Channel Coordination Mechanism Research Articles

Modelling Subsidy as a Cooperative Advertising Channel Coordination Mechanism

This work considers the use of subsidy as channel coordination strategy in vertical cooperative advertising in which the manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader and the retailer is the follower. While the retailer is directly involved in advertising, the manufacturer is indirectly involved through the provision of subsidy to aid the retailer in advertising the product. The work models the demand function using a multiplicative advertising-price-demand function, and obtains the players’ prices, the retail advertising effort, the manufacturer’s subsidy rate and the payoffs. The work observes that with increasing subsidy, the manufacturer’s price margin increases while that of the retailer reduces and eventual becomes zero with total subsidy. However, the manufacturer should not totally subsidise retail advertising since it would be counterproductive for him, while at the same time would lead to very large retail payoff. Thus with appropriate subsidy strategy, the prices and the payoffs, and eventually the entire channel can be coordinated.
 Keywords: Channel coordination, Vertical cooperative advertising, Stackelberg game, Advertising price-demand function, Subsidy rate.

Sustainability Analysis and Buy-Back Coordination in a Fashion Supply Chain with Price Competition and Demand Uncertainty

Supply chain sustainability has become significantly important in the fashion industry, and more and more fashion brands have invested in developing sustainable supply chains. We note that dual channel system comprising a brand-owned direct channel and retail outsourcing channel is quite common in the fashion industry, and in the latter, buy-back contract is popular between brands and retailers. Therefore, we build a stylized dual channel model with price competition and demand uncertainty to characterize the main properties of a fashion supply chain. Our foci are the sustainability analysis and the channel coordination mechanism. We first design a buy-back contract with return cost to coordinate the channel. We then study supply chain sustainability and examine the effect of two key influencing factors, i.e., price competition and demand uncertainty. Interestingly, we find that a fiercer price competition will lead to a more sustainable supply chain. From the perspective of supply chain managers, we conclude that (1) if managers care about environmental sustainability, fierce price competition is not a suggested strategy; (2) if managers care about economic sustainability, fierce price competition is an advantageous strategy. We also find that high demand uncertainty results in a less sustainable supply chain, in both an environmental and economic sustainability sense.

Channel coordination with quantity discounts and/or cooperative advertising

We assess the interactive effects of two commonly used channel coordination mechanisms (quantity discounts (QDs) and cooperative advertising (CA)). We use a game-theoretic model and solve four non-cooperative games. In the first game, neither QDs nor CA is implemented. Cooperative advertising alone is offered in the second game, while quantity discounts alone are offered in the third game. In the fourth game, both QDs and CA are implemented. We obtain analytical solutions and compare equilibrium results across games to assess the effectiveness of CA (QDs) when implemented alone or jointly with QDs (CA). The main findings suggest that the profitability of each of these mechanisms is affected by whether the other is implemented or not in the channel. For example, while CA benefits the manufacturer when implemented alone, it can increase or decrease the manufacturer’s profit when added to QDs. Looking at which coordination mechanism is most effective when used alone, we find that both the manufacturer and the supply chain prefer QDs to CA. Finally, the retailer may not benefit from either one or both of these coordination mechanisms, especially if marketing efforts are not highly effective.

Store assistance and coordination of supply chains facing consumer's return

In this paper, we develop two game theoretic models of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain to study the store assistance service decision and channel coordination mechanism, where the retailer allows consumers to return mismatching product and invests on store assistance service to reduce mismatching rate. Under manufacturer Stackelberg model, we find that the players' profits increase with mismatching rate and mismatching cost if market scale is sufficiently large. We design a quantity discount-subsidy contract to coordinate the pricing and service investment behavior of the retailer and find that the coordinated unit wholesale price increases with mismatching cost and mismatching rate if both subsidy fee and service cost are sufficiently high. By comparing with the retailer Stackelberg model, we find that (i) there exists a first-mover advantage; (ii) the unit wholesale price under retailer Stackelberg is lower than that under manufacturer Stackelberg while the retail price and service level under retailer Stackelberg is higher; and (iii) the retailer's channel leadership raises product quantity if the probability of high mismatching loss is sufficiently low. We design a two-part margin-subsidy rate mechanism to coordinate the retailer Stackelberg supply chain.

Decision models of closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing under hybrid dual-channel collection

A number of factors, including environmental legislations and increasing global uncertainties, have led many companies to consider engaging in remanufacturing. In this paper, we mainly address a topical issue of choosing the appropriate reverse channel format for collecting used products from customers. We suppose a manufacturer who has three reverse hybrid collection channel structures to choose: (1) manufacturer and retailer collecting used products at the same time, (2) manufacturer contracting the collection of used products to a retailer and a third party, and (3) manufacturer and third party collecting used products at the same time. To generate managerial insights into this important issue, we develop a structural model to explore the appropriate reverse channel structure for the manufacturer. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the applicability of the presented model. The results show that, ceteris paribus, the manufacturer and the retailer hybrid collection channel is the most effective reverse channel structure for the manufacturer. We also find that, under the same conditions, the manufacturer and the retailer hybrid collection approach is obviously superior to the single channel collection approach. Finally, we explore the channel coordination mechanism to implement channel cooperation for the manufacturer and the retailer. Our results indicate that the strategic alliance between the manufacturer and the retailer can effectively achieve the desired channel coordination. Furthermore, the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the manufacturer and the retailer in the channel coordination of strategic alliance.

Channel coordination mechanism with retailers having fairness preference ---An improved quantity discount mechanism

Channel coordination is an optimal state with operation of channel. For achieving channel coordination, we present a quantity discount mechanism based on a fairness preference theory. Game models of the channel discount mechanism are constructed based on the entirely rationality and self-interest. The study shows that as long as the degree of attention (parameters) of retailer to manufacturer's profit and the fairness preference coefficients (parameters) of retailers satisfy certain conditions, channel coordination can be achieved by setting a simple wholesale price and fixed costs. We also discuss the allocation method of channel coordination profit, the allocation method ensure that retailer's profit is equal to the profit of independent decision-making, and manufacturer's profit is raised.

Simulation of a Single-Radio Multi-Channel Vehicular Node Structure for VANET in NS-2

We propose a universal single-radio multi-channel vehicle node structure (VNS) in NS-2 for VANET simulation. VNS can support different single-radio multi-channel MAC protocols, while in this paper we implement a split-phase mode MAC as channel coordination mechanism, with a three-way handshake as channel negotiation mechanism. Simulation results in sparse, dense and moving scenarios indicate that VNS is a preferable solution for simulation of VANET.

Product availability in competitive and cooperative dual-channel distribution with stock-out based substitution

Abstract This paper investigates the impact of customers’ stock-out based substitution on the product availability and the channel efficiency of a dual-channel supply chain, which consists of a supplier distributing a single product to customers through both its wholly owned direct channel and an independent retailer. The supplier and its retailer, with the objective of optimizing their own profit, simultaneously choose their own base-stock level to satisfy the stochastic demand from the customers whose channel preferences are heterogeneous and may be affected by each channel’s product availability. The customers dynamically substitute between the two channels in the event of a stock-out. The result shows that the effect of the stock-out based substitution may increase or decrease the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. It is found that while the integrated supplier–retailer may consolidate the base-stock levels to benefit from stock-out based substitution, the independent supplier and retailer are more inattentive to customers’ stock-out based substitution. Thus, the competitive base-stock levels of the decentralized dual-channel supply chain rarely agree with the system optimal levels. Various contracts are examined to shed light on channel coordination mechanisms. In addition, it is shown that the channel efficiency of the dual-channel distribution can be improved by the emergence of Stackelberg leadership from either the supplier or the retailer.

A stochastic and asymmetric-information framework for a dominant-manufacturer supply chain

Consider a dominant manufacturer wholesaling a product to a retailer, who in turn retails it to the consumers at $ p/unit. The retail-market demand volume varies with p according to a given demand curve. This basic system is commonly modeled as a manufacturer-Stackelberg ([mS]) game under a “deterministic and symmetric-information” (“det-sym-i”) framework. We first explain the logical flaws of this framework, which are (i) the dominant manufacturer-leader will have a lower profit than the retailer under an iso-elastic demand curve; (ii) in some situations the system’s “correct solution” can be hyper-sensitive to minute changes in the demand curve; (iii) applying volume discounting while keeping the original [mS] profit-maximizing objective leads to an implausible degenerate solution in which the manufacturer has dictatorial power over the channel. We then present an extension of the “stochastic and asymmetric-information” (“sto-asy-i”) framework proposed in Lau and Lau [Lau, A., Lau, H.-S., 2005. Some two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from deterministic–symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information models. European Journal of Operational Research 161 (1), 203–223], coupled with the notion that a profit-maximizing dominant manufacturer may implement not only [mS] but also “[pm]”—i.e., using a manufacturer-imposed maximum retail price. We show that this new framework resolves all the logical flaws stated above. Along the way, we also present a procedure for the dominant manufacturer to design a profit-maximizing volume-discount scheme using stochastic and asymmetric demand information. Using our sto-asy-i framework to resolve the logical flaws of the det-sym-i framework also reveals two noteworthy points: (i) the attractiveness of the perfectly legal but overlooked channel-coordination mechanism [pm]; and (ii) volume discounting as a means for the dominant manufacturer to benefit from information known only to the retailer.

CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND INVENTORY POLICY IN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

We consider a single-period distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. The supplier may have infinite or finite capacity. The demand at each retailer is random. When a stockout occurs at one retailer the customer may go to the other retailer. We study both the decentralized and centralized inventory control problems. For the decentralized problem we show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists when the capacity at the supplier is infinite. However, when the capacity is finite, only under certain conditions does the Nash equilibrium exist. For centralized inventory control we obtain the optimal allocation that maximizes the expected profit of the entire supply chain. For the case of decentralized controls we also design channel coordination mechanisms, i.e., a decentralized cost structure resulting in a Nash equilibrium with chain-wide profits equal to those achieved under a fully centralized system. We compare the performance of two retailers in the decentralized and centralized controls and analyze the impact of channel coordination on the whole supply chain.

Coordinating Supply Networks in Customized Mass Production: – A Contract-Based Approach

In the paper we discuss conflicting performance requirements in customized mass production and suggest a novel cooperative planning method for sharing information and coordinating decisions between a focal manufacturer and its suppliers. The method strives to achieve high service level and minimal expected average costs—including production, inventory and potential obsolete inventory costs. A channel coordination mechanism drives the overall system towards its right behavior even though the partners make planning and scheduling decisions autonomously. We present the mechanism and discuss its properties on simulated test cases taken from an industrial case study.

Managing Channel Profits: The Role of Managerial Incentives

The existing literature has examined how manufacturers can enhance profits by employing specific channel structures and channel coordination mechanisms. In this paper, we examine the implications of strategically designed managerial incentives for channel performance in a duopoly. We first analyze how equilibrium outcomes (especially manufacturer profits) are altered when the manufacturers provide their channel managers with strategically designed incentives. Following that, we examine how optimal channel structure decisions are altered when manufacturers provide their managers with strategic incentives, i.e., we examine how strategic incentives moderate optimal channel structure decisions. In contrast with the existing literature, we find that an asymmetric channel structure with one manufacturer employing a profit-maximizing retailer and the other integrated manufacturer providing strategic incentives for the channel manager in charge of pricing, is an equilibrium outcome under certain conditions. We then compare how the implications of strategic incentives differ from those of channel structure decisions and channel coordination initiatives, and discuss when and why strategic incentives yield superior outcomes from the manufacturer’s perspective. Our results shed light on the sparsely researched role of managerial incentives in the channel context.

Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer

The retail trade today is increasingly dominated by large, centrally managed “power retailers.” In this paper, we develop a channel model in the presence of a dominant retailer to examine how a manufacturer can best coordinate such a channel. We show that such a channel can be coordinated to the benefit of the manufacturer through either quantity discounts or a menu of two-part tariffs. Both pricing mechanisms allow the manufacturer to charge different effective prices and extract different surpluses from the two different types of retailers, even though they both have the appearance of being “fair.” However, quantity discounts and two-part tariffs are not equally efficient from the manufacturer’s perspective as a channel coordination mechanism. Therefore, the manufacturer must judiciously select its channel coordination mechanism. Our analysis also sheds light on the role of “street money” in channel coordination. We show that such a practice can arise from a manufacturer’s effort to mete out minimum incentives to engage the dominant retailer in channel coordination. From this perspective, we derive testable implications with regard to the practice of street money.

Channel Coordination Mechanisms for Customer Satisfaction

We consider two broad categories of incentives by which a manufacturer can motivate its retailers to provide high customer satisfaction: (1) manufacturer assistance that reduces the retailer's cost of providing customer satisfaction (CS assistance); and (2) customer satisfaction index (CSI) bonus. We show that if a retailer has a long-term orientation, CS assistance is a more effective coordination mechanism that induces the retailer to expend more effort at customer satisfaction. However, if the retailer has a short-term orientation, CSI bonus is a more effective coordination mechanism. We then show that a long-term oriented retailer is more valuable to a manufacturer than a short-term oriented one. Finally, we show that the use of CS incentives results in greater profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer.