Chilcot Report Research Articles

Intelligence Failure as a Mutually Reinforcing Politico-Intelligence Dynamic: The Chilcot Report and the Nature of the Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure

By the time the Chilcot Report was published in July 2016, inquiries of one sort or another focusing on Iraq had been a semi-permanent feature of British politics for a quarter of a century. These stretched back to the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the House of Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee’s investigation of Britain’s role in producing a ‘supergun’ for Saddam Hussein’s regime, and included Sir Richard Scott’s 1992–96 investigation into the export of defence and dual-use goods to Iraq.1 The question of intelligence failure in relation to the 2003 invasion of Iraq had itself been either the context for or subject of four previous inquiries by the time the Chilcot inquiry was established. The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) quickly published a report into The Decision to Go to War in Iraq in July 2003,2 but without access to intelligence assessments. The parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) produced its report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence and Assessments in September 2003.3 This was followed by the report of a judicial inquiry conducted by a former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Lord Hutton, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly, a Ministry of Defence biological weapons expert who committed suicide after giving evidence to the FAC inquiry.4 After this report in January 2004, the Blair Government felt obliged to concede a further inquiry into the WMD question, to be conducted by a team of privy counsellors led by former Cabinet Secretary Lord Butler and including former Northern Ireland Permanent Secretary Sir John Chilcot among its members.

Entering the Invisible College: Defeating Lawyers on Their Own Turf

The fifth volume of the Chilcot Report describes the development of the legal advice provided by Lord Goldsmith to the British government on the legality of the invasion in Iraq. It tracks his change of mind from the view that UNSC Resolution 1441 did not authorise military action, to the ‘better view’1 that no further resolution was needed to authorise military action. Some sixty pages into volume 5 of the Report, a remarkable exchange between Lord Goldsmith, Jack Straw and Sir Michael Wood is described.2 It starts with a memo by Wood, who states there is ‘no doubt’ about the illegality of using force against Iraq, ‘without a further decision of the [Security] Council,...

Learning from the Chilcot report: Propaganda, deception and the ‘War on Terror’

Abstract The 2016 Iraq Inquiry Report (the Chilcot report) was highly critical of the British government and its involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation. Drawing upon the authoritative material in the report, this article provides the most comprehensive and conceptually grounded post-Chilcot assessment of the empirical evidence now available regarding whether deception and propaganda were used to mobilize support for the invasion of Iraq. Employing a conceptual framework designed to identify deceptive organized persuasive communication (OPC), it is argued that the Chilcot report supports the thesis that, through distortions and omissions, deceptive OPC campaigns presented a misleading impression of both the threat posed by Iraqi WMD and Britain’s commitment to a peaceful resolution via the ‘UN route’. Moreover, based upon UK-US communications in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Chilcot report also provides suggestive but highly significant evidence of a broader and covert geo-strategic policy, including action against Syria and Iran, and which was underpinned by a ‘close knit propaganda campaign’. In light of this, it is argued that a major expansion of scholarly inquiry is necessary involving sustained analysis of the establishing phase of the ‘War on Terror’, the role that deception and propaganda might have played with respect to its enablement, and, more broadly, the implications of this for our understanding of propaganda and deception in liberal democratic states.

The Iraq Inquiry: UK interests in Iraqi oil

Abstract The main official reason given by the Allied powers for invading Iraq in 2003 was to destroy Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction. There was hardly any mention of the role of oil in the war. Iraq’s crude oil reserves are among the five largest globally. This fact did not escape the attention of allied politicians. The Chilcot Report made it clear that public statements on the war should focus on the Weapons of Mass Destruction, and that no mention should be made of oil interests, in order not to antagonize Iraqi public opinion and raise the suspicion that the war is about western control of Iraq’s oil. The Report revealed that scores of meetings took place between UK government officials and leading British oil firms such as BP and Shell to ensure that the firms received a sizeable share of the upstream contracts following the war. The Report also showed concerns raised by British officials of US attempts to stop Russia’s negative position towards the war in the UN Security Council by promising upstream oil contracts to Russian firms. British officials also complained that the United States kept the oil file strictly under its domain, particularly after the war ended. The Report documents beyond doubt the role of oil interests in the war, despite the fact that the subject was not raised publicly by the Allied officials.

What the Chilcot report teaches us

Abstract After six years the United Kingdom embarked upon an official inquiry into its participation in the 2003 attack on Iraq and role in the subsequent occupation up until 2009. The inquiry, known by the last name of its chair, Sir John Chilcot, produced an exhaustive report that contains many details of great interest, but it is disappointing when it comes to the bigger questions relating to the culpability and accountability of Tony Blair, the relationship between Britain and international law in war–peace contexts, and a considered analysis of the proper show of respect for the authority of the United Nations by a member State. This article offers a critical appraisal of the United Kingdom’s 2016 Iraq Inquiry.

The mother of all post-mortems

ABSTRACTThe most striking finding of the Chilcot Report is that the record reveals little that was previously unknown. A key point for its authors is that diplomatic alternatives had not been exhausted when the US and UK went to war. But, short of an armed attack by the other side, it is hard to say when they would have been. Here what was crucial was the belief shared by Bush and Blair that Saddam Hussain would not and could not change. For the British the issue of whether alternatives to war remained is particularly important because of its implications for international law, something that did not trouble the Americans. It remains unclear if Blair would have gained or lost leverage over Bush had he made British participation contingent on better American policy, for example on developing a workable plan for the reconstruction of Iraq.

The Chilcot Report: Some Thoughts on International Law and Legal Advice

The Report of the Iraq (Chilcot) Inquiry was finally published, 7 years after the Inquiry’s creation, on 6 July 2016. The scope of the Inquiry’s work was vast, and this was reflected in the enormous size of its final Report. The publication of the Report thus raises a multitude of questions requiring further analysis. In this short article, we aim to contribute some initial thoughts, immediately following the Report’s publication, in just two (interrelated) areas. First, we comment on the role of international law in the Chilcot Inquiry. To what extent was international law considered and how was it presented in the Report? We also ask whether the Report reaches any implicit substantive legal conclusions, despite formally refraining from determinations of law. Secondly, we review the Inquiry’s findings concerning international legal advice and legal advisers. In particular, we contribute some thoughts on the Report’s treatment of questions relating to the appropriate recipients of legal advice and its transparency, the timeliness of advice, the perception and treatment of law and legal advice by the Government, and the independence and quality of that advice.

Dirty Hands and Clean Heels: 21 days of political leadership in the UK

The paper discusses 21 days of political leadership in the UK following the EU referendum, the publication of the Chilcot Report on the Iraq War, and the appointment of a new cabinet by the new Prime Minister, Theresa May. It begins by modelling four possible approaches to political decision-making by taking into account the intent of the decision-maker, their acceptance or avoidance of responsibility, and the nature of the consequences. It suggests that ‘Dirty Hands’ exists when the decision-maker recognizes the deleterious consequences of what they deem to be necessary action – and intends to engender these – but takes responsibility. ‘Clean Heels’ embodies a decision where the decision-maker recognizes the consequences might be deleterious and intends them to be so, but avoids all responsibility. Mea Culpa describes a decision-maker who did not intend deleterious consequences but having seen them occur takes responsibility. Finally, the Spectator is someone who has no intention of making any difference to anything and thus takes no responsibility, but often plays a destructively critical role from the sidelines. This heuristic – and it is no more than a heuristic – is then illustrated by considering the actions of four decision-makers during this period: Boris Johnson, Tony Blair, Nigel Farage, and Theresa May.

Chilcot Report: Department for International Aid

Chilcot Report: Department for International Aid

Chilcot Report: Army

The Political QuarterlyVolume 87, Issue 4 p. 481-483 Original Article Chilcot Report: Army Michael Clarke, Michael ClarkeSearch for more papers by this author Michael Clarke, Michael ClarkeSearch for more papers by this author First published: 14 October 2016 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12302Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume87, Issue4October–December 2016Pages 481-483 RelatedInformation

Chilcot Report: Media

The Political QuarterlyVolume 87, Issue 4 p. 488-489 Original Article Chilcot Report: Media David Loyn, David LoynSearch for more papers by this author David Loyn, David LoynSearch for more papers by this author First published: 04 October 2016 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12306Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume87, Issue4October–December 2016Pages 488-489 RelatedInformation

Chilcot Report: Post‐Invasion Planning

The Political QuarterlyVolume 87, Issue 4 p. 486-487 Original Article Chilcot Report: Post-Invasion Planning Emma Sky, Emma SkySearch for more papers by this author Emma Sky, Emma SkySearch for more papers by this author First published: 04 November 2016 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12303Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume87, Issue4October–December 2016Pages 486-487 RelatedInformation

Chilcot Report: Law

The Political QuarterlyVolume 87, Issue 4 p. 490-495 Original Article Chilcot Report: Law Andrew T. Williams, Andrew T. WilliamsSearch for more papers by this author Andrew T. Williams, Andrew T. WilliamsSearch for more papers by this author First published: 28 September 2016 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12301Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume87, Issue4October–December 2016Pages 490-495 RelatedInformation

Britain’s Difficult War in Iraq

The Chilcot report contains a wealth of evidence and analysis to show that, throughout the Iraq War, Britain was lacking in competent strategic leadership.

The Chilcot Report

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Report) was recently published. In this article, Christopher Elliott observes that, while the Chilcot Report has shed light on Britain’s involvement in the conflict, it could have provided a more detailed assessment of the decision-making processes for the UK’s military operations.