Channel Tunnel Project Research Articles

The Channel Tunnel: A case study of financing and governance after 25 and 125 years

This paper juxtaposes the Channel Tunnel project of the 1880s with the Eurotunnel project 100 years later to reveal issues affecting the financing and governance of large, complex infrastructure projects. The paper concludes by attempting to derive lessons affecting the operation of public-private partnerships and to measure the Tunnel’s success.

Digging beneath the iron triangle: the Chunnel with 2020 hindsight

The Channel Tunnel project (the Chunnel) to connect the UK and France was the largest privately financed transport megaproject of the 20th century. Despite nearly 25 years of successful operation and growing profitability, the Chunnel is frequently portrayed as a failure. Some authors even suggest that it should never have been built. If one looks beyond the so-called ‘iron triangle’ criteria of keeping to time, cost and scope, and the project’s early financial troubles, reality looks rather different. This paper takes a holistic, multi-disciplinary, multi-stakeholder long run perspective to dig beneath the iron triangle to argue that the Chunnel was not just an extremely successful megaproject that has delivered real economic benefits, but also an important agent of change. The Chunnel made a significant contribution to modernising Europe’s transport infrastructure on its journey towards sustainability and in improving knowledge about how to deliver privately financed megaprojects through public-private partnerships. With perfect 2020 hindsight on demand risks and cost overruns, a public sector investment subsidy of around 50% of the capital costs would have been required to make the project financially attractive to private investors, whilst generating an economic rate of return over the life of the concession estimated between 3 and 6%.

英仏海峡トンネルプロジェクトにおける全体最適化の実現( 大規模プロジェクトのマネジメント( 大規模プロジェクトのマネジメント)

英仏海峡トンネルプロジェクトにおける全体最適化の実現( 大規模プロジェクトのマネジメント( 大規模プロジェクトのマネジメント)

A-13 英仏海峡トンネルプロジェクトにおける全体最適化の実現 : プロジェクトマネジメントの真髄'全体最適化'実現の事例

A-13 英仏海峡トンネルプロジェクトにおける全体最適化の実現 : プロジェクトマネジメントの真髄'全体最適化'実現の事例

The Chunnel in History: Breakthrough or Continuity?

This paper places the Channel tunnel project (the Chunnel) in a historical context of privately financed transportation mega-projects. We examine the extent to which the Chunnel represents a break or continuity with the past by looking at the technological, financial and intuitional dimensions of innovation compared to previous projects. We also analyse the project’s economics from a long run perspective. Although rightly hailed as an engineering triumph, the Chunnel’s main innovation was in the scale and form of private financing. Rather than being something completely new, we argue that this was a reinvention of financing techniques commonly used in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The project’s failings in terms of cost overruns, delays and over-optimistic demand forecasts certainly represent continuity with the past. In contrast to previous authors, we argue that the Chunnel should be portrayed as both a financial and economic success story. To support this case, we present a new simplified economic analysis suggesting a 3% to 6% return over the very long term. The Chunnel’s place in history is assured, but its long term legacy and continued relevance will depend in part on how well we learn lessons for delivering the trans-European networks of the future.

TUNNEL CHANNEL PROJECT VERSUS 3rd BRIDGE PROJECT OVER THE BOSPHORUS STRAIT

This project deals with the problems of landroad dominated transportation system in Istanbul , and compares the social costs and benefits of Channel Tunnel (tube) and 3rd Bridge Projets respectively. Although , cost-benefit analysis of both projects proves that , the Channel Tunnel Project is indispensible with regard to principles of public economy. But , this project has been postponed , since big business successfully exerted heavy influence over the politicians in favour of 3rd Bridge Project over the Bosphoros . The Channel Tunnel Project not only generates positive external economies in the forms of decreasing death toll and pollutions , saving the foresty areas ; and reducing the petroleum consumption etc , but it also helps to connect the high speed train projects of EC countries to East Asia. For this reason , this project should be considered as an international public goods benefiting many countr i es and calls for contribution of nations be financed collectively. On the other hand , extension of Tunnel Project through high speed trains to Antalya , Urfa via Ankara and Trabzon will also contribute to the establishment of i nfrastructure of Turkish economy by encouraging tourism and industry .

Opposition to the Channel Tunnel, 1882–1975: Identity, Island Status and Security

AbstractThis article will discuss the defence arguments that were used to oppose the channel tunnel, the relationship between these arguments and Britain's island status, the perceptions of British insularity, together with how and possibly why these changed in the period 1882–1975. The opposition to the Channel Tunnel project, especially in the period 1880 to 1945, can provide historians with a valuable insight into the British relationship with the sea. In particular, the opposition to a channel tunnel provides a way of analysing concepts of island status within Britain and what being an island meant to the British sense of self and identity, as they were expressed in the media as well as in official papers. At the same time, the changing attitudes to a channel tunnel, notably in the inter‐war period and the post‐1945 era, also show how the British understanding of what being an island state gave them in terms of security and identity changed. Such a change was as a result of new or improving technologies, particularly the aircraft, and the resulting impact it had on conceptions of security that being an island provided.

Impacts of construction events on the project equity value of the Channel Tunnel project

With the growing strains on public resources, many governments in recent years have turned to the private sector for infrastructure project financing. The special purpose vehicles (SPVs) taking on such projects usually have a two-stage business model: a construction stage followed by an operating stage. However, the project risk in stage 1 is very high, and in most cases, the impacts of specific construction events on project risk and capital cost are unobservable owing to lack of informational transparency. Eurotunnel (the Channel Tunnel project) is unique in that the share price data for the entire construction period are publicly available. Based on event study methodology, empirical tests were conducted for several well-documented Eurotunnel construction events to measure and assess the project risk and the impacts of such events on the SPV’s equity value. The test results show that: (1) during the construction stage, efforts to better manage the interests and incentives of contractors produce more significant positive impact on investors than efforts for cost containment; (2) during the construction stage, meeting the project deadline is a higher investor priority than containing construction cost; and (3) once the construction phase is complete, the investors’ priority then becomes the overall cost and the impact of construction events on the expected returns from investment. Finally, the level of risk and the potential conflicts of interest that arise during the construction phase of a mega infrastructure project are such that turning to IPOs to provide equity capital may not be appropriate.

The hold-up problem in the management of construction projects: A case study of the Channel Tunnel

The hold-up problem in the presence of asset specificity poses great transaction hazards. Therefore, having a sound understanding of this problem is an important managerial issue. The purpose of this research is to apply the perspective of transaction cost economics (TCE) to the analysis of three major disputes that arose in the Channel Tunnel project during 1988–94. A special form of asset specificity is identified for construction projects: process specificity. This yields additional insights into the root causes of the hold-up problem. Three parameters, including ungovernable uncertainty, degree of lock-in and amount of money under dispute, are identified. It is shown that the observed connection between bargaining power as specified by this TCE model and the outcomes of dispute resolution is in line with the theoretical predictions. The lesson learnt from this project is that clients should not stretch the protective strength of a lump-sum contract too far and that the hold-up problem can indeed in some circumstances be regarded as both serious and unsolved by existing administrative structures and governance.

Images and economic development in the cross-Channel Euroregion

ABSTRACTThe 1990s saw the proliferation of trans-frontier partnerships between European regions and the designation of a number of so-called Euroregions. The cross-Channel Euroregion was created in 1991 as a partnership between Kent, Nord-Pas-de-Calais (France) and the Belgian regions of Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. The Euroregion partners hoped that closer collaboration would allow a more coordinated response to the opportunities presented by the Channel Tunnel project and would also enable the region to confront its economic problems more effectively. Despite its central location at the West European scale, parts of the Euroregion have underperformed and economic recovery has been impaired by the negative external image which blights certain sub-regions. However, although its internal borders have become more permeable, the Euroregion has failed to develop as a coherent economic or political entity and its weaker sub-regions have gained least from the Channel Tunnel project and the associated improvements to the transport infrastructure.

Holywell Coombe, Folkestone: A 13,000 year history of an English Chalkland Valley

Holywell Coombe is a valley cut into the scarp-face of the North Downs Chalk cuesta, near Folkestone, Kent. Its geological importance stems from a highly fossiliferous sequence of Lateglacial and Holocene deposits that line the valley floor. These have yielded a molluscan succession of particular importance, providing a record of environmental change throughout the past 13,000 radiocarbon years. Waterlogging of the basal deposits has prevented oxidation, leading to the preservation of a range of organic fossils, such as plant and insect remains, that normally do not survive in calcareous environments. This enables linkage between faunal and vegetational records, allowing the differential rates of response of particular groups to be critically compared. The importance of the site was revealed in 1968 in trial pits connected with an aborted Channel Tunnel project. Resurrection of plans to build a tunnel led in 1987 to major ‘rescue’ excavations and multidisciplinary investigations, the results of which are reviewed here. A three-dimensional picture of the valley infill was established from a network of 180 boreholes. Critical parts of the sequence were investigated in specially excavated trenches and sections exposed during construction of the tunnel. Systematic sampling at a number of locations within the valley provided a palaeontological record from the full stratigraphical succession. A number of Lateglacial and Holocene soils were found to be represented in the sequence, including that formed during the Allerød phase of the Lateglacial interstadial. The molluscan zonation scheme previously defined at Holywell Coombe, and applicable over large areas of southern Britain and possibly further afield, has been refined and dated with greater precision. The Lateglacial sequence has been extended back to the early part of the Lateglacial interstadial by this study and the site chronology is now underpinned by over 35 new radiocarbon dates. Quantitative palaeoclimatic reconstructions from beetle remains, using the Mutual Climatic Range method, cover the period between 13,000 and 9000 yr BP. The earliest sediments, marsh deposits with thermophilous insect taxa and a species-poor molluscan assemblage, date from around 13,000–12,000 yr BP. Just before the end of this period, changes in beetle faunas record climatic cooling, heralding slope instability and the accumulation of thick colluvial deposits. By 11,500 yr BP the climate had stabilized and slope movement had ceased, allowing the formation of the ‘Allerød soil’. There followed a major deterioration to the arctic climate of the Younger Dryas, during which renewed erosion from the valley sides brought further material onto its floor, burying and sealing the earlier sediments. The beginning of the Holocene saw the onset of tufa formation around two dominant springs in the upper valley. There was progressive development of forest, hazel-dominated woodland being established by 9500 yr BP. There is some evidence for thinning of the forest canopy during the late Mesolithic and Neolithic, but the major clearance occurred during the Early Bronze Age, causing renewed instability on slopes and consequent hillwash accumulation. This final depositional phase continued, with pauses marked by soil formation in the Early Bronze Age and the Iron Age, to the present day. The hillwash seals structures relating to prehistoric human activity, including plough-marks, and contains an extensive sequence of artefacts.

BRITISH RAIL'S CHANNEL TUNNEL (1993) PROJECT: OVERVIEW AND MANAGEMENT.

This paper describes the main implementation phase of the Channel Tunnel (1993) Project as developed by British Rail to establish passenger and freight services through the Channel Tunnel and connect the national railway systems of Britain and France in accordance with the obligations of the Channel Tunnel Act (1987). It covers the establishment of the integrated private industry/public utility management team, describes the discrete schemes of the £1700 million project and reports the various components of the project management plan and its execution, progression, monitoring and success.

Culture and Organization: The Case of Transmanche‐Link

The relationship between culture and organization has often been discussed, but rarely explored directly. This paper implements a cultural values instrument taken from Hofstede together with a behavioural instrument derived from Van de Ven to matched samples of British and French managers working on the Channel Tunnel project. The results largely replicate the findings of Hofstede regarding cultural values, but do not support the predicted implications for behaviour. In essence, the British were found to be more bureaucratic and more team‐oriented than their French counterparts, who tended to be more fonceur and competitive. This indicates that the relationship between culture and behaviour might be more complicated than research to date suggests.

Managing large-scale technology and inter-organizational relations: The case of the Channel Tunnel

This paper provides an analysis of the difficulties affecting the development of the Channel Tunnel fixed link. The study draws upon relevant concepts and concerns located in the disciplines of technology policy, decision theory and project management. It evaluates the inflexibility (and non-incrementality) of the Channel Tunnel project in terms of capital intensity, unit size, dependence upon specialized infrastructure and lead time. Hitherto, research has provided support for the hypothesis that technological projects characterized by the aforementioned factors will be unusually painful to develop, with adverse implications for their performance in operation. Studies of this type have analysed, amongst other subjects, the development of nuclear power and first generation North Sea oil fields: cases which contravene the prescriptions of incrementalism. Another aspect of the paper investigates the claim, also supported by previous research, that inflexible technology projects are promoted by centralized decision-making processes to the exclusion of legitimate stakeholders. A more flexible, incremental approach, on the other hand, would emphasize the mutual adjustment and coordination of various stakeholders. The theme of the paper referred to here relates to the implications of centralized decision making early in the life of large-scale projects for subsequent inter-organizational conflict and the lack of the partnering or mutual approach that is widely accepted as being a key factor in the effective management of such projects. The research benefits from interviews with key participants in the Channel Tunnel project as well as from a wealth of secondary data. Conclusions drawn refer to the whether the findings of the research support or refute the incremental thesis and whether more flexible alternative options were available to decision makers.

Modeling for Litigation: Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches

A contractor to the channel tunnel project instigated litigation to claim for the costs of disruption and delay. We used several interacting models to make the case for the claim more persuasive, coherent, and verifiable. Mixing qualitative modeling (large cognitive maps) with influence models and with system dynamics simulation modeling improved the quality of the claim. Quality, in this case, being that the modeling process was understandable to the client to the extent that it could argue the claim in court, that every aspect was expected to be transparent to the judge, and that it was robust and defensible management science. Cycling between modeling approaches gave benefits that could not have been attained by either hard or soft modeling in isolation. The claim ultimately was settled satisfactorily out of court with the client acknowledging that the modeling played a significant role.

IMAGE VERSUS REALITY - CHANNEL TUNNEL IMAGE MANAGEMENT.

Keywords GOVERNMENT OF BERMUDA, MAUNSELL, KENNEDY & DONKIN TUNNELS, CHANNEL TUNNEL, MANAGEMENT, IMAGES, PROJECTS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, OPINIONS, COMMUNICATIONS TRANSMANCHE LINK CHANNEL TUNNEL UK, FRANCE... Show All

The Channel Tunnel: A Geographical Perspective

The Channel Tunnel Project - Origins and Development The Development of High-Speed Rail Passenger Services in Europe Passenger Transport and the Channel Tunnel Tourism and the Channel Tunnel The Channel Tunnel - Industrial Location and Peripherality The Implications of the Channel Tunnel for Freight Environmental Implications of the Channel Tunnel The Regional Economic Impact of the Channel Tunnel The High-Speed Rail Link - Planning and Development Implications Anglo-French Co-Operation - the Effect of the Channel Tunnel Transport Policy and the Channel Tunnel - UK, French and European Perspectives.

DESIGN AND BUILD - LESSONS FROM THE UK CHANNEL TUNNEL TERMINAL.

The 10 billion pound Channel Tunnel project was procured by Eurotunnel under one of the world's largest and fastest design and build contracts. The main contractor - Transmanche Link - had to cope with constantly changing operational, cost and quality requirements and yet still deliver an acceptable standard of design. This problem was particularly acute at the environmentally sensitive UK terminal site, where more than 17 professional disciplines were involved. This paper records some of the design and management issues raised by the scale, process and pace of the project and concludes with a series of recommendations for major design and build projects of the future. (A)

The Channel Tunnel project: Challenge and rewards

The Channel Tunnel project: Challenge and rewards

The Channel Tunnel: The dream becomes reality

The Channel Tunnel project is outlined briefly from conception to completion with particular reference to work on the French side. The scope of the contract and companies involved are listed. Statistics are listed concerning earthmoving volumes, personnel invlolved, length of tunnels, tunnelling machines and cable lengths. the geology and choice of tunnelling machines are noted. Techniques adopted for construction on the French side are discussed. Special works are described including piston relief ducts, communication passages, pumping stations and railway crossovers. Other topics briefly outlined include the large terminal buildings required at each end of the tunnel and the recruitment and training of the labour force.