Cheng Brothers Research Articles

How to attain oneness through internal affectivity (neigan)? Divergent responses in the philosophy of the Cheng brothers

ABSTRACT This article examines the neo-Confucian response to the question, “How to achieve the state of oneness,” as put forth by Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao. While both philosophers achieve this state through internal affectivity, their interpretations diverge significantly. Cheng Yi views internal affectivity as an inherent goodness that emanates from the pre-manifested mind but warns against emotional instability and desires. He thus rejects the notion of “teaching benevolence through perception.” (yijue xunren) and instead emphasizing the primacy of the unmanifested mind in attaining oneness. Conversely, Cheng Hao stresses the inward perception of bodily sensations and supports “teaching benevolence through perception.” He argues that through sensory arousal and the transformation of vital energy, the mind and body can achieve harmony, thereby embodying the benevolence present in “heaven, earth, and all things.” This divergence in their approaches to oneness reflects their differing responses to Buddhism and contrasting views on human nature.

Which is More Important? Moral Virtue or Life itself?: An Exploration of a Confucian Theme

AbstractThis paper examines a dilemma within the Confucian tradition wherein one is forced to choose between upholding moral virtue and preserving one's own life. The mainstream view valorises and exalts the act of sacrificing one's life in order to uphold moral virtue. There are many supporters of this view, spanning across different periods, including but not limited to Confucius, Mencius, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, and so on. There is, however, an opposing voice within the Confucian tradition. Wang Gen, a Neo‐Confucian thinker and founder of the Taizhou School of thought, opposes the mainstream position by arguing for the primacy of life and against the glorification of these acts of sacrifice. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to trace the development of the mainstream view within the Confucian tradition. The second aim investigates how Wang Gen argues against the mainstream position whilst situating himself within the Confucian tradition.

정주(程朱)의 충서론(忠恕論)과 당대신유가의 해석

Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi explained Zhongshu忠恕 by dividing it into the Zhongshu of saints and the Zhongshu of scholars. If the Zhongshu of a saint completely realizes the Zhongshu of heaven and earth without any selfishness, the Zhongshu of a scholar requires constant efforts to practice. In particular, Zhu Xi paid attention to the Zhongshu of scholars, set up a problem situation in which Zhongshu was not carried out properly, and then suggested the study of deliberation and sincerity as a solution. According to Cheng-Zhu’s theory of Zhongshu, Zhong and Shu have a logical structure of Ti體 and Yong用. The relationship between the two can be seen as the relationship between Ili一理 and Wanshu萬殊. Feng Youlan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan, who are counted as the contemporary Confucians, each presented different interpretations of Cheng-Zhu’s theory of Zhongshu from their own perspectives. Feng Youlan refers to “Desiring to take his stand, one who is Good helps others to take their stand; wanting to realize himself, he helps others to realize themselves.” as Zhong忠, “Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire.” as Shu恕. On the other hand, Tang Junyi considers the former as active Shu and the latter as passive Shu. In addition, Xu Fuguan divided Zhong and Shu into two aspects: the completion of one’s own self(成己) and the completion of all things(成物). Lastly, Mou Zongsan insists that Cheng Mingdao’s understanding which explained Zhongshu in the dimension where the heavenly principle is constantly revealed, that is, “existing and active”, is correct. In addition, he evaluates that the explanations of Cheng Yichuan and Zhu Xi did not properly explain the true meaning of Zhongshu. The various explanations of the contemporary Confucians on Zhongshu each have their own grounds for argument. It can be said that their various reading methods have broadened the horizon of interpretation. Korean scholars generally take the view of Tang Junyi’s view, which divides Shu into positive and negative aspects among Contemporary Confucians’ Interpretations. I think this is because it keeps in mind Cheng-Zhu’s theory of Zhongshu. In the future, in-depth discussions on the modern significance of Zhongshu should be added.

Zhuxi's criticism of The School of Cheng Brothers' Idea of Investigate Things and the 'internal and external' issues of Investigate Things targets

이 글은 『대학』 格物說에 대한 二程과 程門의 관점 그리고 그에 대한 주자의 계승과 비판을, 특히 격물의 ‘대상’ 문제를 중심으로 검토함으로써 주자의 사상적 지향과 특징을 구명하는데 목적이 있다. 주자는 『대학』 주석에서 유일하게 격물의 대상 문제에 대해서만 정문의 관점을 비판한다. 주체 내면과 외부 세계를 모두 탐구하라는 이정의 관점과 달리 정문은 내면의 문제에만 천착했다는 것이 비판의 핵심이다. 정문과 주자는 모두 이정을 계승하여, 주체 내면과 외부 세계는 동일한 이치를 지니고 있다고 말한다. 즉 ‘내외합일’이다. 그러나 정문은 외부 세계에 대한 탐구의 궁극적 목적이 주체 내면의 인격적 확립이라고 생각한다. 때문에 외부 세계에 대한 탐구보다는 내면의 도덕성에 좀 더 주목해야 한다고 주장한다. 반면 주자는 외부 세계에 대한 탐구의 독립적 의의를 인정한다. 그에게서 격물은 대상에 대한 인지적 이해가 아니라, 대상과 주체 모두가 온전한 상태(各得其所)를 얻어 원만한 관계를 맺는 것이기 때문이다. 때문에 정문에게서 ‘내외합일’은 사실상 주체로의 수렴을 의미하지만, 주자에게서는 ‘관계’ 차원에서의 주객의 소멸을 의미한다.

From Philosophy to Neo-Confucianism and Back: Yong Huang's Why Be Moral?

From Philosophy to Neo-Confucianism and Back:Yong Huang's Why Be Moral? Kam-por Yu (bio) Special Features of the Book Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers by Yong Huang is a work of comparative philosophy with an original approach. It is a careful and learned study of two important philosophers in Chinese philosophy, but at the same time it is an interesting and stimulating alternative introduction to fundamental philosophical problems. Huang explains: "My interest is not in exploring the similarities and differences between Confucianism and virtue ethics in the West …, but in seeking the possible contributions Confucianism can make to contemporary virtue ethics" (p. 68). I think Huang is able to deliver very well the goods he has set out to deliver. The topics discussed are all living issues in contemporary philosophy. Such topics include: why be moral; the critique that virtue ethics is self-centered; the problem of the weakness of the will; the debate between universalism and particularism; the distinction between the political and the personal; and the idea of a moral metaphysics. The book aspires to "argue that the Chinese thinkers' views on … [certain] Western philosophical questions are superior to those found in the history of Western philosophy itself" (p. 11), while at the same time "to make sure that the views I present here are indeed the Cheng brothers' views" (p. 13). In what follows, I would like to respond critically in exactly these two regards, namely by asking: (1) How far are the philosophical views presented by Huang superior views? and (2) How far can the views be taken as accurate representations of the views of the Cheng brothers? Huang examines seven philosophical questions in the book. In this comment I will only engage in a discussion of three of the issues: (1) Why be moral? (2) Is morality one or many? and (3) How is morality related to human feelings? I shall comment critically on these three issues with reference to philosophical soundness and hermeneutic accuracy. Why Be Moral? Huang offers the dual observation that "Confucianism is a learning of self-cultivation," and "the highest goal of self-cultivation is joy (le 樂)" (p. 43). If [End Page 288] such Confucian views are justified, then there is an intrinsic relation between joy and being moral. The two are not just compatible, they are also inseparable. Huang argues that "as long as one is in accord with morality, one can find joy in anything one encounters" (p. 45). It is not that there must be joy in what one encounters, but that the joy comes directly and intrinsically from being moral. So, as long as one's heart is in what is moral, one has the joy, and such joy cannot be changed. I think Huang has argued very convincingly that there is an intrinsic connection between being moral and being joyful. The question is how strong such a joy is when compared with other joys, and how strong it is as a motivation for action. It seems right to say that the immoral or amoral person cannot have real joy or complete joy, as he lacks a source of joy that comes from being moral. But this is not the same as saying that a moral person can always have a net joy in being moral, even if it is granted that alternatives other than what is moral will only bring greater pain. Even if it is true that "a Confucian sage or superior person can find it a joy to be moral" (p. 49), this does not mean that he will never find pains that can outweigh his joy. If, for example, by insisting on doing what is moral he has to see innocent people, including his family members, friends, and loved ones, being cut into pieces (say, as in the case of Fang Xiaoru, 1357–1402) while they are alive, can he still have joy? As a moral person, he will still do what is right. He will not change his mind, and maybe will not even hesitate, and will have no regrets. He may feel peaceful, calm, and undisturbed, but can he still have joy in...

Why Be Moral? Comments on Yong Huang's Book on the Cheng Brothers

Why Be Moral? Comments on Yong Huang's Book on the Cheng Brothers

Joy as a Moral Motive: A Response to Yong Huang's Why Be Moral?

Joy as a Moral Motive:A Response to Yong Huang's Why Be Moral? Justin Tiwald (bio) Introduction Yong Huang's Why Be Moral? is a splendid book and an outstanding addition to the existing comparative work on the Cheng brothers. It is insightful and refreshingly thoughtful about the particular kind of comparative philosophy it undertakes. In my response, I will raise three concerns about Huang's answer to the very question "Why Be Moral?" which is the subject of the first chapter of the book. First, I suggest that the justificatory interpretation of the question is as important as the motivational one, in general and for the Cheng brothers, and that it shouldn't be dismissed as quickly as Huang dismisses it. Second, I argue that joy cannot be the direct motive for being moral, but propose that it could be (and probably is) an indirect motive, and speculate about the particular kind of indirect motive it might be. Finally, I ask whether Huang's appeal to "being human" as a motive is better understood in the Millian way or the Aristotelian way, and suggest that Mill's approach is a better fit for the Cheng brothers. Justifying Morality Huang takes the question "why be moral?" as seeking the proper motivation, not justification, for being moral—that is, he thinks it is more usefully described as a way of asking what motivational reasons we can find for doing (or being) what we ought rather than just asking for, say, an argument or evidence that we ought to do what we ought to do. This is because the justificatory version of the question is problematic. As Huang notes, following Stephen Toulmin, there is a sense in which asking "why be [End Page 280] moral?" is either circular or absurd, because it seems that, at the end of the day, "being moral" just is doing what we ought to do (Toulmin 1964, pp. 160–162). So there is no further justification needed to show that we should do what we ought to do, just as there is no further justification needed to show that scarlet things are red (Huang 2014, p. 31). Huang acknowledges that some have found non-tautological interpretations of the question, most notably Kai Nielsen and David Copp (Huang 2014, pp. 32–133), but in a move I don't quite follow, Huang proposes that we might as well re-interpret this as a motivational question, because "the person asking the question is not a moral skeptic. She knows clearly that she should be moral but lacks the motivation to do so" (p. 33). But I don't want to give up on the justificatory version of the question so quickly. As I see it, a lot depends on what we mean by "being moral." There's a familiar sense of "being moral" according to which one is moral just in case one is doing what one ought to do all things considered—that's "being moral" in the broadest sense, which I'll call the "all things considered sense." But often in natural language we use "being good," "being moral," or "being ethical" in various narrower senses. For example, sometimes people think that being moral is necessarily other-regarding. According to this view, if I'm stranded on a desert island and deciding between moping about it or finding ways to entertain myself, that's a question about what I ought to do, but not a "moral" question. It's not morally right or morally better to entertain oneself than to bemoan one's fate—it's just more prudent (or something). Then there are the variety of senses of morality that Bernard Williams explicates so well when he talks about the "peculiar institution" of morality, or the sense of morality assumed by Susan Wolf when she argues against moral sainthood, according to which certain types of ethical norms like moral obligations always trump the norms required for a fuller and more well-rounded life.1 Or there is Zhu Xi's construal of "being good" (shan 善) when he complains about the Buddhist tendency to praise as "good" things like venerating religious objects or maintaining a Buddhist...

Why Be Moral: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers

In the monograph under review, Yong Huang constructs a timely and innovative intervention in contemporary philosophical ethics. This text is self-consciously philosophical and does not approach Neo...

“Evaluating the Four Books” (四書評)

The article is devoted to the problem of authorship of Evaluating the Four Books (Sishu ping 四書評), presenting a review of academic discussion that took place in Chinese historiography in 20th century and providing some new ideas as the continuation of this discussion in order to solve the problem. Evaluating the Four Books is often considered to be the work of Li Zhi (李贄, 1527–1602), who is famous for his original ideas and critical attitude toward neo-confucianism in the interpretation of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers. Li Zhi died in jail, where he was put in accordance to the order of emperor Shenzong (Era name Wanli 1572–1620), and his death attracted a lot of attention by late Ming educated people. Against the background of Li Zhi’s increased popularity, a lot of book sellers signed books with his name for commercial purposes, while in fact these books were not written by Li Zhi. We suppose that Evaluating the Four Books belongs to such type of works and give some argument for the point that it is a fabrication made by Ye Zhou (葉晝, ?–1625), a late Ming scholar who is also generally considered to be the true author of commentaries to classical Chinese novels e.g. “Water Margin”, “Romance of Three Kingdoms” and “Journey to the West”, also signed with the name of Li Zhi.

Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers by Yong Huang

Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers by Yong Huang

Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi by Joseph A. Adler (review)

BOOK REVIEWS JOSEPH A. ADLER, Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi. SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2014. x, 331 pp. US$95 (hb). ISBN 978-1-4384-5157-2 Joseph A. Adler’s contribution to Confucian studies aims to clarify the problematic relationship that unites Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) with Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017– 1073). Indeed, why did Zhu Xi choose a minor figure with Daoist connections as the founder of “Neo-Confucianism”? In order to clarify this “appropriation” from one thinker to another, Adler proposes an answer in two parts (argumentation and translations ), divided into eight chapters. The introduction, especially useful to non-specialist readers, recounts the emergence of Song Confucianism and its masters. Unsatisfied with the conventional philosophical explanation for Zhu Xi’s choice of Zhou Dunyi, Adler argues that one must inquire into Zhu Xi’s life and religious practice to understand his thought. Through a well-justified explanation of Confucianism as a religious tradition, Adler asserts that Zhu Xi’s articulation of the difference between belief and action is fundamental to explain “the peculiar shape taken by the Cheng-Zhu school” (p. 7) and, therefore, to analyze the issue of the succession of the Way or daotong 道統. Through the exposition of biographical, historical, and political elements (chapter 1), Adler shows that Zhu Xi’s vision of the Dao 道 is grounded in the differentiation between Buddhist (Chan) and Confucian metaphysical interpretations, as well as in their concrete applications within society. Zhu Xi aims to find the way to cultivate oneself and to practice the Confucian Dao at a governmental level. Regarding the transmission of the Dao, Adler examines its discontinuous structure through the figures of Confucius, Mencius, Han Yu 韓愈, and the Cheng brothers 二程. He then turns to Zhou Dunyi’s life, and to Hu Hong’s 胡宏 (1105–1155) first assertion that Zhou was the one who carried on the Confucian lineage (see Zhu Xi’s Preface to Master Zhou’s Tongshu, translated by Adler on pp. 32–34). For his part, Zhu Xi discovered Zhou Dunyi’s writings in 1152, but only developed a true interest for his thought under the leadership of his teacher, Li Tong 李侗 (1093–1163), beginning in the 1160s. In chapter 2, Adler pertinently considers Zhu Xi’s discursive strategy and campaign with Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133–1180), through pilgrimages and commemorations (some of which are translated by Adler), to establish Zhou Dunyi’s legitimacy. For Zhu Xi, the parallels between the figures of Fuxi 伏羲 and Zhou Dunyi as well as their expressive styles (trigrams and diagram) prove that Confucianism is the sole authentic Dao, and that only these two sages received it directly from Heaven. Thanks to Zhu Xi’s disciples, the idea of Zhou Dunyi being the first sage of the Song dynasty had become orthodox by the Yuan dynasty (1259–1368). Journal of Chinese Religions, 43. 2, 194–219, November 2015© Society for the Study of Chinese Religions 2015 DOI 10.1179/0737769X15Z.00000000024 But Adler points out that this “scenario” has weaknesses, since Zhu Xi’s 1190 prefaces to the Daxue 大學 and to the Zhongyong 中庸 clearly omit Zhou Dunyi in the transmission of the Way to the benefit of Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085). To solve this contradiction, Adler argues that, in this case, Zhu Xi does not consider the transmission of the Way in general, but only the transmission of these two texts in particular that are further linked to the Cheng brothers’ concerns. One may reply that the issue of authenticity or cheng 誠 is nevertheless fundamental to these two texts and to Zhou Dunyi’s Penetrating the Scripture of Change (Tongshu 通書). For Adler, Zhu Xi’s choice in favor of Zhou Dunyi is a reevaluation of his opinion, and he detects three types of issues—sectarian, philosophical, and historical —that would explain the difficulty of including Zhou Dunyi within the Learning of the Way or daoxue 道學. In chapter 3, Adler considers a central issue of Zhu Xi’s thought, that of unexpressed (weifa 未發) and expressed (yifa 已發) heart-mind (xin 心). He shows that Zhou Dunyi’s concept of “interpenetration of activity and stillness” (jing 靜 dong 動) is the key to the...

Drifting among Rivers and Lakes: Southern Song Dynasty Poetry and the Problem of Literary History by Michael A. Fuller

Reviewed by: Drifting among Rivers and Lakes: Southern Song Dynasty Poetry and the Problem of Literary History by Michael A. Fuller Hilde De Weerdt Drifting among Rivers and Lakes: Southern Song Dynasty Poetry and the Problem of Literary History by Michael A. Fuller. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013. Pp. xi + 526. $59.95. Drifting among Rivers and Lakes is no ordinary book; it is no ordinary literary history either. It accomplishes three things at once. First, it offers an overview of the major poets and developments in poetic practice during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Second, it anchors this overview in a broader consideration of how understandings of literary practice and the structures of aesthetic experience were changing between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Finally, this second and central aspect of Fuller’s work also leads to a new model of literary history. In its contextualization of the literary in larger political, social, and cultural processes, the model may appear reminiscent of literary theory after the cultural turn and New Historicism. However, in seeking to ground literary theory in permanent problems relating to human experience, the model also seeks to integrate European and Chinese philosophies of aesthetics. There are several substantial Chinese-language surveys of Song-period literature in general and poetry in particular, but no such work exists in English. In some ways, Fuller’s contribution to The Cambridge History of Chinese Literature foreshadows the more extensive account in Drifting among Rivers and Lakes.1 In that earlier work, Fuller had already begun to tackle the question of how the development of the Neo-Confucian movement of the Learning of the Way [End Page 471] (Daoxue 道學) reshaped writing by challenging the basic assumptions on which literary and poetic practice rested. In Drifting among Rivers and Lakes, Fuller traces the gradual and multifaceted transformations of poetic practice and discourse during the two centuries when the Learning of the Way moved from the periphery to the center of literati life. In so doing, Fuller offers the best account yet of Southern Song poetry. Some of the poets who play a central role in this account are well known (Yang Wanli 楊萬里, Lu You 陸游, Liu Kezhuang 劉克莊, and Wen Tianxiang 文天祥, for example). Traditional surveys accord some space to these figures and represent them as patriotic heroes or average talents in a period that holds little interest for those focused on the traditional genres of Chinese poetry ascendant during the great age of Tang and Northern Song poetry. In contrast to such standard accounts, Fuller’s work contextualizes the work and literary criticism of these poets (and others now forgotten but well known at the time) and explains how poets, both individually and collectively developed and adapted new understandings of poetic practice. In the first chapters, it becomes evident that the Song reconfiguration of the relationships between language, experience, and meaning does not in fact derive from the purported Learning of the Way founders (the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai 張載, Shao Yong 邵雍, and Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤). The much broader reorientation toward the self and moral cultivation that took place during the eleventh century set the stage for a thorough rethinking of how poets and poetry expressed meaning and activated aesthetic structures. Scholars from the twelfth century onward have recognized and affirmed the central role of Huang Tingjian 黃庭堅 in this transformation of poetic practice. Fuller explains that, in contrast to his more illustrious contemporary Su Shi 蘇軾, Huang Tingjian broke away from the traditional concept of poetic practice as an irrepressible expression of the human response to all sorts of phenomena in the world. Despite sharing the traditional cultural notion that the natural and the human world are coherent and share patterns, Huang Tingjian nevertheless reoriented poetic response away from phenomenal experience and toward texts. The Chinese textual tradition recorded human responses and moral commitments, contained authoritative insights into human nature, and thus provided for attentive readers the opportunity to discover internally the moral order of the phenomenal and human realms— [End Page 472] a moral order whose discovery depended upon aesthetic experience through the reading of texts. The question that Huang Tingjian and his contemporaries left for twelfth-century literati was how the textual...

Gewu 格物, Zhizhi 致知, and Xiongli 窮理 in the Cheng Learning (Cheng Xue 程學) Tradition – The Interpretations of the Four Representative Direct Disciples of the Cheng Brothers and the Significance of Zhu Xi’s Reinterpretation

Gewu 格物, Zhizhi 致知, and Xiongli 窮理 in the Cheng Learning (Cheng Xue 程學) Tradition – The Interpretations of the Four Representative Direct Disciples of the Cheng Brothers and the Significance of Zhu Xi’s Reinterpretation

Between Mind and Trace — A Research into the Theories on Xin 心 (Mind) of Early Song Confucianism and Buddhism

From Han Yu’s yuan Dao 原道 (retracing the Dao) to Ouyang Xiu’s lun ben 论本 (discussing the root), the conflicts arising from Confucianists’ rejection of Buddhism were focused on one point, namely, the examination of zhongxin suo shou 中心所守 (something kept in mind). The attitude towards the distinction between mind and trace, and the proper approach to erase the gap between emptiness and being, as well as that between the expedient and the true, became the major concerns unavoidable for various thinkers to integrate the two teachings and to propel academic development. “To understand by mind” and “to blame for matter” were of crucial methodological significance for transcendence in both Confucianism and Buddhism. The arguments of Confucian scholars like Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers on the identity of mind and trace and the unity of void and solid are mutually manifested. The same mind with the same principle means “mind is principle.” The “common axis of Confucianism and Buddhism” exists in the emphasis on mind beyond trace. The unification of mind and trace or the accordance of body and function has actually become the cardinal foundation for the possible mergence of the Three Teachings.

Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy ed. by John Makeham (review)

Book Reviews 125 argues that the Liezi places the relationship between life and death in the more general context of a universal evolutionary framework, which distinguishes it as an exceptional Daoist text. He proceeds with a comparison of a single passage from Liezi with the opening of the Zhuangzi, and the reader readily sees his point about the clarity with which the former text discusses the role of humans in the evolutionary process. But the comparison stops there, and Jones oddly does not compare some of the interesting evolutionary sections of the Zhuangzi with similar sections of the Liezi text. So, as with Cline’s comparative fallacy, Jones’ point about the exceptionalness of Liezi, while intriguing, fails to convince fully. These brief, specific points about each article in no way do justice to the richness and complexity of most of the chapters in this volume. As a whole, Riding the Wind with Liezi offers engaging and interesting analyses by specialists in philosophy, religion, and Chinese culture. Anyone who is interested in Daoism, the early medieval period in China, and the Liezi text will benefit from reading these chapters, which will no doubt spur even more debate on this neglected text. ERICA BRINDLEY, Pennsylvania State University Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy Edited by JOHN MAKEHAM. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010. xliii, 488 pages. ISBN 978-90-481-2929-4. €181.25 hardcover. The Dao Companion is a compendium of recent scholarly, philosophic studies on NeoConfucian thinkers from the northern Song to the early Qing. Editor John Makeham called upon specialists from several lands to prepare this book. The contents consist of the editor’s “Introduction” and studies mostly on one or two thinkers, including a brief biography, an intellectual overview, and a thematic philosophical inquiry, respectively. The “Introduction” gives an incisive survey of current issues in Neo-Confucian studies, a sketch of key terminology, a critical reflection on philosophic thought and historical circumstance, and a preview of each contribution. I had expected a book of this magnitude to cover several significant but usually neglected schools of Neo-Confucian thought, which, to a limited extent, it does. For example, it covers the Hu Hong 胡宏 (1105-1161), Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133-1180) school but leaves out the rival Yang Shi 楊時 (1053-1135), Luo Congyan 羅從彥 (1073-1135), Li Tong 李侗 (1093-1163) school; both of these Song schools were necessary to Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130-1200) evolving 126 Journal of Chinese Religions synthesis. Also, Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 (1092-1159), a later follower of the Cheng brothers who interacted with Buddhists, and Zhu’s intellectual rival Chen Liang 陳亮 (1143-1194), an institutional and utilitarian thinker, are not covered. Neglected also are the crucial transitional Ming figures Chan Baisha 陳白沙 (1428-1500) and Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水 (1466-1560), as well as Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 (1472–1529) follower Wang Longxi 王龍溪 (1498-1583) who worked out a subtle Confucian-Buddhist synthesis. As to the contributions themselves, their excellence in scholarship and philosophic reflection is impressive indeed. The earlier pieces are relatively scholarly and the latter ones more philosophical, which is reasonable since the earlier thinkers set forth the lexicon and laid down the intellectual foundation of the movement while the later thinkers reflected critically on those earlier teachings. Overall, the contributions resonate around the two monumental figures, Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-1529), who warrant two studies each. Among the earlier contributions, Hoyt C. Tillman and Christian Soffel’s study of Zhang Shi, an intellectual friend and correspondent of Zhu Xi, is an excellent example of original, in-depth scholarship. On the basis of a newly discovered Zhang Shi text, free of Zhu Xi’s editing, Tillman and Soffel reveal the distinctiveness and originality of Zhang Shi’s thought by distinguishing his from Zhu’s usages of key Neo-Confucian terms, such as human nature, heart/mind, humaneness, supreme ultimate, and self-cultivation. John Berthrong’s and Kwong-loi Shun’s offerings on Zhu Xi initiate the shift in emphasis from scholarship to philosophy. Berthrong celebrates the grandeur of Zhu’s li-qi 理氣 architectonic, modulated by the supreme ultimate, taiji 太極, while Shun painstakingly analyzes Zhu’s ethical theory. Kai Marchal discusses the neglected but important syncretic thinker, Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (11371181 ), a...

Taking on Proper Appearance and Putting It into Practice: Two Different Systems of Effort in Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism

Both “jianxing” 践形 (taking on proper appearance) and “jianxing” 践行 (putting into practice) were concepts coined by Confucians before the Qin Dynasty. They largely referred to similar things. But because the “Daxue” 大学 (“Great Learning”) was listed as one of the Sishu 四书 (The Four Books) during the Song Dynasty, different explanations and trends in terms of the “Great Learning” resulted in “taking on proper appearance” and “putting into practice” becoming two different systems of efforts. The former formed a vertical kind of representation and a complete system of practice by “developing the sincerity of intentions inside and taking on proper appearance and looks outside” in “shendu” 慎独 (self-discipline when alone) and “chengyi” 诚意 (developing the sincerity of intentions), and the latter developed into a horizontal system of practice through the interdependency of zhi 知 (knowing or knowledge) and xing 行 (doing or practice). The “interdependence between knowledge and practice” promoted by the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi represented the vertical practice of moral understanding, while the “integration of knowing and doing” advocated by Wang Yangming represented using the way in “developing the sincerity of intentions” to adjust and transform the representation of the relationship between knowledge and practice. The ideas that were frequently stressed, such as “the same effort” and “naturally being so,” were all from “developing the sincerity of intentions” and “taking on proper appearance,” and they were all the representation of “really making intentions sincere.” In fact, the confusion over “the integration of knowing and doing” reflected the tension between two different systems and inconsistency in their thoughts.

The formation, development and evolution of Neo-Confucianism — With a focus on the doctrine of “stilling the nature” in the Song period

The formation of the discourse of Neo-Confucianism1 in the Song period was a result of the interactions between many social and cultural trends. In the development of the Neo-Confucian discourse, the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi) played key roles with their charismatic thoughts and impelling personalities, while Zhu Xi pushed Neo-Confucian thought and discourse to a pinnacle with his broad knowledge and precise reasoning. In the warm discussions and debates between different schools and thoughts, the Neo-Confucian discourse proceeded towards completion and perfection, and evolved as contemporary topics and thinking modes changed. The essay argues that “ding xing 定性 (stilling the nature)” was an important Neo-Confucian topic during the Song period. The doctrine of “stilling the nature” involves much central Neo-Confucian discourse such as the definition of xing 性 (human nature), the interior and exterior aspects of human nature, nature and qing 情 (feelings, sentiments), nature and xin 心 (mind, heart), nature and ren 仁 (benevolence, humanity, humaneness) and yi 义 (righteousness), nature and shi 事 (affair) or wu 物 (thing, object), the practice of preservation and cultivation, etc. Therefore, an examination of the formation, development and evolution of Neo-Confucianism is of great importance to the study of its early history.

Morally Bad in the Philosophy of the Cheng Brothers

Morally Bad in the Philosophy of the Cheng Brothers

“WHY BE MORAL?” The Cheng Brothers' Neo‐Confucian Answer

ABSTRACTIn this article, I present a neo‐Confucian answer, by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” I argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition. According to the Chengs, one should be moral because it is a joy to perform moral actions. Sometimes one finds it a pain, instead of a joy, to perform moral actions only because one lacks the necessary genuine moral knowledge—knowledge that is accessible to every common person as long as one makes the effort to learn. One should make the effort to learn such knowledge—to seek joy in performing moral actions—because to be moral is a distinguishing mark of being human. This neo‐Confucian answer seems to be egoistic, as its conception of motivation for morality is based on self‐interest: to seek one's own joy. However, since it emphasizes that one's true self‐interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human, which is to be moral, self‐interest and morality become identical; the more a person seeks one's self‐interest, the more moral the person is, and vice versa.

Neo-Confucian Hermeneutics at Work:Cheng Yi's Philosophical Interpretation of Analects 8.9 and 17.3

In this article, I discuss the Song 宋 Neo-Confucian Cheng Yi's 程頤 (1033–1107) interpretation of two related controversial passages in the Analects, the recorded sayings of Confucius. The term “neo-Confucianism” was coined by Western scholars to refer to the Confucianism of the period from the Song dynasty to the Ming 明 dynasty (and sometimes through the Qing 清 dynasty). Among Chinese scholars, neo-Confucianism is most commonly referred to as the Learning of Principle (li xue 理學). Although before Cheng Yi and his brother Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) there were three other philosophers who are normally also regarded as neo-Confucians— Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077), Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), and Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077)—we can justifiably regard the Cheng brothers as the real founders of neo-Confucianism in the sense that principle becomes the essential philosophical concept for the first time in their works. There is no consensus among scholars as to the relationship between the philosophies of these two brothers. The traditional view regards them as substantially different due to the two different schools of neo-Confucianism that developed from their teachings, the realistic school synthesized by Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) from the teachings of Cheng Yi and the idealist school culminating in Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) from the teachings of ChengHao. I, however, tend to think that the philosophical positions of the two brothers are largely similar. Unfortunately, since Cheng Hao did not live as long as Cheng Yi, there is insufficient material to create a systematic picture of his view of the Analects passages with which this article will deal.