy under President Xi Jinping, highlighting the new emphasis on stability maintenance and ideational governance. Next, I explore experiences of (in)security in Uyghur communities in- and outside of Xinjiang in the era of internment to consider how far PRC counter-terrorism initiatives have now evolved into state terror. In doing so, I apply Ruth Blakeley's (2012) definition of state terror as a deliberate act of violence against civilians, or threat of violence where a climate of fear is already established by earlier acts of violence; as perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state; as intended to induce extreme fear in target observers who identify with the victim; and as forcing the target audience to consider changing its behaviour. Finally, I discuss the six contributions to the special issue.

Islam and State Policy in Contemporary China

Since Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic policy of opening up and reforming the country in the late 1970s, Islam has witnessed a revival in China. Just as the Chinese nation has experienced rapid economic, political and social development, so too has Islam grown and diversified. Since Muslims generally enjoy the freedom to practice their religion and the benefit of China’s Preferential Program (a policy giving special privileges to minority Muslims) – if they obey the state law and keep harmonious relations with other social groups – some Chinese Muslims regard today as a “golden age” for Islam in the People’s Republic. This paper offers an overview of the major developments in Chinese Communist policy on religion and discusses the internal and external influences of domestic and international relations on Communist Party policy towards Chinese Muslims. It argues that Chinese Communist Party policy since the 1970s protects religious freedom but does so while maintaining state control over religion. Further, in the case of Islam in the People’s Republic, state protection and control are defined according to the domestic and international concerns of the State.

Marxism and Religion ed. by Lü Daji, Gong Xuezeng (review)

the creative processes of the universe. He set much stock in dreams as yet another source of divinatory guidance, as in dreams he participated in dialogues with the sages. He touted the value and importance of study and learning in the communal context of developing a coterie of mutually supportive friends. In a nutshell, Kelleher’s translation of and commentary on Wu Yubi’s “Journal,” in a graphic and lively manner, offer concrete illustrations of quiet-sitting, meditation, moral introspection, and ethical learning. It will be a most useful resource for anyone teaching Confucianism. Yet, precisely because the book seems to be consciously and purposefully developed as such a resource, it refrains from addressing some deeper questions that any study on the Confucian tradition should pay some due attention to: What is Confucian religiosity and spirituality in relation to its metaphysics ? What is the Confucian mystique as expressed in the notions of quiet-sitting, sagehood, the Way, and Heaven? One may also gripe that the bibliography and suggested further readings are unnecessarily parsimonious. My minor disgruntlement notwithstanding, I am thrilled by its publication and foresee using it in one of my classes. I urge my colleagues to do the same. ON-CHO NG The Pennsylvania State University LÜ DAJI AND GONG XUEZENG, eds., Marxism and Religion, translated by Chi Zhen. Religious Studies in Contemporary China Collection, vol. 4. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2014. xiv, 421 pp. €150, US$194 (hb). ISBN 978-90-04-17456-6 Its cover announces that this book’s contributors, China’s leading scholars on religion and senior cadres involved in religious affairs, aim to correct mistaken perceptions by “so many westerners” that Chinese scholarship is “outdated,” “dogmatic,” and “in the service of communist regime’s propaganda.” The ten scholars who wrote for this volume live up to the expectations by presenting interesting, and at times bold and frank opinions, on the understanding of religions by Chinese Marxists . In addition, three important officials in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy and the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) present their views on religion. Most of these chapters reveal a diversity of views, but the variety of perspective on offer amounts to little more than minor disagreements on the exegesis of authoritative texts within the Marxist-Leninist canon. There are a few remarkable exceptions and original voices in this book, reflecting an increasingly sophisticated and interesting scholarship on religion in China. This book does not claim to represent this diversity, however. It aims primarily to publicize to outsiders the views of the authorities and, as the advertisement to the book candidly mentions: its texts “contribute to the ruling party’s ideological reconstruction.” This compilation represents a very useful collection of texts, regardless of one’s personal views on the matter, because it reveals that officials’ policies are informed by the work of social scientists, and even though Marxism remains an important source in the thinking of many, the interpretation of that authoritative source varies considerably , even while other perspectives—from the West, but also from China— contend with the official ideology. 210 REVIEWS This book is not about the CCP policies on religion, nor an account of relations between religions and the Chinese government. It rather presents to us the evolution of the official thinking on religion by the Party and by some prominent experts in religious studies whom state officials consult. One central issue that most of the essays discuss is that Marxism was misunderstood in China. These essays, however, do not offer a unified corrective to these previous misinterpretations and do not provide clear criteria on how to properly read Marx. Some of the voices express personal views, others enunciate the position of state officials. Some them go to great pain to adapt Marx to the conditions of China. For example, Zhuo Xinping 卓新平, the director of the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, writes that many Chinese aware of Karl Marx’s statement that “religion is the opiate of the masses” read that statement through the lens of the painful historical memory of the Opium Wars’ defeat and the humiliation that followed, therefore intensifying their hostility to religion. Zhuo Xinping...

The Fatal Politics of the PRC's Great Leap Famine: the preface to Tombstone

What follows is the Preface to Tombstone (), Yang Jisheng's two-volume investigative study of China's Great Famine that claimed some 36 million lives in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The book was published in Hong Kong in 2008 and was banned on the mainland. The death toll was unprecedented and remains unmatched in Chinese or world history. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tried to cover up the terrible reality by classifying key information as secret and placing the blame elsewhere, as in the euphemism ‘the three years of natural disaster’. Yang Jisheng, an economist, journalist and Xinhua editor, has devoted more than two decades of his life to collecting data from official archives and interviewing survivors, witnesses and officials. The result is a thorough and powerful account of extraordinary inhumanity and magnificent courage that rivals Alexander Solzhenitsyn's study of the Soviet Gulag and Robert Conquest's history of Stalin's collectivization famine. Tombstone covers both diverse localities and the power center in Beijing to explain the dynamics of the catastrophe caused by CCP policies and practices under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Chief among these policies were the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing grain, the power of officials to seize grain from people's homes, compulsory collective mess halls that ‘imposed the dictatorship of the proletariat on every individual stomach’, and a full-scale collectivization that left villagers no means of saving themselves. Despite receiving reports of widespread famine and cannibalism, Mao touted alleged successes and attacked those who spoke the truth as counter-revolutionaries, thereby prolonging and intensifying the famine for another two years. On this basis Yang places the ultimate responsibility for 36 million deaths on China's political system. Tombstone is a monumental work that is also intended as a monument to Yang's own father (whose death by starvation is described in heartrending detail below) and to all the other 36 million innocent victims. At personal risk, Yang is trying to end ‘an amnesia imposed by those in power’. In the process he sheds unprecedented light on how a political system presented to the Chinese people as a ‘Road to Paradise’ instead turned into a ‘Road to Perdition’. Yang has condensed and updated the Chinese-language manuscript for foreign-language publication. The following Preface is part of an English translation currently in progress.

Contemporary Yangge: The Moving History of a Chinese Folk Dance Form

Since the beginning of its rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has consistently claimed that the performing arts "should assist in the process of educating the masses" (Mackerras 1981: 9). The development of yangge dance is particularly linked to the CCP's policies during both the party's establishment and the Cultural Revolution. In this paper, I use personal experience and embodied research to complicate the existing conventional historical narrative that asserts the political exploitation of yangge in modern Chinese history.

The evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's policy on the bourgeoisie (1949–1952)

From its very beginning, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had a shifting policy towards the bourgeoisie. Until the early 1940s, it maintained a relatively stable policy which successfully isolated the monied classes in China and helped it overthrow the rule of the KMT. But with the establishment of the new regime, the CCP Central Committee came under conflicting pressures: on the one hand it continued its former policy out of political expediency; on the other hand, based on traditional socialist political theory and Soviet experience, it kept a close watch on the bourgeoisie and even proposed targeting them as the chief enemy of next revolution. After the establishment of the PRC, as a result of the failing economy and the new government's lack of economic support and political experience, the CCP firmed up its policies on the bourgeoisie. However, with the bourgeoisie and capitalism still prominent elements in Chinese society, the communists became uncertain about which direction to take. As the CCP Central Committee had anticipated, officials of both the party and the government often gave way to corruption after taking over major cities. The Central Committee regarded this particular combination of money and power as a “violent attack” against the new communist regime by the bourgeoisie as a whole. In order to tighten its grip on national power, the Central Committee launched two anti‐corruption movements known as the Three‐Antis and the Five‐Antis. These movements were in fact aimed at the bourgeoisie as a whole, and succeeded in destroying the basis for capitalist business in the New China. Encouraged by this outcome, the CCP launched a policy of socialist transformation aimed at depriving Chinese capitalists of their means of production. Thus the CCP gradually and inevitably moved away from its original policy of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie.

Imagining China’s Madrid in Manchuria

This article is an interdisciplinary study of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military decision making at the outset of the civil war. The historical phenomenon of the Communists’ invocation of “Madrid” is studied in the context of the Chinese civil war in Manchuria, particularly the battle of Sipingjie. The strategic culture of the Communist leaders is discussed thematically in terms of their desire for a decisive battle, their expectation of a short war, and their propensity for preemptive strikes. Analyzing newly released primary documents, the author argues that norms, beliefs, and material conditions work in tandem in the making of strategy in a way that the realist premise fails to explain. He concludes that the interaction of normative and material factors, symbolized by the Madrid concept, heightened the CCP policy makers’ acceptance of risk in 1946, which foreshadowed the open general war in China over the following three years.

The Party and Private Entrepreneurs in the PRC

In July 2001, Party Secretary Jiang Zemin announced that private entrepreneurs,
 among other 'outstanding' representatives of the new social elites, were welcome
 to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The move led to controversial
 ideological debates as it was widely interpreted as a clear signal that the communist
 party was finally turning capitalist. Things become less clear, however, when we
 look not so much at ideologies but at the actual facts. Realizing how little we
 know about the reality of relations between the CCP and private entrepreneurs,
 the aim of the paper is two-fold: The first is to collect and critically assess the
 information available on current developments of the 'private economy' (a vague
 notion in itself), and on the proportion of entrepreneurs who are already CCP
 members. Second, based on this analytical 'deconstruction' of statistical data and
 categories, the article delineates motives and strategies that might lie behind the
 new policy of formally admitting private entrepreneurs into the party. As will be
 argued, one important reason could be that the CCP, by co-opting entrepreneurs,
 attempts to (re-)gain access to the ever larger labour force employed in the growing
 non-public sector of the economy and thus to strengthen its organizational
 presence at the grassroots level. However, while we know something about the
 CCP's policy, much more needs to be known about the political preferences,
 attitudes and behaviour of private entrepreneurs. Therefore, instead of drawing
 macropolitical conclusions, the paper ends with an outline of relevant microscopic
 aspects of the relations between entrepreneurs and the CCP that deserve more indepth
 analysis in the future.

Chinese Communist Party Policy towards the Nationalist Movement in Inner Mongolia after World War II

Chinese Communist Party Policy towards the Nationalist Movement in Inner Mongolia after World War II

Managing Risk: The Suppression of Private Entrepreneurs in China in the 1950s

Good entrepreneurs are generally recognised as good risk-takers, and there is a considerable amount of research about how different risks can be managed. This paper discusses how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) managed, or rather suppressed, private entrepreneurs in the 1950s. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the CCP policy towards private entrepreneurs was ‘utilisation’, ‘restriction’ and ‘transformation’, as defined in Article 10 of the 1954 Constitution. This paper describes how the Chinese government successfully drew private entrepreneurs into the centrally planned economy, and as a consequence suffocated market activities. It became a very effective, if unorthodox, way of managing risk. The government became the only handler of resource allocation. It is argued that this condition of ‘socio-economic hegemony’ forced private entrepreneurs to conduct underground economic activities on the black market, which posed different types of risks.

The Myth of America's "Lost Chance" in China: A Chinese Persopective in Light of New Evidence

Did there exist a chance in 1949–50 for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the United States to reach an accommodation or, at least, to avoid a confrontation? Scholars who believe that Washington “lost a chance” to pursue a non-confrontational relationship with the CCP generally base their argument on two assumptions – that the Chinese Communists earnestly sought U.S. recognition to expedite their country's postwar economic reconstruction and that the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union was vulnerable because of Moscow's failure to offer sufficient support to the Chinese Revolution. These scholars thus claim that it was Washington's anti-Communist and pro-Guomindang (the Nationalist party or GMD) policy that forced the CCP to treat the United States as an enemy. This claim, though seemingly critical of Washington's management of relations with China, is ironically American centered, implying that the CCP's policies toward the United States were simply passive reactions to what Washington was doing toward China. This essay, with insights gained from new Chinese and, in some places, Russian materials, argues that, in the final analysis, the CCP's confrontation with the United States originated in the Party's need to enhance the inner dynamics of the Chinese Revolution after its nationwide victory, and that from a Chinese perspective, no chance existed for Communist China and the United States to reach an accommodation in 1949–50.