China-Myanmar Relations Research Articles

Unraveling Chinese Bilateral Diplomatic Behavior: Evidence from Post-Coup Sino-Myanmar Relations,a Rational Choice Approach

Attempting to understand the strategic motives and geopolitical interests behind Chinese actions in bilateral international relations, this paper examines Beijing’s reaction to the 2021 Myanmar Coup. Adopting a rationalist approach, the paper conducts cost and benefit analysis through game-theoretical lenses and categorizes Chinese interests as expansionary and defensive, both contributing to its potential payoff in bilateral exchanges. Applying the resulted model to the Post-Coup Sino-Myanmar interactions in which Beijing’s attitude shifted from the initial ambiguity to more favorable stance towards the Tatmadaw, the authors find that such shift can be attributed to a changing reality of China’s perceived political and economic outcomes at different time periods. In addition to offering insights into ongoing China-Myanmar relations, this article identifies key patterns of the decision-making process taken by Beijing. It argues that, when countries engage with China bilaterally, they will likely face a more volatile, daring player willing to take more controversial actions.

China, India and Myanmar Triangular Relationship: In the Context of Rohingya Issues

Myanmar’s geo-political and geo-economic position is very important to China and India. India and China are the two regional powers of Southeast Asia, although it shares border with the two coutries. Basically, Myanmar is the center of connectivity to South Asia and Southeast Asia with the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The new economic super power of the world. China’s ambitious project BRI connects Myanmar with two corridors. Especially in the case of importing fuel oil and exporting products to the global market, Chinese ships have to go around the Malacca Strait, which is time consuming and costly and strategically risky. But using Kukpyu Port in Rakhine State will reduce China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait and expand trade. That is why the bilateral relationship between the world’s second largest economy China (GDP $14.140 Trillion, 2019) and the 73rd economy Myanmar (GDP $ 69.994, 2019) is very important (Ahamed, Rahman & Nur, 2020) . China has been playing an important role in Myanmar’s economic development through bilateral trade relations since 1988. From 1988 to 2018, 26% of all foreign investment in Myanmar came from China and as of June 2020, Chinese investment in Myanmar was US $21350.668 Million (DICA, 2020). India shares a 1643 km land border with Myanmar with 4 northeastern states of Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur. Myanmar is the gateway to the implementation of ‘Act East Policy’ and ‘Neighborhood First Policy’ announced by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 (Ahamed, Rahman & Nur, 2020). In addition, the world’s two most important sea routes, The strait of Malacca and The strait of Hurmuz, are connected to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean through the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar has a 725 km coastal boundary with the Bay of Bengal. Because of this, Myanmar is geo-politically and geo-strategically India., important to the Western world including China. Due to US presence in Indian Ocean, recent Sino-Indian conflict and Myanmar’s strategic location, Sino-Myanmar relations have become one of the research topics at present. This article will analyze the multifaceted aspects of China-Myanmar relations.

A Comparative Study of Abbreviations in Burmese and Chinese

With the rapid development of politics, science, technology, economy, and culture, people generally seek more economical and concise language expressions, and concise and bright abbreviations that cover all aspects are produced. There are many abbreviations in modern Burmese and Chinese vocabulary systems, but there has been no comparative research on them. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the word formation and pronunciation characteristics of abbreviations in Burmese and Chinese, and then to derive the abbreviation law. On the one hand, it can improve the comparative research findings of Burmese and Chinese researchers. Language, on the other hand, is inextricably linked to social life. With increasing economic and cultural exchanges between China and Myanmar, strengthening comparative language studies promotes scholars' understanding of Myanmar's politics, economy, and culture, and has some practical implications for the friendly development of China-Myanmar relations.

Of constraints and opportunities. Dependent asymmetry in China-Myanmar relations, 2011–2021

This article argues that a peculiar pattern of dependent asymmetry – ‘dual dependence’, i.e. a combination of internal and external dependence – has come to characterize the structure of China-Myanmar relations since the late 1980s. The hypothesis we present is that shifts in this pattern of dependent asymmetry account for fluctuations in China-Myanmar relations between 2011 and 2021. We test this hypothesis against empirical evidence from what we identify as two shifts in the structure of bilateral relations: for each, we trace how structural changes were perceived in Naypyitaw and Beijing, and how such perceptions oriented an adjustment in their respective policies. Myanmar’s reduced external dependence on China in 2011–2012 expanded the set of the potential courses of action available to Myanmar’s decision-makers and reduced the set of those available to China; conversely, the opposite happened in 2017–2018, following Myanmar’s return to full-fledged external dependence on China. The paper finally speculates that the military coup in 2021 could well represent a third shift in the structure of bilateral relations, further strengthening Myanmar’s external dependence on China and constraining the military government’s room of manoeuvre.

Myanmar's strategy in the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor: a failure in hedging?

Abstract This article examines Myanmar's hedging strategies in China's Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Myanmar has avoided being overly reliant on China by strategically hedging and diversifying its foreign relations with other countries in the region. However, Myanmar's ability to hedge is compromised by its domestic fragmentation, caused by the protracted civil war and rising civil–military tensions. We focus on the two advanced projects in CMEC, the Muse–Mandalay railway and Kyaukphyu deep seaport, and have conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in China–Myanmar relations (2016–2021) under the National League for Democracy (NLD). Through the fieldwork findings, we problematize the assumption in the hedging literature which takes for granted a country's competence to act strategically in their foreign policy. Our findings from the Myanmar case suggest that the state's level of fragmentation and capability to hedge are inversely proportional. The multiple actors in Myanmar's political space complicate its China policy and limit its ability to hedge effectively. This is augmented by the military coup in February 2021, which further fragmented the country, compromising Myanmar's China policy even further, making hedging a less viable framework to examine Myanmar's China strategy.

China–Asean Relations January 2017 to March 2017: Chronology of Events

China–Asean Relations January 2017 to March 2017:Chronology of Events Ping Xiaojuan (bio) As a research institute based in Singapore, the EAI monitors developments in relations and interactions between China and the individual countries of Southeast Asia as well as the ASEAN grouping as a whole. This material is presented in the form of (i) a chronology of events and (ii) important documents. —the Editors JANUARY 2017 1st Chinese President Xi Jinping sends a message of condolences to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte over the typhoon Nock-ten that hit the Philippines, and caused heavy casualties and property damage. Xi emphasises that China and the Philippines are friendly neighbours. China expresses deep concern about the Philippine people who become homeless and affected by the disaster, and also readiness to provide emergency assistance to the typhoon-hit area. 3rd Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin meets with Cambodian Minister of Commerce Pan Sorasak. Liu reiterates that China is willing to intensify cooperation with Cambodia, comprehensively implement outcomes of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit and deepen practical cooperation in various fields, so as to bring more tangible benefits to the two peoples. Pan Sorasak states that the two countries have enjoyed a long-standing traditional friendship, and that Cambodia is ready to collaborate with the Chinese side to advance bilateral relations, especially economic and trade cooperation for greater development. 10th Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin meets the delegation led by the Director-General of the Department of Treaties and Law of the [End Page 208] Laotian Foreign Ministry Phoukhong Sisoulath at the Chinese foreign ministry for their first official consultation meeting to exchange in-depth views on the working mechanism and capacity-building of treaties and laws, legislation and contracting issues concerning foreign affairs, issues of human rights treaties, legal affairs relating to the domestic implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, relevant settlement of disputes pertaining to the China–Laos Investment Agreement and other issues. Both sides unanimously agreed that the establishment and continuation of such a consultation mechanism between the two counterpart departments is conducive to enriching and deepening the China–Laos comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. FEBRUARY 2017 7th The China–Myanmar "2+2" High-level Consultations led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence are held in Kunming, China. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission Shao Yuanming, Myanmar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs U Kyaw Tin and Myanmar's Chief of the No.1 Special Operations Bureau of the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar Armed Forces, Tun Tun Naung co-chair the consultations. Speaking positively about the sound development of China–Myanmar relations, both sides agree that proper and careful resolution of the northern Myanmar issue and the maintenance of peace and stability at the China–Myanmar border area are of great significance to promoting bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation in the new era. China expects the relevant parties in Myanmar to practise restraint and achieve a ceasefire in the northern Myanmar area soon to ensure stability at the China–Myanmar border area. Myanmar claims that it will take practical measures to stabilise the situation in northern Myanmar and advance the domestic peace process. Myanmar also welcomes China to play its due role in the process in a constructive way. At a joint press conference that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holds with Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop after the fourth round of the China–Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue, Wang highlights that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership and any other regional arrangement are all pathways leading to a larger goal of achieving a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Wang says that China stays positive and open to all regional arrangements conducive to promoting regional economic integration and safeguarding the global free trade system. Wang says China is ready to work with Australia to advance the RCEP initiative, [End Page 209] which is led by ASEAN in the 10 Plus Six Initiative, i.e. 10 ASEAN members and six dialogue partners, towards an early agreement and with the early conclusion of the RCEP. China can...

Nationalism and anti-ethno-politics: why ‘Chinese Development’ failed at Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam

In 2011, the Burmese military-backed government stunned global audiences by unilaterally suspending the construction of the Myitsone Dam, the cornerstone of China’s largest hydropower project abroad. This prominent failure of China’s “Going Out” investment strategy reverberated globally. Both Western and Chinese accounts frame the event as a pivotal moment in Myanmar’s celebrated reform process, the cooling of China–Myanmar relations, and US–China geopolitical rivalry in the Asia-Pacific. However, my ethnographic field and media research from 2010 to 2015 reveals that the mega-project’s failure does not originally stem from inter-state geopolitics or contested economics and ecology. Through chronological narration, I show how the Myitsone Dam is primarily the casualty of a distinctly ethno-political causality, whereby three nationalisms clashed and the replication of China’s “anti-ethno-political” model of development failed. Though no monolithic Chinese state directs “Chinese Development” overseas, individual Chinese entrepreneurs nonetheless draw from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) anti-political and state-centric paradigm when facing foreign social worlds. In the particular case of Myitsone, Chinese proponents drew from PRC’s state-nationalist heuristics of “national minorities and state-led development” and “Western anti-China conspiracy,” when facing Myanmar’s ethnic Kachin and Burman nationalisms. State ideological subjectivities of these developers seemed to blind them to the weakness in their own anti-ethno-political strategies, even when those collapsed publicly. I conclude that the Myitsone Dam’s construction will likely not be restarted, despite the hydropower company’s efforts. The Myitsone case also exemplifies how China’s previous historical entanglements in its neighboring regions uniquely disrupt the progress of “Going-Out” in Asia.

Myanmar's China Policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions

This paper argues that a key factor in Myanmar's new approach towards China since 2011 has been the Myanmar government's foreign policy goal to reintegrate itself into the international community. The success of this approach is dependent on Myanmar's rapprochement with the United States, which requires both domestic political reforms and a foreign policy realignment – a need to reduce Myanmar's dependence on China, particularly in the context of US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. In the context of China–Myanmar relations, the factors that have influenced Myanmar's China policy since 2011 are growing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar, growing concern over China's interference in Myanmar affairs, and the rapprochement with the United States. Myanmar's China policy shift, in terms of direction, is by no means to seek to be independent of China, but rather for there to be an increased interdependence between the two countries.

Differentiating the Politics of Dependency: Confucius Institutes in Cambodia and Myanmar

Cambodia and Myanmar are both identified as ＂pro-China＂ Indochinese countries with regimes that rely on political support and economic investment from Beijing. Cambodia and Myanmar, therefore, have become testing grounds for China 50 new soft power initiative of ＂spreading cultural understanding＂ by means of the establishment of Confucius Institutes. China 50 relations with both Cambodia and Myanmar are improving, but local responses to the Confucius Institute initiative differ in the two countries. Phnom Penh has one Confucius Institute and three Confucius Classrooms equipped with thirteen Chinese language teaching stations. including those installed in the Roy al Cambodian Armed Forces Academy and the Office of the Prime Minister: The initiative is enthusiastically championed by government and political leaders. In the case of Myanmar, three Confucius Classrooms, rather than Confucius Institutes, have been established by ethnic Chinese associations in Yangon and Mandalay. Lacking governmental endorsement, these Confucius Classrooms need to keep a low profile. The aim of this article is to differentiate between the politics of dependency in China-Cambodia and China Myanmar relations by exploring local contexts and responses to Beijing's soft power initiatives.

Post-Myitsone Relations Between China and Myanmar – More Continuity than Change?

While the world's media has centred on the opening up of Myanmar and the removal of sanctions by the West, less attention has been focused on Myanmar's relations with China. Can this relationship be ignored within the context of the Sino-American rivalry in the Asia-Pacific? This policy article focuses on the recent evolution of China-Myanmar relations and Chinese interests in and perceptions of Myanmar in transition.

China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence Georgetown University, November 4, 2011

Georgetown University’s Asian Studies program hosted a conference on November 4, 2011 entitled “China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence.” The conference included panel discussions by scholars and government officials from China, Myanmar, Thailand, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and the United States. With an attendance of over 150 people, it proved that discussions regarding the Sino–Myanmar relationship are able to attract interest in Washington.

China and Myanmar

Three decades of economic reform have led to a comprehensive recasting of China’s geostrategic priorities in its immediate periphery. China’s relations with Myanmar are an instance of a bilateral relationship that has gone from strength to strength in the past two decades following internal political upheavals in the late 1980s that motivated the two countries to reach out to each other following international opprobrium. This article will explain the strategic nature of relations between Myanmar and China in the last decade and attempt to posit this equation in a South Asian context. The structure of the article includes includes four sections—the first section is a brief introduction that captures five decades of relations between Myanmar and China from 1950 to 2000; the second section examines the comprehensive nature of their bilateral relations; the third section analyses mutual perceptions; and the concluding section focuses on the impact China–Myanmar relations has on the South Asian region. There are two central arguments in this research article—the first revolves around the hypothesis that Myanmar–China relations are motivated by geo-strategic and geo-economic considerations. The second argument rests on the premise that there is no ‘client dependency’ in this bilateral relationship and China–Myanmar relations while ‘close’ and ‘friendly’ do have their share of concerns.