Chief Of Mission Research Articles

Legal Status of Couriers of Diplomatic Bags (Analytical Study)

The mutual interrelationships between the persons of international law are the most characteristic of contemporary international life. The function of practicing these relationships it is the responsibility of the competent instituations to manage them. These relations are means (instrument) of practicing diplomatic and consular affairs that bind international entities together. The presence of these instituations is necessary under the emergence of unexpected problems among international entities, to mitigate their effects. All these issues will be through missions are specially formed to achieve the objectives, and these missions consist of two elements: personal and material. The first element includes: the chief of mission, staff…etc. The second element includes: mission office, mission archive, means of diplomatic communication…etc. Diplomatic means of communication include: diplomatic bag, electronic media…etc. Therefore, the diplomatic bag has an important role in the diplomatic action. No less important than what we said, the issue of how to transfer the diplomatic bag between countries. International law regulated this issue by studying what is a diplomatic bag? Or what should it include? Also, its immunity. International law was also concerned with regulated diplomatic couriers, their types and their immunities.

Death and Life at Sea

Luca Casarini, who has served as “chief of mission” on the Mare Jonio, recounts the experience of sailing on the ship and rescuing migrants in distress. He situates his personal experiences in the context of the current plight of migrants in the Central Mediterranean and the Italian government’s attacks against humanitarian organizations.

The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments

Media accounts of presidential appointments have often characterized the ambassadorial appointments process as overtaken by patronage concerns, with the most attractive posts set aside for those responsible for the president's election, few of whom have diplomatic experience. Here, using original data on all ambassadors, envoys, and other chiefs of mission appointed during the 68th through 112th Congresses, I leverage the credentialing process of the Foreign Service to conduct an empirical test of the determinants of professional versus nonprofessional appointments. I find that Foreign Service appointments are more likely when there exists significant ideological distance between the appointing president and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when the difficulty of the posting is high, and when the attractiveness of the posting is low.

Amateurs or Ambassadors? The Political Determinants of Professional Diplomats

Media accounts of presidential appointments have often characterized the ambassadorial appointments process as overtaken by patronage concerns, with the most attractive posts set aside for those responsible for the president’s election, few of whom have diplomatic experience. Here, using original data on all ambassadors, envoys, and other chiefs of mission appointed during the 68th through 112th Congresses, I leverage the credentialing process of the Foreign Service to conduct an empirical test of the determinants of professional versus nonprofessional appointments. I find that Foreign Service appointments are more likely when there exists significant ideological distance between the appointing president and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when the difficulty of the posting is high, and when the attractiveness of the posting is low.

The Path that Led to the Cease-Fire Ending the War of Attrition and the Stationing of Missiles at the Suez Canal

At midnight on 7 August 1970, the military episode known as the ‘War of Attrition’ came to an end.1 On 3 June 1970, after long months of fierce fighting across the Suez Canal between Egypt and Isra...

Bosom Buddies?

surfaced that rocked the traditionally calm corridors of the United Nations secretariat, while at the same time highlighting the depths of the problems faced by the UN secretary-general. Spineless, ineffectual, lacking in charisma and above all “conspicuous in [his] absence at critical moments,” the memo from the distinguished deputy chief of mission of Norway only highlighted publicly what many had known for some time: Ban Ki-moon is in deep trouble. At the same time that Obama appears to have his own problems with Congress and America’s worsening economic problems, the UN chief is faced with having to find his own way out of a wilderness. It is now almost axiomatic to say that the election of Barack Obama inspired hopes for a new American relationship with the United Nations. Not only did Obama campaign for the White House on a platform of renewed American multilateralism, but in his first year in office, he pressed for dramatic changes in U.S. policy at the United Nations and sought a deepening American involvement in the world’s only universal security organization. But, after the initial engagement period, the close U.S.-UN partnership, which many observers had expected and hoped for after the contentious relationship of the George W. Bush presidency, has not developed. In fact, though Washington has arranged its priorities more along the lines of the UN’s own agendas, there is now an unacknowledged but discordant note in the Obama administration’s dealings with the United Nations. In his recent speeches, Obama rarely mentions the organization. While he has met the secretary-general in a few private get-togethers, the relationship is cordial but not personal. Furthermore, in the White House’s pursuit of its overseas policies, especially on the critical issues of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Iran and North Korea (except for sanctions), and on other matters like global warming and terrorism, the administration has, for the most part, sidelined the United Nations. Admittedly, President Obama has been preoccupied by a series of domestic issues— above all, the economic crisis and health care reform, not to mention his sagging popularity. But beyond those priorities, American disenchantment with the United Nations seems to stem from a more general feeling that the body is simply not acting as forcefully as it should be in the global arena. Obama clearly desires a UN leadership he can work with, along the lines of President Stephen Schlesinger is a fellow at the Century Foundation and the former director of the World Policy Institute. He is the author of Bitter Fruit (Doubleday, 1982), about the U.S. coup in Guatemala; Act of Creation (Westview, 2003) about the founding of the United Nations; and coeditor of Journals 1952–2000, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (Penguin, 2007).

Federated States of Micronesia

Federated States of Micronesia John R. Haglelgam (bio) The beginning of this review period was particularly busy. The new national administration led by President Emanuel Mori had just been inaugurated and the political watchers were focusing on nominations for department heads. The first batch of nominees the president submitted included his uncle for secretary of resources and development, and his brother-in-law for FSM ambassador to the United States. The respective congressional committees favorably recommended the nominations for approval. However, the whole congress rejected both. Neither the reports of the jurisdictional committees nor the floor debates addressed the issue of nepotism, which was foremost in everyone's mind. Regardless, the political pundits knew that the two nominations were rejected because the nominees are close relatives of the president, who is from Chuuk State. In this particular case, the FSM public can heave a sigh of relief that the built-in checks and balances at the national level worked. The president nominated Makato Robert from Chuuk as his attorney general. At the time of his nomination, Robert was still facing charges of unethical practices in the FSM Supreme Court. In its report, the Judiciary and Governmental Operation Committee criticized the court for not acting promptly on the nominee's application for reinstatement to the FSM bar, but ignored the fact that the nominee still cannot appear before the FSM Supreme Court. Regardless of the deficiency in Robert's credentials, the FSM Congress took the bizarre action of approving his nomination. It is not clear how the new attorney general will represent the nation before the FSM Supreme Court, and how much damage this action has done to the reputation, image, and legitimacy of the national government. At the time of this writing, the Mori administration has filled almost all the major overseas posts with new ambassadors. Yosiwo George, the former governor and chief justice of Kosrae and most recently the manager of MiCare, the national government health insurance program, is the new FSM ambassador to the United States. John Fritz, a Japanese-educated Chuukese and longtime staff member of the embassy in Tokyo, has taken over from Kasio Mida as the ambassador to Japan. The former counsel general in Guam, Samson Pretrick, has become the new ambassador to Fiji. Masao Nakayama remains the head of the FSM Permanent Mission at the United Nations. Beijing is the only unfilled overseas post, but Carl Apis, a Pohnpeian, has been appointed as deputy chief of mission there. The consul general positions in Guam and [End Page 114] Honolulu are filled respectively by Gersen Jackson of Kosrae and Akilino Susaia of Pohnpei. Jackson is a former lieutenant governor of Kosrae, and Susaia served as the secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs under former President Joseph Ursemal. It is interesting to note that Masao Nakayama is the only remaining member of the old FSM diplomatic corp. Yosiwo George served a couple of years as head of the FSM mission at the United Nations in New York. Pretrick and Fritz are new in their posts but they are experienced diplomats. The two consul generals are new to diplomacy, but they are experienced administrators. The FSM president's cabinet consists almost entirely of new members. Finley Perman, a former official of the Pohnpei state government, now heads the Department of Finance and Administration; Lorin Robert, the former deputy secretary of foreign affairs, became the head of that department. Vita Skilling, a physician at the Kosrae state hospital, became the secretary of the new Department of Health and Social Affairs. The head of the newly renamed Department of Resources and Development is Peter Christian, the former Speaker of the national congress. Casiano Shoniber, the former Pohnpei state director of education, took over the new Department of Education. Francis Itimai, the former director of planning and budget in Yap, became secretary of transportation, communication, and infrastructure; the former head of that department, Andrew Yatilmal, now heads the Office of Environment and Emergency Management. Dr Rufino Mauricio remains the director of the newly expanded Office of National Archives, Culture, and Historic Preservation. Fabian Nimea, former manager of the Pohnpei Branch of the Bank of the FSM, becomes the director...

Transforming International Legal Principles into National Law: The Right to a Nationality and the Avoidance of Statelessness

Journal Article Transforming International Legal Principles into National Law: The Right to a Nationality and the Avoidance of Statelessness Get access Carol A. Batchelor Carol A. Batchelor Chief of Mission, a.i., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, India Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 25, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 8–25, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0142 Published: 01 September 2006

AMERICA’S FIRST FEMALE CHIEF OF MISSION: RUTH BRYAN OWEN, MINISTER TO DENMARK, 1933–36

This article examines the career of the United States’ first female chief of mission, Ruth Bryan Owen, Minister to Denmark (1933–36). After briefly tracing Owen’s background, it explores President Franklin Roosevelt’s pathbreaking appointment; the highlights of Owen’s Ministry, notably her practice of “people’s diplomacy”; the circumstances of her resignation; and her strengths and weaknesses as an envoy. It concludes that although Owen was not a brilliant diplomat, she was extremely popular and sufficiently effective to establish firmly the precedent of female appointments, and thus deserves recognition as an important pioneer in eroding the male domination of American diplomacy. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Soo Chun Lu, the support of Pennsylvania State University, and the research assistance of Michelle Terzigni.

B1. Former U.S. Diplomats, Open Letter to President George W. Bush, 4 May 2004.

The following letter, drafted following the example of the senior British diplomats' letter to British prime minister Tony Blair (Doc. A2), was signed by eighty retired U.S. diplomats, including former ambassadors to Albania, Bangladesh, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guyana, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Togo, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, as well as a number of chiefs of mission, consuls general, and chiefs of station. In contrast to the British letter, which criticizes British policy both with regard to Israel and Iraq, the U.S. letter focuses exclusively on Bush's policies in the Israeli-Palestinian arena and most notably his endorsement of the Sharon plan and recent policy changes on final status issues. The letter was published in the Guardian on 4 May and is available online at www.commondreams.org

The human rights situation in present-day Cuba

It is a pleasure to be here with you today. I wish to thank the University of Miami, the Cuban Transition Project and Dr. Jaime Suchlicki for their kind invitation to speak with you on a subject that occupies most of my waking moments, the struggle for the respect of human rights in Cuba and the transition towards a participatory form of government. These, along with continued successful implementation of the 1994/1995 Migration Accords, remain our primary objectives in Cuba. I am a career foreign service officer with more than 33 years of experience, mostly in Latin America and southern Europe. For the last eight months, I have been serving as the chief of mission of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. It is a unique place and the experience has so far provided me with some of the most interesting tales I will have to tell about my service to my country. But a month ago, I would have started this speech by drawing attention to the fact that the Cuban people had managed to preserve their fundamental dignity in the face of more than four decades of repressive rule. Today, I must say that dignity is being stretched very thin. With its recent crackdown against human rights activists and the country's nascent civil society, the Castro regime has shown that it is willing to risk even the ire of the international community to maintain its central role. I say the government is repressive because no one I deal with on a regular basis in Cuba says otherwise. And in fact, all of our allies agree that their policy goal in Cuba is, ultimately, the same as ours; the rapid and peaceful transition to a democratic government characterized by strong support for human rights and an open market economy. Before I get to the heart of my remarks, I'd like to discuss recent events that have a direct impact on our efforts to support safe, orderly and legal migration. As you are aware, there have been six hijackings in the last six months, three of which occurring over the last three weeks. I want to take this opportu-

'A Woman's Touch in Foreign Affairs'? The Career of Ambassador Frances E. Willis

Although women have now attained the top ranks of American foreign policymaking, we know relatively little about the early history of American women diplomats, and even less about one of the most important: Frances E. Willis (1899-1983), the first woman chief of mission to have emerged from the career Foreign Service. This article seeks to help fill this gap by tracing Willis' career; suggesting how she succeeded; and exploring how she approached 'the women's issue'. It argues, in part, that Willis' success stemmed from the influence of mentors; her competence, perfectionism, and self-confidence; and her refusal to make an issue of her sex. These survival strategies notwithstanding, it also concludes that Willis exhibited gender-consciousness, took pride in her accomplishments as a woman, and knowingly pursued low-key, moderate means towards feminist ends.

Doing It All Wrong in the Middle East: Iraq

Edward Peck, a retired U.S. ambassador, served as chief of mission in Baghdad from 1977 to 1980.

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

By two circular notes, both dated December 22, 1993, the Secretary of State informed the Chiefs of Mission at Washington,,first, of recently enacted congressional legislation related to nonpayment of parking fines or penalties owed to the District of Columbia, and second, of a new policy with respect to payment of parking tickets, effective January 1, 1994, that the Department of State had initiated in response to congressional concerns about the problem and in cooperation with the District of Columbia.

Career versus political: A statistical overview of presidential appointments of United States chiefs of mission since 1915

Career versus political: A statistical overview of presidential appointments of United States chiefs of mission since 1915

Perez de Cuellar and the Iran‐Iraq War

Negotiation JournalVolume 8, Issue 2 p. 173-184 Perez de Cuellar and the Iran-Iraq War Cameron R. Hume, Cameron R. Hume Cameron E. Hume is a foreign service officer who has been a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. At the request of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy he has recently completed writing a history of the United Nations' dealings with Iran and Iraq. Hume is currently serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See, Rome, Italy.Search for more papers by this author Cameron R. Hume, Cameron R. Hume Cameron E. Hume is a foreign service officer who has been a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. At the request of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy he has recently completed writing a history of the United Nations' dealings with Iran and Iraq. Hume is currently serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See, Rome, Italy.Search for more papers by this author First published: April 1992 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1992.tb00662.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume8, Issue2April 1992Pages 173-184 RelatedInformation

The efforts of the Truman administration to resolve the Arab‐Israeli conflict

A basic and virtually unquestioned assumption of the Truman administration was that economic aid could induce desired political results. The Marshall Plan stands out in this respect, but the favourable combination of enlighted self-interest and positive recipient motivation was not always to be found. In the Middle East, where the problem was to initiate economic development (unlike the European problem of recovery from war and financial dislocation), the political difficulties were unyielding and frustrating. Nevertheless the administration went to considerable lengths to prepare economic inducements which would be sufficiently attractive to create 'conditions favorable for a settlement'.' This approach was the hallmark of the New Deal inheritance, and was based on an optimistic view of society typical of the Democratic Party. As a tactic for dealing with Middle East conflicts, it provided a basis for a shrewd disengagement from political stalemate. The Truman administration realized nonetheless that a prime ingredient was necessary some willingness on the part of the recipients to accept responsibility for the refugee situation created by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Responsible and cooperative attitudes, however, were submerged beneath strong political emotions. The Saudi monarch Ibn Saud was paranoid in his fear of being surrounded by Hashemite enemies on the thrones of Iraq and Jordan. Egypt was profoundly suspicious of the British connections of the Hashemites, and of Abdullah's 'Greater Syria' ambitions which included the desire to annex Central Palestine. At the same time, the Iraq-Jordan rift intensified with the agitation for the unity of Iraq and Syria. Cutting across the rivalries and opposing ideological movements of the Arab world was a view of the new Jewish state as an alien intrusion rather than as a gallant testimony of creative survival. While in Israel itself, the fundamental commitment was to unlimited Jewish immigration despite its threat to blot out the country's prospects of economic viability. The Truman administration tried to convince the Arabs of American friendship, while at the same time working for a solution of the conflict. But sectarian misunderstanding was inherent in the situation. American support for Israel's application for membership of the United Nations, which was approved in May 1949, was resented. For its part, Israel accused the State Department of pro-Arab bias and saw its chief support in the White House. In turn, the executive denied that policy was determined on two different levels,2 and strove for a coherent and balanced approach. In response to misunderstandings about its intentions, and to maintain policy cohesiveness across a range of distant outposts, the State Department convened a meeting of Chiefs of Mission in the Near East at the end of

United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1982. Compiled by Evan M. Duncan. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Publication #8738, 1982. Pp. 394. Free, paper.)

United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1982. Compiled by Evan M. Duncan. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Publication #8738, 1982. Pp. 394. Free, paper.)

Interview: Helmut Sonnenfeldt with Philip Geyelin

INTERVIEW: HELMUT SONNENFELDT WITH PHILIP GEYELIN Helmut Sonnenfeldt, now a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institute, was born in Berlin and became a U.S. citizen in 1944. A graduate of SAIS, he was thL· review's first editor. Later he served as a Soviet scholar and director of intelligence and research in the State Department, moved to the White House to become senior member of the National Security Council staff, and then returned to the State Department as counselor under Secretary KL·singer. In 1976 he was "traduced," in ^singer's words, by a series of newspaper columns that elevated a confidential account of an informal policy dmussion to the level of a "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." The incident was shortly caught up in the presidential campaign of that year as evidence of a supposed "softness" toward the Soviet's role in Eastern Europe—"an absurd accusation," according to Kttsinger, "reflecting a woeful ignorance of the convictions and contributions of an outstanding public servant" whose "superb analyses" have been confirmed "with the passage of time to be penetrating, shrewd, and wL·^" In the following interview with Philip Geyelin, syndicated columntit and editor-in-residence at The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS, Mr. Sonnenfeldtdxcusses the circumstances surroundingthe matterofthe "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" and updates hL· views on current issues having to do with Poland in particuhr, and East-West refations in general. GEYELIN: You have become unjustlyfamous as a consequence ofhavingyour name attached to a doctrine having to do with Eastern Europe and our policy toward the Soviets. How did that all come about? SONNENFELDT: It came about because there was a discussion of American policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in a meeting in London of the American Chiefs of Mission in Europe in December 1975. It was a 161 162 SAIS REVIEW rather freewheeling discussion which, after a lapse of several weeks, the State Department decided to paraphrase in a very condensed form in order to give the participants a summary of what had been said. The particular telegram that contained this nonverbatim account was given to a number of journalists by somebody in the government, and two of them [Evans and Novak] chose to give it some play by picking some of the phrases out of the discussion relating to Eastern Europe, changing the phrases, and making it appear as though I had advocated essentially the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union as a way of keeping Eastern Europe quiet. It's hard to say why precisely this newspaper story received as much attention and currency as it did. One reason, no doubt, was that it came against the background ofa critique, misplaced in my opinion, ofthe Helsinki Final Act, and the widespread allegations made in late 1975 and early 1976 in connection with the presidential campaign that the U.S. administration had sold out Eastern Europe permanently to the Soviet Union. As events have shown, both the critique of the Helsinki Final Act, and the version of American policy toward Eastern Europe attributed to me, were quite erroneous . Therefore, the debate that resulted, if it can be dignified by that term, was quite unnecessary, and in any event wholly distorted. It did not address the genuine issues and dilemmas we have always faced when making policy toward Eastern Europe, but especially since Eastern Europe has been in flux since the early 1970s. GEYELIN: What was the policy you meant to convey ? SONNENFELDT: The policy discussed at the meeting, and on which I commented, was the policy of differentiating between the countries of Eastern Europe, encouraging internal change, and urging more active and normal relations with the Western world to the extent that it was in the United States' power to do so. At the same time this policy recognized that in terms of power the Soviet Union was nearby and had demonstrated a capability and a readiness to employ its raw power whenever it felt that developments in the East European countries were getting out of control. In other words, the discussion did not come to any firm conclusions about this set of problems. It highlighted the complexity of conducting a policy of fostering change...

Wooden O's in Plastic Boxes: Shakespeare and Television

Royal jealousy: accused queen dies; schoolboy prince felled by psychosomatic illness. Princess abandoned in diapers as chief of mission is eaten in animal encounter. But younger generation heals all wounds as king repents and maternal statue walks off pedestal. Whatis unmistakable in this parody is not so much the plot of The Winter's Tale as the style of TV GUIDE. The television ambience—even its flack—is saturated in the television style: vividness through disconnection; 'relevance' no matter how irrelevant; diction that leapfrogs fact and logic to land with a thump on cliché and pizzazz. The style is enveloping, as our instant recognition shows. In contrast, there is no pervasive 'theatrical' style. We rarely experience a staged play by Shakespeare in the context of other plays. Only reviewers attend the theatre night after night, so for most of us the foil and context of stage performance is the daily round. But the foil and context of Shakespeare on television is other television. All's Well and Macbeth are time-slots between Whatever and the Eleven O'Clock News, items in the weekly line-up—of which the general viewer watches enough hours a day to constitute something like a university teaching load. I am, however, less concerned about the possible contamination of Titus Andronicus by Kojak or about the operation of Gresham's Law of Show Biz than about some consequent differences between the situations of the theatre and the television audiences.